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THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

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VOLUME XI.

CONTAINING THE SECOND PART OF THE WRITINGS ON CHRISTIANITY AND HEATHENISM IN POLITICS AND IN SOCIETY.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE essays in this volume on the papacy and the supremacy of the spiritual order, directed chiefly against Gallicanism and political atheism, seem to me as necessary to meet the dominant spirit and tendencies of the present time as they were when first published, some thirty years ago.

The corrections and alterations in them were made by the author about ten years ago, when preparing two essays, which will appear in the thirteenth volume, on Church and State and the Papal Infallibility. These additional essays were produced in order to carry out more fully the original design, which was left incomplete.

The essays on the papacy were not received with favor by all the members of the hierarchy, and were strongly opposed, not as unorthodox, but as inopportune, as imprudent, and likely to expose the church in this country to unnecessary odium. But since the publication of the Encyclical of Pius IX., and the Syllabus, December 8th, 1864, and the decrees of the holy Council of the Vatican defining the supremacy and infallibility of the successor of Peter in the See of Rome, they are more likely to be regarded with favor by the hierarchy than they were when first published.

The view taken in these essays of the supremacy of the spiritual order, the normal relations of church and state, and of the power exercised by the popes over temporal sovereigns in the middle ages, when there was a Christendom, was the view held by the late illustrious Bishop of Boston, whose correct theological learning and sound judgment were always of assistance to the author until his removal to New York from Boston, in October, 1855.

The same view was given the author by his own study of ecclesiastical history, and he always held it, and always regarded himself as a thorough-going papist, never what is called a liberal Catholic. If a contrary impression was at one time entertained by the Catholic public, it was not owing to any change of doctrine or opinion on his part, but to his forbearing to insist on the high-toned papal doctrine of these essays.

Dr. Brownson addressed these essays to Catholics believing it more important to labor to check the liberalism and latitudinarianism which he

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found to be spreading even among Catholics both at home and abroad, than it was to direct his efforts to the conversion of non-Catholics. He was often rebuked when he insisted on the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, and he found even dignitaries of the church "abusing the pope hypothetically in their sermons," and apparently more intent on asserting the independence of the temporal order than on defending the rights of the papacy and the supremacy of the spiritual order. He often said he could scarcely meet a Catholic layman who would not assert the total separation of church and state, that his religion had nothing to do with his politics, that he would reverence and obey his pastor so long as he remained in the sanctuary, and did not step beyond his sphere; but let him interfere in politics, even if he were the pope himself, he would resist him as he would any other man. This was in principle, simply political atheism, or the assumption that the political order is independent of the law of God; that is, that God is not sovereign in the state, that for the state there is no God. Hence he found Catholics at home and abroad sympathizing with the revolutions of 1848 and praying for their success, though those revolutions, republican in name, were led on by infidels and were aimed less at the overthrow of monarchy than the destruction of the papacy and the church.

This political atheism among Catholics can be traced to the prevalence of Gallicanism, or of the spirit that dictated the four articles adopted by the assembly of the Gallican clergy by order of the king in 1682. Those articles emancipated kings and princes from the power of the keys, declared their independence in temporals, placed the temporal order on the same plane with the spiritual, and made the state independent of the church, and free to pursue its own policy in defiance of her remonstrance. This could be true only on the Manichean doctrine of two eternal principles, or on the supposition that there is no God but Cæsar in the political order.

To meet this doctrine of the independence of the temporal order he saw no other way than that of asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, which means only the sovereignty of God, and of the pope as the representative of that order. The four articles never had any authority in the church for Catholics, but were condemned and annulled by Innocent XI. as soon as published, and the king, when humbled by the reverses of his arms, promised the pope to rescind the edict he had issued enjoining them upon the clergy and seminaries of France. The fact is, Gallicanism was the doctrine of the political sovereigns, their lawyers

and courtiers, never of the church, and every Catholic was always free, if not bound, to oppose it and to maintain the supremacy of the church and the subordination of the state. Gallicanism, if not condemned as a heresy, and Gallicans could receive absolution without retracting it, was always *suspect*, and never favored by the church. It was, as we now know, barely tolerated till the church was ready to pronounce definitive judgment against it.

The author defended the deposing power as held and exercised *jure divino*, against those who maintained that the popes held and exercised it only *jure humano*, because, if the spiritual order be supreme, and the pope its representative, or the vicar of Christ on earth, it is a necessary consequence that he has the divine right to deprive sovereigns and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance whenever the rights and interests of the spiritual order, that is, of truth and justice, in his judgment, render it necessary or expedient, and because the sovereign pontiffs who practically exercised the power, claimed to possess it by divine right and to exercise it by divine right.

But it is impossible to slur over the fact that after the removal of *Brownson's Quarterly Review* to New York, in 1855, a change gradually came, not over its doctrine, but over what may be called its tone and policy. Highly esteemed friends, contemplating a special movement for the conversion of non-Catholic Americans, invited Dr. Brownson to remove his *Review* to New York and make it an auxiliary to them in their proposed movement. As he had done pretty much all he could do in opposition to latitudinarianism, liberalism, socialism, revolutionism, and political atheism, he accepted the invitation. Turning now to address those without, and laboring, as he had not done before, to present the church in a light as little offensive to their prejudices as he could without sacrificing orthodoxy, he felt obliged to confine himself to what was strictly of faith, and to insist on nothing that had not been formally defined to be *de fide*. He could not assert the papal infallibility, or the absolute papal supremacy as since defined by the Vatican Council, and was obliged to content himself with insisting on the minimum instead of the maximum of Catholic doctrine,—the very opposite of what he had begun by asserting,—and fell insensibly into the poor policy of presenting Catholicity in its weakness, instead of its strength, which he had previously rejected and even ridiculed. This lost him, to a great extent, the confidence of the Catholic public, and inspired in many of them a

conviction, which they were not slow to express, that he was on the point of returning to Protestantism or infidelity.

In October, 1864, the *Review* was suspended. The attempt to make it the organ of a movement for the conversion of the country to the church by converting the church to the country had not succeeded. It is true that the decrees of the Council of the Vatican, or even the Syllabus, had not then been published, but Dr. Brownson had never ceased to believe as true the doctrines they define. He knew that there are many things which have never been defined that no one is at liberty to deny,—that, in fact, nothing is judicially defined till it has been controverted, as he had maintained against Cardinal Newman's theory of the development of Christian doctrine, which assumes that nothing is of faith till it is defined. The definition does not make the faith, and really only opposes the faith to the error that contradicts it.

After all, it is very probable that Dr. Brownson was led into this mistake by his politics, especially his hatred of great centralized states, whether democratic or imperial. This was the bond of sympathy between him and the illustrious Count Montalembert. All centralism in the state, he held, is despotism; to maintain liberty, power must be divided, and each division given a separate organization of its own, so that each may operate as a veto on the others. In human governments the principle is certainly sound, but is not always and everywhere practicable. Indeed, power cannot ever be so organized as not to be abused, and no civil government alone ever does or can suffice for the double office of maintaining order and liberty. It is only by the aid of the spiritual, divinely organized and sustained, that the opposites, order and liberty, can be reconciled and made one.

Yet there is little doubt that the opposition to the centralization of power in the civil order led him, as it did so many others, to oppose the tendency to it in the church. His Americanism unconsciously influenced his theology. Even those who call for decentralization are forced to demand unity, and it is hard for the human mind to assert one principle in civil organization and another in ecclesiastical organization. The democrat seeks to democratize the church, the monarchist to monarchize, and the Englishman would organize her after the model of his civil constitution, with an upper and a lower house, and the king or queen for nominal head.

Born and bred in a republic, and required by his religion to be loyal

to the republican government of his country, Dr. Brownson was naturally a liberal in politics, and it was no easy matter in the atmosphere of New York, the Paris of the New World, to be a liberal in politics and not also a liberal in religion. But in the leisure that followed the suspension of his *Review* in 1864, he resumed the old Boston tone and wrote, in June, 1872: "Whatever else I may be, I am not a liberal Catholic, but heartily accept the Syllabus and the decrees of the Vatican.

"I am content with the church as she is. I came to the church in 1844 in order to be liberated from my bondage to Satan, and to save my soul. It was not so much my intellectual wants as the need of moral helps, of the spiritual assistance of supernatural grace, in recovering moral purity and integrity of life, that led me to her door to beg admission into her communion. I came not to reform her, but that she might reform me. If I have even for a moment seemed to forget this, it has been unconsciously, and I ask pardon of God and man."

TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1853.]

Although not very profound, or in all respects faultless, this work is the best popular history of the sovereign pontiffs with which we are acquainted. It is written by a layman for the people, not for theologians, and is, to some extent, an abridgment, rather than a strictly original work; but the author seems to have had access to good materials, and to have availed himself of the best authorities on the subject. He has in the later volumes inserted some valuable documents not generally known, and upon the whole produced for the general reader a valuable as well as a very interesting history of the sovereign pontiffs from St. Peter down to Pius VI. inclusive, which we should be most happy to see presented to our public in an English dress. It is a work much needed, and would be of great service to our community, especially to our *liberal* Catholics, who wish the pope to confine himself, as a good *curé*, to his parish church at Rome.

M. Artaud is a sincere Catholic, and for the most part writes as a *Roman* Catholic, not merely as a member of *l'Église gallicane*. He has lived long enough in Italy and at Rome to get rid of many national prejudices, and to acquire a sincere affection for the successors of St. Peter, and a warm devotion to the Holy See. He writes in an amiable spirit, with great sweetness of temper, and true French urbanity and grace. He evidently aims at strict historical truth, and he takes good care not to sully his pages with the unfounded charges against the sovereign pontiffs, so often repeated by the enemies of religion and lovers of the world; although the most serious charges against some of them, which have passed into history and been entertained by grave Catholic historians, he briefly examines,

**Histoire des Souverains Pontifes Romains.* Par M. Le Chevalier Artaud de Montor, Ancien Chargé d' Affaires de France à Rome, à Florence, et à Vienne, Membre de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, etc. Paris: 1847.

and, for the most part, refutes. His history would please us better, we confess, if it gave us fuller details of the lives of the earlier popes, and especially of the popes in the much calumniated tenth century; also if it presented the pontiffs in their relations to the Catholic world generally, instead of presenting them exclusively, or almost exclusively, in their relations with France. Under a Catholic point of view, France has always been an important kingdom, but it is not and never has been all Christendom. The author, however, is a Frenchman, writing for Frenchmen, and it is not strange that he should take his own country for his centre, and judge persons and events by their bearing upon its interests.

Still it would be unjust to the excellent author to leave the impression upon our readers that he is remarkably French in his feelings and attachments. His nationality sometimes, indeed, warps his judgment, and leads him to praise certain French kings and statesmen who deserve any thing but the commendation of Catholics and friends of European civilization; but in general he is candid and just. He takes sides, as he should, with the popes in the quarrels of the sovereigns of his country with the Holy See, and earnestly protests against pronouncing judgments against men according to their national origin or breeding. He aims to rise above nationalities, and to remember that Rome, not Paris, is the centre of Catholic unity. Certainly he loves his own nation, for which no one can blame him; but he uniformly insists that we have no right to condemn, or to speak slightingly of, any people as a whole. For this we thank him. It is too much the fashion with many of us to praise or condemn whole nations and races, and to deny all good or all evil to a people, because French, English, German, or Italian. This is wrong. God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and there is no nation incapable of virtue or of vice,—in which there are not individuals who can degrade themselves below the brute, or through grace rise to true heroic virtue. The Celt can equal the Saxon in good and in bad qualities, and the Saxon in both can equal the Celt. Man is man the world over, and of whatever nation one may have sprung, it is properly no ground of glory or of disparagement. Even these United States may yet have their saints descended from the old Puritan stock. England was once called the Island of Saints, and may be again. Germany has given us Luther and the Reformation, but she has also given us

St. Henry and the author of the *Following of Christ.* Poland floods the world with revolutionists and desperadoes, but she did much to defend Christendom against the Turks, and has given her share of saints to the calendar. France has spread false philosophy and incredulity through all civilized nations, but she has also hallowed every continent and the most distant isles of the ocean with the blood of her martyred missionaries of the Cross. She has given her name to a theory which virtually emancipates the temporal order from the law of God, and sanctions political atheism, but she has furnished us the ablest and most successful defenders of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the prerogatives of the Holy See. There is good and there is bad in all nations and races, and never should we allow ourselves to commend or condemn any one nation or race indiscriminately.

M. Artaud evidently believes himself an ultramontane, and is much more ultramontane than many Italians who declaim lustily against Gallicanism, but he is not precisely a papist after our own heart. He denies, indeed, the last of the Four Articles, the one which asserts that the doctrinal decisions of the pope are reformable, unless accepted by the church; but we can find nowhere in his pages a distinct denial of the first, by far the most objectionable of them all, —the one which denies the church all temporal authority, and asserts the independence of sovereigns in temporals, and which therefore involves the political atheism now so rife throughout the civilized world. It is true, he defends St. Gregory VII. in his conflict with Henry of Germany, and Boniface VIII. in his struggle for the rights of the church against Philip the Fair of France, but he does it on principles which the lowest Gallican of the times of Louis XIV. might have accepted, and by no means on the principles asserted by these holy pontiffs themselves. He professes to follow the popular theory of the excellent and learned M. Gosselin of St. Sulpice, and derives the power exercised by the popes over temporals in the middle ages from the concessions of sovereigns, the consent of the people, the public law of the time, and the maxims then generally received; not from the express grant of power by our Lord to Peter, nor yet from the inherent universal supremacy of the spiritual order. He must, therefore, hold that power to be of human origin, and its possession a mere accident in the history of the church. This, with many for

whom we have a profound reverence, is at present a favorite method of defending the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils in the middle ages,—a power always odious to tyrants and demagogues, and which it is gravely asserted is no longer held or claimed by the successors of St. Peter.

Of course we are far from denying the fact of the consent and concessions alleged, or that the claim of the power in question was in accordance with the public law and generally received maxims of the age; nor do we deny that this fact fully justifies, on the principles of modern politics, the use which was made of it by popes and councils; yet we confess that the complete and absolute justification of that power seems to us to demand the assumption of a higher ground, and a different line of argument.

According to M. Gosselin, as cited by M. Artaud in his Life of St. Gregory VII., "the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils in the middle ages was not a criminal usurpation of the rights of sovereigns by the ecclesiastical authority," because "the popes and councils who exercised this power only followed and applied the maxims then very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous." The fact here alleged is undeniable, but when we adduce it in defence of the exercise of that power, do we not defend the church as a human rather than as a divine institution? This line of argument would, no doubt, answer our purpose most admirably, if we were defending a human government; but where what we have to defend is not a human government, but a divinely constituted and supernaturally assisted and protected church, it, even if admissible at all, seems to us altogether unsatisfactory. It is certainly undeniable that the concessions of sovereigns and the consent of the people were obtained on the ground that the popes held the power by divine right, and that those maxims on which M. Gosselin relies for the justification of the popes and councils in exercising it were, that the spiritual order, and therefore the church as the representative of that order, is supreme, and temporal sovereigns are subjected to it, and to the pope as its supreme visible chief. Popes and councils in exercising authority over sovereigns even in temporals were, according to those maxims, only exercising the inherent rights of the church as the spiritual authority, and consequently sovereigns were bound to obey them, not by human law only, but

also by the law of God. Such incontestably is the doctrine of the magnificent bulls of St. Gregory and Boniface, and of the maxims according to which it is attempted to justify the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils.

Now these maxims either were true or they were false. If they were false, how will you justify an infallible church —expressly ordained of God to teach the truth in faith and morals, and to conduct individuals and nations in the way of holiness—in adopting and acting on them? If they were true, how can you deny that the power exercised is of divine origin, or pretend that it is derived from the consent of the people, or the concession of sovereigns?

Moreover, we confess that we are extremely averse to defending things in the history of the church, which happen just now to be unpopular, on the ground that they were authorized by the maxims of the age, that is, the public opinion of the time. We have yet to learn that public opinion is infallible or obligatory. We are unwilling to receive it as law, and cannot understand how an infallible church, deriving her knowledge and wisdom from above, can take it for her guide, far less how, in case she adopts and follows an erroneous opinion, she can plead in her justification or excuse, that she "only followed and applied the maxims very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous." Have we in the church nothing superior to human intelligence and virtue? Is the church dependent upon, and responsible to, public opinion, and therefore in nothing superior to an ordinary Protestant sect? We own we had thought it the office of the church, not to learn from public opinion, but to instruct and form it,—not to be judged by it, but to judge it,—not to conform to the maxims of the age, but to use all her power to make the age conform to her own maxims. Is this her office? Is she qualified to discharge it? How, then, undertake to justify her in the exercise of a power which you deny to be properly hers, on the ground that she only followed the maxims of the age; or how dare you suppose, in case of a collision between her and public opinion, that she, not public opinion, is in the wrong, and must give way?

The church, placed in the world to teach and govern it, must undoubtedly apply her own principles and maxims according to the circumstances, conditions, and wants of particular times and places; but we cannot help believing that it is our duty either to renounce her, and no longer hold

her to be God's church, supernaturally endowed and assisted, or else to maintain that the principles and maxims she adopts and applies, no matter in what age or nation, are those which she receives from her Lord, and not from the world which she is ordained to teach and govern. If she adopts and applies false principles and maxims, or a line of policy not at all times and places just and true in principle, she is, as far as we can see, inexcusable, and it is but a miserable defence to allege that she only "follows and applies the maxims very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous." Re-establish the "discipline of the secret," if you can, resort to the *œconomia* or prudent reserve practised by the fathers, if you will, or if it is possible with the past history of the church before the public, but do not take up a line of defence that reduces her to the level of human governments, philosophies, and sects. Least of all attempt to justify her on the ground that she only conforms to the maxims of the age, that is, of the world, especially in these times, when the tendency is to derive all authority from the multitude, and to declare popular opinion the supreme law.

We have not read M. Gosselin's highly esteemed and learned work on the power of the sovereign pontiffs in the middle ages, and consequently are unable to speak of his theory as he may himself hold it. What we oppose is not his theory, at least as his, but a theory which we every day encounter, and which is almost everywhere alleged against us, whenever we venture to assert the supremacy of the spiritual order, save as a vague speculation, intended to have no practical application,—a theory apparently adopted as a sort of compromise between Gallicanism and ultramontanism, yet a compromise in which the concessions are all on the side of the anti-Gallican, and incompatible with the theory of the church that we have been taught, and with what seems to us to be the natural relation between the two powers, temporal and spiritual. Nothing we may say is intended to have any application to M. Gosselin himself.

It strikes us that the advocates of this popular theory, which concedes the human, but denies the divine right of the church over sovereigns, confound two things which are very distinguishable, namely, the origin and ground of the power in question, and the conditions of its practical exercise and its temporal or civil consequences. As a matter of fact, this power was in accordance with the public law and the gen-

erally received maxims of Christendom in the middle ages, and had it not been so, its exercise would not and could not have had direct practical effects in the civil order. To its practical efficacy in temporals, the consent of sovereigns and of the people was indispensable. The church is herself a spiritual kingdom, and her powers are in their origin and nature spiritual, and to be exercised always for a spiritual end. Her exercise of these powers has not *per se* temporal consequences in the temporal order, because she is not herself the temporal power, and has not in herself the material force requisite to give them temporal effect, and cannot, as a fact, obtain it without the consent of the power, royal, aristocratic, or popular. She might without the maxims and public law of the middle ages have performed all the acts she did in regard to temporal sovereigns, and they would have had their spiritual effect, but no temporal or civil effects. In a country like ours, for example, excommunication has only spiritual consequences, because the civil law does not recognize it. The excommunicated person loses none of his civil rights, and stands before the civil law or the state precisely as if no sentence of excommunication had been pronounced against him. Marriage, invalid by the canon law, yet not contrary to the civil law, is invalid here only in the eyes of the church, and loses none of its civil rights or effects. The excommunication and deposition by the pope of a sovereign of England would, as the English law now stands, work no civil consequences, because the law of the realm does not recognize such excommunication and deposition, and makes none of the civil rights or prerogatives of the sovereign depend on his being in the communion of the Catholic Church. And this, too, whether the sovereign be a Catholic or a Protestant. Yet were her present gracious Majesty to become reconciled to the church, she would forfeit her crown, because the civil law incapacitates all but Protestants, of some sort, from wearing it, as before Elizabeth it incapacitated all but Catholics. As a fact, then, the canons of the church can have civil consequences only on condition that the prince recognizes them as the law of the land. Hence the church can never secure to her decrees, sentences, or canons their proper civil effects against, or without, the consent of temporal sovereigns. Like consequences would not now generally follow acts like those of the popes and councils in the middle ages, because now in most states the civil law does not recognize them,

and would treat them as *non avenus*. The civil law in our times concedes to the acts of the spiritual authority no civil efficacy, and therefore their direct consequences are all confined to the spiritual order. We grant, then, that, as a matter of fact, the church is dependent on the consent of the people for the civil consequences of her power over temporal princes, and in this sense and thus far we agree with the advocates of the theory in question.

But not therefore does it follow that the power formerly exercised by popes and councils over sovereigns in temporals is derived from the concessions of princes and the consent of the people, from human law, and the generally received maxims of the age. It by no means follows from any thing of this sort, that princes or people have the right before God to prevent the power from having its civil consequences, or that the power itself is not of divine origin, and inherent in the church as the spiritual authority. A man may, if he chooses to incur eternal damnation, reject or blaspheme the church, but that does not prove that he has the right to do so. Princes and people may refuse to recognize as law the canons of the church, and proceed as if no such canons existed; but that does not prove that they can do so without wrong, or without incurring the wrath of Heaven. The church may, in fact, depend on the will of sovereigns or civil enactments for the civil efficacy of her canons, and yet have a divine right over sovereigns in temporals as well as in spirituals. Because the public law and the maxims generally received by nations have, in this respect, been changed in modern times, we cannot say that they have been rightfully changed, that civilization, freedom, and virtue have profited by the change, or that the popes have lost, far less abandoned, the power they formerly exercised over temporal affairs. They may not assert the power now, because now it cannot be exercised with its proper temporal consequences; but because they do not now assert it, we are not to conclude that they do not now possess it, or that they did not exercise it by divine right.

We regard this question, as to the relation of the two powers to each other, as of no little practical importance at the present time, and even in our own country; and though we have often discussed it, we must be allowed to discuss it again, and with some thoroughness. There have crept even into the Catholic camp not a few gross errors in regard to it, which are no less dangerous to civil liberty and social

order, than hostile to the church and derogatory to the rights of her sovereign pontiff. It is quite the fashion even for Catholic politicians to assert, that, though the church is supreme in spirituals, the state in temporals is absolutely independent of her authority. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. As long as the church keeps within her own province, and confines herself to spirituals, we respect her, and submit to her authority; in spirituals, we even recognize the authority of the pope, and allow that in them he may do what he pleases; but he has no authority in temporals, and in them we will do as we please." Such is the popular doctrine of the day, and of not a few who would take it as a gross affront and as downright injustice were we to insinuate that they are but sorry Catholics. Scarcely a Catholic layman amongst us engaged in politics can open his mouth without uttering this doctrine, and uttering it as if it were an incontestable truth and a maxim of divine wisdom. It has become the commonplace of the whole political world, and is rung out upon us from thrones and the cabinets of ministers, the halls of justice and legislation, and from the hustings and the caucus. Whoso ventures to question it, is stared at as the ghost of some old dreamy monk of the dark ages. Let us, then, be allowed to examine it.

"The church is supreme in spirituals, the state in temporals; the two powers are distinct, each independent in its own order." This is the popular doctrine in its least offensive form. It was the doctrine of the Gallican bishops,—or rather Colbert, the minister of Louis XIV.,—assembled by order of the king in 1682. According to this doctrine, in all that belongs to the temporal order, the temporal authority is supreme, and therefore absolutely independent of the spiritual authority. This is a bold doctrine, and it requires some nerve in a man who believes in God to defend it. If it is conceded, it must be maintained, that, let the sovereign reign as he will, tyrannize and oppress his subjects in temporals as he may, the spiritual authority has no right to rebuke him, and the pope, as visible head of the church, has no power to admonish him, or to subject him to discipline. However his subjects may be ground down to the dust, however they may groan under the weight of his iniquitous exactions, the church must look on in silence, and never dare open her mouth in their behalf, or in the most modest and timid tones possible remind the tyrant "that the king is not in reigning, but in reigning justly."

Nor is this the worst. The doctrine means, if any thing, that the temporal order is independent of the law of God, and therefore of God himself. It must, if independent of the spiritual authority, be virtually independent of God, even though you should pretend that it is bound to obey his law; for it can in such case be bound to obey that law only as it interprets it for itself, and a law which it is free to interpret for itself is no law at all—is but its own will, passion, or caprice. To declare the temporal independent of the spiritual, is only, in other words, to declare that God has no dominion over it, no right to legislate for it, or to sit in judgment on it, and therefore that sovereigns in temporals are under no law, accountable to no power above themselves, and free to do whatever they please. Their sovereign will and pleasure is the only rule of right or wrong in temporals. What the prince wills is right, what he forbids is wrong. Here is absolute political atheism. God is voted out of the constitution of the state, and in politics there is no God, unless it be the temporal sovereign himself. Do you not see that, if you hold this, you must take Cæsar for God, as under pagan Rome, and hold right and godlike whatever he does, and that it is permitted you to have no will but his? How, if Cæsar be God, or subject to the divine law only as he interprets it for himself, can you accuse him of tyranny or oppression? What law can you adduce that he is bound to obey? What right have you to denounce the temporal tyranny of a Nero, a Decius, a Maximian, a Diocletian, a Henry II., a Louis of Bavaria, a Don Pedro the Cruel, or a Charles le Mauvais? Let the crowned monsters, whom all history holds up to our execration, ride roughshod as they will over the hearts of their inoffending subjects, what right have you to blame them? They do but exercise the independence you claim for them, and denounce us for denying to them.

But it may be you are democrats, and fancy that you obviate this objection by asserting the sovereignty of the people, and making all power emanate from them, and all rulers and magistrates responsible to them. But you only crown the people instead of one man, put the people in the place of the king. You assert their independence of the church, and maintain the absolute independence of their will in temporals. Are the people as sovereign bound to conform to the law of God as interpreted by the church? To say that, would be to abandon your favorite doctrine,

and to agree with us. Are they bound to conform to that law only as they interpret it for themselves? Then are they virtually not bound by it at all. Are the people a God? You cannot say it, if you are Christians. Are they infallible? You dare not pretend it, if you respect common sense. Are they impeccable? You know better, if you know any thing. What assurance, then, have you that they will not construe the law of God, even if they acknowledge it, so as to authorize whatever iniquity they, for the time being, imagine it for their interest to practise? Or that they will not tyrannize in temporals as well and as fatally as kings and kaisers?

"O, but you blaspheme the people! You are no democrat; you are an absolutist, an aristocrat, a monarchist, and would have kings and nobles, born booted and spurred, to ride us by the grace of God. *À bas les rois! À bas les aristocrats! Vive le peuple!*" Peace, good friends! Do not suppose, because you have lost your senses, that everybody else ought to be sent to the lunatic asylum. Do not fancy that, because your understandings have become darkened, you are enlightened, or that all light is extinguished. If you retain the least glimmering of common sense, you must see that it is precisely against absolutism, that is, the independence of the temporal sovereign, whether king or people, that we are contending. Blaspheme the people! And whom do you blaspheme when you put the people in the place of God, and declare their will the law of God, as you do in your application of the maxim, "The voice of the people is the voice of God"? We love freedom, perhaps, as much, to say the least, as you do; but do not require us to be stupid enough to suppose that the best way to secure it is to destroy its indispensable conditions. Have you no knowledge of history? Know ye not that the very doctrine which we oppose, and you defend, was originally, invented by graceless courtiers to please tyrannical masters, and that it has been by substituting it for what you call the monkish doctrine of the dark ages, that kings have emancipated themselves from all law, destroyed the old free constitutions of Europe, and established very nearly throughout all Christendom that Byzantine system of government, or that centralized despotism, against which you direct in vain your Jacobinical and red-republican revolutions? You, with all your democratic froth and foam, only reproduce in another form the very doctrine that permits kings to play the tyrant

at will. Because you make the people God, or at least claim for them the prerogatives of the church of God, you must not suppose that we make kings and kaisers the object of our idolatry. We are republican, republican born and republican bred, and we have never yet raised our voice but in behalf of freedom and against tyranny; and against tyranny and the principles of tyranny we will raise it, whether royal or popular. We wish the people free,—free from their own passions, and from yours and mine,—alike free from despots and from demagogues; and we know there is and can be no freedom for them, either in spirituals or temporals, except in so far as they are subjected to the law of God, as interpreted and applied by his church.

Democracy, understood as the ancients understood it, may be a good government, nay, the best government, when and where it is legitimate, as with us. But even legitimate democracy has a natural tendency, as old Aristotle tells us, to "degenerate into *demagogie*." And does so degenerate, "when the lowest of the people, those who have no fortune and less virtue, become the majority, suffer themselves to be seduced by flatterers to despoil and oppress the rest. For the people also are a monarch, not an individual, but a collective monarch. Hence they seek to be themselves a monarchy, and to reign alone, without law, as a despot. They assume the air and manner of tyrants; and like them have their flatterers, who grow rich and powerful, because the people dispose of all, and they dispose of the people."*

We are no advocates of monarchy; we are firmly attached to the institutions of our country, and we should have something to say against kingly and much in favor of republican government, if the prevalence of Jacobinism, socialism, and communism, so many degrees worse than the worst monarchy possible in a Christian country, did not make it our duty to be silent in both respects. The madness and infidelity of European radicals have made it impossible to say aught against monarchical government, without making war on the church and on society itself. But whoever knows any thing of democracies knows perfectly well that the people count for much less in them than is commonly pretended. The great body of the people in all countries are well disposed, sincerely desire just and stable government; but they are necessarily engrossed with their private affairs, and

*Aristotle *apud* Rohrbacher, Hist. Univ. de l'Église Cath., tome I., p. xii.

ignorant and inefficient in what regards the public. They must at best rely on the few for information, even where newspapers abound, and they easily fall a prey to demagogues and party leaders, who flatter and deceive them. The will that rules in a democracy is the will of these demagogues and party leaders, who have no honest principle to restrain them, and who can be deterred by no considerations of shame; for they affect always to rule in the name of the people, and are able to shift upon them the responsibility of their own acts. It is easy to understand, then, without any disrespect to the great body of the people, that democracies can tyrannize and oppress as effectually, and to as great an extent, as monarchies themselves, and therefore that the assertion of the absolute independence of the temporal power in temporals is no less dangerous to civil liberty where the form of the government is popular, than where it is monarchical. Demagogues and party leaders, to say the least, are no more infallible or impeccable than kings and emperors, and no more safe depositaries of absolute power.

No man, unless a downright atheist, dares, in just so many words, to assert the monstrous proposition, that the temporal order is not subjected to the law of God. God is the universal Lord, the sovereign King, and his dominion extends to all, from the highest to the lowest; for he is the sole creator of all, and from him, and by him, and in him, and for him, are all things, in whom we also live, and move, and have our being. His providence extends over all the works of his hands, and he takes cognizance of all our thoughts, words, and deeds,—our eating and our drinking, our downsitting and our uprising, our sleeping and our waking, our speaking and our silence; he gives us seed time and harvest, the early and the latter rains, the heat of summer and the snows of winter; he makes the corn to grow in our valleys, and crowns our hills with flocks and herds; he gives victory or defeat to our armies, setteth up and putteth down kings, rears the infant colony into a mighty people, and overwhelms the empire and makes the populous city desolate; he is the sovereign arbiter of nations as of individuals, in temporals as in spirituals. His law is as universal as his providence, and is the sovereign law in all things, for all in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth.

This universal dominion, extending to temporals no less than to spirituals, which none dare deny to God, or can deny to him, unless they deny his existence, and therefore

their own, belongs also to our Lord Jesus Christ, not only as he is the Son of God, but also as he is the Son of Man. "All things," he says, "are delivered to me by my Father." (St. Luke x. 22.) "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth." (St. Matt. xxviii. 18.) Here his universal dominion is unequivocally asserted, and asserted of him as Son of Man, because it is said to be *delivered* and *given* to him, which could not be said of him as Son of God, for as Son of God he is God, and always possessed it. That he possesses this dominion as Son of Man was well argued in 1329 by Roger, archbishop-elect of Sens, before Philippe de Valois, in behalf of the French bishops and clergy, against Pierre, lord of Cugnières, who had spoken in the name of the French nobility in defence of the doctrine we are opposing.

"For," he says, addressing the king, "Jesus Christ had both powers [temporal and spiritual], not only according to his divine nature, but also according to his human nature. He is a priest after the order of Melchisedech, and hath written upon his garment, and on his thigh, KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS. (Rev. xix. 16.) By his *thigh* and *garment* is understood his humanity united to his divinity, as a garment to him who is clothed therewith. He says of himself 'All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.' The Epistle to the Hebrews says that God, his Father, hath 'constituted him heir of all things,' and the apostle applies to him the words of the eighth Psalm: 'Thou has made him a little less than the angels; thou hast crowned him with glory and honor; and hast set him over all the works of thy hands. Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet; all sheep and oxen, and beasts of the field.' Now in subjecting all things to him, the apostle concludes, 'God has left nothing not subjected to him.' (Heb. i. 2; ii. 7—9.) Hence it is evident that, in that same nature in which Christ is inferior to the angels, he has dominion over all things. The same conclusion follows from this other text (Phil. ii. 8—10); 'He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God hath exalted him and given him a name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and in hell.' Hence according to that nature in which he humbled himself hath God exalted him above all things, since in the name of Jesus every knee must bow. St. Peter asserts the same in the Acts of the Apostles (x. 40—42), where he says, that God has appointed him to be the judge of the living and the dead; for he speaks of him according to that nature in which God raised him up again the third day. All scripture proclaims the same thing."*

* *Apud* Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Église Cath.*, tom. XX. pp. 302, 303.

Kings and temporal lords, as such, are confessedly null, and therefore unknown, in the spiritual order, and are in it only private individuals, indistinguishable as to state or dignity from the meanest of their servants. With no propriety, then, could our Lord have on his garment and on his thigh, "King of kings and Lord of lords," if he had not dominion over them in temporals, in that order in which they are kings and lords. St. Paul declares (Col. ii. 10), that he is the "head of all principality and power." And we may conclude with absolute certainty that he has, even according to his human nature, universal dominion; and that only he, as the apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 27), who put all under him, is not subject to him. It follows, therefore, necessarily, if the dominion of our Lord in the flesh, or as the Messiah, is thus universal, that the *Christian* law, the law of Christ, extends not only to spirituals, but also to temporals, and is the supreme law of both orders. Kings and lords, magistrates and rulers, sovereigns and subjects, are under it in all things, alike in things temporal and in things spiritual. Whoso denies this denies not merely the sounder opinion, but the Christian religion itself.

This established, we demand to whom, under God, it belongs to keep, interpret, declare, and apply the law of Christ. Whom hath our Lord constituted the depositary, the guardian, and the judge of his law? Certainly the Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church, and the successor of Peter, as visible head or supreme chief of that church. "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." (St. Matt. xxviii. 18—20.) Here, plainly our Lord commits his law to his church, and gives her pastors authority to teach it to all nations, and to teach them to observe whatsoever it commands. Certain then is it, that the church has received his law, and is the guardian and judge for all men, of whatever rank, state, or dignity, in all things to which it extends, and therefore that all are bound to receive it from her, and to observe it in all things as she teaches and declares it. It will not do to say here, that she is its guardian and judge in spirituals, and that sovereigns are its guardian and judge in temporals. The commission is to the church, not to the state, and nowhere can it be found that our Lord has made princes, as such, guardians

and judges of his law, even in the temporal order. He only gives them authority to execute it when declared to them. Besides, to keep, teach, and declare the law of Christ, whether in spirituals or temporals, is manifestly a spiritual function, and temporal sovereigns, it is confessed in the very doctrine we oppose, have no spiritual functions.

Here we must be permitted to avail ourselves again of the reasoning of Roger, archbishop-elect of Sens, in reply to Pierre de Cugnières. After having, in the passage already quoted, established the dominion of our Lord according to his human nature, over both orders, temporal and spiritual, Roger proceeds:

"St. Peter, whom our Lord constituted his vicar, had the same power. He condemns judicially Ananias and Saphira for the crimes of larceny and lying. Paul also pronounces sentence against the convicted fornicator. That Christ has willed to give this judgment to the church, is manifest from his words (St. Matt. xviii. 15—18); 'If thy brother sin against thee, go and rebuke him between thee and him alone. If he hear thee thou shalt gain thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. And if he will not hear them, tell it to the church. And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican. Amen, I say to you, Whatsoever ye shall bind upon earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven,' Behold how expressly he wills that, wherever there is sin of one against another, if the delinquent corrects not himself, the matter shall be referred to the judgment of the church, so that the offender, if he will not hear her, may be excommunicated. And the reason he gives is, that 'whatsoever ye bind or loose upon earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven.' *Whatsoever, all,* without excepting any thing, any more than the apostle does, when he says all is subjected to Christ. I prove it, also, from St. Luke (xxii. 38), cited by his lordship of Cugnières in his own favor. I will beat him with his own staff. He says, and says truly, that by the two swords are to be understood the two powers, the temporal and the spiritual. But in whose power does Christ will the two swords to be placed? Certainly in that of Peter and the apostles, of the pope and bishops, that is, of the church. Do you say that Christ blamed Peter for striking with the temporal sword? That is nothing. For, mark, he did not tell him to throw it away, but told him to return it to its scabbard, and to keep it in his possession, signifying, that, although this power is in the church, he wills that under the New Law it should be exercised by the hand of the layman at the order of the priest.

"I prove it also, in the third place, by St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 1—6), who orders that whoever has a lawsuit should bring it to be judged before the

saints. His reasoning is, 'Know ye not that the saints shall judge this world? If then the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters? If therefore ye shall have judgment about the things of this world, set them to judge who are the most despised in the church.' It is evident from these testimonies, without mentioning others which I omit, that both powers may be in an ecclesiastical person. If St. Peter and the apostles made little use of the temporal power, it was in virtue of the principles, "All things are lawful to me, but all are not expedient,' and 'Every thing in its time.' Now that all Gaul is subject to the Christian faith, the church rightly insists on the punishment of crimes and the execution of justice, that men may amend their lives. Our conclusion is therefore founded in divine right.

"I prove it again by natural reason. . . . . He appears best fitted to judge who is nearest to God, the rule of all judgments. Ecclesiastics are nearest to God. Therefore it is fitting that the church should judge in these matters. Besides, nobody denies that ecclesiastics may take cognizance of the sin in these [temporal] affairs. Moreover, who has the right to judge of the end has the right to judge of what is ordained to it which is the reason of its existence. The body being ordained to the soul and the temporal to the spiritual, the church therefore has the right to judge of both, according to the axiom, The accessory follows the nature of the principal."

Such was the Gallicanism of France in 1329; for Roger spoke before the king in council, after consultation with the assembled bishops, by their order, and in their name. Between this and the Gallicanism of the Four Articles there is a distance. In 1329 the French clergy thought more of asserting the rights of the church than of pleasing the king, and opposed instead of following the maxims of the French lawyers and courtiers. Hence the difference between the Gallicanism of 1329 and the Gallicanism of 1682.

There are two points made by Roger against the nobles, that of themselves alone decide the whole controversy. Nobody, he says, doubts that ecclesiastics may take cognizance of the sin which is found in temporal matters. Nobody can doubt it. Every Catholic who knows his catechism, or who has ever been to confession, knows that the priest can interrogate him on his temporal conduct, and judge him for sins committed in his temporal no less than in his spiritual relations. It would be a startling novelty for a Catholic to be told by his ghostly father that he need not confess any sins he may have committed in temporal matters, such as lying and cheating in his business transactions, refusing to pay his honest debts, stealing, fornication, adultery, mur-

der, sedition, treason, for these pertain to the temporal order, and the church has no jurisdiction in temporals. Does not the law of Christ extend to all these matters? Are they not all forbidden by the law of God? Are they not all matters which touch conscience? How, then, withdraw them from the jurisdiction of the church, and say that she has no authority in temporals? If the church can take cognizance of the sins of private individuals in the temporal order, she can also take cognizance of the sins of public persons, of kings and magistrates, in the same order. If she may subject private persons to her discipline for the sins of fornication and adultery, why not sovereigns? Do these sins cease to be sins when committed by kings and kaisers? If she can impose on private persons the law of having only one wife, can she not do the same for sovereigns, and judge the sovereign as well as the private person who violates it? If she can judge of sedition and treason in the subject, wherefore not also of tyranny and oppression in the prince? Are tyranny and oppression in temporal matters, on the part of princes, less sins against the law of Christ, than sedition and treason on the part of subjects? Is it for the church to bind the subject to the prince, and not the prince to the subject? Were that just? What king ever protested against the church's condemning sedition and treason? By what right does the church condemn these, and not the prince who fails in his duties as prince? Theodosius the Great was a pious and orthodox emperor, but he was liable to fits of anger, in which he committed acts of injustice. In one of these fits he ordered a most cruel massacre of some seven thousand of his subjects in the city of Thessalonica. This was an act in the temporal order, of temporal sovereignty, and therefore an act for which the church, according to the doctrine we oppose, could not judge him; nay, for which even God himself could not judge him, if the temporal sovereign is independent of the spiritual power in temporals. Yet St. Ambrose, one of the four greatest Latin doctors of the church, archbishop of Milan, thought otherwise, rebuked him severely for his tyranny to his subjects, and made him do public penance for it. Some Christians, provoked by the malignity of the Jews, destroyed a Jewish synagogue. Theodosius ordered them to rebuild it. Here, again, was an act of temporal sovereignty in the temporal order. But St. Ambrose interposed, forbade the Christians to obey the order of the emperor, and informed him that it

was not lawful for Christians to build the temples of a false religion, or in which their own religion would be blasphemed.

The other point made by Roger is equally conclusive, namely, that whoever has the right to judge of the end has the right to judge of the means. The body is for the soul, the temporal is for the spiritual, and therefore the church; since, therefore, she has the right to judge the soul, she has the right to judge the body; and since she has the right to judge the spiritual, she has the right to judge the temporal. We cannot too often repeat, that the temporal does not exist for its own sake, and that the end for which it does exist is not in its own order, —is not temporal but spiritual. It has no end, no purpose, no legitimacy, but as it is subordinated to the law of Christ, and made subservient to the spiritual end of man. The state is inaugurated, the king is crowned and invested with the insignia of command, only for society, and society itself is only for man's spiritual destiny,—his ultimate union with God as his supreme good; for man has been created solely that he "might know, love, and serve God in this world, and be happy with him for ever in the next." This is his end and only end. The earthly is for the heavenly, the seen for the unseen, the temporal for the eternal, man for God. This is the order of things. The Christian religion is the law according to which, from the beginning of the human race, in all times and places, man fulfils his destiny, or attains to the end for which he has been created and redeemed. No other law has ever been given to man. The Christian religion is, in substance, one and the same religion from the beginning. It is not a new religion, and is a new law only as to its state, for St. Paul argues to the Galatians, that it was before Moses, and therefore that it was madness to think of being perfected by the Mosaic law without Christ. They who were saved before the coming of Christ were saved by the same faith, the same religion, the same law, by which we are saved; only they believed in a Messiah to come, and we in a Messiah who has come. Always was the law of Christ in the world, always was it the one law for all men, of whatever state, rank, or dignity,—the only law by which man could render himself acceptable to his Maker and fulfil his destiny. There never has been any other religion properly so called than that of Christ, and that is of all times and places.

The Catholic Church, also, is from the beginning, not an institution of yesterday. It is catholic in time as well as in space. The church is catholic, we are taught in the catechism, because "she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She has subsisted under different modes indeed in all ages; but whether as the patriarchal religion, as the synagogue, or as the Roman Catholic communion, she is always one and the same Catholic Church, the immaculate spouse of the Lamb slain from the foundations of the world, and the joyful mother of all the faithful. All things are ordered in reference to her. Her Maker is her husband, and he will own none as his children who have not been carried in her womb and nursed at her breasts. Such is his will, eternal as his own being, and which is without variableness or shadow of turning, immutable and immovable as his own nature. She has been instituted expressly to guide, assist, and conduct us to God. For this end she has been made the depositary of the law of Christ, authorized to keep, to teach, to interpret and apply it,—to teach, feed, rule, and govern all men and nations, in reference to their final and only end. How, then, say she has no authority over temporals? How can she have authority to judge the only end for which temporals exist, or have any right to exist, if she have not the right to judge them, and to approve or condemn them as they do or do not subserve this end? How can she have charge of thee nd without also having charge of the means, since the means are necessarily subordinated to the end, and controlled by it? As she has charge of the end, that is of gaining the end, she must have charge of the means, and as the temporal exists only as a means to man's final end, she must, by virtue of the very spiritual authority which she confessedly is, have supreme power over the temporal, and plenary authority to govern it according to the demands or the utility of the end, and therefore in all respects whatever.

But let us not be supposed to insist on a doctrine which we do not. We contend not here for the doctrine, that the state holds from God only through the church, although we should be loath to deny even that doctrine, since it has high authority in its favor; but we stop with the doctrine of Bellarmine and Suarez, that the temporal prince holds his authority from God through the people or the community, and therefore concede, as we have always conceded, that the people, where there is no existing legitimate government,

are the medial origin of government. But the people, even on this ground, are not the ultimate source of power, and do not give to civil government its right to govern, for *non est potestas, nisi a Deo;* they are only the medium of its constitution, not the fountain of its rights. The government when constituted has immediately from God its authority or right to govern, and consequently holds immediately under his law, and for the end that law prescribes. That end, as we have seen, is the Christian end, the ultimate end of man. The government then, whether regal or popular, holds its authority on condition that it exercises all its powers in obedience to the law of Christ for that end, and, of course, forfeits its rights whenever it neglects or violates this condition. The powers of government are a sacred trust, and must be exercised according to the conditions of the trust; to violate these conditions is, then, to forfeit the trust, and to lose the powers it confers. We must say this, unless we accept oriental despotism, and contend for the inamissibility of power; that is, that the prince, let him do what he pleases, tyrannize and oppress as he may, never loses his right to reign,—a doctrine which cannot be consistently maintained by any Englishman who boasts of his "glorious Revolution" of 1688, or by any American who on each succeeding Fourth of July reads with patriotic pride the Declaration of Independence by the Congress of 1776.

Now, although we do not say that the church commissions the state, or imposes the conditions on which it holds its right to govern, yet as it holds under the law of Christ, and on conditions imposed by that law, we do say that she, as the guardian and judge of that law, must have the power to take cognizance of the state, and to judge whether it does or does not conform to the conditions of its trust, and to pronounce sentence accordingly; which sentence ought to have immediate practical execution in the temporal order, and the temporal power that resists it is not only faithless to its trust, but guilty of direct rebellion against God, the only real sovereign, fountain of all law, and source of all rights, in the temporal order as in the spiritual. She must have the right to take cognizance of the fidelity of subjects, since they are bound to obey the legitimate prince for conscience sake; and therefore of the manner in which princes discharge their duties to their subjects, and to judge and to declare whether they have or have not forfeited their trusts, and lost their right to reign or to command the obedience

of their subjects. The deposing power, then, is inherent in her as the spiritual authority, as the guardian and judge of the law under which kings and emperors hold their crowns, and have the right to reign; for in deposing a sovereign, absolving his subjects from their allegiance, and authorizing them to proceed to the choice of a new sovereign, she does but apply the law of Christ to a particular case, and judicially declare what is already true by that law. She only declares that the forfeiture has occurred, and that subjects are released from their oath of fidelity, who are already released by the law of God.

This power which we claim here for the church over temporals is not itself precisely temporal. We are indeed not at liberty to assert that the church has no temporal authority, for that she has no temporal authority, direct or indirect, is a condemned proposition,—condemned, if we are not mistaken, by our present Holy Father, in his condemnation of the work on Canon Law by Professor Nuytz of Turin; but the power we are now asserting, though a power over temporals, is itself, strickly speaking, a spiritual power, held by a spiritual person, and exerted for a spiritual end. The temporal order by its own nature, or the fact that it exists only for an end not in its own order, is subjected to the spiritual, and consequently every question that does or can arise in the temporal order is indirectly a spiritual question, and within the jurisdiction of the church as the spiritual authority, and therefore of the pope, who, as supreme chief of the church, possesses that authority in its plenitude. The pope, then, even by virtue of his spiritual authority, has the power to judge all temporal questions, if not precisely as temporal, yet as spiritual,—for all temporal questions are to be decided by their relation to the spiritual,—and therefore has the right to pronounce sentence of deposition against any sovereign when required by the good of the spiritual order.

No Christian can or will deny that whatever we do,—whether we sing or pray, eat or drink, wake or sleep, assist at public worship or pursue our own domestic avocations, whether we act in a private or in a public capacity,—we are bound to do it from conscience, and for the glory of God, for whom we are created, and who is our supreme good, as well as the supreme good itself. The church, as the spiritual power, has jurisdiction in all matters that touch conscience, the law, the glory of God, our supreme good.

Then she has jurisdiction over all our lives, and all our acts. Does the law of God prescribe our duty to temporal sovereigns? Does it prescribe the duty of sovereigns to their subjects? We have seen that it does. Can we neglect our duty to sovereigns, or they their duty to us, with a good conscience, or without sin? Of course not. If sovereigns play the tyrant, if they become cruel, oppressive, governing their subjects iniquitously for selfish ends, do they or do they not violate the laws of God, and forfeit their rights? If you are not a base despot or a vile slave you must say they do. If the church is the spiritual power, with the right to declare the law of Christ for all men and nations, can any act of the state in contravention of her canons be regarded as a law? The most vulgar common sense answers, that it cannot. Tell us then, even supposing the church to have only spiritual power, what question can come up between man and man, between sovereign and sovereign, between subject and sovereign, or sovereign and subject, that does not come within the legitimate jurisdiction of the church, and on which she has not by divine right the power to pronounce a judicial sentence? None? Then the power she exercised over sovereigns in the middle ages was not a usurpation, was not derived from the concession of princes or the consent of the people, but was and is hers by divine right; and whoso resists it rebels against the King of kings and Lord of lords. This is the ground on which we defend the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils in the middle ages.

We know this ground is not acceptable to sovereigns, to courtiers, or to demagogues. But is that our fault? Who has made it our duty to please them? Are we not bound to please God, and to adhere to the truth, let it offend whom it may? On this subject permit us to translate some remarks from the Abbé Rohrbacher's *Universal History of the Catholic Church*, which we find very much to our purpose.

"In the seventh book of this History," says the abbé, "we have seen the three representatives of ancient wisdom, Confucius, Plato, and Cicero, professing with one voice that God alone is the true sovereign of men; that there is no power that comes not from him; that his reason is the supreme and normal law of all others; that what princes, judges, and peoples decree, that is contrary to this supreme rule, is in no sense law; that there was to come a time in which the Holy, the Saint of saints, the Word, the Reason itself of God, would be manifested in a sensible manner, give to all nations the same law, and make of the whole

human race one only empire, of which God should be the sole common Master and the Sovereign Monarch. We have seen, in the nineteenth book, that this ancient doctrine of human wisdom is, as it were, a distant echo of the divine wisdom; and, joining one to the other, we may establish the following articles of the divine government of mankind.

"ARTICLE I. God only is properly sovereign. ART. II. The Son of God made man, Christ, or the Messiah, has been invested by his Father with this sovereign power. ART. III. Among men there is no power or right to command, unless from God and by his Word. ART. IV. The power is from God, but not always the man who exercises it, or the use which is made of it. ART. V. Both the sovereignty and the sovereign, and both the use which is made of it and those on whom it is exercised, are equally subordinated to the law of God. ART. VI. The infallible interpreter of the divine law is the Catholic Church.

"Hence these consequences:—

"Therefore all that which regards the law of God, conscience, eternal salvation, the whole world, nations and individuals, sovereigns and subjects, are subordinated to the power of the church and of her chief. Hence, also, in all that which interests conscience, civil legislation is subordinated to the legislation of the Catholic Church. Hence the first axiom laid down by a French prelate, M. de Marca, in his book *De la Concorde du Sacerdoce et de l'Empire*, is, that the constitutions of princes and temporal laws contrary to the canons are absolutely null and void.

"To escape this conclusion, it is necessary either to deny to the Catholic Church the right in the last resort to decide doubts concerning the divine law, conscience, salvation, or else to say that the temporal power and laws are not a matter which concerns the law of God, salvation, conscience. Say either, and you will arrive at anarchy, that state in which there is no longer either law or human duty; for if it belongs not to the Catholic Church, undeniably the highest authority on earth, to interpret definitely the divine law, this right belongs to nobody. He, in fact, who refuses it to the highest authority can accord it to none,—to the prince or the nation no more than to the meanest individual. If in this case the prince and the nation are permitted to deride the church and her chief, the meanest individual must be permitted to deride the nation and the prince. The divine law, the only source of duty, will be for man as if it were not. Moreover, if submission to the temporal power and law be not a matter which interests conscience, salvation, it ceases to be a duty to submit to them; then there is no longer any right, no longer any society. There is no medium. Either society is absolutely null, or else it is subordinated to the Catholic Apostolic Roman Church.

"But, as we have seen, this is a hard truth. What king will hear it? It revolted the idolatrous emperors of pagan Rome, them who pretended themselves to be not only emperors, but also sovereign pontiffs and gods. During three centuries they made war on the Eternal and his Christ, in order to repulse the yoke of Christ and his church. But the Eternal

laughed at them, his Christ has broken them and their empire as a potter's vessel beneath his feet.

"This subordination to the kingdom of God on the earth generally displeased the Greek emperors of Constantinople. A few submitted to it with sincerity; the greater part either did it only in an astute manner, or openly refused to do it, pretending themselves to be, if not gods, at least sovereign pontiffs. We have seen the Emperor Nicephorus, in order to justify his adulterous marriage, cause to be declared by a conciliabulum of courtier prelates, that the emperor is above the divine laws. The Greeks of Constantinople were in name and in fact the *Lower* Empire, till it disappeared beneath the cimeter of the Mahometans.

"In Germany, Frederic Barbarossa and the emperors of his race and character pretended to be the living and sovereign law, from which emanate all the particular rights of nations and of kings. Consequently they would not have the divine law interpreted by the church of God. By their force, their address, and their activity, they counted on prevailing against the church, and against the rock on which she is built. They ended by being broken against it, they and all their race. Such are the judgments of God, of which we have been the witnesses.

"In France we have seen a grandson of St. Louis forgetting the lessons and example of his grandfather, above all, the lessons and example of Charlemagne, who called and proved himself a devout defender of the Holy Church and humble coadjutor of the Apostolic See in all things,—we have seen Philip the Fair, walking in the footsteps of the Germans, and the Greeks of the Lower Empire, insult the church in her chief; and we have seen in a few years Philip the Fair disappear, and all his posterity. And France, who, instead of expiating the iniquity of her king, augmented its fatal consequences, we have seen delivered over to the English, and on the point of becoming an English province, when God in his mercy sent a Lorraine virgin [Joan of Arc] who restored France to the French.

"Frederic Barbarossa and Philip the Fair were misled and ruined, among other things, by what are called lawyers, men who study laws, but purely human laws, above all, the laws of pagan Rome, when her Cæsars were at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods, consequently the supreme and only law. More or less imbued with this political idolatry, the lawyers made each prince understand that, instead of being subject to the law of God interpreted by the church, he was himself the living law and sovereign of all laws. Regarding, therefore, as *non avenues* both the authority of the Catholic Church and the sovereignty of Christ on earth, they revived and justified in principle at once both the most odious tyranny and the most frightful anarchy. For if the law of God, and the church of Christ that interprets it, are nothing for kings, they are nothing for the people,—are nothing for anybody; and no one has any law but himself.

"Hence, from the times of these sovereigns we may remark among

lawyers and their like a certain *lower empire* of intelligences, low both as to ideas and sentiments, seeing only matter, only the individual, only the king, at best only a particular nation, never mankind in their integrity, humanity regenerated in God by Christianity, and advancing in the church towards a perfect and triumphant humanity in heaven. They see nothing, wish to see nothing, and will not allow others to see any thing of all this. To prevent it, they alter and disguise facts, or falsify them by malicious interpretations. They dissemble the good, they bring up and exaggerate the evil. It might be said that the Lower Empire of the Greeks, with its baseness of ideas and sentiments, its chicanery, duplicity, and, above all its hatred of the church of Rome, has passed from Constantinople to the West, and become naturalized among the writers of the last three centuries. It is, as it were, an invasion of learned barbarism, which suffers to appear in history only quarrels, wars, and ruins, without any thing that consoles or edifies the heart of the Christian reader. In the assemblage of human ideas, all is confusion, inconsequence, contradiction, incertitude,—a confusion worse than that of Babel. In the confusion of languages one no longer understood his neighbor, but in the confusion of ideas which has perplexed literary Europe for three centuries, men no longer understand themselves. They will not allow that politics are subordinated to the law of God, interpreted by the church of God; they insist that politics shall be the law to themselves; and after having thus indoctrinated kings, queens, and princes, they complain that kings, queens, and princes follow their lessons, and acknowledge, politically, no moral law but their own interest. And what is most strange is, that they even blame the church for their being no better,—the church whom kings and princes would not suffer in the Council of Trent to proceed to their reform, as she did to that of the popes and bishops. They declaim against the theory of Machiavelli, and yet they have themselves no other, and differ from him only in the fact that he knew what he said and what he thought. The sight of this general baseness of the French mind and the incoherence of its ideas moves in us an immense pity for men and the writers of that epoch [the sixteenth century?]. When we see a Francis I. and a Henry II. . . . . league with Mahometans against Christians, and with Protestants against Catholics, while they punish heretics in their own dominions, we are tempted to exclaim, O God, forgive them! for they know not what they do, any more than they who counsel them."*

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* Rohrbacher, 2d edition, Tom. XXIV. pp. 611—614. We have introduced this extract, not only for its intrinsic merit, but also for the purpose of giving our readers a specimen of the author's ultramontanism. The Abbé Rohrbacher's work wants method, is sometimes a little crude and indigested, and is not always consistent with itself ; but it is a work of extensive erudition, written from a truly Catholic point of view, with great sincerity, earnestness, and vigor ; and may be consulted with full confidence and great advantage on all those points on which our popular

The doctrine that the political order is subordinated to the law of God interpreted by the Catholic Church, is of course deeply offensive to sovereigns, courtiers, and demagogues; but that, if we rightly consider it, is no argument against its truth, or against its being fearlessly asserted. It is only by bringing both sovereigns and subjects back to it that we can save society from being the prey, on the one hand, of the most odious tyranny, and on the other, of the most fearful anarchy. It is no new doctrine, invented by us. The supremacy of the spiritual order is a dictate of the most vulgar common sense,—a universal conviction of mankind. It is in the nature of things, and was recognized by all gentile antiquity, however it may have been disregarded in practice. It runs through all the Old Testament, and no one can deny that under the old law, in the synagogue, the kingly power was subordinated to the sacerdotal. The church, as containing in herself the whole priesthood, and all the spiritual authority instituted under the primitive law, and as succeeding to the synagogue and continuing it in all not of a local and temporary nature, necessarily inherits and possesses this supremacy in its plenitude. The very end for which she is instituted and placed in the world, the very nature of her office and mission, presuppose it, and authorize us to assert it for her, even in case no express grant of power over the temporal order by our Lord to Peter could be alleged. For every Catholic, at least, the church is the supreme judge of the limits and extent of her own powers. She can be judged by no one, and this of itself implies her absolute supremacy, and that the temporal order must receive its law, at least its interpretation, from her.

So she herself has always asserted, by the mouth of all her holy doctors, her councils, and her sovereign pontiffs. Through all the long years of what is termed the martyr age, during her long and bloody struggle with pagan and idolatrous Rome, she asserted it and wrote it out in the blood of her dearest children, whom she commanded to

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histories are the most defective or the least trustworthy. The abbé is no mean philosopher, a sound theologian, and a hearty papist. His work cannot be too extensively circulated, or too diligently studied. It is well adapted to the wants of the Catholic world in our own times, and even in our own country, where the laity are to a fearful extent infected with the lowest form of political Gallicanism, and seem to imagine that religion has nothing to do with politics.

submit to all manner of tortures, and to death in its most frightful and excruciating forms, sooner than obey Cæsar against Christ. She has no sooner emerged from the catacombs, and gained a *status* in the world, than she reasserts it, and proclaims in the face of Arian emperors and infidel kings the supremacy of the law of Christ, and her right, as its guardian and judge, to judge all men, of every state, rank, or dignity, and to subject them to her discipline.

Whenever the occasion occurred, she asserted her power, not in empty words only, but in deeds, to judge sovereigns, kings, and Cæsars, to bestow or to take away crowns, to depose ungodly rulers, and to absolve their subjects from their oath of allegiance. Under this claimed and generally admitted supremacy of the church, pagan Rome was conquered, barbarians were subdued, the empires, kingdoms, and states of modern Europe were founded, civil liberty established and protected, nations converted, wholesome laws enacted, and civilization advanced. The human mind awoke from its sleep, rejoiced in new freedom, and felt itself endowed with an unwonted vigor. Men gloried in a sublime ideal, cherished lofty principles, and glowed with noble and generous sentiments. They adopted in their political conduct the Christian law for their guide, saints for their model, and performed deeds, and attained to an heroic virtue, before which the greatest and best of our times seem mean and paltry. Shall we fear to do honor to our noble Catholic ancestors, or to assert the doctrine to which under God was due their greatness, lest we offend the fastidious ears of unbelieving sovereigns, or disturb the tranquillity of graceless courtiers and demagogues, who, to gain political advancement, would not hesitate to sell Jesus Christ to be crucified? Out upon such servility! We have not so learned Christ; we are not so lost to all true manliness. If God be for us, nothing can be against us, and he whose soul is knit in the bonds of love to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, may well defy all the wrath of man and all the rage of hell. Dare be freemen in Christ, or wear not his livery.

The church was doing her work, and civilization was advancing, when one day the German lawyers, courting the favor of a German kaiser, who would be pope as well as kaiser, recalled the old doctrine of the idolatrous emperors of pagan Rome, and assured him that he was the living law, the fountain of all rights and of all honor; that he

was emperor, sovereign pontiff, nay a god, from whom emanated all authority, civil and ecclesiastical, which was therefore held at his sovereign will and pleasure. The kaiser, inflated with his newly discovered godhood, undertook the management of all affairs in church and in state, and to make and unmake bishops and sovereign pontiffs at will. What the German lawyers claimed for the German kaiser, or emperor, the French lawyers, not to be outdone as accomplished courtiers, claimed for their king, the Spanish lawyers for theirs, and the English for theirs. Thus the sovereigns were freed from their subjection to the church, the supremacy of the temporal order was proclaimed, the church was declared a civil institution, to be protected and preserved only to preach the submission of the people to the civil tyrant, and to threaten them with eternal damnation if they dared resist his tyranny. And religion grew faint in men's hearts, the light of truth became dim, faith expired, civilization was arrested, and the world seemed abandoned to the violence and misrule of crowned monsters. Faith, piety, liberty, science, intelligence, morality, all that makes life worth possessing, were extinct in the secular world, and the courtiers applauded, and their dupes called it progress, the emancipation of the human mind from spiritual bondage, the glorious instauration of science and virtue! Would you have us reinstate these dupes, and follow the lead of those old German lawyers, who would make kings and emperors believe themselves at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods, as the old pagan emperors of idolatrous Rome claimed to be?

This doctrine of the German lawyers, since called Gallicanism, and contained in principle in the first of the four Gallican Articles of 1682, introduced into western Europe the politics of the Lower Empire, or of the Greeks of Constantinople, and destroyed the free constitutions of mediæval Europe, and established on their ruins the absolutism of the last three centuries, expressed in the famous *L' État c'est moi* of Louis XIV. All the world has revolted against this absolutism, and kings, and especially the church, are held responsible for it, although the church always opposed it, and her sovereign pontiffs exerted all their power to prevent its introduction and establishment, and it was introduced and established only in defiance of spiritual censures and anathemas. But everybody feels, that to make kings absolute, to give them all power, and free them

from all law but their own will, is not precisely to found and secure civil freedom, or to provide for the well-being of the temporal order. Hence is renewed the doctrine of the responsibility of kings and rulers, but not now their responsibility to God through the church. It is now responsibility to the people. The modern demagogue does for the people what the German lawyer did for the German kaiser. He does not say the people are sovereign under the law of God interpreted by the church; but he says the people are the living law, the fountain of all rights, and from them emanates all just authority, both civil and ecclesiastical. Therefore he makes the people emperor, sovereign pontiff, god. Hence he actually uses the strange terms people-king, people-pontiff, people-god. Read Pierre Leroux, read Giuseppe Mazzini, and you will find these barbarous epithets, or their equivalents, used in sober earnest, and the last-mentioned of these worthies is the recognized chief of the whole European democracy, and commands the sympathy of constitutional England and democratic America. The people are crowned and deified in opposition to kings and emperors, but it is still the assertion of the independence, nay, the supremacy, of the temporal order, and the denial of its subordination to the law of God. The people are king, pope, god, and may do what they will, and hence for the despotism of kings we have the despotism of the mass, social despotism, or rather the despotism of the demagogues who mislead and abuse the people.

But some revolt, again, at this, and will no more submit to king-people than to any other king. They see in the people only a collection of individuals, and will not admit of the whole collectively any more than is true of each individual taken separately. Hence we actually hear individuals, not in a mad house, not looked upon as out of their senses, but honored and held up as the great lights of their age, claim for each individual what the lawyers claimed for the kaiser, what the demagogue claims for the people, and assert, each for himself, I am emperor, sovereign pontiff, and god. It is only the logical consequence of the Protestant doctrine of private judgment, only Protestantism consistently developed. But with this monstrous claim of the individual, no law, no government, no society, nothing but anarchy, is possible. Here is where the movement against the absolutism of kings does and must end. Asserting the independence of the temporal order, it passed on to the ab-

solutism of the mass, and from that it passes on to the absolutism of the individual, the free trade of the late William Leggett, and would pass further, only there is no further; sink to a lower deep, only a lower deep there is not.

Would you have us follow in this track, assert people-king, people-pontiff, people-god, or declare each individual emperor, supreme pontiff, god, for himself? Would you have us, in order not to incur the censure of our age, or offend the god of our demagogues, so belie our common sense, so stultify ourselves, as to accept such arrant nonsense, or rather such horrid blasphemy, which the fools of the day boast as a proof of the light and progress of this nineteenth century? But we must do it, or reassert the Catholic doctrine of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and maintain that the whole temporal order in all things is subordinated to the law of God as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church. We cannot assert the premises of the idolaters of kings, the idolaters of the people, or the idolaters of the individual, and deny their conclusions; for their conclusions follow necessarily from their premises. We must deny their premises, and that we cannot do without asserting the supremacy of the church as guardian and judge of the law of God over both sovereigns and subjects, in temporals no less than in spirituals. There is no medium, save at the expense of common sense or common honesty.

We are aware of the arguments usually adduced in defence of the antichristian and antisocial doctrine of the independence of the political order, but not one of them has the least conceivable force. Our Lord said, we are told, "My kingdom is not of this world." We should grieve to think it otherwise; but how, from the fact that his kingdom is not of this world, infer that it has no jurisdiction in or over this world? The kingdom of Christ does not derive its authority from this world, and is not founded on the principles or maxims of this world; yet it is set up in this world expressly for the purpose of governing it, of reducing the kingdoms of this world to subjection to the law of God, and making them the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." Most assuredly; but what things *are* Cæsar's? Who has the authority to answer this question for us as Catholics? Not Cæsar himself, for he is neither infallible nor impeccable, and may claim somewhat more than his own, nay, the things that are God's, which he has very often done, and is in gen-

eral inclined to do. We will give him exactly what the church bids us give him, not a groat more, though he burn us at the stake, behead and disembowel, or hang and draw and quarter us, for the church is the highest authority. But may not the church usurp the rights of Cæsar, and refuse to authorize me to give him his dues? And if she can do such a naughty thing, who is to decide for us whether she does do it or not? Suppose she does, what she usurps may be as safe in her possession as in his. The church any day is as sovereign as Cæsar, and as safe a depositary of power, and the insolence and encroachments of churchmen, suppose them to be as great as the most shameless courtier or politician ever pretended, are less intolerable than the insolence and encroachments of Cæsar and his satellites. Any day the mitre is above the crown, and the priest above the demagogue. But after all, we have a tolerable pledge of the good behavior, of the justice and discretion, of the church, in the fact that she is the Holy Catholic Church, the church of God, the kingdom of Christ, the immaculate spouse of the Lamb, divinely commissioned and supernaturally assisted by the Holy Ghost to teach and judge the law of God, and to conduct individuals and nations in the way of truth and holiness. We trust her in all that concerns the soul, and it would be a hard case if we could not trust her also in all that concerns the body. At any rate, she is less likely to go astray than Cæsar, and we may safely trust her in preference to him.

But it is a mistake to suppose that our Lord in the text cited is giving a positive demand. He gave no decision, but merely answered a captious question put to him by the Jews. Some Jews, seeking to entangle him and get something whereof to accuse him either before the Roman emperor or before the people, asked him, "Master, is it lawful for us to pay tribute to Cæsar, or not? But he, considering their deceit, said to them, Why tempt ye me? Show me a penny. Whose image and inscription hath it? They, answering, said to him, Cæsar's. And he said to them, "Render, therefore, to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." (St. Luke xx. 22-25.) Here is no decision. It is not our Lord who says the penny is Cæsar's; it is the Jews who say so. He merely says, If, as you say, it is Cæsar's, then render it unto him; for it is the principle of justice to render unto every one his own. But he decides nothing as to this further question, whether

any thing really is Cæsar's or not. The text therefore cannot avail those who would adduce it in defence of the political independence of the temporal order. But even if this interpretation be rejected, the text says nothing against the right of the church to decide what things are Cæsar's and what things are God's.

We are also told that our Lord paid tribute for himself and Peter to Cæsar, and thence is inferred the supremacy of Cæsar in temporals, or the subjection of the church in temporal matters to the temporal lord. But unhappily for our anti-papists, or idolaters of the temporal order, the very text relied on condemns them. "They that received the didrachma [tribute money] came to Peter, and said to him, Doth not your master pay the didrachma? He said, Yes; and when he was come into the house Jesus prevented him, saying, What is thy opinion, Simon? Of whom do the kings of the earth take tribute or custom? Of their own children, or of strangers? And he said, Of strangers. Jesus said to him, Then the children are free. But *that we may not scandalize them*, go thou to the sea and cast in a hook; and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when thou hast opened its mouth, thou shalt find a stater; take that and give it to them for me and thee." (St. Matt. xvii. 23–26.) Our Lord here plainly teaches that he and Peter, and therefore the church, are not subject to tribute, and he paid it only to avoid scandal. The text asserts the absolute freedom of the church even in temporals, or that even in temporalities she owes nothing to the political authority.

All the arguments that can be adduced amount to nothing, for, if any thing is certain, it is that Christ has instituted his church to govern all men and nations according to his law, which she alone is competent to interpret and apply. We only ask our readers to bear in mind, that the church is not herself the civil authority, and that she ordinarily governs the temporal order only through the temporal sovereign. She bears by divine right both swords, but she exercises the temporal sword by the hand of the prince or magistrate. The temporal sovereign holds it subject to her order, to be exercised in her service, under her direction. This is the normal order, and it is only an unmanly fear of offending, or an undue desire to please, secular governments, that has ever led any intelligent Christian to concede the contrary. That the church has always been able to exercise her right-

ful supremacy, or that secular governments have in general shown themselves to be her obedient children, we are far from pretending; but we owe it to her and to them to assert her rights and their duties, and perhaps in doing so we may aid in preparing a better future, and do something to enable her to check the reign of political atheism, and to save society, now threatened at once by both despotism and anarchy, from utter dissolution.

We have dwelt at length on this subject, because we wish to show that those noble popes, who withstood the secular tyrants and deposed them for their crimes against the church and against their subjects, only exercised their rights and discharged the duties of their office. We meet not a few calling themselves Catholics, who regard the conduct of these popes towards the secular power as something to be apologized for, or as something to be excused only by a reference to the false maxims and strange ignorance and barbarism of the times. Even though flaming democrats, if not because flaming democrats, they side with such cruel and debauched tyrants as Henry IV. of Germany and Henry II. of England, and by an unaccountable blindness or perversity insist that the cause of truth, justice, and civil freedom was defended by these crowned monsters against the arrogance, ambition, and rapacity of the sovereign pontiffs. It was no such thing. The cause of truth, justice, civil freedom, is, and always has been, the cause of the church, and these much calumniated pontiffs have often stood alone in its defence, as at one time St. Thomas of Canterbury stood alone in England against the king in defence of the rights of the church of God. The first interest of mankind in every age and country is the maintenance of the freedom and independence of the church, for it is only through her and in her that mankind are redeemed, and able to form and maintain real society. The sovereign that makes war on the church, that denies her her freedom and authority, by that act alone forfeits his rights, and deserves to be deposed, alike in the name of God and in the name of mankind; for the true good of man is inseparable from the honor and glory of God in his church. When, then, we find a sovereign pontiff judging, condemning, and deposing a secular prince, releasing his subjects from their obligation to obey him, and authorizing them to choose them another king, we may regret the necessity for such extreme measures on the part of the pontiff, but we see in them only the bold and

decided exercise of the legitimate authority of the spiritual power over the temporal; and instead of blushing for the chief of our religion, or joining our voice to swell the clamor against him, we thank him with our whole heart for his fidelity to Christ, and we give him the highest honor that we can give to a true servant of God and benefactor of mankind. It is not the sainted Hildebrand, nor the much-wronged Boniface, that we feel deserves our apology, or our indignation, but Henry of Germany and Philip the Fair of France.

The popes have been wronged by timid or time-serving Catholics, and it is time that we learn to do them justice, and free their memories from the foul calumnies with which party spirit and sectarian malice have loaded them. The pope is our father; and shall we not love him as our father? He is dearer to us than natural father or mother, for he is the vicar on earth of our God and Saviour in heaven, and shall we not feel every arrow winged at him speed deep in our own hearts? Shall we not glory in his power, which after all is only the power of the cross? Shall we not sorrow when he is driven into exile by the wicked, and applaud when he strikes down the oppressor, defends suffering innocence, and makes himself the friend of the friendless, the father of the fatherless? O Sovereign Pontiff, Successor of the Prince of the Apostles, Vicar of God on earth, if ever through love of the world, or through fear of the secular power, whether royal or popular in its constitution, we forget to assert thy rights as supreme chief under Christ, our Saviour, of the whole spiritual order, and as such supreme alike in spirituals and in temporals, let our right hand forget her cunning, and our tongue cleave to the roof of our mouth!

We yield to none in our loyalty to civil government, and we are loyal to it because we are loyal to the successor of Peter. Religion with us governs politics, and the pope is lord of Cæsar. Without the pope, the church would break into fragments, and dwindle into puny and contemptible Protestant sects; without the church, religion would become an idle speculation, a maudlin sentiment, or a loathsome superstition, like that which is revived among us by our modern necromancers, or "spiritual rappers"; without religion, the spiritual order disappears, morality no longer exists even in name, and man sinks into a mere animal, wallowing in the mire of sensuality. All history proves it;

all reasoning demonstrates it; all study of our own hearts confirms it. Shall we then be so mad as to attempt to circumscribe the power of the sovereign pontiff, or not to spurn with loathing and disgust that paltry spirit that would rob him of his glorious prerogatives, and make him a base slave of the mob, or of a Byzantine, a German, or a French kaiser? There is no liberty without the supremacy of the spiritual order; that supremacy cannot be maintained without the papacy; and therefore, while others pay their homage to graceless demagogues, or to a Frederic Barbarossa or a Louis XIV., we will reserve ours for the Roman Pontiff.

THE SPIRITUAL NOT FOR THE TEMPORAL.

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We have heretofore proved the supremacy of the spiritual order and the divine right of the power exercised in the middle ages by popes and councils over temporal sovereigns; we resume the general subject of the supremacy of the spiritual order, for all the great controversies of the age—in fact, of every age—turn on the relations of the temporal to the spiritual, and the provisions which Almighty God has made for the practical maintenance of the spiritual order on earth. Protestantism, as we have heretofore abundantly shown, does not, when considered in its essential character, present a rival religion to the Catholic; for whatever of religion Protestants may in reality possess, is derived from Catholicity, and can find its unity and integrity or its complement only in the Catholic Church. In its essential elements, Protestantism simply opposes, in one form or another, the supremacy of the temporal order to the supremacy of the spiritual, which the church always asserts and does her best to maintain. Ordinarily, Protestants are not, we willingly grant, fully aware of this, and in practice seldom attempt to go so far. They commonly attempt a sort of compromise between heaven and earth, in which a certain degree of superiority is claimed for each order. They retain too much of Catholic tradition and good sense, to say, in just so many words, that the temporal order is supreme; but they are afraid to assert

the absolute supremacy of the spiritual, lest they belie their Protestantism, and find themselves forced by an invincible logic to return to the church from which they originally separated, and against which they continue to protest. They seek, therefore, to effect a compromise between the two orders, or as some of them express it, between faith and reason, authority and private judgment, religion and politics; that is, between Christianity and heathenism, grace and nature, heaven and earth, God and man, eternity and time. But since such compromise is, in the nature of the case, impossible, since no man, in the words of our Lord, "can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other," the compromise turns out in the end to be the total sacrifice of the spiritual, or the assertion of pure secularism, that is, the absolute supremacy of the temporal. Hence, we defined Protestantism to be the assertion of the supremacy of the temporal order, therefore not a religion; and though Protestants may not generally in their words go so far, yet the great body of them when hard pressed will not shrink from it,—will hold to the temporal and despise the spiritual, and choose rather to follow their Protestant movement into open apostasy, than to return to Catholicity.*

*Calvinism may seem an exception to this statement. Both John Calvin and John Knox asserted in the strongest terms possible the supremacy of the spiritual order as they understood it, and the obligation of the state to conform to the word of God, and maintained that the state had no right to enact any thing, even in matters indifferent, contrary thereto, and that the magistrate is bound to suppress by law and armed force, if necessary, every thing the church decides to be forbidden by the divine word. The Puritans of New England in old colonial times held the same. Hence they bored the ears and tongues of dissenters, banished Baptists, hung Quakers, and enacted a law making it death or banishment from the colonies to harbor a Catholic priest for a single night or to give him even a single meal of victuals. This, so far as words go, is explicit enough, and certainly in words recognized the general principle of the supremacy of the spiritual.

But unhappily the Calvinistic church was a self-constituted association of individuals, and in no sense the spiritual order, nor its divinely constituted representative. It was a man-made church, having only a human authority, and the assertion of its supremacy over the state was only the assertion of the supremacy of one form of the temporal over another. It did and could govern only by a human, that is a temporal authority, for it had no divine commission, and in Geneva, in Scotland, and in New England, it became in practice the most intolerable tyranny, as long as its authority was respected, that the world has ever known. It still exerts an odious despotism in our own country, not now in the name of God, indeed, but in the name of humanity. So Calvinism really forms no exception to the assertion in the text.

In all the controversies which arise between the church and the state, or between the church and any class of her enemies, it is always a question between the two orders, and the point to be determined is always, Which is supreme? "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." Ye cannot assert that one order is supreme in some things, and the other supreme in other things, as those who contend for the total separation of the two orders foolishly maintain, because the two orders, though distinguishable, are not in reality separable, and because this would leave no authority to decide in what things the temporal is supreme, or in what the spiritual. If you make each the judge of its own powers, of the extent and limits of its own authority, you bring the two orders into perpetual conflict, place them in a state of perpetual hostility, with no possible means of establishing peace between them; you declare the claims of each, however they may conflict with those of the other, just and legitimate, and as the authority of each in determining its own powers is, on this hypothesis, equal, you must maintain that the same claim is both just and unjust at the same time, which we need not say is a palpable absurdity. To escape this inconvenience, you must give the power to determine the province of each order either to the temporal or to the spiritual. If you give it to the spiritual, you declare the spiritual supreme; if to the temporal, you make the temporal supreme. One or the other of these two you must do whether you will it or not. Then you must either subject the spiritual to the temporal, or the temporal to the spiritual. As Protestants do not and will not do the latter, they must be regarded, inasmuch as they are Protestants, as always doing the former.

As the state lies in the temporal order, and the church in the spiritual order, it is clear that every controversy between the church and the state is a controversy between the spiritual and the temporal. And since the church lies in the spiritual order, and is its representative, it is equally clear that every controversy between her and a sect or an individual, let the question be what it may as to its form, is at bottom a controversy between the two orders, and resolves itself in the last analysis into the question, Which of the orders is supreme? Hence we say truly, that all the great controversies of every age turn on the question of the mutual relations of the two orders, and can be disposed of only by first disposing of the question, whether the supremacy be-

longs to the spiritual authority, or whether it belongs to the temporal.

Reduced to its simplest expression, common sense, no doubt, decides the whole controversy; for no man capable of understanding the terms can hesitate to say at once, that the spiritual order is supreme, and prescribes the law for the temporal. This is the traditionary wisdom of mankind, and is also a simple dictate of the reason of all men. Yet it is precisely this that all who oppose the church do really deny, although they may not in general be distinctly conscious of the fact. Most men's heads are confused, and the bulk of mankind, educated or uneducated, at best see men only "as trees walking." They have only a dim and confused view of the questions before them; they do not see them distinctly, in their simplicity and integrity, and seldom see them at all except from the special point of view of their own passion, prejudice, or interest. Hence they affirm or deny more or less than they intend, and often without the slightest suspicion of what it is that in reality they are affirming or denying. In general thesis, a man will admit the authority of the state, and yet in defending some special thesis he will deny it; so in general thesis he will concede without the least hesitation the supremacy of the spiritual, while in every special thesis he defends he will deny it, and assert the supremacy of the temporal. It is the special, not the general, that characterizes, and hence we are to characterize or judge men, not by what in a general thesis they may concede, but by what they assert or deny in their special theses.

In judging the mass of non-Catholics, we make no account of the fact, that in general thesis they concede Christianity to be the true religion, or the spiritual authority to be supreme, because in their special theses they always deny both the one and the other. But in reasoning with them, in endeavoring to refute them, we make use of what they concede in their general thesis as the principle of their refutation. It is only in this way that men are to be refuted and brought back, as far as reasoning brings back, to the truth. A man's special thesis can be refuted only by being shown to be contrary to his general thesis. If men did not concede generally that the spiritual is supreme, or if this, or a more general truth than this which implies it, were not a truth of common sense, or a dictate of the reason of all men, we should and could have no *data* from which to refute those

who oppose the authority of the church, and in their special theses assert the supremacy of the secular order. Proceeding on the principle admitted by all in general thesis, that the spiritual is supreme over the temporal, we established in our last article the supremacy over the temporal order of the Catholic Church, and therefore of the sovereign pontiff, her visible head and supreme governor.

We do not disguise from ourselves or from our readers, that this conclusion is exceedingly offensive, not only to schismatics, heretics, apostates, and infidels, but also to many who would fain pass for good Catholics. We cannot help this. We have every disposition in the world to render ourselves agreeable to all men, and we take no pleasure in displeasing others. But the truth is neither theirs nor ours. It is independent of both them and us, and it would be no less truth were we to disguise it or to deny it. Our affirmations do not make truth; our denials cannot unmake it. The laws of logic are not of our creating, and are not subject to our control. We are ourselves as much subjected to them as are any of our readers. What would be the gain to our readers or to ourselves, were we either to reason illogically or to misstate facts? Our sophistry could not alter the truth, and our misstatements could not change the nature of the facts themselves. If our conclusion is true, it is all-important, and should be told and accepted by all men; if it is not true, let it be refuted. In either case there is no occasion to be angry with us. If the truth offends, it is not he who tells it that is in fault, but he whom it offends. If we err, it may be our misfortune, but it is no reason why you should be offended with us. To err is human, and it is only when a man errs through neglect of doing his best to obtain the truth, or persists in his error after it has either been rationally refuted or declared to be an error by a competent authority, that he can be blamed for it.

We know the doctrine we contend for is offensive to men who forget heaven, and seek only earthly felicity, or who seek to serve at the same time two masters,—God and Mammon; but is it not rather with themselves than with this doctrine that they ought to be offended? Earthly felicity is not the end, nor one of the ends, of man. In the present providence of God, man is not placed here to enjoy, to have his heaven in this world. He is here for trial, in a state of probation, to prepare for another world, and to secure his heaven in a life after death. This world is not our proper country,

is not our home, is not our permanent abode. It is transitory, and with all that it contains passes away, and leaves no trace behind, any more than the keel that splits the wave, or the bird that cleaves the air. Man was not made for this world, nor for its fleeting pleasures. He was made for another world, and his true country, his true home, his true good, is in heaven, which can be reached only by passing through the dark valley of death. All here is of value only in relation to our future life, only as subordinated and made subservient to the final end for which our Creator designed us. All experience proves that we have and can have no real, no permanent good here, because our end is not here. The error is not, then, on our part, or on the part of those who subordinate earth to heaven, or the temporal to the spiritual, but on the part of those who persist in seeking their good from the temporal order, in believing that they are placed in this world to enjoy, and in acting as if earthly felicity were the final destiny of man.

But after all, the doctrine we advocate is not hostile, but in reality favorable, to the real well-being of man, even in this world, and there are ample reasans why we should love as well as believe it. Truth is always good, and, when rightly apprehended, commends itself to our hearts no less than to our understandings. The supremacy of the spiritual, the supremacy of the church, the power claimed and exercised by popes and councils over temporal sovereigns, against which we hear so many violent outcries, is not only in accordance with truth, is not only the order established by God himself, but useful and even necessary to the temporal, the preservation of social order, the maintenance of civil and political liberty, and the promotion of civilization. In other words, the maintenance in practice as well as in principle of the supremacy of the spiritual order represented by the church and her sovereign pontiff, is the necessary condition of all real good for this world, as well as for the world to come; and hence they who oppose us have no less interest than we in maintaining it.

Yet let it not be forgotten, that we state here a fact which may induce men to desire the doctrine, not a conclusive argument for its truth, nor a reason why we are to believe it. The positive institutions of God can be concluded only from positive revelation, and are to be submitted to only on the ground that they are his, and he commands us to receive and obey them; not because we find them useful or neces-

sary to the temporal order. "Seek first," says our Lord, "the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." Here is the doctrine we contend for, in all its length and breadth. If we seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, that is, maintain in all things the supremacy of the spiritual order, all these things, that is, all that we need or that is good for us in the temporal order, shall be added unto us; but it is not for the sake of these *adjicienda*, these goods in the temporal order, that we are to seek the kingdom of God and his justice. Our Lord is not assigning a reason why we should seek God, but why we should not be anxious for temporal goods. To seek God for the *adjicienda* would be to make them the primary object of our seeking, and to fall into the precise error of the heathen and the old carnal Jews, who subordinated the spiritual to the temporal, against which our Lord admonishes us. The church is not instituted for the promotion of the earthly well-being of man, individual or social; for that well-being, as we have seen, is not the end for which man was designed by his Creator. She is not placed in this world for the promotion of civil and political liberty, civilization, or temporal prosperity; but to teach, direct, govern, and assist us to gain heaven, the only end for which we exist. This, the glory of God in the salvation or beatitude of souls, sanctified by him through her ministry, is the sole end of her institution. This glory of God in the salvation of souls is the sole reason why we should embrace her, and submit ourselves unreservedly to her direction. Yet as she is in the world, though not of it, and affects all our interests in life, we may lawfully consider her influence on the temporal order, either as a means of augmenting our love for her, or of removing the obstacles which timid and worldly-minded people find to yielding themselves to her authority; or rather, as the means of removing all our anxiety about the temporal order, of assuring ourselves that, if we are faithful to her, the temporal order can suffer no detriment, and all temporal good that can be called good will follow without any special care on our part, or direct labor for its promotion.

The very doctrine we maintain prohibits us from seeking the spiritual for the sake of the temporal, or religion, so to speak, for the sake of politics. By the supremacy of the spiritual, we do not mean merely its superior rank, or the inferior rank of the temporal, in the hierarchy of life. We

mean altogether more than this. The spiritual is not only superior to the temporal, but is its sovereign, and prescribes its law,—the end it is to seek, and the rules by which it is to seek it. The end, and the sole end, of man is spiritual. He has, *in hac providentia*, strictly speaking, no temporal end, and therefore no absolute temporal good. Every creature exists for some end, which is its good. The good of a creature and its end are one and the same thing. Consequently, there is good or evil for a creature only in relation to its end. All that aids a creature in gaining its end is good for that creature; all that turns it away from that end, or hinders it from gaining it, is evil for it. Man's end is spiritual, and therefore there is for him, strictly speaking, only spiritual good, and the temporal is, and can in the nature of things, be good for him only as it aids him to gain his spiritual end, his heavenly end, for which alone in the decrees of God he exists. The temporal in itself is not evil, for no work of God is evil; neither is it in itself good for us, for it is not our end, and therefore it is and can be good for us only relatively to the spiritual, inasmuch as it is subordinated and made subservient to the spiritual. Evidently, then, it is not lawful for us to seek the spiritual for the temporal, the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of having all these things after which the heathen seek added unto us,—although if we seek first, as the primary object of our pursuit, the kingdom of God and his justice, these things, as far as they can serve us, will be added to us.

We insist here and everywhere, now and always, on the fact, that in relation to man the universe itself has no temporal end. Man exists in the designs of his Creator solely for a spiritual end, and would so exist even if he existed, as he does not, for a natural as well as a supernatural beatitude. God, whether we speak of natural or supernatural morality, is the sole final cause of man. The temporal, by the very fact that it is temporal, and does not exist for itself, is not and cannot be our final cause. We might as well call it our first as our last cause. Nothing can be a first cause that is not in itself complete, absolute, independent, self-existent, and eternal; and nothing else can be a real final cause. Hence the apostle teaches us that all things are *for* God, as well as from him, by him, and in him. It is true, that man is not all spirit, that he has a body as well as a soul; but the body is for the soul, not the soul

for the body. Is it not so? Who dares say that the soul is for the body, the spiritual for the secular, the eternal for the temporal, the heavenly for the earthly, the divine for the human? Who dares say that it is for the body to give the law to the soul, the senses to reason, the secular to the spiritual, the temporal to the eternal, the earthly to the heavenly, man to God? The very thought is no less absurd than impious. The reverse everybody knows is the fact. Then the end of man, individual or social, and therefore of the temporal, is spiritual, in the spiritual order; and here is the foundation of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the church as representative of that order, or as instituted to teach and govern us in relation to our spiritual end. Hence all secular life is subordinated to a spiritual end, and must receive its law from the spiritual, not from itself, or the temporal order; and therefore from the church, if she has been instituted to teach and govern us in relation to our final end, that is, in relation to salvation, to our eternal beatitude in heaven.

We are, then, always to seek the spiritual, or, in other words, religion for its own sake, not for the sake of the *adjicienda*. This is frequently forgotten even by men who mean well to religion. Because "these things" are clearly seen to be added unto those who forsake all for religion, or those who yield a filial submission to the church, some argue as if *therefore* we should seek religion. It is clear from history, that the church is favorable to civil and political liberty, to civilization, and the general temporal well-being of the people, while Protestantism, in proportion as it loses the Catholic elements retained by the early Protestants, tends to barbarism, and to the intellectual and social degradation of the people; therefore, say some, we should be Catholics, not Protestants; but this argument conceals a subordination of the spiritual to the temporal, and therefore cannot be used otherwise than as a mere *argumentum ad hominem*. The church was not, we repeat, instituted for temporal ends. It is he who will lose his life for Christ's sake that shall save it, and he who seeks to save it that shall lose it.

The whole Christian economy is founded on the denial of nature, and reverses the maxims of the natural man; because it starts with the assumption that man's nature has fallen, and by the fall has been turned away from God, therefore from good. Nature is not destroyed by the fall, but it has

received a violent shock, which has turned all its tendencies in a direction from God, its supreme and only real good. Regarded in themselves, inasmuch as they belong to our original physical being, all our primitive tendencies are good, for, so considered, they are the work of God, and no work of his is or can be evil. But if we follow them, we depart from our good, for being turned away from God, they conduct us, not towards our end, but from it. If our nature remained in its normal state, if it stood with its face towards God, not averted from him, its primitive tendencies would all be so many indices of its true end, and we might adopt with perfect safety the old heathen maxim, "Follow nature," or the modern transcendental rule, which is virtually the same, "Obey thyself, follow thy instincts." But averted as our face is from God, we can attain to him only by conversion, and must adopt the Christian rule, "Deny thyself, crucify nature." Here is the difficulty; and here is the great fact which condemns not a few who are far from meaning to deny all religion. There are many who admit that our end is supernatural, who yet fancy that our natural tendencies lead us in its direction, and therefore that they may be safely followed as far as they go. Nature, they suppose, moves in the right direction; but it cannot of itself go to the end, and its deficiency must be supplied by grace. But this is a grand mistake. Our end lies not in the direction of our natural tendencies since the fall, but in the opposite direction, and therefore the natural man must be arrested and converted, turned round, before he can move towards God, his last end and supreme good. And as good for us is only in relation to our last end, it follows that there is no good, absolute or relative, but in denying nature, and in making a holocaust of it to God. We must not seek God in addition to the creature, nor for the sake of the creature, but for himself, and the creature in him and for him. Such, indeed, is our frailty, that we cannot, while in the flesh, permanently love him, purely for his own sake; yet we must aim to do it. Fénelon's error was not in asserting that God is to be loved for his own sake alone, or that we can so love him in this life, but in supposing that we can attain to such a degree of charity, even in the flesh, as to love him habitually, without any reference to him as the object of hope, or as our supreme good. This is not possible, for while in this life hope is always a virtue, and a charity so perfect as to exclude it is reserved

for the blest. We are therefore permitted to seek God as our own good,—to have respect to his rewards, but not for the sake of a good which he is not, or which is not from him and in him. Hence we can never propose the *adjicienda*, which lie in the temporal order, as the end to be sought, or God to be sought for their sake; for this would be to lose both him and them. "He that will save his life shall lose it."

The error we here point out is that into which the secular authority in nearly all ages has fallen. That authority seldom openly denies all religion, but it is very much in the habit of seeking the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of the *adjicienda*, a temporal or secular end. Princes seek to protect and support religion, not for its own sake, or for the spiritual welfare of themselves or their subjects, but for the sake of the state, or rather as an instrument of their own selfish ambition. Their study is to use religion, not to serve it. Some few princes, like Theodosius the Great, Charlemagne, St. Henry, St. Stephen, St. Louis, St. Edward, and perhaps half a dozen others of England and Spain, sought indeed to serve religion, and to promote it for the sake of their own salvation and that of their subjects; but as a general rule they subordinate religion to politics, and protect it, if at all, only as a part of the machinery of government. They proceed on the assumption that all is for the state, and that the end of man is to be governed, or to accomplish the will of the temporal power; and they imagine that they have the right and the duty to use religion as the means of sustaining their own power, and keeping their subjects in submission to their despotic and too often oppressive rule. These remarks, unhappily, apply to professedly Catholic as well as to non-Catholic sovereigns. The emperors of Constantinople, professedly in communion with Rome, rarely suffered the church in their dominions, save as far as they could control her affairs and make her subservient to their political purposes. Frederic Barbarossa of Germany, Philip the Fair of France, Henry Plantagenet of England, as well as a multitude of minor sovereigns, all professed to be Catholics, and there is no reason to suppose that any one of them ever meditated a renunciation of the faith, or for a moment wished the Catholic religion abolished in their respective states. They only wished to prevent it from being their sovereign, and to make it subservient to their temporal views. They would

have religion but for the sake of the *adjicienda*, not for the sake of God and heaven. The same is true of all the Catholic sovereigns of Europe since the Protestant reformation. We are not aware of a single Catholic sovereign in modern history that has regarded religion in any other light than as a branch of the police, although several of them have been personally pious. As princes, they have asserted the total separation of the two orders, and in their public and official conduct have looked upon the church merely as the auxiliary of the government, and religion as subordinated to the interests of state.

It is to this fact that we must attribute the frightful scandals of Catholic Europe for the last two centuries. The revolt and opposition of the Protestant nations of Europe in the sixteenth century, and the wars which followed for over a hundred years, enabled the Catholic sovereigns to assert their independence in temporals of the spiritual power, to suppress the estates, and to establish their absolute power. From the latter half of the seventeenth century, absolutism was established throughout nearly all Europe. It was successfully resisted, after half a century of civil war, only in England, and even there only for the Protestant portion of the population. As far as Catholics were concerned, whether English or Irish, the state even there was absolute, sovereignly despotic and oppressive. In all the great continental states the political order was based on the despotic principles of pagan Rome's degenerate cæsardom. The maxim of the old Roman law, *Quod principi placuit, id legis habet vigorem*, was everywhere adopted. In no Catholic state even was the church free. She was everywhere circumscribed by the secular power, and could communicate with her members or they with their head, only by virtue of a royal or imperial *placet*. The assemblage in council of her bishops was prohibited, and the bishop could not address a pastoral to his flock without the license of the secular authority. The secular power went so far as even to prohibit bishops in the same kingdom from corresponding with each other. The state was not satisfied with being independent in temporals, it even assumed to be supreme in spirituals, maintaining that religion was for the state, and bound to serve its interests, or rather the pleasure of the sovereign. The chief agent in effecting the degradation of religion in the Catholic states of Europe, in the seventeenth century, if we except, and

perhaps if we do not except, Cardinal Richelieu, was Louis XIV., the greatest revolutionist France has ever had; for the chiefs of her revolutions in 1789 and 1848 only followed his example and sought to carry out his principles. They only attempted for the people what he effected for the prince. The civil constitution of the clergy condemned by Pius VI. was only the necessary pendant of the *Declaration* which he forced from the French clergy in 1682, and which, though annulled by Innocent XI., continued, and perhaps still continues to be regarded by the civil authority as in force. Spain, once the most Catholic state in Europe, with the accession of Philip V., the grandson of Louis and the first of her Bourbon sovereigns, lost almost the last relic of her civil freedom, and adopted the despotic maxims which France had borrowed from the Byzantine court and pagan Rome. Portugal followed in the train, and at the beginning of the present century had proceeded so far as to prohibit all communication on the part of her clergy with the Holy See. In Catholic Germany and the present empire of Austria the same maxims obtained. Joseph II., aided by his infamous minister, Kaunitz, brought the church in his empire to the very verge of schism, suppressed over two thousand religious houses, and expelled some twenty thousand religious, assumed the sovereign control of ecclesiastical affairs in his dominions, and prohibited all communication with the pope save through the government; and his infamous laws against the freedom of the church, and subjecting ecclesiastical affairs to the control of the imperial chancery, remained in force till the accession in 1848, of the present pious and noble-spirited young emperor of Austria. Such was the freedom of the church throughout Catholic Europe from the death of Cardinal Mazarin down to the revolutions of 1848.

Now in this fact we may find the proximate cause of that corruption and social degradation of the Catholic population of Europe in the eighteenth century, especially in France under the regency, and at the breaking out of the revolution of 1789, which non-Catholics, in their profound philosophy, charge upon the Catholic Church. This corruption and degradation have no doubt been exaggerated, and were more than matched by those of Protestant Europe; yet they were undeniably great and scandalous, and we have no disposition to deny or to disguise them. But they resulted from the separation of the temporal and the spiritual, from the

temporal independence of sovereigns, the restrictions placed by these independent sovereigns on the freedom of the church, and the efforts of princes, statesmen, lawyers, and philosophers to subordinate religion to the state, and to make its ministers mere police officers. It cannot be contended that this separation, this independence, these attempts of the secular power, and these restrictions on the freedom of ecclesiastical discipline, are due to the church, and approved by her; for she aways opposed them, and did all in her power to resist them, as non-Catholics and Gallicans not only concede, but contend, since their standing charge against her is, that she seeks to rule over temporal sovereigns, and to be supreme in all things. The civil governments, during the period we are considering, were independent of the church; the sovereigns ruled in civil matters as seemed to them good, regardless of all admonitions of the spiritual authority; and they stripped the church in their respective dominions of all her possessions, of all her rights and liberties, which they regarded as incompatible with the sovereign power and the true interests of the secular order. They followed the counsels, not of the church, but of civil lawyers, enlightened and free-thinking statesmen, and liberal philosophers. Their ministers were frequently Protestants, and even Jews, men who, we are to presume, had none of the bigotry and superstition of the dark ages; and if sometimes they were served by churchmen, they were such as had nothing of the spirit of the church, such as paid no respect to what are called ultramontane doctrines, and such as preferred the temporal to the spiritual, and subordinated the church to the state. Their policy was precisely, at least in principle, that which all who oppose the church approve and contend for even now, and directly opposed to that Catholic policy of the middle ages against which our liberal editors protest, and try to laugh at us for seeking to revive. How, then, can its natural and inevitable effects be charged to the Catholic religion? Have you not declaimed with all the strength of your lungs against the power formerly exercised by popes and councils over temporal sovereigns? Do you not protest, in season and out of season, against all intervention of the church in secular affairs? Do you not claim the whole temporal order for Cæsar, and boldly assert his right to govern it independently of all control or dictation on the part of the spiritual authority? Do you not fearlessly maintain that Cæsar has the right to subordinate the administration

of religion to the interests, or what he judges to be the interests, of the state, and to deprive the church of all power over the state, or to resist its enactments? Is not this what you are asserting for him now in Piedmont and Switzerland? How, then, hold the church responsible for the temporal condition of the people during the period when your own policy prevailed? From the last half of the seventeenth century down to our own days, Cæsar has been independent of the spiritual authority; he has had the supreme control of the temporal order, and prohibited the discipline of the church so far as he saw proper, as Lord John Russell proved, in order to justify his Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Where, then, is the justice in holding her responsible for the evils which have accrued in the temporal order under Cæsar's absolute sway? Do you need to be told, that, to separate the temporal from the spiritual, and prohibit the church from all interference in the temporal order, you must charge to Cæsar, to the state, not to her, the evils that you may find in that order to deplore? You could charge them to the church only on condition that Cæsar had submitted himself to her direction in both temporals and spirituals, and she had encountered no resistance in either order to her commands. We deplore as much as any one can the moral and social degradation of the people of Europe during the eighteenth century; but we cannot forget that the generations so immoral and so degraded were formed under the despotism of Cæsar and the prevalence of Gallicanism, or the doctrine that separates entirely the two orders, denies the church all authority over temporals, and proclaims the emancipation of civil rulers in their public capacity from the law of God as interpreted by the church, and we find no cause to blame her, but only most powerful reasons for asserting the necessity and utility of maintaining her supremacy in all things, and of condemning in the strongest terms of which language is capable, the folly and impiety of those sovereigns, statesmen, lawyers, courtiers, and demagogues who seek to restrict her freedom, to restrain her discipline, and to deprive her of her right to pronounce judicially on the morality of the acts of the secular power.

It is a grave mistake to suppose that all is Catholic in Catholic countries, and that the church there has every thing in her own way. Scarcely a professedly Catholic government, from the first Christian emperor down to the last of the German kaisers, or to the present emperor of the

French, has left the church perfectly free to enforce in her own way her own discipline, and has been ready in all things to lend her, when requisite, the support, for that purpose, of the secular arm. As a general thing, professedly Catholic governments, as well as others, have shown themselves at all times jealous of the ecclesiastical authority, and sought to treat ecclesiastics officiating in their respective dominions as subject to their jurisdiction. They never willingly recognize the church as the kindom of God on earth, independent of all earthly kingdoms, and above them all, instituted for the express purpose of making the kingdoms of this world the kingdoms of God and of his Christ,—of teaching and directing all men and nations in the way of holiness. Even when they cheerfully admit her as doctrine and as worship, they only reluctantly recognize her as a kingdom, as government, as law. They claim to be themselves, each in his own dominions, the supreme and only government, and hence, when the church presents herself in the aspect of a government, and of a government that claims to govern not only abstractions, rites, and ceremonies, but men, and men, too, in every department of life, in their souls as well as their bodies, in their relations to earth as well as to heaven, to their temporal rulers as well as to their spiritual chiefs, she seems to them a dangerous rival, and they place themselves on their guard against her, and seek to deprive her of her governing power, and to confine her action to a subordinate sphere. This would be well enough if the secular government were, as it assumes to be, the supreme and only government, if God had nothing to do with the temporal order, or if it had pleased him to intervene in the government of mankind only through the medium of the state ; that is, if the state, and not the church, were the kingdom of God on earth. It would also be well enough, if the church were a mere human institution, and not, as she is, the church of God, divinely constituted and commissioned for the very purpose of teaching and applying to sovereigns as well as to subjects, and to sovereigns in their public and official capacity as well as in their private capacity, the supreme law, the law which all alike, and in all things, are bound to obey. But nothing is or can be more unreasonable or unjust, when it is conceded, as all must concede, that the spiritual order is supreme in all things, and when it is understood that the church is God's representative, and sole representative, of the spiritual order on earth.

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Nevertheless, this jealousy on the part of Catholic, as well as non-Catholic states, is a "fixed fact," and imposes restrictions on the liberty of the church. The church, being herself a purely spiritual kingdom, spiritual in her origin, in her proceeding, and in her purposes, has not of herself, in her own body, the means requisite to give to her discipline its proper effect in the temporal order against the consent of the temporal authority. Her canons cannot have their civil effect without the concurrence of the state, and the state will rarely give its concurrence without some concession on the part of the church, and a concession which restricts the exercise of her spiritual authority. The state will do nothing gratuitously; it will do nothing from a sense of obligation on the part of the secular power to obey and serve the spiritual; it always insists on treating with the church as a foreign, or at least as a coördinate, power. For every service it performs for religion it demands a concession. One concession granted paves the way for another, which, if not granted, is usurped, and the church generally finds herself obliged in the end to acquiesce in the usurpation as the less of two evils. In this way the church is so hampered by precedents, concessions, and concordats, that she often finds herself less free in Catholic than even in non-Catholic countries.

In fact, the worst enemies the church for the last two hundred years has had to contend with, have not been either Protestants or Turks, but the professedly Catholic governments of Europe. The old French revolution and the late revolution that established a republic, or rather the tyranny of the triumvirate, in Rome, were bad enough in all conscience, but they were not so bad as the royal and imperial governments of the greater part of Catholic Europe. They were too violent to last long, and their evil effects could be only temporary. The injury done by open violence, though terrible for the moment, is necessarily short-lived. After the storm there comes the calm, in which the damages undergone may be repaired. But the evils which result from foresight, from a deliberate and settled policy, though imperceptible at first, prove, in the long run, to be the most deplorable, and, moreover, precisely those which it is the most difficult to repair. A Constantius is a more fatal persecutor than a Decius or a Diocletian. These nominal Catholic sovereigns, professing themselves to be sons of the church, contributing, it may be, to the maintenance of the

clergy and to the pomp and splendor of public worship, perhaps, like Louis XIV, though well-nigh in open schism with the church, going even so far as to tolerate no worship but the Catholic, and using their military force to suppress hostile sects, yet constantly encroaching on the ecclesiastical authority, demanding concession after concession, and threatening universal spoliation or schism, if she does not accede to their peremptory demands, backed by the whole physical force of the kingdom, are really more injurious to the cause of religion, more hostile to the influence of the church, than open and avowed persecutors, even the most cruel. Under pretence of favoring religion, and providing for its wholesome and efficient administration, they labor to enslave and corrupt it. The church has to bear with them, to negotiate with them, and, to escape the evils of spoliation or schism, to yield to them, as far as she can without self-annihilation. In consequence, religion becomes half-secularized, her ministers dependent on the temporal sovereign, and the faithful, no longer fed on strong meat, become weak and puny, and fall prostrate at the first blow of adversity. All this must deeply afflict our mother, the church, and cause her to weep tears of blood over the sad condition of her children. We cannot name a single professedly Catholic state that has afforded, for these three hundred years, more than a momentary consolation to the Holy Father. The bitterest enemies of the Holy Father have been of his own household, and the only sovereigns in the eighteenth century, and the first half of the nineteenth, that treated him with respect, were, we grieve to say it, sovereigns separated from his communion. Pius VII. was indebted to Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, for the restoration of the temporal possessions of the Holy See, usurped by one Catholic emperor and retained by another. How absurd, then, to suppose that all in Catholic states is Catholic, that even professedly Catholic sovereigns are always, or even ordinarily, the obedient sons of the church, and that she is responsible for all that is done in countries where she is legally recognized!

We have, as Catholics, a few grievances, and many annoyances, to complain of in this country, but there is no Catholic country in the world where the church is as free and as independent as she is here, none where the pope is so truly pope, and finds, so far as Catholics are concerned, so little resistance to the full exercise of his authority as visible head of the church. The reason is, not that the government here

favors or protects the church, but that it lets her, for the most part, alone. Yet we cannot help thinking, that, were our republic to establish the Catholic religion by law, and profess itself Catholic, it would very soon seek to subject the church to its authority, to abridge her freedom, and labor to obtain the control of ecclesiastical affairs. It would soon fancy, that, in return for the great favor to the church of professing the Catholic religion, it ought to have a voice in her government,—at least the nomination of pastors, or a veto on their nomination; and the first to suggest something of the sort, we need not doubt, would be some miserable Catholic politician, demagogue, or courtier, borrowing the civil maxims of pagan Rome, or of the Lower Empire, and anxious to prove to his non-Catholic colleagues that he is too liberal and enlightened to submit to priestly domination. Alas! scandals must needs come, but woe unto him by whom they come. The church in this world is always the church militant, and the empire of Cæsar is always, when not subjected to the law of God as she interprets it, the empire of fraud and violence, against which she does and must wage unceasing war.

Our constant readers know perfectly well that we have no sympathy, republican as we are, with the European revolutions of the last century and the present; but they may not have observed that we have always maintained that those revolutions were, though not justified, provoked by the despotism and corruption of morals and manners which preceded them. Their causes, aside from the inborn corruption of human nature, are to be sought in the tyranny and licentiousness of the royal and imperial courts of Europe, which the assertion of the independence of the temporal order, and the encroachments of the secular power on the spiritual, rendered the church unable to correct. The European sovereigns, by asserting their independence, by separating the temporal from the spiritual, by rejecting the authority which in happier times popes and councils had exercised over the temporal, and by subjecting the ecclesiastical affairs of their respective states to the control in a greater or less degree of the secular power, were able to render themselves absolute and to reign as despots, pretending, with James I. of England, that royal pedant, to hold their crowns immediately from God, and therefore to be responsible for their public and official conduct directly to him, and to no other; or, in other words, to be subject to his law only as interpreted by

themselves for themselves, and not as interpreted for them by the church of God. Borrowing from Protestant England the doctrine of the divine right of kings and passive obedience, a doctrine which lost the unhappy and wrong-headed Stuarts the crown of the British Isles, and which, as understood in opposition to the right of the church to teach and apply the law of God to sovereigns as well as to subjects, is a virtual assertion of political atheism, they expelled the church from the state, and fancied that they might disregard all her admonitions, and govern according to their own arbitrary and despotic wills, without any impeachment of their orthodoxy or their personal piety. Though holding themselves in their public and official conduct entirely independent of the church, they yet, for the most part, professed the Catholic religion, and insisted on its being the religion of their subjects. They insisted that it should prescribe the duty of subjects to honor and obey their sovereigns, but took good care to prevent it from prescribing to the sovereign the correlative duty of practising justice towards his subjects, especially from pointing out explicitly to sovereigns what is the justice they owe to those intrusted to their government. They thus degraded religion in the popular estimation, rendered her unable to restrain the lawlessness of sovereigns, and presented her to the people as the accomplice of despotism, and as upheld solely to enable kings and kaisers the more effectually to oppress their subjects. They thus necessarily begat in the minds of the people a distrust of the clergy, and weakened the hold of religion on the popular heart.

Moreover, the example of the greater part of the courts of sovereigns was any thing but edifying. This was especially true of the French court, which, from Francis I. down to the death of Louis XV., was unenviably distinguished for its profligacy. Francis I. is a favorite with the popular writers of France, and we deny not that he may have had some generous impulses, but both as a sovereign and as a man he deserves utter detestation. As a sovereign he fought against the head of the church of which he professed to be a member, leagued with the Turks, the avowed enemies of Christendom, and introduced them into Hungary, Italy, and even his own kingdom of France. As a man, he was a monster of vice and profligacy, and there goes a story of a beautiful maiden of the south of France, selected by a town council to present him a petition, who was so alarmed by the libidinous looks he cast upon her,

that, as soon as she escaped his presence, she washed her face with *aqua fortis* and destroyed her beauty for life,—a far more heroic act than that of the ancient Lucretia, so extolled by ancient and modern poets. Henry III. would have been distinguished even in Sodom; Henry IV. was notorious for his profligacy, and if he embraced the Catholic faith, he took good care never to practise Catholic morals. Louis XIII. was weak and sickly, and we know nothing against his personal character; but Louis XIV. till his old age led a scandalous life, and even after he was broken by his misfortunes he wished to make his bastard progeny sovereigns of the Most Christian Kingdom and Eldest Daughter of the Church. The Regent Orleans and Louis XV. with his *parc aux cerfs*, and his Pompadours and Dubarrys, shameless harlots, for his prime ministers, have become proverbial for all ages, and can hardly be matched among the basest sovereigns of the Lower Empire or most degenerate Cæsars of pagan Rome. The profligacy of the court extended to the nobility and higher classes, and the corruption of morals and men now became general. Civil tyranny kept pace with the loss of decency and the increase of vice; and what wonder, that, when it began to excite the spirit of revolt against the government, the altar was associated with the throne, and priests shared in the hostility incurred by kings and their ministers and courtiers?

Alas, poor people! had you been better informed, or had you been better able to discriminate, you would have seen that your profligate masters had sacrificed the freedom of the church before they sacrificed yours, and that she had become the victim of their tyranny before you, and for the sake of you, because she would maintain justice and preserve you from slavery. If she continued to preach submission to you, it was not because she approved the conduct of your masters, or the manner in which they treated their subjects, but because submission was your wisest course, because she would open to you a source of spiritual consolation, and because she would preserve you in a condition to save your souls,—after all, the only thing a wise man can look upon as worth a thought or a wish. Had she broken openly with the profligate sovereigns, it would have remedied no evil, and only made matters worse. You yourselves, corrupted by the false doctrine of the independence of the temporal order, by the all-prevailing Gallicanism which they had commanded to be taught you, would have supported them against her had she fulminated her spiritual

censures against them, and have regarded her as transcending her province, and encroaching on the prerogatives of sovereigns. She did all that you permitted her to do for you; she was the only friend you had left on earth, and you were worse than mad when you turned against her, cursed her as your enemy, and plunged your daggers into her maternal bosom.

Nevertheless, these revolutions were provoked by the despotism and licentiousness of the courts and higher classes, and were only a just judgment of God on the lawless sovereigns and nobles for their outrages upon his immaculate spouse. Deplorable as have been their ravages, in vain were it to deny that they have been serviceable to the cause of religion, and therefore to mankind. They have taught the people, for some time to come, we hope, the madness of rebellion, and the folly of attempting by anarchical and infidel revolutions to realize a paradise on earth; they have broken many of the bonds with which the church had been bound by civil rulers; and they have impressed effectually on the minds of sovereigns, we would fain hope, that, if they would have religion serve the state, they must leave her free,—free to follow her own laws, under the direction of her own divinely appointed chiefs, without any let or hindrance from them. They have done this, because they have appeared in their own character, as open enemies of religion, as undisguised persecutors of the church, which never suffers, but always gains, by open, avowed persecution. It is disguised persecution, persecution not seen by the faithful to be persecution, and which finds an accomplice in their loyalty, and deprives them of the merit of martyrdom, that does the mischief. We are no enemies to the monarchical form of government, and we do not believe that the democratic form, even tempered as it is with us, is adapted to any European state; but we confess that we have no tears to shed over the fate of the royal or imperial families of Europe, dethroned or exiled or guillotined by these Jacobinical revolutions. Especially have we none for the princes of the house of Bourbon. They, with the exception of the all but martyred Louis XVI., deserved all they suffered, and still suffer, for their jealousy of the papal power, and their unrelenting persecution, in France, Spain, and Naples, of the children of Loyola.*

* Alas! the hopes here expressed, in 1853, are yet far from being realized. The people have not profited by the lessons read them, and the rulers are madder than ever. 1872.

These remarks and historical references, while they amply vindicate the church from all responsibility for the corruption and degradation of Catholic Europe, in the last or the present century, prove that the utility of religion even in a social and political point of view depends entirely on her being recognized as supreme, and sought for her own sake, not for the sake of that utility. We wish to impress this truth on a class of friends who regard themselves as having been enlightened by recent events, and who now are loud in declaring the worthlessness of all institutions, social or political, not based on religion. Events have taught them that the state, that society itself, is an idle dream, without religion for its support; *therefore*, say they, we must have religion. But we fear that, while these recognize the utility and the necessity of religion, they do not recognize the only conditions on which it can serve their purpose. To seek religion for the sake of society, is to seek the kingdom of God and his justice for the sake of the *adjicienda*. It is to subordinate the spiritual to the temporal, and to deny the supremacy of the church. Emancipated from religion, we grant, there is no state, no society, properly so called. In the absence of religion men can only vacillate between despotism and anarchy. The independence of the temporal order was first asserted in favor of sovereigns, and the result was despotism, the loss of all civil freedom, and the general dissolution of manners. It was then asserted in favor of the people, and the result was anarchy, and the threatened dissolution of all society. The people themselves, alarmed at the abyss opening before them, have just now recoiled, and evidently recur once more to monarchy, —to throw themselves into the arms of despotism again, as the less of two evils? Perhaps so, and certainly so, if the independence of the temporal order continues to be asserted. This will be followed by new popular revolutions; for if sovereigns are not bound to submit to the law of God as interpreted by the church, the people are not bound by that law so interpreted to obey their sovereigns, and they will continue to seek relief from despotism in new revolutions, as they will seek relief from anarchy in new returns to despotism. All this is evident, and the only remedy is in religion. But if we seek religion expressly as a remedy for this evil, for the state or for society, and not for itself, not for a spiritual end, it will avail us nothing; for we then leave the temporal order supreme, make its well-being the

end, and religion merely the means. Religion must be sought, not as the means, but as the end, of the temporal, and as the means solely of saving our souls, and glorifying God, or it can serve no good purpose whatever.

Furthermore, it is not religion, as an abstraction, as doctrine, or as a *cultus*, that will serve our purpose here; it must be religion in her proper character, religion as law, religion as goverment, religion as a kingdom,—the kingdom on earth of the King of kings and Lord of lords. It pleased the Almighty to found on earth, for the government and salvation of men, a spiritual kingdom; not an invisible kingdom, but a visible kingdom,—as visible as the kingdom of France or of Great Britain. This kingdom we call the church, and the church is everywhere represented in the Holy Scriptures as a kingdom, the kingdom of God set up on the earth. She is instituted to teach, to pray, to give thanks, to be the medium of grace, but she is also instituted to govern, and is invested with plenary authority, and all the faculties and organs necessary to govern. As sentiment, as doctrine, as worship, the Catholic sovereigns of Europe of whom we have spoken, even at the worst, accepted religion, protected it, and enforced its observance. Probably not one of these sovereigns, and very few of their ministers, ever believed or thought for a moment that the state could be firm, or society exist, without religion. There is no non-Catholic sovereign even, as far as we are aware, that doubts the absolute necessity of religion to maintain society and secure the stability of civil government. Victoria of Great Britain, Nicholas of Russia, the Grand Turk, is as certain of this as Francis Joseph of Austria, or Napoleon III. of France. It is the commonplace of all statesmen in all countries and ages of the world. Even Robespierre was convinced of it, and inaugurated the worship of the *Être Suprême*, and the most debauched set of French atheists demanded a *culte*, and instituted the worship of Reason, under the symbol of an infamous prostitute. The point is not to maintain religion in general, or even the Catholic religion simply as dogma and worship, but to maintain the Catholic religion in all its authority as the kingdom of God on earth. The spiritual order, all must admit, is supreme; but it has pleased our Heavenly Father to give this order a visible embodiment, a visible and special representation, to maintain, as far as possible with the free will of man, its supremacy in the affairs of the world. He has not given it two repre-

sentatives, one in spirituals, and the other in temporals, because to have done so would have been to divide what is essentially indivisible. The state, as distinguished from the church, is purely temporal, and therefore has, and can have, no spiritual function. But to suppose it the representative of the spiritual, in so far as the spiritual applies to the temporal, would be to suppose the temporal spiritual, and would in effect be, in all that relates to the temporal order, the emancipation of the state from the law of God, and the subordination of the spiritual to the temporal, contrary to the admitted truth, that the spiritual order is supreme. Supposing, then, a representative at all of the spiritual order, we must suppose that representative is one and indivisible, and represents the whole spiritual order on earth. There is no alternative, then; either the church is that representative, that embodiment, and has alone the authority to apply the spiritual to the whole temporal, state and all; or the state itself represents the spiritual, and the spiritual is absorbed in the temporal, and the state has the sole authority, as Hobbes taught, to interpret and apply the law of God in all things,—which is even a more absolute civil despotism than that of the Grand Turk, who in his spiritual decisions must consult the Grand Mufti, the mollahs, or doctors of the law. The last no man in his senses can admit, for it is the virtual denial of the spiritual, and the assertion of the supremacy in all things of the temporal, which is itself virtual, if not formal, atheism. We must then take the other alternative, and assert the church as the sole representative of the spiritual, and therefore as the supreme and only spiritual authority on earth. Consequently, as the spiritual is confessedly the sovereign of the temporal, we must admit her, not as the state, or as the supreme temporal authority, but as the supreme authority for applying the spiritual to the state, and determining the spiritual law, which in all its acts the state is bound to consult and obey; and it is only when so admitted, so recognized, that she can afford a firm support to the state, or save society from dissolution. She was not so admitted by the Greek emperors of the Lower Empire, and they and their empire have passed under the dominion of the Moslem, and become only a byword and a reproach. She was so admitted for a time in western Europe, and the barbarians were civilized, the states and empires of the modern world founded, and modern civilization created and cherished. She ceased after the Protestant rebellion to be

so admitted, and the state became a prey to anarchy, and society itself, three years ago, seemed threatened with utter extinction. It is only by being so admitted again, that society can be reëstablished, and good order confirmed.

It is, then, the church as a spiritual kingdom, the kingdom of God on earth, through which God governs secular kingdoms, and through which secular sovereigns are responsible to him for their exercise of their powers, that we want, on which we must place our dependence, and for which we must contend, if we expect religion to save society and confirm the state. Discipline belongs to the church as much as doctrine, and she bears the keys as well as the word, and her liberty is as much infringed when she is denied the liberty of exercising the power of the keys, as when she is denied the liberty of teaching, or of celebrating mass. She has authority over all persons, whatever their state or dignity, to bind and loose, and God assures her that whatever she binds or looses on earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven. This power is that which constitutes her a kingdom, and gives her the faculty to govern. Without it she might teach and pray, and advise, and entreat, but could have no power to make her doctrines observed or her precepts obeyed. To deprive her of this power, to prohibit her from fulminating spiritual censures, and binding the violator of God's law, whoever he may be, would be to reduce her to the level of a sect or of a school of philosophy; and to resist the exercise of this terrible power is no less sinful than to deny the truth she teaches. It is by this power especially that she is able to enforce the obedience of subjects to their sovereigns, and the practice of justice by sovereigns to their subjects, and therefore it is only by recognizing this power, and allowing her free scope for its effectual assertion, that she can exercise that guardian care of the state, and have that conservative influence in society, which late events have proved to be so indispensable.

This granted, it is easy to see the wisdom and necessity of the papal constitution of the church. The church is a kingdom, a power, and as such must have, if she is to exercise her authority, a supreme chief. This authority is to be exercised over states as well as over individuals; therefore the church as a government must be catholic, for otherwise it could not govern all nations; it must be one and catholic, otherwise it would be subjected by each sovereign in his own dominions. And this unity and catholicity are im-

possible without the monarchical constitution, without its subjection to a single head, with supreme authority over the whole body, prepared at any moment to exercise that authority on any point and against any enemy that may be necessary. This is the point towards which we have been looking from the first, and contains the practical lesson which we wish to impress on the minds of our readers. The church is built on Peter, and its defence is all included in the defence of Peter, as the state is defended in defending its sovereign. *Ubi Petrus, ibi ecclesia.* But though we have reached the point at which we have been aiming, we must reserve its development and defence to a future number.

THE SPIRITUAL ORDER SUPREME.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1853.]

These three volumes by the Abbé Jager furnish, upon the whole, the best and most satisfactory history of the French Revolution, from 1788 to 1793, that we have read, and we have been reading histories of that revolution ever since we can remember. As a history of the church in France, it stops too soon, unless more volumes are to be added; and it is not so full as we could wish in its details of the clergy during the period from the abolition of the Catholic religion to the suppression of the constitutional church by the concordat of 1802, the most glorious period for the clergy of France since the early days of the Gallican church. We want a fuller history of the sufferings and fidelity of the confessors and martyrs among the French clergy, religious, and faithful, from 1792 to 1802, than any we have seen, or, so far as we are aware, has as yet been published. A full history of these martyrs and confessors would be no less edifying than that of the Christians during the persecutions of the early ages, and would prove that, however far France for the moment had gone astray, or however frantic she had

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* *Histoire de l'Église de France pendant la Révolution.* Par M. L'Abbé Jager. Paris: 1852.

become, her heart remained thoroughly Catholic, and that not in vain had she placed herself under the protection of the holy mother of God.

Certainly, prior to 1789, the clergy and religious of France were far from being in all respects an edifying body, and several members of the episcopacy, as well as a large number of the second order of the clergy, were tainted more or less with the new doctrines of the philosophers, and gave much scandal; but when the hour of trial came, it is remarkable how few were found wanting, and seldom, if ever, in any country or in any age, has the church suffered so severe a persecution, in which the constancy and firmness of her children were upon the whole more consoling to her maternal heart. The Catholic heart is not grieved at suffering and martyrdom; it is grieved only by the prevarication or the apostasy of the faithful. Comparatively few of the French clergy of either order prevaricated, and still fewer apostatized. The great body of them listened to the voice of the Holy Father, and chose to suffer imprisonment, exile, and death, rather than desert their faith, and admit the supremacy of the temporal over the spiritual. It was not, as we had been early taught to believe, as royalists, except in rare instances, that the clergy were persecuted; it was as Catholics, and their fidelity was first and foremost fidelity, not to the monarchy, but to Catholicity,—not simply to their king, but to their God. This puts for us a new face on the conduct of the revolutionists, and on the constancy and sufferings of the clergy, and commands the highest love and reverence for Catholic France from every Catholic heart.

The deputies of the clergy in the states-general of 1789, especially those chosen from the *curés*, committed, there is no question, great mistakes; and if they had been more firm in maintaining the rights and interests of their order, it is not impossible that the revolution would have been arrested, and France spared the horrors and bloodshed that followed. But we should not forget that we live after the revolution, and are able to judge of the conduct of all parties as instructed by its example. In 1789 there were only a few who could foresee what a people clamoring for liberty, with the rights of man, benevolence, and brotherly love on their lips, would do when broken loose from the restraints of authority, and taking themselves for their own guides and masters. How could these country curates, who were not without sympathies with the people, who had grievances of

their own to redress, and who knew little of the world out of their respective parishes, distrust the fair-spoken demagogues, not yet known to be demagogues, who made them fair promises, and seemed to them to be intent only on removing real evils, and regenerating political France? Who could expect them, till their faith as Catholics was directly attacked, to foresee the dangers threatened to religion by the political reforms proposed? Surely religion is not the accomplice of tyranny, and is no supporter of political and social abuses, and what danger then has it to apprehend from correcting these abuses and providing guaranties for public liberty? None in the world, if you attempt it only by lawful means, under the direction of men who have the real interests of religion and society at heart, and in obedience to the call of reason and charity, and not by unconstitutional means, under the direction of infidel philosophers, Jansenistic demagogues, and visionary theorists, and in obedience to the call of revenge, selfish ambition, wild enthusiasm, and Utopian dreams. But this was but imperfectly seen at that time, because there had been no recent experience to enlighten the mass of ecclesiastics, and because for a hundred years the tendency in France had been to regard politics as an independent order, entirely distinct and separate from religion. The clergy had accepted and been indoctrinated in the Four Articles of 1682, and were as unprepared to appreciate as they were to withstand the movements of 1789.

The clergy, with some honorable exceptions, certainly betrayed in the beginning the interests of their order; but in this they did no more than had been done by the assembly which put forth the famous Four Articles a hundred years before, and they betrayed their order not now in favor of the king, as did that assembly, but, as they believed, in favor of the nation and of liberty. The nobility, too, were false to their own order, and the king betrayed both nobles and clergy, and the monarchy to boot. It seems to have been one of the misfortunes of the time, that the king, the nobles, and the clergy, looked upon their respective orders as personal matters, rather than constituent elements of French society. Louis XVI. was no fool; he had good natural parts, had been well educated, was sincerely pious, and had a most excellent heart; he loved his people, and there was no sacrifice that he was not willing to make for their good; but he could never understand, nor be made to understand,

that the quarrel was not personal, or that it was France, not simply himself and family, he sacrificed in refusing to defend the throne. Not one drop of blood, he said, shall be shed for me or my family. This was well, was noble, for Louis XVI. as a private man, but for him as king it was not well. It was either an abdication of the sovereignty, or else an implied assertion that he was king only for his private benefit. He was not king for his private benefit or that of his family, but for the benefit of France, and it was his duty to defend his rights, not for his own sake, but for the sake of the public good. The rights of the crown were not his private property: he held them as a sacred trust, and was bound to defend them, and to the full extent of his power to transmit them unimpaired to his successor, according to the fundamental constitution of the kingdom. He might have restored and he ought to have restored to the estates of his kingdom the rights which his predecessors had usurped; but to go further was to become himself a revolutionist, a traitor to France. Unhappily, he never understood this, and, unwilling to shed blood in his own personal cause, he would suffer no efficient steps to be taken to protect the monarchy. Louis XIV. claimed the crown as his private property, and usurped the rights of the nation to his own profit; Louis XVI. regarded it equally as his private property, and parted with it to the injury of the nation, and to the profit of nobody. We honor in him the generosity, the humanity, and the self-denial, of the private man, but we are obliged to censure and almost despise the weakness of the sovereign.

The nobility, from far less honorable motives, were faithless to their order. Nobility was an order in the state, and existed and was supported for a public reason. It had no doubt private rights or privileges which it might surrender, but it had no right to annihilate itself as one of the estates of the kingdom. France was in theory, and had been in practice, a constitutional monarchy. The government consisted of the king and the three estates,—the clergy, the nobility, and the commons,—sitting in separate houses and voting by orders. True, the estates or states-general had not been summoned since 1614, that is, for a hundred and seventy-five years, which was a serious damage; but the summoning of them in 1788 to meet in 1789 indicated the intention to restore the legal constitution of the kingdom to its vigor. The law which required the estates

to sit in separate houses, and to vote by orders, should have been enforced from the first, or rather should not have been suffered for a moment to be drawn in question. It never would have been questioned but for the revolutionary doctrines of the followers of Voltaire and Rousseau, and of these doctrines the nobility were at the time the chief patrons. The nobility were indeed the last to unite with the Tiers État, but it is clear that they held out not from patriotic motives; and when they did unite, and consent that the three orders should be merged in a single national assembly, and vote *per capita*, they abandoned, through selfishness and hatred of the clergy, their own order. They united with the deputies of the commons in abasing the royal authority, and in despoiling the clergy, evidently with the expectation of gaining for themselves what was wrested from the king and clergy. But when they had unduly depressed the royal authority, and sacrificed the clergy, their turn came round, and they became the victims of their allies, the commons. They were compelled either to emigrate, or to atone for their infidelity with their blood on the Place de Grève, while the lurid light of their burning castles gleamed on the midnight sky. They, by attacking the old constitution of their country, hoped to gain something for themselves; but the king and clergy, by abandoning their trusts, could only expect to lose their personal advantages, and their conduct, however mistaken, or deplorable in its results, commands in some measure our respect, because it was disinterested.

With all the faults committed by the deputies of the clergy, it must be acknowledged that it was chiefly among them that were found the men who really comprehended the nature of the struggle in which the nation was engaged, who defended old rights and privileges on the true ground, and who knew how to reconcile authority with liberty. There was no class of deputies in the Constituent Assembly that showed so much patriotism, so true a love of liberty, so much statesmanship, and so much real courage as the clergy; and if they committed faults, nobly, heroically, and amply, with a few exceptions, did they atone for them. Only four bishops out of one hundred and thirty-five took the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, and of the second order of the clergy, less than one third; and a large number of these subsequently retracted, were reconciled to the church, and atoned for their crime by suffering heroically for the

faith. This fact, so honorable to the French clergy of the period, proves of itself that the so-called Gallicanism, however earnestly it may have been adopted by the court and a few courtier prelates and dignitaries of the church, was more of a speculation than a settled conviction with the French clergy in general. In the hour of her pride and her prosperity, France preached Gallicanism, set up her nationalism against the papacy; but always in her heart of hearts she was the most papistical of all Catholic nations, and most favorably in this respect does her conduct contrast with that of England under Henry VIII., as well as with that of Germany under Joseph II. It is customary with some, even at the present day, to sneer at the French seminaries as Gallican; but as stanch ultramontanists as we have in our own country may be found among bishops and priests who studied their theology in the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris. We confess that we love and honor Catholic France, and all the more, the better we become acquainted with the ecclesiastical history of the Gallican church during the terrible days of the old revolution.

The Abbé Jager is an able writer, and his views are in general profound and just; but in tracing the causes of the revolution, he does not seem to us to go far enough back. He traces them back only to Voltaire and Rousseau. The influence of these two chiefs of the army of Satan, we by no means deny. The philosophy they taught or encouraged, the abominable doctrines they inculcated, and the political speculations which they, especially the latter, so widely circulated, so eagerly caught up by the *bourgeoisie* and the younger members of the nobility, no doubt had an immense influence in weakening the hold of religion on the hearts of multitudes, in corrupting the manners and morals of the higher classes, and in giving to the revolution its special tone and character; but we think the real authors of the revolution are to be sought in Louis XIV., and the Assembly of 1682. Louis XIV., aided by Cardinal Richelieu and his successor, Cardinal Mazarin, who prepared the way for him, had usurped all the powers of the state for the crown, and established, in defiance of the old constitution of the kingdom, absolute monarchy, which, as long as man remains what he is, can be in practice only despotism. Having virtually suppressed the states-general, he left no organized check on his arbitrary will, except the church. So long as the great body of the people of any country hold

the Catholic faith, absolute monarchy can exist only in name, if the church be left free, and her bishops and clergy independent of the state, responsible only to their own spiritual chief. Louis could effect his purpose and establish the absolutism he adored only by destroying the freedom of the church and the independence of the clergy. This he attempted to do by the declaration he forced from the too famous Assembly of 1682. That declaration was indeed drawn up by the great Bossuet, but it is probable that he acted from prudential considerations, and consented to go the length of the Four Articles, only that he might prevent the Assembly from going further, and rushing into absolute schism and heresy. He may have feared that, in the temper of the king and of many prelates and ecclesiastics at the time, there was danger that France would follow the example of England under Henry VIII., separate herself from the Holy See, and set up a national church under the king for pope, and the archbishop of Paris, perhaps, for patriarch,—a measure which would have pleased the courtiers, and enchanted the Jansenists. But we do not think the danger was so great as was apprehended, for France has always been in her heart attached to the Holy See, and never could be rendered schismatic, save for a brief moment. Louis XII. was obliged to abandon the Concilabulum of Pisa and his five cardinals, and the great Napoleon, in the height of his power, found it necessary to dissolve the council he had convoked against unity. The Catholic sentiment of France under the Directory rose against the civil constitution of the clergy, and would soon have forced the government, whoever was at its head, to reëstablish communion with Rome. After the first rude shocks, after the first stunning effects of the revolutionary measures, the faith and piety of the nation began to revive, and Bonaparte only anticipated the real wish of France in soliciting the concordat of 1802. Yet Bossuet may have feared a schism, and is to be excused if he did, and his motive is to be honored, even if, enlightened by subsequent events, we are forced to doubt the correctness of his judgment.

The Four Articles of the French clergy have generally been opposed, at least, as far as we are informed, almost exclusively on the ground that they deny the infallibility, unless accepted by the church, of the papal definitions of faith and morals; but this denial is not their essential character, and is only incidental to their main purpose. The

infallibility of the pope, when defining faith or morals for the whole church, we are told, may be denied without formal heresy, because it has been controverted, and has not yet been explicitly defined; but, with the great body of Catholics, we hold it to be true, and should regard ourselves as guilty *in foro conscientiæ* of heresy were we to deny it, for the evidence of its truth is conclusive to us, and it is not of Catholic faith only in the sense that the church has not by a formal judicial act so declared it. But the Four Articles bear on our present discussion chiefly in their teaching as to the relations of the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal. The essential point of the Gallican declaration is the assertion of the entire separation of church and state, the denial to the church of all authority, direct or indirect, over the temporal order, and the declaration of the absolute independence of the state in temporal affairs, as expressed in the first of the Four Articles: "Beato Petro ejusque successoribus Christi vicariis ipsique Ecclesiæ rerum spiritualium et ad æternam salutem pertinentium, non autem civilium ac temporalium, a Deo traditam potestatem . . . . *Reges ergo et principes in temporalibus nulli ecclesiasticæ potestati Dei ordinatione subjici, neque auctoritate clavium Ecclesiæ directe vel indirecte deponi, aut illorum subditos eximi a fide atque obedientia, ac præstito fidelitatis sacramento solvi posse*, eamque sententiam publicæ tranquillitati necessariam, nec minus Ecclesiæ quam imperio utilem." We certainly do not mean to imply that it was the intention of the Assembly to assert the absolute independence of the temporal order, for its members professed to be Catholics, and intended, it is to be presumed, to assert nothing contrary to Catholic faith; their purpose was, we suppose, to deny the authority of the church over sovereigns, and to assert the independence of kings and princes in temporals. They no doubt held that the state is bound to be just in the management of temporal affairs; but, by denying all authority of the church as a government over princes in the temporal order, they left the prince free to judge for himself, in that order, of the justice as well as of the wisdom or prudence of his acts, and therefore emancipated him in temporals from all obligation to obey the law of God as interpreted and applied by the church, which was in effect to emancipate the whole temporal order from its subjection to the spiritual order; for the church, the pope as visible head of the church, is the sole representative of the spiritual order on

earth. They declared the prince free, so far as the church is concerned, to rule his subjects as he saw fit, and gave him the right to adopt any and every measure of public policy which he should judge to be for their temporal prosperity or well-being, whether in accordance with the teaching of the church or not. They thus entirely separated politics from religion and morality, withdrew them from all spiritual jurisdiction, and abandoned the political order to the judgment, the mercy, the will, or the caprice of Cæsar, with no right on the part of Peter to take the least conceivable cognizance of his temporal government. Consequently, they removed by their declaration all check imposed by the church on the arbitrary will of the sovereign, and left Louis XIV. the absolute monarch he wished, and, till God began to send him afflictions, he was determined, to be.

Under the political relation the Gallican Declaration of 1682 was simply the complement of the revolution of Louis XIV., in favor of absolute monarchy; under the ecclesiastical relation it excluded the church as a governing body from the state, and greatly weakened her moral force even in spirituals. It tended in the first instance to depress the power of the papacy in favor of the episcopacy; in the second instance, to depress the episcopacy in favor of the presbytery; and in the third, to depress the presbytery or *clerici* in favor of the laity, and thus to prepare the way for the assertion of the absolute supremacy of the state, not only in temporals, but also in spirituals, as was fully proved in the proceedings of the National Assembly which decreed the civil constitution of the clergy. The original vice of the Four Articles was in the separation of the two powers, and placing the state and the church, each in its own order, on the same footing, each holding immediately from God, independently of the other; which assumed the secular prince in seculars to be as high and as independent a sovereign as the pope is in spirituals, or that God had made Cæsar as supreme in the one order as he had Peter in the other. It placed the two orders on a footing of perfect equality, as two coördinate powers, and made Peter and Cæsar equally independent and supreme. If in spirituals Peter could say to Cæsar, "I am your master," in temporals Cæsar could say to Peter, "I am your lord, and you are my subject."

To this specious theory, which is still popular even with many Catholics, there are one or two rather grave objections. In the first place, the normal relation of the two

orders is not, and cannot be, that of equality or mutual independence, because the temporal order, as we have heretofore shown, exists for the spiritual, not for itself, and is therefore subordinate to the spiritual, and consequently subject to the spiritual sovereign, in obedience to whose authority the temporal sovereign must govern. This lies in the nature of the case, and cannot be denied, if we concede any spiritual order at all. In the second place, the separation of the two orders supposed is not and cannot be a fact. The two orders are distinguishable, but not separable. The temporal is never without the spiritual, any more than the creature is without the creator. It is impossible in practice to draw a line of demarcation between them, so that the one shall never overlap the other. There is no state without law; there is no law without justice, and justice, whether natural or supernatural, is always in the spiritual order. The church in her tribunals takes cognizance of sins against natural justice, no less than of sins against faith and the sacraments. Nobody can deny to the spiritual authority the right to do this, and contend that sins against natural justice are not sins against God, are not spiritual offences. The real office of the prince, the real mission of the state, is to maintain natural justice in society, and for this purpose the magistrate bears the sword; but the state is not constituted the supreme interpreter of the law of nature, the supreme judge to declare what is or what is not even natural justice. Its office is principally executive, and is legislative or judicial only within the sphere of simple human prudence. It must take the law, the justice, or the morality of its policy from the spiritual authority, and defer to it in every question of right and wrong in the natural, no less than in the supernatural, order; for to interpret the law of nature, natural right, which the revealed law always presupposes and confirms, is just as much a spiritual function as it is to interpret and apply the revealed or supernatural law itself. Now as the state supposes the natural law, as temporals are all subjected to this law, and cannot rightfully be withdrawn from the sovereignty of natural justice, to make the secular authority independent and supreme in civil and temporal affairs is to clothe it with spiritual attributes, and to declare it in the temporal order a real spiritual authority, which is to deny the very separation of the two powers asserted, and to fall into the contradiction and absurdity of declaring the purely temporal authority at once temporal and spiritual.

The separation and independence of the two powers, declared by the Assembly of 1682, are therefore impracticable and absurd.

But grant it for a moment. Then the prince is and must be supreme judge of the natural law, as applicable to the temporal affairs of his subjects. The revealed law does in no instance abrogate the natural law. It presupposes and confirms it. Then nothing can be enjoined in the revealed or positive law that conflicts or can conflict with the natural law. Then, if the church demands any thing that conflicts with his judgment of what is enjoined by the natural law, he has the right to refuse obedience. This makes the prince the judge not only of the natural law, but, to a certain extent, of the revealed or supernatural law. If the prince is supreme judge of the natural law as applicable to civil and temporal affairs, in regard to which, say the Assembly of 1682, the church has received no power from God, he then has the sovereign right to adopt any and every measure for the temporal well-being of his subjects or of his principality, that he judges to be authorized or permitted by the law of nature or natural justice, and to overrule any judgment of the church to the contrary, or any provision of the revealed law that conflicts with his own judgment. Suppose, then, he regards the modification or the suppression of the Catholic hierarchy, or the ecclesiastical organization in his dominions, as essential to that well-being. How can you deny his right to effect such modification or suppression? Do your best, then, your Gallicanism becomes Febronianism, and asserts the right of the civil authority, leaving the revealed dogma and the sacraments untouched, to determine the government and discipline of the church, and the civil constitution of the clergy decreed by the National Assembly in July, 1790, is only its legitimate development.

The revolution of 1789, then, was, on the one hand, only the reaction of old constitutional France against the absolutism effected or very nearly effected by Louis XIV., and, on the other, the natural development of the independence of the civil authority asserted by the declaration of the thirty-five bishops of the Assembly of 1682. Even the movement of Voltaire and Rousseau is in some sense justified by that declaration. The Jansenists were the children of the Protestant reformers, and the philosophers were the offspring of the Jansenists. But it cannot be denied, that

the declaration of 1682 was favorable to the Jansenists, inasmuch as it depressed and restricted the power of the Holy See, detracted from the moral weight of the papal constitutions, and rendered the suppression of heresy by the spiritual authority practically difficult, if not impossible. The Assembly practically asserted the right of inferiors to define the rights and powers of superiors, and when once the principle that inferiors have the right to define the authority of superiors is admitted, there is no end to its application. All authority is subverted, and superiors can have no authority, except such as the inferiors choose to concede them. Jansenian bishops, under cover of this principle, could contest the papal constitution condemning them. Jansenian presbyters could dispute their orthodox bishops, as these had the pope, and the laity could restrict the power of the clergy of either order at will. The Jansenists were naturally irritated against the popes and bishops who condemned them, and the more so, in proportion as their respect for their authority was diminished. They became also irritated against the monarchy, which displayed its force against them, and the more so, in proportion to its responsibility, increased by the independence conceded to it by the Four Articles. Hence they prepared the way for Voltaire and Rousseau, and for the hostility to the church and the monarchy, and to all authority, which was displayed by the philosophers and their dupes.

The Four Articles must, if reduced to practice, be so interpreted as to make the civil authority the sole and supreme judge of the natural law. The tone or temper of mind that would so interpret them would assert the natural as the limit of the revealed law, and assume that there can be nothing in the latter opposed to the monarch's interpretation of the former. But, after all, the monarch is human, and his authority is only human authority, which of itself alone does not and cannot bind conscience. It binds conscience only by virtue of its conformity to the laws of nature. But the law of nature is only another name for natural reason; consequently there can be in revelation nothing repugnant to natural reason. But reason is all and entire in every man, and therefore whatever claims to be the revealed will or law of God that is repugnant to *my* reason, is false, is fraud, or imposture. In practice, with our corrupt nature, this will be *my* individual right to judge of the law of nature, and to reject as false, as

fraud, as imposition, whatever is repugnant to *my* reason, to *my* will, to *my* passions, or to *my* caprice. Here is Voltaire, and the whole of him, and here, too, is Rousseau, at least in part. Rousseau was more comprehensive than Voltaire. Voltaire was simply the Luther of the eighteenth century; Rousseau was at once the Luther and the Calvin of the same century. He was a critic and destroyer, like Voltaire and Luther; he was also a constructive genius, like Calvin. In destroying authority, he labored with Voltaire; in seeking to construct, to organize, he went beyond him. The Four Articles had, in the secular interpretation of them, declared kings and princes absolute,—that is, had declared absolute and supreme the civil authority, and reasserted the old maxim, *Quod principi placuit, id legis habet vigorem.* But St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Bellarmine, Suarez, Du Perron, Fénelon, and nearly all Catholic doctors of any note, except Bossuet, who in this seems to have followed James I. of England and the legists of the courts of Frederick Barbarossa and Philip the Fair, teach that kings derive their power from God through the people, and hold it as a sacred trust from God for the nation. The real human sovereign, then, is not the king, but the people or the nation, and therefore the absolutism asserted by the Four Articles for kings and princes is, by an easy and necessary transition, asserted for the people or the nation. And here is the remainder of Rousseau, the democratic part,—the substitution of the nation or the people for kings and princes. As the people have the right to institute government for their common good, and as they are, since sovereign, the sole judges of what is or is not for their common good, they have the right to alter, modify, or suppress all existing laws, usages, institutions, of whatever name or nature, which they judge to be repugnant to that good, and to introduce such new institutions and laws as they judge to be favorable to it as they understand it for themselves. Here is the French revolution, the suppression of the Catholic hierarchy, and the enactment of the constitutional church,—the substitution of democratic for monarchical despotism. All follows logically enough from the absolutism of Louis XIV., and the independence of the temporal authority asserted by the Assembly of 1682.

We think too much influence has been attributed to Voltaire and Rousseau and their confederates. The Jansenists and Protestants had more to do with forming the civil con-

stitution of the clergy, and the persecution of Catholics, than the philosophers. We do not believe philosophers are ever able to revolutionize any state, either for good or for evil. They are a proud, high-pretending class, but usually weak and inefficient. Without the deplorable antecedents of Louis XIV. and the Declaration which he forced from the French clergy, Voltaire and Rousseau would have labored in vain to shake the faith of the French people, or to overthrow the French state. Their infidel philosophy had corrupted a portion of the nobility, and of the wealthier members of the *bourgeoisie*, it is true, but even at the opening of the states-general it had not touched the great body of the nation. It prevailed in the châteaux, the saloons, and, to some extent, among the people in the capital and large towns of the kingdom; but it had hardly penetrated into the provinces, and the people generally retained their faith, as the instructions of the electors of all orders, especially of the clergy and the commons, to their deputies to the states-general amply prove. Its adherents, in the beginning, were only a minority even in the states-general, and if the friends of order and religion had been as active and as energetic as their opponents, they could easily have crushed the revolution in the bud. The measures so hostile to religion afterwards decreed by the National Assembly, could not in the beginning have obtained even a hearing. The fatal measures which were adopted in the summer of 1789, when the clergy were everywhere applauded as the warm friends of liberty, would, notwithstanding the union of the three orders in a single assembly, voting *per capita*, have been indignantly rejected, had they not been looked upon as purely political measures, having no important bearing on religion. There was a strong dislike to absolute monarchy, there was an absurd craving for equality, that is, of every man to secure to himself the highest round of the ladder; but there was no general hostility to the church, no general animosity against the clergy.

The first fatal measures, those which we can now easily see involved all that followed, were taken with the approbation or the acquiescence of the greater part of the clergy themselves, and supported by ecclesiastics, who proved, by their subsequent conduct, that they were firm in their attachment to the church, and ready to die for the faith. They saw not, they suspected not, whither things were tending. They had been taught to regard politics as separate

from and independent of religion. They had been trained under the Four Articles, and many of them under these articles as developed and understood by courtiers and Jansenists. Regarding politics as a distinct and separate sphere from religion, they followed heedlessly the political direction given by the adroit few who wished to *decatholicize* France, without once stopping to inquire whether they were not conceding in the state principles which they must disavow the first moment they recurred to the rights and interests of religion. They did not think of applying their principles as Catholics within the arena of politics, and committed themselves to the dangerous measures before suspecting them to be dangerous.

Moreover, the bishops and clergy, conceding on all occasions the doctrine of the Four Articles, were unable to oppose with strict logical effect the attacks of the revolution on the rights of the church. They professed themselves ready to yield to it in every thing pertaining to the temporal order, in every thing that did not touch the spiritual authority. But who was to decide where the temporal ended and the spiritual began? The church? Then the Four Articles had no sense, for then the church was supreme in all things, inasmuch as she defined both her own powers and those of the state; and therefore the clergy, in saying they recognized the independence of the state or of the National Assembly in temporals, meant nothing, and used only vain words. The state? Then when the Assembly declared the measures it adopted purely political measures, the bishops and clergy were bound on their own principles not to oppose them, unless on political grounds. The bishops and clergy, throughout all the controversy excited by the anti-Catholic measures proposed by the *côté gauche*, were evidently embarrassed by the Four Articles. Their thought was sound, was ultramontane, but they undertook to bring it out and defend it under Gallican forms, which deprived it of its practical power. What they wanted to say was: The church is supreme, and you have no power except what you hold in subordination to her, either in spirituals or in temporals. You say your measures are only political, and are only such as you are free, by virtue of the independence of the political order, to adopt. This is nothing, for you are not your own judges in either order. You no more have political than ecclesiastical independence. The church alone, under God, is independent, and she de-

fines both your powers and her own. The question for you is not whether your measures are purely political or not, but whether they are such as she leaves you free to adopt; for not even in the political order are you free to adopt any measures which she disapproves. This would have been plain, consistent, straightforward, and left no room for equivocation, for craft, or subtlety in confusing the question, and misleading the judgment; but this language the Four Articles forbade to be used.

Furthermore, by having taught the people the independence and supremacy of Cæsar in the political order, they had given occasion for the mass of the people to entertain an honest doubt, of which the revolutionists availed themselves with terrible effect, whether the measures objected to by the bishops and clergy were not within the competency of the civil power. The enemies of the church contended throughout that their measures touched only temporals, that they left the spiritual power, the Catholic religion itself, intact; and as they really made, so far as the poor people could perceive, no change in doctrine or worship, how were these poor people—who had always heard it said that the church had no political power, that she is incompetent in temporals, and that all temporal affairs are of the domain of Cæsar, who is as supreme in his order as she is in hers—to be assured that the National Assembly had transcended the powers of the state, and that the opposition of the clergy to its measures did not spring from self-interest, fanaticism, or aristocratic and monarchical tendencies, instead of conscientious attachment to religion and fidelity to the church? Certain it is, that large numbers supported the constitution, and persecuted the nonjuring clergy, who were by no means in their own estimation apostates. The majority of the National Assembly even intended to retain the Catholic religion, and went the length they did only because they held that the measures they adopted were political, and not spiritual, and therefore within the competency of the political power.

Do Thomas F. Meagher, and the not inconsiderable number of Irishmen in this country who sympathize with him, intend to renounce their faith, or imagine that they cannot do all they propose to do without ceasing to be good Catholics? Not at all. They doubtless are well aware that they have no strong claims to be regarded as pious and devoted Catholics, but they suppose that their movements are all in

a sphere independent of the church, and therefore such as may be prosecuted without any impeachment of their religion. These movements, in their judgment, are wholly in the political order, and they have heard it said, from their youth up, that the church has nothing to do with politics, that she has received no mission in regard to the political order, and they therefore very naturally conclude that they are under no kind of obligation to render her any account of their political conduct.

So was it with a large portion of the French people in 1789. In opposing the nonjuring bishops and priests they believed they were only asserting their natural rights as men, or as the state, and were merely resisting the unwarrantable assumptions of the spiritual power. If they had been distinctly taught that the political authority is always subordinate to the spiritual, and had grown up in the doctrine that the nation is not competent to define, in relation to the ecclesiastical power, its own rights, that the church defines both its powers and her own, and that, though the nation may be and ought to be independent in relation to other nations, it has and can have no independence in face of the church, the kingdom of God on earth, they would have seen at a glance, that to support the civil authority against the spiritual, no matter in what measures, was the renunciation of their faith as Catholics, and the actual or virtual assertion of the supremacy of the temporal order. Brought thus distinctly to the point, and compelled, without any subterfuge or any sophistry to confuse and bewilder their understandings, to choose between the Catholic religion and the constitutional religion, we feel confident that very few would have prevaricated, and that the National Assembly would have found general execration, instead of popular support, for its schismatic and infidel measures. The independence of the political order asserted by the Four Articles, laid the people open to the influence of artful leaders, who wished to destroy the church, and rendered but too many of them deaf to the expostulations of their legitimate pastors. We look upon the French revolution, therefore, as a judgment of God on the king and nobility, and especially the clergy, for their unfaithfulness to their trusts, for their betrayal of the rights and non-performance of the duties of their respective orders, and as a practical demonstration to the whole world of the dangerousness to the state, to the nation, and to religion herself, of the doctrine asserted in the too famous Gallican Declaration of 1682

There is always, even in the most Catholic times and in the most Catholic states, a party more or less numerous, who have no conception of religion as law, or of the church as a kingdom, with a constitution, laws, and chiefs of her own, set up on the earth with plenary authority, under God, over states and individuals,—a party who never think of the church as a divinely constituted government, even in spirituals, and count for nothing her external organization, her mission, or her discipline. The creed, the sacraments, and the ritual comprise, for them, the whole of religion, and they never can or never will understand why these may not be just as salutary when held out of unity as when held in it. If a bishop has really received the episcopal character, and if he holds the substance of the Christian doctrine, and observes the approved ritual, they see no reason why his ministrations are not of the same value, when he receives his mission, his jurisdiction, or investiture from the state, as when he receives it from the successor of Peter. The authority, the mission, the external unity of the church, or her unity and jurisdiction as a government, never strike them as essential elements of her constitution, or as necessary to be believed and maintained in order to believe and maintain the Catholic religion. Here was the difficulty in France during the revolution. The great body of the faithful knew the church as the revelation of God, as the sacraments, and as worship; but owing to the innate jealousy of the temporal power, and perhaps to the necessary prudence on the part of the church of doing or saying as little as possible to irritate this jealousy, or to give offence to Cæsar, no small portion of them had remained comparatively ignorant of her as the kingdom of God set up on the earth for the *government* of all men and nations, states and individuals. They recognized in her authority to teach the symbol and to administer the sacraments, at least in a restricted sense; but when there was question of government, and the word *kingdom* was mentioned, they thought only of the state, and were ready to exclaim, in their simplicity, with the Jews who demanded of Pilate the crucifixion of our Lord, "We have no king but Cæsar!" This is what gave to the Jansenists, Protestants, and philosophers in the National Assembly, and out of it, their fearful power over a portion of the French people, and what took away from the faithful pastors their legitimate influence over their flocks.

In these revolutionary times the great point to be spe-

cially insisted on, it seems to us, is, that the church is a government, a kingdom, the Kingdom of kingdoms, and Principality of principalities. What is most important is, to understand that she is an organized power, divinely constituted, assisted, and protected, representing the divine authority on earth, and as such universal and supreme. How the state is organized or by whom administered, is a matter of comparative indifference. The state may be monarchical or republican, aristocratic or democratic, if it only be understood and conceded that over it, as over every individual, there is a spiritual kingdom, a spiritual authority, commissioned by God himself, to interpret and apply his law to every department of human life, individual or social, public or private; for if such authority be recognized and submitted to, no interest, temporal or spiritual, can fail to be protected and promoted.

Undoubtedly, the assertion of this authority is a delicate matter, owing to the utter confusion which obtains in men's minds respecting it; but we pray such of our readers as have some little candor and good-will to bear in mind that to assert this authority is by no means to merge the state in the church, or to claim for the church direct temporal authority, although even to claim for her direct temporal authority is not, to say the least, forbidden to the Catholic. What we here assert is, that the spiritual authority, in the nature of the case and by the express appointment of God, extends beyond what are ordinarily called spirituals,—to all matters which do or can interest conscience, or concerning which there can arise any question of right or wrong, true or false. The church, we grant, nay, maintain, is spiritual, and governs in reference, and only in reference, to a spiritual end; but as the temporal order subsists only by and for the spiritual, she, though not it any more than God is the world, not the temporal authority itself, has, as the God whose representative on earth she is, supreme authority over it, and the full right, under God, to declare for it the law it is bound in all things and at all times to consult and obey.

We do not, indeed, claim for the church in relation to the temporal authority the right to make the law, for God himself, and he only, makes the law; but we do claim for her the right to declare and apply his law to kings and princes, states and empires, as well as to individuals, in public as well as in private matters. The church, of course, has

no right to depose a legitimate prince, that is, a prince who has the right to reign, or to absolve his subjects from their allegiance, for she has no right to do wrong or to violate the law of God, and we are not at liberty to suppose that she ever does, ever will, or ever can, for she is holy and infallible by virtue of the in-dwelling and assistance of the Holy Ghost; but she has the right to judge who has or has not, according to the law of God, the right to reign,—whether the prince has by his infidelity, his misdeeds, his tyranny and oppression, forfeited his trust, and lost his right to the allegiance of his subjects, and therefore, whether they are still held to their allegiance or are released from it by the law of God. If she have the right to judge, she has the right to pronounce judgment, and order its execution; therefore, to pronounce sentence of deposition upon the prince who has forfeited his right to reign, and to declare his subjects absolved from their allegiance to him, and free to elect themselves a new sovereign.

She has the *right*, we say, to pronounce sentence, but whether the sentence shall be carried into effect or not in the temporal order depends, in point of fact, on that order itself; not because she has no authority over it, but because she has no temporal arms with which to enforce the execution of her sentence. She bears indeed the temporal sword, but it was not the will of her Spouse that she should wield it with her own hands. She ordinarily exercises it only by the hands of the laity, and she has only spiritual means by which to compel them to exercise it according to her orders. So, however extensive her authority, or full her right over the temporal power, she depends solely on the faith and conscience of her children for its practical assertion beyond the sphere of the spiritual order. It is this fact, we apprehend, that has led so many to misconceive and to misstate her authority in regard to temporal sovereigns, and it is the misapprehension of this fact that usually so alarms Cæsar and his ministers. God respects in all men the free will of man, and forces no man into the church or into heaven against his free will. There is no one who cannot, if he chooses, resist divine grace, disobey the law of God, and lose his soul. God will have none but a free-will offering, none but a voluntary service, although those who reject his offers, refuse to serve him, and disobey his commands, do so at their own peril, and must suffer the consequences.

So he has not willed that his church should with her own

hand wield the temporal sword, and has left the nations, not the right, but the ability, to resist her judgments, and to refuse to execute her decrees. If their faith and conscience will not lead them to execute her sentence, when that sentence requires the exercise of physical force, she can herself do no more, and the responsibility rests with them. Her practical power over temporal affairs is therefore restricted to that which is yielded her by the faith and piety of the faithful, although her right, her authority, is supreme and universal. If her children are uninstructed as to this right, if they grow up with the persuasion that she has no authority over temporals, and that her power is restricted to teaching the catechism and administering the sacraments, she will be able to exert little or no power over temporal governments, and her children, as in the French revolution, will too often be found siding with the state against her, and rushing headlong into heresy and schism, to the ruin of the state and the perdition of their own souls. Nevertheless, her authority, her right remains; and not unfrequently her heavenly spouse in a mysterious manner intervenes to vindicate it, and to carry her sentence into effect, as we saw surprisingly manifested in the case of the Emperor Napoleon I. Schismatic Russia, heretical England and Prussia, and even infidel Turkey, were made in the providence of God instruments for the execution of her decrees, and inflicting merited chastisement on the persecutor of her sovereign pontiff. Napoleon laughed at the idea of an excommunication of a sovereign by the pope in the nineteenth century, and asked, sneeringly, if the old man expected that the thunders of the church would cause the muskets to fall from the hands of his soldiers. He had his answer on his retreat from Moscow, when the muskets did literally drop from their hands.

This power which we claim for the church over temporal sovereigns and their subjects is neither more nor less than the simple power of the keys. Bossuet, indeed, in the first of the Four Articles, denies that kings and princes can be deposed, and their subjects absolved from their allegiance by the power of the keys, and maintains that these give the pope no right in civil and temporal affairs; but in this he clearly places himself in opposition to some of the greatest and most holy pontiffs that have ever sat in the chair of Peter. St. Gregory VII. expressly deduces his right to depose princes and absolve their subjects from the power of

the keys, and the authority of this pontiff, canonized by the church, is greater than that of Bossuet, or even the whole thirty-five French bishops who made the Gallican Declaration of 1682. Bossuet also is easily refuted by the reason of the case, unless he can, as he cannot, adduce a decision of authority, disclaiming the power in question. Popes have claimed it, have exercised it, and have never disclaimed it. They have uniformly deduced it from the power of the keys, and none have ever denied it. We have, we think, then, the right to insist that the power of the keys is unrestricted, or without other limitations than such as are imposed by its own nature. Our Lord says to Peter, "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." (St. Matthew, xvi. 19.) Here is conferred all the authority of the kingdom, and the authority of the pope as the successor of Peter therefore has no other restrictions than those of the kingdom of heaven itself; and that authority, we have shown over and over again, by its own nature extends over the whole temporal order. This is evident, too, from the very purpose of our Lord in setting up his kingdom, that is, the church, on the earth. He set up his kingdom on the earth to rule over the kingdoms of this world, and to make them the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. In giving the keys of this kingdom to Peter, he must from the nature of the case have given him through them all the powers necessary to accomplish that purpose; for he who imposes the end necessarily confers the right to use all the means necessary to effect it.

The king or prince holds either under the law of nature or under the revealed law of God, and of course is bound to conform to the law under which he holds. If you say he holds under the revealed law, there is no controversy between us, for there is no question with any Catholic that the church has supreme jurisdiction in every case that does or can arise under that law. If then you do mean to oppose us, you must say that he holds under the law of nature, which is what all those who take the ground of Bossuet do say. The question then is, Has the church, or has she not, supreme judicial authority in all cases that do or can arise under the law of nature? Has she, or has she not, the right to take cognizance of offences against the natural law, as distinguished from the revealed law? To a certain ex-

tent she certainly has, as every Catholic does and must concede. She does not, she cannot, indeed, abrogate the natural law, nor modify any of its essential provisions; but natural morality is no less within her jurisdiction than supernatural morality. She takes cognizance in her tribunals of offences against natural justice, as well as of offences against faith and the sacraments, *for they are equally offences against God*, and offences against the natural law are accounted offences even of a deeper dye than those against the positive law. In the process of canonization, evidence is first taken with regard to the cardinal virtues, and if the candidate is found deficient in these, the inquiry stops and the case is dismissed. Obedience to the natural law lies at the foundation of all virtue, and where that is wanting, neither faith nor the sacraments will avail us. If we have violated natural justice, we must make restitution before we can receive absolution. Certainly the church has jurisdiction of cases under the natural law, as every one who has learned the catechism, heard an instruction from the pulpit, or been to confession, must concede.

If the church has jurisdiction in some cases under the natural law, she must have in all cases, unless some cases be specially excepted by God himself and expressly reserved to another tribunal. No such cases can be alleged. There are reserved cases, as from a priest to the bishop, and from the bishop to the pope, but none from the supreme pontiff himself. The church, then, has supreme jurisdiction in all cases which do or can arise under the natural as well as the revealed law. The question then comes up, Are kings and princes bound by the natural law, that is, bound in their government of their subjects to observe the law of nature? They most assuredly are, if they hold under that law, and *a fortiori* if they hold under the revealed law, which presupposes and confirms the natural law. That law is the ground of their rights and the rule of their duties, and if they violate it, and rule unjustly, tyrannically, oppressively, they sin, and sin against God, for the natural law is law, is obligatory, only inasmuch as it is the law of God or a transcript of the eternal law. Of that sin the church may take cognizance as of any other sin, and bind or loose those guilty of it according to her own judgment in the case. If the sin is one that forfeits their power, according to the law of nature, and there is no evidence of repentance, and every reason to believe that it will be persisted in, she

has the right to bind them, and to declare judicially that they have no longer the right to reign, and that their subjects are no longer bound to obey them; that is, to depose them, declare the throne vacant, and to absolve their subjects from their allegiance and declare them free to elect a new sovereign, for in all this she does only declare a simple fact. In doing this, it is clear that she only exercises the power of the keys, of binding and loosing, and that, if she could not do thus much, there would be a class of sins that exclude from heaven of which she could take no cognizance, and to which she could apply no remedy.

We concede that kings hold under the law of nature, and therefore that the rights and duties of sovereigns and of subjects remain even after the reception of the faith what they were before, or rather, that the reception of the faith annuls none of the rights of the sovereign, and releases the subject from no duty to his sovereign which he owed prior to the reception of Christianity,—what we understand to be the doctrine of St. Thomas on this subject. We do not suppose the church has any power to annul these rights, or to dispense from these duties. But we reason on the supposition, that, under the law of nature, sovereigns have duties as well as rights, that subjects have rights as well as duties, and that the rights of sovereigns are forfeited when their duties are neglected, and the duties of subjects cease to oblige when their rights are systematically and perseveringly violated and trampled upon. We do not hold, we grant, the doctrine of the divine rights of kings, which was so strenuously advocated by James I. of England, and which was so ably refuted by Bellarmine and Suarez, both Jesuits, and by Cardinal Duperron in his masterly discourse in the assembly of the states-general of France in 1614. We believe in the divine origin of power, for, *Non est potestas nisi a Deo;* but we do not believe that it ever becomes the private property or estate of any man, of any family, or of any set or class of men. Let who will be invested with it, it is a trust, a trust from God for the nation, and, like all trusts, liable to be forfeited by abuse. This is the doctrine, as we understand it, taught by all the great doctors of the church, and especially by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the Jesuit Suarez; and no one of any note, as far as we are aware, except Bossuet, teaches any thing to the contrary. In none of the early Christian states formed by the northern tribes on the ruins of the Roman

empire was the principle even of hereditary monarchy acknowledged.

In all those states formed under the auspices of the church, not excepting England and France, monarchy was elective, and wherever it has become hereditary from father to son, it has been by a slow and gradual usurpation. France, in electing Louis Napoleon to be her emperor, has, in that respect, only returned to her ancient constitution; and in elevating a new family to the throne, she has done no more than she did in the case of the Carlovingians and in that of the Capetians. England in the case of Henry VII., unless we assume that he reigned by right of conquest, in that of William and Mary, and in that of the elector of Hanover, whatever we may think of the wisdom or of the motives of her acts, only returned to her original constitution, and exercised a right which, though long in abeyance, it would be difficult to prove had ever been absolutely lost. The principle of oriental despotism, which assumes power to be the indefeasible right of the sovereign, and his subjects and their possessions his private property, is as repugnant to Catholic ethics as it is to public and private liberty. The kingdom is not, strictly speaking, the domain of the king, and the king, though he has the right to *govern*, has no right, if we may use the word, to *dominate*. Monarchy, in the sense of absolute domination, is expressly condemned by St. Gregory I. and St. Gregory VII., treated as a violence, and declared to originate in sin,—to be the offspring of violence and iniquity. Princes receive power from God to rule, not to enslave their subjects, to govern them as freemen, not as slaves, as men, not as things,—to govern as pastors or fathers, not as lords and despots,—in love, according to the rules of eternal justice, not in wrath, in hatred, or according to the promptings of their own passions, or the dictates of their own arbitrary will. The prince who does not bear this in mind, and rule according to the conditions of the trust he has received, forfeits his right to reign, and by that releases his subjects from their allegiance.

This is what we understand to be the law of nature on the subject, as interpreted and applied by the church, and it is in the main the doctrine of all modern statesmen who profess to be the especial friends of liberty. It was to this doctrine that the English Parliament appealed against Charles I. and James II., and also the American Congress

of 1776 against George III. The church, then, in deposing a sovereign and absolving his subjects, does not abrogate the law of nature, but simply administers it. She really only declares the law, or pronounces judgment under it. It is not her judgment that makes the forfeiture, or that releases the subject; she only declares a forfeiture already incurred, and releases subjects already virtually released by the act of the prince. This declaration is necessary, because neither princes nor subjects can judge in their own case. If we allow the prince, as do the Gallican monarchists, to be his own judge, to interpret and apply the law for himself, he can tyrannize and oppress at will; and if we allow the people to be their own judges, as do the Gallican democrats, and concede that the sovereign is justiciable by them, we reverse all ideas of government, give them the right to refuse submission when they please, and can have nothing but universal revolution and disorder as the result.

Assuming that we have rightly interpreted the law of nature on the subject, political power is a sacred trust from God. The prince, then, is responsible to God for the use he makes of it. If responsible, his abuse of it is a sin, and a sin which may damn his soul. How, then, say that the church has not, by virtue of the keys, the power to take cognizance of his public acts, to sit in judgment on him in his public capacity, and bind or loose him as a sovereign? Does he not owe a duty to his subjects? If he deliberately neglects that duty, and tramples on their rights, does he not sin against justice, and sin grievously? How can you say, as a Catholic, that the church can take no cognizance of that sin, and deal with the guilty prince as with any other sinner? But how can she do this without judging his conduct as temporal prince, and by what right can she do that, if she has no power over the temporal order? The power she has received with the keys is a power to take knowledge of sin, wherever or by whomsoever committed, and to bind or loose the sinner,—to acquit or to condemn him. The keys, then, do give her power to bind or loose monarchs as well as private persons, and in relation to sins committed by them in their public as well as in their private capacity. We must, then, side with the popes even against Bossuet.

Subjects, again, owe allegiance to the legitimate prince, that is, as we have said, the prince who has the right to reign, and it is not a matter of indifference, in a moral point

of view, whether they obey him or not. To disobey him, deliberately to refuse to obey him or to resist his authority, is a sin, and a grievous sin, against God; for subjects are bound to obey the civil magistrate, not for wrath, that is, to avoid the punishment he may inflict, but for conscience' sake, because God, in both the natural law and the revealed, commands them to be subject to the powers that be. But they are not bound to obey every one who claims, or has power to enforce, their obedience. They are not bound to obey the usurper, the tyrant, him who never had any right, or if he had, has forfeited his right to govern, or him who commands them to do things contrary to natural justice, or things forbidden by the law of God. But the church has undeniably the right to take cognizance of the sin of disobedience, and to bind or loose, according to her judgment in the case. How can she take cognizance of the sin and judge the sinner, that is, exercise the power of the keys, if she cannot take cognizance of matters in the temporal order, and decide who is or who is not a legitimate prince, when and to whom civil obedience is or is not due? Thus far the power of the keys undeniably extends, and if thus far, it extends to the sentence of deposition upon the prince, and to the absolution of his subjects from their allegiance. The power denied to the church by the Four Articles, then, must be conceded as included in the power of the keys, the power of binding and loosing, unless we take the ground that the civil power is not subject to the law of God, either natural or revealed; and if we take that ground, we have no right to censure the sovereign pontiffs for having exercised the deposing power, for they who hold themselves amenable to no law can appeal to no law for protection. The fact is, that the church could never exercise her spiritual discipline, or accomplish her work of spiritual government, if her power of binding and loosing did not extend to sovereigns as well as to subjects, and to sovereigns in relation to their public trusts as well as to their private conduct.

The power which Bossuet denies the church must be hers, for she is by her very mission bound to be the guardian and protector of the faithful. She has as God's church the right to exist, and therefore has, by the law of nature even, the common right of self-preservation and self-defence. Thus, if attacked by an infidel, an heretical, or a schismatical power with an armed force, she has the right to call upon her faith-

ful children to arm in her defence, and to make war on her enemies, as in the case of the crusades, and the religious wars of the sixteenth century. She has the right and the duty to protect the faith and the virtue of her children, wherever they are, by all the means in her power. Thus, if a prince falls into schism or heresy, and attempts to pervert the faith of his subjects, and to carry them away with him, she has the right to declare him deposed, and his subjects released from their allegiance; for he by such conduct abuses his trust, and forfeits, even by the natural law, his right to govern. The law of nature binds all men to accept and obey the revealed law of God, as soon as it is sufficiently promulgated; for the law of nature binds all men to love, serve, and worship God in the way and manner he himself prescribes, therefore according to a supernatural law, if he reveals such law to them. Infidel princes cannot be forced to accept and obey such law, because God has chosen that faith should be voluntary; but they can be compelled by Christian princes to desist from persecuting those who have received it, and to leave their subjects free to embrace and conform to it if they choose. The church, however, cannot excommunicate them, for they are not in her communion, nor depose them, if their subjects are infidels, for then they do not own her authority. They are without, and those without she does not judge.

But princes made her subjects by baptism are to be presumed to have had the revealed law, the Christian faith, sufficiently promulgated to them to be morally bound to receive and obey it. They are then bound by their office to profess it, and to protect with their power the church, who is its depositary, and therefore the faithful in their respective states. If they do not, and use their power against her, to pervert or persecute the faithful, she as the guardian and protector of the faithful, and as authorized to interpret and apply the law of God, to bind and to loose, has the right, if no milder measures will answer, to declare them to have forfeited their right to govern, and their subjects to be absolved from all obligation to obey them. She has this right by virtue of the keys; she has it also by virtue of her obligation to protect the faith and virtue of her children; and she has it, finally, by virtue of her right of self-preservation, which includes, of course, the right of preserving the faith of the members of her communion. These considerations are sufficient, in our judgment, to save from the reproaches

with which it is still loaded, even by some unreflecting and worldly-minded Catholics, the memory of those great popes who have found it necessary to exercise authority over rebellious and sacrilegious princes, to smite them with the sword of Peter and Paul, and to declare them fallen from their rights as sovereigns. They were forced, in the cause of justice and the church, to resort to extreme measures, and to exercise a most fearful power; but they resorted to those extreme measures with extreme reluctance, and only after all other measures had been tried and exhausted in vain. Their own hearts bled, and they delayed till longer delay would clearly have been a betrayal of their trust. Let us hope, and devoutly pray, that no occasion for resorting to such extreme measures may ever again occur, but at the same time let us dare own the past history of the sovereign pontiffs, and not fear to assert the inherent rights of the church, freely and firmly, in meekness and humility, as becomes us, against all who question them.

It has been in no light or wanton spirit that we have discussed so much at length the mutual relations of the two orders, and asserted the subordination of the temporal, and the universal and absolute supremacy of the spiritual. It has been absolutely necessary to do it, in order to combat with any prospect of success the prevailing errors and heresies of our times. The flesh remains in Catholics, for baptism does not destroy concupiscence, which inclines to sin, and consequently they, as well as others, are liable to be affected in a greater or less degree by what is called the spirit of the age. The peculiar errors and heresies of any age they are in some measure predisposed to favor, and it is only by the powerful restraints of divine grace and the sleepless vigilance of pastors, and especially of the chief pastor, that they are held back within the limits of sound doctrine and lawful conduct. The radical and revolutionary spirit of our times has by no means been confined to those who are out of the external communion of the church; the great body of the faithful have felt its workings in their own bosoms, even when they have through grace successfully resisted it; and many, too many, of them have yielded to it, followed it in its mission of destruction, and made shipwreck of both their virtue and their faith. In our own country our Catholic brethren have been and still are peculiarly exposed to its influence. The great body of them are still suffering under the sad effects of ages of oppression and misrule, and natu-

rally regard as their friend any one who declaims lustily against tyranny and clamors for liberty and the rights of man. They find something within that responds to the burning words and daring measures of the revolutionary chiefs, and we have had men amongst us that would sooner die than renounce their faith, who yet have sympathized with Mazzini, Kossuth, Ledru-Rollin, and been ready to lend their active support to European radicals and American filibusteros. We can account for it, and we may have much to say in exculpation of the simple faithful whose generous sympathies have been played upon by artful leaders, and who have been betrayed into measures of active hostility to the religion of their fathers, but it is nevertheless necessary to undeceive them, and this we cannot do unless we refute the notion they generally entertain, that religion has nothing to do with politics, and show them that according to Catholic doctrine the church is the judge of our whole duty, in whatever sphere or order it may lie.

The church undeniably commands obedience to civil rulers, and ranks sedition and rebellion in the class of mortal sins; we must, then, as Catholics, condemn *in toto* the revolutionary spirit and the revolutionary attempts of our times. We have here no option. Our duty is clear and undeniable. But while insisting on the duties of subjects, are we to forget the duties of power? Does the church recognize in power no duties, and in subjects no rights? Does she bind the subject to obedience and loose the prince from the obligation to reign justly, for the common good of all his subjects? By no means. She is not the accomplice of tyranny, and she never asserts the rights of rulers and the duties of subjects, without at the same time asserting the rights of subjects and the duties of rulers. We could not, then, in justice to her, insist on the sin of disobedience, without touching on the sin of tyranny or oppression, or assert her authority to interpret and apply the law for subjects, without asserting also her authority to interpret and apply it for princes. Necessarily, then, have we been forced to consider her power over the political order, and her right to judge kings and princes as well as private persons; in a word, her supreme authority to apply the law of God for the government of all men and nations, in temporals as well as in spirituals. It were only calculated to excite hatred and distrust of the church to represent her as merely commanding obedience, as simply instructing

subjects in their duty, and never intimating that she also instructs rulers, and subjects them, proud as they may be, to her discipline, when they violate her rights, or sin against God by oppressing their subjects, whom they are bound to protect.

Moreover, the spirit of the age, while it declaims against monarchy, and makes war on kings and emperors, claims absolute independence for the civil power. It reasserts for the people, or for the demagogues as leaders of the people, the independence and supremacy which the German lawyers in the time of Frederick Barbarossa asserted for the emperor, and which James I. and the Anglo-Protestant ministers under the princes of his family asserted for kings and all sovereign princes. It substitutes for kings and princes the people, and democratic for monarchical despotism. To hear the men of our age talk, you would suppose the people were the church, nay, God himself, the Most High, whose will is in all cases law, and supreme law. They bind kings, princes, and pontiffs, and assert the independence of the people, and tell us, that whoso dares disobey the people sins against God. Now people-god is no more to our taste than king-god, and it is no less idolatry to render supreme homage to the people than it is to render it to Cæsar. The people are as much bound in their collective as in their individual capacity to obey the law of God. We have been able, therefore, to refute the error of our age, and to oppose despotism on the one hand and anarchy on the other, only by asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, and defending the right of the church to judge the political power, however constituted, and by whomsoever administered; that is, her right to subject rulers as well as ruled to her discipline, which right were a vain word, or a mere abstract right incapable of being practically asserted, without the papal constitution of the church, and the plenary authority, as vicar of God, of the sovereign pontiff. The controversies of the day have forced us to go thus far, and therefore, what we always do with extreme reluctance, to take part in disputes among Catholics themselves. We have been obliged to fall back on the strong papal doctrines asserted by the Gregories, the Innocents, the Alexanders, the Bonifaces, and the Piuses, in opposition to the Gallicanism so rife in all the courts of Europe in the last century and the beginning of the present, and which in this country, England, and Ireland, has been car-

ried to a dangerous extreme for the purpose of conciliating power, which in all these states is inveterately hostile to Catholicity.

That what we have said on the delicate topics we have treated will be perverted, and made the occasion of saying hard things against our church, we have no doubt, for we are well aware that it is precisely because the church claims, and, when occasion offers, exercises, the power we have asserted for her, that the powers of this world hate her, and persecute her faithful children. But we cannot help it. The more moderate doctrines embodied in the Four Articles of the Gallican clergy have never saved Catholics from persecution, or reconciled Jansenistic, Protestant, or infidel governments to the church. It was tried by the English Catholics under Elizabeth and the Stuarts, and it did not save them from fines and imprisonment, or from being hung, drawn, and quartered, as traitors. It did not save the nonjuring bishops and clergy in France during the old revolution from being maltreated, imprisoned, massacred, or exiled. It never will save any of us, if we adhere to the church at all, because the most ultra Gallican, if he means to remain in the communion of the church, must, when hard pressed, fall back on the ultramontane doctrine, and say, "It is necessary to obey God rather than men." There is a point beyond which submission to the temporal authority, whether monarchical or republican, aristocratic or democratic, is apostasy and can in no sense whatever be tolerated. We must all say this, and our enemies know it; and they know that the great body of the faithful will place that point where it is declared to be by the sovereign pontiff.

The truth is, this world hates the church because she condemns it, and do what we will, as long as she exists in the world, she must be the church militant. This world is given up to Cæsar, and Cæsar will tolerate no rival, much less a superior; for Cæsar expresses the pride of the human heart. He will always regard her presence as did Aman Mardochai sitting in the king's gate, and erect his gallows fifty cubits high, on which to hang her. He will always oppose her in the name of this world, and declare her incompatible with civil government. She *is* incompatible with all *unjust* civil government, with all civil government that would govern by arbitrary will, irrespective of the law of God, and we cannot deny it, although she is well known to be the friend and firm supporter of every civil government that seeks to govern

wisely and justly, for the common good of its subjects. Yet men with liberty and equality on their lips will still blaspheme her as the enemy of the state, now the enemy of power, and now the enemy of liberty. We cannot help it. It is in the nature of the men of this world to do so. We who have the happiness to know her doctrine and spirit, know how false and unjust all this is, but it is a part of our penance to submit to it. Nothing that we or any one else can say will commend her to those who hate her, and will not have her Spouse to reign over them. To us she is all beautiful, but for the men of this world she has no beauty or comeliness, that they should desire her. To us she is the wisdom of God and the power of God, but to them she is foolishness or a stumbling-block. No explanation, no softening of her features, no apologies, can make them love her, or cease to fear her. We must then consult first of all the good of the faithful, and, while we are careful to offer no gratuitous offence to Cæsar or his minions, we must study a wise boldness, and take care that the doctrines which will best succor the faithful in the hour of danger, and best enable them to detect and foil the designs of the enemy, be earnestly and specially insisted upon, and that they are never caught, as were so many in the French revolution, doubting whether they are to side with the state or with the church.

"YOU GO TOO FAR."*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1854.]

That this work exhibits learning and much patient research, no one can deny, and it certainly brings together much valuable information on a large number of interesting and important questions. It enjoys a very high reputation, and is by far the best work that has been written in defence of the conduct of popes and councils in the middle ages, by an author who denies, or is unwilling to assert, the temporal authority of the church over sovereigns by divine right. The author professes to waive the theological controversy on the subject, and perhaps does not, in just so many words, deny the theological opinion, as he calls it, which attributes to the pope a temporal jurisdiction over sovereigns, at least indirect, by divine right; and yet it is clear from his work that he does not hold that doctrine, and he certainly labors with extreme diligence to refute it historically. He does not, indeed, undertake to refute it from the point of view of theology, or by theological arguments; but he does labor to bring all the weight of history against it, and for this purpose not seldom reads history backwards. We are frequently reminded, in reading his work, of our modern physicists who profess to have nothing to do with religion, and to investigate nature as simple scientific inquirers. As such, they bring out, not facts, but theories and explanations of facts utterly repugnant to revelation, and if we object in the name of religion, they gravely reply, "We deal only with science, we leave theological questions to the theologians." As if any thing can be scientifically true and theologically false, or scientifically false and theologically true! M. Gosselin knows perfectly well that there

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* *The Power of the Pope during the Middle Ages; or an Historical Inquiry into the Origin of the Temporal Power of the Holy See, and the Constitutional Laws of the Middle Ages, relating to the Deposition of Sovereigns, with an Introduction on the Honors and Temporal Privileges conferred on Religion and on its Ministers by the Nations of Antiquity, especially by the first Christian Emperors.* By M. Gosselin, Director in the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris. Translated by the Rev. Mathew Kelly, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. London: 1853.

can be no discrepancy between history and Catholic theology, and therefore that, if he places history and any theological opinion in conflict, he necessarily assumes either that the opinion is not true, or that his history is false.

We should not like to assert that the doctrine of St. Thomas, of Bellarmine, Suarez, Duperron, and the great majority of Catholic theologians, which attributes to the pope, as visible head of the church, temporal jurisdiction over sovereigns, at least indirect, by divine right, is a simple theological opinion, which may, as M. Gosselin represents, be held or rejected as the individual Catholic thinks proper. There have been some recent decisions and condemnations of Gallican works, at Rome, which may be thought to put a new face on the question, and to raise that doctrine to the rank of a *sententia ecclesiæ* rather than of a *sententia in ecclesia*. But however this may be, M. Gosselin, in so far as his theory excludes the temporal authority, at least indirect, of the church, by divine right, cannot make it incumbent upon us to accept it. If he is free to assert, we are equally free to deny it. Rome has never been partial to it, and has shown, on more occasions than one, what she thinks of it. We do not believe it. We believe, we have been forced to believe, after the fullest investigation we have been able to make on the subject, the direct temporal authority of the pope, as vicar of Jesus Christ on earth. We do not put this forth as Catholic dogma, nor have we ever insisted on it in our pages, but we do believe Catholic dogma requires us to assert, at least, the indirect power contended for by Bellarmine and Suarez, unless we would forego our logic. Without going thus far at least, all Catholic history is to us a chaos of unintelligible facts, and Catholicity itself sinks very nearly to the level of the Greek schism, and is not much better than high-church Anglicanism. We do not question M. Gosselin's good intentions; we do not question his honest desire to serve the cause of religion, but his book is not a little repugnant to our Catholic convictions and feelings. The liberties he takes with the language of illustrious pontiffs and distinguished doctors is startling. He does not hesitate to interpret their language in what seems to us a sense the very opposite of its plain and obvious meaning, and we feel that, if such liberty may be taken throughout, not a little in Catholic theology would lose that fixed and certain character which it has been supposed to possess. Even according to his own concession, if he is

right, popes, councils, doctors, and the great body of the faithful, for centuries entertained an erroneous theological opinion. A doctrine of which this can be said, or which requires so liberal a concession to the enemies of the church, it seems to us, ought to be received with suspicion by every sincere and generous-hearted Catholic.

Without expressly denying the theological doctrine of the divine right of the church to temporal authority, M. Gosselin contends that the temporal authority of the popes in the middle ages did not originate in that doctrine, for they possessed it, he says, before that opinion, as he calls it, was known, and therefore it could not have been its source. Whether that opinion be true or false, he contends, it did not originate the title by which they held and exercised their temporal power. The title by which they really did hold and exercise it, he maintains, was the *jus publicum* of the times, the constitution and laws of Catholic states in the middle ages. They had a real and valid title to it *jure humano*, but not *jure divino*. That the temporal authority of the popes in the middle ages was a part of the *jus publicum* we certainly do not deny, but that it derived from the *jus publicum* we do not believe. The learned author seems to us, to use a homely illustration, to put the cart before the horse. The pope preceded the constitution and laws of the states of the middle ages, and, as a matter of fact, gave law to them, instead of receiving his title from them. They received their peculiar character from him, as the vicar of Jesus Christ. They did not spring into existence without him, and then create him supreme arbiter of temporal affairs, but were made what they were under his arbitratorship. We might as well contend that the Creator derives his authority as universal Lord from his creatures, as that the pope derived his temporal jurisdiction from the constitution and laws which he dictated or inspired. The simple fact is, that the constitution and laws of Catholic states, in the middle ages, recognized the temporal supremacy of the church, and conformed to it, but did not confer that supremacy. The church has by divine right power to enact canons for the government and interests of the church, and these canons, when enacted, bind all, sovereigns as well as subjects, and therefore the civil authority itself, in so far as they touch it. The civil authority may or may not recognize them, but their vigor as laws remains the same in either case. The state, by refusing to recognize them, may impede

their operation, but cannot annul them. It may recognize them, conform the civil law to them, or declare them, as far as they go, the law of the land; but in doing so, it only facilitates their operation, it does not give them their vigor as laws. The sovereigns in the middle ages did not, historically considered, confer the authority on the pope which he exercised over them; they simply acknowledged it, and promised to obey it. In modern times most states have become pagan, and refuse to do so, just as the individual sinner refuses to recognize and obey the law of God; but this, while it obstructs the operation of the temporal authority of the popes, does not take it away, or in the least affect their title to it. One of two things, it seems to us, must be admitted, if we have regard to the undeniable facts in the case; namely, either the popes usurped the authority they exercised over sovereigns in the middle ages, or they possessed it by virtue of their title as vicars of Jesus Christ on earth. We do not, therefore, regard M. Gosselin's theory as tenable, and we count his attempted defence of the pope, on the ground of human right, a failure.

There is, in our judgment, but one valid defence of the popes, in their exercise of temporal authority in the middle ages over sovereigns, and that is, that they possess it by divine right, or that the pope holds that authority by virtue of his commission from Jesus Christ, as the successor of Peter, the prince of the apostles, and visible head of the church. Any defence of them on a lower ground must, in our judgment, fail to meet the real points in the case, and is rather an evasion, than a fair, honest, direct, and satisfactory reply. To defend their power as an extraordinary power, or as an accident in church history, growing out of the peculiar circumstances, civil constitution, and laws of the times, now passed away, perhaps for ever, may be regarded as less likely to displease non-Catholics and to offend the sensibilities of power, than to defend it on the ground of divine right, and as inherent in the divine constitution of the church; but even on the low ground of policy, we do not think it the wisest, in the long run. Say what we will, we can gain little credit with those we would conciliate. Always, to their minds, will the temporal power of the pope by divine right loom up in the distance, and always will they believe, however individual Catholics here and there may deny it, or nominally Catholic governments oppose it, that it is the real Roman Catholic doctrine, to be

reasserted and acted on the moment that circumstances render it prudent or expedient. We gain nothing with them but doubts of our sincerity, and we only weaken among ourselves that warm and generous devotion to the Holy Father which is due from every one of the faithful, and which is so essential to the prosperity of the church, in her unceasing struggles with the godless powers of this world.

The excellent author, no doubt, believes that he has hit upon a theory which enables him to vindicate the conduct of the popes and councils of the middle ages, in their relations to temporal sovereigns, without incurring the odium attached to the higher ground of divine right, and this, he will pardon us for believing, is his chief motive for elaborating and defending it. He cannot be unaware, that the doctrine he rejects is the most logical, the most consonant to Catholic instincts, the most honorable to the dignity and majesty of the papacy, or that it has undeniably the weight of authority on its side. The principal Catholic authorities are certainly in favor of the divine right, and the principal authorities which he is able to oppose to them are of parliaments, sovereigns, jurisconsults, courtiers, and prelates and doctors who sustained the temporal powers in their wars against the popes. The Gallican doctrine was, from the first, the doctrine of the courts, in opposition to that of the vicars of Jesus Christ, and should therefore be regarded by every Catholic with suspicion? M. Gosselin cannot be ignorant of this, and therefore we must believe that he is attached to his theory principally from prudential considerations. We confess that we see nothing in his theory that can alarm the pride of power, or offend the enemies of religion. This is, no doubt, what the author has seen and felt. He professes to regard it as a recommendation of his theory, that many learned Protestants have adopted it, and he cites, under a special head, a number of Protestant authorities in its favor, winding up with a clincher from Voltaire. We see nothing in his theory which Voltaire or any intelligent Protestant might not assent to, or even maintain, without once dreaming of becoming a Catholic; but this fact alone creates in our mind a strong presumption against it. The author seems to us to have fallen into the new snare of Satan. The latest and most approved mode of warfare against the church is, not to denounce her as a satanic institution, but to generate a habit of thinking and

speaking of her as a simple human institution. None of her intelligent enemies sympathize with the vulgar Protestantism which calls the church Babylon and the pope Antichrist. They have too little religious belief, and are too cunning, for that. They speak of her under a human point of view, as a human institution, and as such adopt the language of eulogy, not of vituperation. They admire her, are struck with her profound policy, her deep knowledge of human nature, and her marvellous skill in governing the masses of the people. As a human institution, especially for the infancy of nations, they are in raptures with her, and pen occasionally magnificent paragraphs in her favor, as we see in Ranke, Macaulay, and others. As far as he goes, the simple-hearted author falls in with them, and his whole method of explaining the origin of what he calls the extraordinary power of the popes, by representing them as obeying the impulses of the Christian populations, making them, as it were, the impersonations of the popular opinions and instincts of their times, and defending their temporal power by the pious belief of the people, the maxims and jurisprudence of the age, is in perfect harmony with the method of these modern humanizers, who will extol the popes to the skies as men, as secular arbiters of temporal affairs, and treat with the most ineffable scorn every one of their claims as the vicars of Jesus Christ. We wish M. Gosselin had been careful to render broader and more distinct the line of demarcation which separates him from these our ablest, subtlest, and most dangerous enemies.

M. Gosselin puts forth his theory as historical, as an induction from the historical facts in the case. We do not much like this; we have very little confidence in any inductive theory of the sort, and no man can truly represent the history till he has ascertained the theology of the church. The doctrines of the church are the fonts of her history; they precede and determine the facts. The church works *more humano* by human agents indeed, but is herself superhuman, and introduces a superhuman element into all her operations. No fact in her long history can be explained, that is, adequately explained, from a purely human principle. Every explanation of an ecclesiastical fact on that principle alone is partial, and leaves out the element most essential to be considered; and, moreover, tends to give us false views of the church, and to degrade her to the level of human sects, philosophies, and governments. But, even

as an historical induction, M. Gosselin's theory does not satisfy us. We have already shown that the temporal authority of the pope preceded the civil constitution and laws of the middle ages, and was exerted in determining their peculiar character. The whole current of history is against the author. He cannot adduce a single official act of pope or council which concedes that the temporal authority exercised was held only by a human title. All history fails to show an instance in which the pope, in deposing a temporal sovereign, professes to do it by the authority vested in him by the pious belief of the faithful, generally received maxims, the opinion of the age, the concessions of sovereigns, or the civil constitution and public laws of Catholic states. On the contrary, he always claims to do it by the authority committed to him as the successor of the prince of the apostles, by the authority of his apostolic ministry, by the authority committed to him of binding and loosing, by the authority of Almighty God, of Jesus Christ, King of kings and Lord of lords, whose minister, though unworthy, he asserts that he is,—or some such formula, which solemnly and expressly sets forth that his authority is held by divine right, by virtue of his ministry, and exercised solely in his character of vicar of Jesus Christ on earth. To this, we believe, there is not a single exception. Wherever the popes cite their titles, they never, so far as we can find, cite a human title, but always a divine title. Whence is this? Did the popes cite a false title? Were they ignorant of their own title? or was this assertion of title an empty form, meaning nothing? This is a grave matter, and this fact alone seems to us decisive against the author.

M. Gosselin feels the force of this argument, and seeks to evade it by saying that deposition was only an incidental or indirect effect of excommunication; and as excommunication is a spiritual act, the pope could rightly set forth that he performed it by virtue of his apostolic authority. That excommunication did in some cases work deposition may be true, but that it did in all cannot be asserted, and numerous instances may be cited of excommunication without deposition. But there are documents enough in which the pope not only excommunicates, but solemnly deposes, a prince, and in these very documents we find the title set forth, and the only title set forth, is that derived from his apostolic ministry. Never does the pope profess to depose, any more than to excommunicate,

by virtue of any other than a divine title. Whatever he does in the case, he always professes to do it by his supreme jurisdiction as the vicar of Jesus Christ, and the successor of Peter the prince of the apostles. That the popes wilfully erred, M. Gosselin cannot pretend; that they held the theological opinion which founds their power on divine right, that is, as private doctors so held, he concedes, or at least regards as highly probable. He will, then, permit us to think that, even as private doctors, the opinion of such illustrious pontiffs as St. Gregory VII., Alexander III., Innocent III., Innocent IV., Boniface VIII., St. Pius V., and Sixtus Quintus, may weigh as much in the scale as that of the learned author of the work before us. We permit ourselves to believe that these illustrious pontiffs knew the origin and ground of their title as well as he does, and that, had they even been acquainted with his theory, they would have continued to think and act as they did. We mean no disrespect to the author, but really we have no patience with this manifest irreverence and want of filial respect and devotion to the Holy See. Our Lord founded his church on Peter, and we have no patience with those who, with good or bad intentions, are constantly laboring to undermine its foundation. We may err, but if we do, God grant it may never be in denying to the successors of the prince of the apostles any portion of that power which he has conferred on them. Never for one moment shall Cæsar weigh in the scale with us against Peter. Indeed, we can better endure open, avowed Protestantism itself, than stingy, narrow-minded, and frozen-hearted Gallicanism, always studying to split the difference between Peter and Cæsar, God and the devil. It has been a blight on religion and society wherever it has prevailed, and terrible, terrible have been the calamities it has brought upon the Christian nations of the East, upon Germany, upon France, and upon England. It is a traitor in our camp, an enemy in the guise of a friend, who damps our zeal, depresses our courage, renders us lukewarm, unfits us for all heroic deeds, and opens the gates of the citadel to the adversary. We may die, but let us die with the blessing of the Holy Father.

But we have said more of M. Gosselin and his theory than we intended. We do not like his theory; we do not believe it, and could not believe it, without violence to our whole understanding of the Catholic system of truth. The author, in principle, is a thorough-going Gallican, and, if

he defends the illustrious pontiffs who have been so maligned by non-Catholics and courtiers, he does it on principles which seem to us to humiliate them, and to degrade them to the rank of mere secular princes. His theory, at first view, may have a plausible appearance, but it is illusory, like all theories invented to recommend the church to her enemies, or to escape the odium always attached to truth by the world. In saying this, we are not ignorant that many whom we love and respect embrace that theory in part, and explain and defend by it the temporal power exercised by popes and councils over sovereigns in the middle ages. They do not, indeed, agree with M. Gosselin, in his denial that the popes held that power by divine right, but they think it suffices to explain and defend it on the ground of human right. They agree with us as to the supremacy of the spiritual order, and the temporal jurisdiction of the popes, but they think that all the objections of non-Catholics can be adequately and honestly answered without taking such high ground, and the ground of human right being sufficient and less offensive, it should, in prudence, be adopted, and the other doctrine be passed under the *disciplina arcani*. They therefore disapprove of the course we take, and wish we would content ourselves with more moderate views, not because we are uncatholic, but because we are imprudent, and subject Catholics to unnecessary odium.

There are those also who reason in the same way on a variety of other topics, and who regret to find us and other Catholic journalists broaching certain delicate subjects, and bringing out doctrines which, though true enough in the abstract, are exceedingly offensive to the public, and have just now, in their judgment, no practical application. Undoubtedly Catholicity, they confess, is the only solid basis of the social fabric, and the state ought to recognize and conform to the revealed doctrines which the church teaches; but public opinion is against it; modern states have fallen back on the simple natural law, and the church must withdraw from the sphere of political and social action, and content herself to minister in spirituals to those who recognize her authority. It is idle to expect to realize in the political and social order the Catholic ideal. This may be a calamity, but it is, in our times, a necessity, and, however reluctantly, we must submit. Consequently, we should not suffer ourselves to reaffirm those high-toned

Catholic doctrines which were current in the middle ages, and which were well enough when society avowed itself Catholic, but which are practically obsolete now. Society has abandoned them, and is not prepared to resume them.

We acknowledge that this objection is at least plausible, and deserves to be treated with respect. But possibly it originates in too desponding a view of society, and a certain lack of confidence in the power of divine truth. We do not shut our eyes to the present state of society, and we think we are not ignorant of the prevailing public opinion. Certainly we shall not succeed in realizing in all respects the Catholic ideal, or in bringing society into perfect harmony with the principles of our holy religion. Always will the Philistines dwell in the land. But, as in the case of individual sanctity, it is better, even here, to aim high than it is to aim low. He who aims only at so much virtue as will barely admit him into heaven, is in great danger of falling short of his mark. In the constitution of government, in practical legislation or administration, the rule of wisdom is to consult, not what is ideally perfect, but what here and now is practicable. We cannot go, and it is worse than useless to attempt to go, far in advance of the community. Our American society is pagan, not Christian, and by no possible legislative or administrative acts can it be made Catholic. To organize and conduct it on Catholic principles is utterly impracticable, and no Catholic statesman worthy of the name, were he in power, would make the attempt. People must be converted to the Catholic faith before they can be organized or governed as Catholics, and conversion cannot be forced. To keep the faith when once received, may be of necessity, but to receive it is a matter of free will, which cannot be coerced. Our Lord forces, and allows his church to force, no one to accept his bounty. He proffers it freely to all, but if any one chooses to reject it and suffer the consequences, he is free to do so. Our Lord suffers no dragooning of unbelievers into his church; he asks the heart, the free will, a voluntary, not a forced worship.

Nevertheless, it by no means follows that the state, in the sight of God, has any more right than the individual to profess a false religion, or to be indifferent to the true; far less does it follow that society organized on uncatholic principles, and operating in opposition thereto, can long subsist or answer, even as to the natural order, the true ends of so-

ciety. All society worthy to be so called, in the ancient gentile world, was preserved by virtue of the Catholic principles it retained, after the dispersion of mankind, from the primitive revelation made to our first parents, and all gentile society tended to complete dissolution in proportion as those principles became more and more corrupted or lost sight of. Society has been preserved in Protestant nations only by virtue of the Catholic traditions and usages which they did not reject when they broke away from the church, and disappears in proportion as those traditions and usages lose their hold, and are exchanged for new modes of thought and new manners and customs. There is no true society, no genuine human race, no human race in its unity and integrity, out of the Catholic society or church, as the lamented Donoso Cortés, in his profound *Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism*, demonstrates with equal truth and eloquence. The reason of this is, that man in the present decree of God is under a supernatural providence, the unbeliever no less than the believer, ordained to supernatural rewards or to supernatural punishments. The natural nowhere in human life subsists alone, and nowhere can it prosper, save as nourished with the sap of the supernatural.

We cannot make infidel governments, hardly professedly Catholic governments themselves, understand this, consequently almost everywhere the faithful, as under the pagan emperors of Rome, must constitute a society of their own, independent of the pagan society in the midst of which they live, complete in itself, and adequate to all social wants and necessities. The Catholic society is in the Old World the remains of a once general Catholic society; in our country it is, as under the pagan Cæsars, the germ or nucleus of a new Catholic state. All the hopes of the Old World centre in these Catholic remnants, all the hopes of the New in this Catholic germ. It is this Catholic society sustaining itself or forming itself under overshadowing heathenism, that we must consult in our addresses and discussions. To save the non-Catholic society from continual decline and corruption is as hopeless as it was to save the Jewish state under the Roman governors, or pagan society under Nero or Diocletian. The thing is out of the question, because modern society as distinguished from the Catholic has in itself no recuperative energy, no germ of life. All society must conform to the principles of our holy religion, and spring from Catholicity as its root, or sooner or later lapse into barbarism. The liv-

ing germ in all modern nations, the nucleus of all future living society, is in the Catholic portion of the population. They are the salt of the earth; they are the leaven that is to leaven the whole lump. Hence the important thing is to look to it that the salt lose not its savor, nor the leaven its virtue. If the faithful themselves become conformed, in all things not expressly of dogma and ritual, to the unbelieving world in which they live, or if no care be taken to give them juster views of society, or any truer and nobler political and social ideas, than those entertained by that world itself, little influence will they be able to exert, either in saving themselves from the fate of all anti-Catholic society, or in forming a society in accordance with the Catholic ideal.

It cannot have escaped any moderately careful observer, that, amid the political and social convulsions of modern times, the Catholic populations have themselves to a fearful extent lost the idea of Catholic society. The anti-social doctrines of the age have on all sides penetrated into the Catholic camp, and vast masses of Catholics have believed that, for all the purposes of society, government, and general civilization, Protestantism is preferable to Catholicity. Our young men grow up with this feeling, and though they make it, in some instances, a point of honor not to desert the religion of their fathers, they look with something like envy on their Protestant companions. As a religion they hold Protestantism in sovereign contempt, but as an instrument of civilization and worldly prosperity they almost venerate it. Nothing, it strikes us, is of more pressing importance, than to disabuse our young ambitious Catholics of this fatal illusion, and to show them, as well as the Catholic populations generally, that society has its root in those great principles which Catholics alone do or can possess in their unity and integrity, as living and life-giving principles. We must insist on this, not so much for those who are without as for those who are within. The church cannot in these times rely on her own children. These false political doctrines and social theories, so widly diffused among us, and borrowed from and sustained by the spirit of the age, are so many impediments to the progress of religion. They prevent it from doing its work, and occasion the ruin of innumerable souls. Can it then be useless, or in any sense unimportant, to bring out with clearness and distinctness, with earnestness and power, those very Catholic principles which stand directly opposed to these false doctrines and destructive theories?

Perhaps they who counsel reserve and moderation would not do amiss to bear in mind, that in some respects our position is also very different from that of the early Christians under the pagan Cæsars. They could observe the discipline of the secret, we cannot; they had not a past to defend, we have. It was enough for them to unfold the political and social bearings of their fate as occasion offered for its political or social application. The fathers under the pagan emperors had no occasion to discuss the rights and duties of a Catholic state towards heretics and schismatics, for as yet there was no Catholic state. It was enough for them to confine themselves to the question in so far as it was then a practical question. The same remark is applicable to a large number of other grave questions. But it is not so with us. There have been and still are Catholic states, and the answers which the church gives to all great practical questions have become historical. These answers are, in many instances, no doubt, very offensive to the spirit of the present age, and such as the prevailing public opinion denounces; but there they stand on the page of history, and can be neither honestly nor successfully denied or explained away. What the church has done, what she has expressly or tacitly approved in the past, that is exactly what she will do, expressly or tacitly approve in the future, if the same circumstances occur. This may be a difficulty, an embarrassment, but it will not do to shrink from it. We are responsible for the past history of the church, in so far as she herself has acted, and to attempt to apologize for it by an appeal to the opinion of the times, or to explain it in conformity with the prevailing spirit and theories of non-Catholics, in our age, is only to weaken the reverence of the faithful for the church, and yield the victory to her enemies. The odium we may incur should not move us. There never was a time when Catholicity was not odious to the non-Catholic world, and there never will come a time when it will not be. That world hated our Lord, and it hates his church because it hates him. But our faith gives us the victory over the world. Always have we this consolation in the worst of times,—the truth is able to sustain itself and all who are faithful to it. It is no difficult matter to vindicate to the Catholic mind the historical answers we allude to, for they are all intrinsically just and true, and as for vindicating them to the non-Catholic mind, we can waive that. If we believe Catholicity is true, we believe non-Catholics are wrong, and can become right,

and form correct judgments of Catholic things, only through conversion. We would never unnecessarily offend them, we would studiously avoid throwing any obstacles in their way, and for their sake do all in our power to bring them to a knowledge of the truth. But we shall best promote their conversion by commanding their respect, and this we shall best do by convincing them that we have nothing in the past history of our church of which we are ashamed, or that we wish to conceal, explain away, or apologize for; and by making all our Catholics firm, frank, ingenuous, and intrepid defenders of unemasculated Catholicity.

These were the principles prescribed to us for our guidance when we commenced this *Review* as a Catholic review, and on these principles we have endeavored to conduct it to the best of our ability. The age is latitudinarian, and thinks one religion, unless it be the Catholic, as good as another, because it believes in none. We found our Catholic laity extensively infected with a latitudinarian spirit, fraternizing with their "separated brethren," and calling upon Protestant ministers to say grace for them at their public dinners, and in presence of their own priests, too,—throwing up their hands in pious horror at our illiberality, if we hinted that their liberal Protestant friends could not be saved unless they became Catholics, and most loudly applauding themselves for being liberal Catholics. We found our current Catholic literature so explaining the qualification which some theologians add to the dogma, Out of the church there is no salvation, as to open heaven to the great mass of heretics and infidels, and to save more by the exception than the rule. Indeed, every Protestant, Anglican, Calvinist, Socinian, or deist, of decent manners and kind feelings, was looked upon as in the way of salvation. What was our duty as a Catholic writer? We found the age clamoring for religious liberty, meaning thereby the liberty of infidelity to enslave and oppress the church, and we found Catholics uniting in the clamor, and maintaining that every man has the natural right to be of what religion he chooses, thus denying the essential distinction between truth and falsehood, virtue and vice. Were we to be silent, and suffer a manifest error to be imbibed by our Catholic community, an error which would create serious embarrassments for our grandchildren, lest by contradicting it, and stating the truth on the subject, we might expose our religion to the censure of non-Catholics? If Catholics themselves were

in no danger of being infected with the error, prudence would require us to pass it over in silence; but when we could hardly speak with a Catholic layman in the country, who would not echo the condemned doctrine of Voltaire on *Tolerance*, it was manifestly our duty to state the truth as taught by our approved Catholic theologians.

We found a very general disposition among the Catholic laity to separate religion from politics, to emancipate politics from the Christian law, to vote God out of the state, and to set up the people against the Almighty. Was this in these revolutionary times to be passed over in silence, and no effort made to arrest the tide of political atheism? We saw our Holy Father driven into exile; we saw large numbers of nominal Catholics rejoicing at the impious usurpations of Mazzini & Co., sympathizing with the infamous assassins and parricides who, in the name of liberty and democracy, were seeking to overthrow the papacy, and destroy the world's last hope. What was then our plain duty? Was it not to assert the supremacy of God, the jurisdiction of the spiritual power, to expose the fatal error of Gallicanism, and, as far we could, exhibit the real position of the papacy in the Catholic system? So we have felt, and so we have done. We have always believed it the duty of every publicist to defend the outraged truth, the truth that for the time being is the least popular, the most offensive to public opinion, therefore the most needed, and the most endangered. The popular truth, the truth which nobody questions, stands in no need of any special defence. It is the unpopular truth, as the unpopular cause, attacked by all the armies of error, and deserted by all its timid and time-serving friends, that calls for defenders, and that the Christian hero or the really brave man will make it his first duty to defend.

Certainly society in our days is far enough below the Catholic ideal, and even the Catholic populations themselves, though far above what they were fifty years ago, are by no means fully prepared for a society organized throughout and conducted on the principles of their religion. Yet bad as society now is, it is not further removed from the Catholic standard than it was when St. Peter transferred his chair from Antioch to Rome, or than it was under Constantius, the son of Constantine, or when Odoacer placed himself on the throne of the Cæsars, and the church is as vigorous and Catholicity inherently as living and as powerful

as it was then. It is a no greater work to bring society up to the Catholic standard from where it now is, than from what it was in the days of the apostles or at the irruption and conquest of the barbarians. We have all the forces to work with that our Catholic ancestors had, for the church never grows old or falls into a decline. We cannot share the despondency of the late Donoso Cortés, who seemed to think the European nations were past being recovered, and placed what hope he had for society in the army, instead of the church's militia. As long as the church stands, there is hope for society, for she is the medium of a constant supply of supernatural force. All she asks is that her children offer no impediment to its operation. We see no ground for concluding that it is all over with Catholic society, or that society in the future may not be brought even nearer to the Catholic ideal than it ever was in the past. We know the world is not prepared for that ideal; even our Catholic populations are not prepared for it. But does it follow from this that they cannot be, and that no effort should be made to prepare them for it? And shall we prepare them for it, if we do not call their attention to it, present it before them as something to be desired, to be sought, to be struggled for? Shall we prepare them for it by representing it as wholly impracticable, and by denouncing those who have the disposition and the courage to labor for it as pursuing mere abstractions, as pushing matters to extremes, as being more Catholic than Catholicity, and threatening them, if they do not desist, with an opposition from plain sensible, honest-minded Catholics, that they will find it impossible to resist?

We have heard some very loud whispers about ultra-Catholicity, and have received some significant hints that we are ultra-Catholic. But we venture to hint, in reply, that there is and can be no such thing as ultra-Catholicity, and that the charge is absurd. Catholicity is a definite system of truth, and to be more or less than Catholic is simply not to be Catholic at all. Catholicity, so long as it continues to be Catholicity, cannot be carried to excess. It is not one system among many. It is simply the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It excludes all not itself; it recognizes no rival; it will be all or nothing. The more thoroughly we take it in, the more completely we are filled with its spirit, the more exclusively we are under the domin-

ion of its teaching and submissive to its inspirations, the better Catholics we are, and the more powerful we are for pulling down the strongholds of error and sin. We believe the best way to convert infidels, to bring back heretics, and spread our holy religion, is to throw ourselves unreservedly upon the living body of Catholic truth, in its unity and integrity, its principles and its consequences, and to strive constantly with all our strength, through grace, to realize it in all our thoughts, words, and deeds.

Prudence is certainly a virtue, and zeal without prudence can only do harm; but we must remember that the church does not stand in human prudence, and it was not by human prudence, any more than by human sagacity and virtue, that the fathers converted the world from paganism, and founded Christian society. God's ways are not our ways, and he seems to delight in bringing the schemes and plans of human wisdom to naught. His ways are always foolishness to the wise and prudent of this world. True prudence, under the gracious providence of God, is always rashness or folly in the world's estimation. Perhaps our most prudent men, who are so excessively studious to avoid giving offense, or exciting the prejudices of non-Catholics, or disturbing the equanimity of lukewarm, indolent, or cowardly Catholics, are, in a Christian sense, our most imprudent men, and the least successful in adapting their means to their end.

We are not ignorant that the course we have pursued differs from that which was some time since generally pursued in England and this country. Crushed to the earth by triumphant heresy, our English and American Catholics had lost heart and hope; they forgot their privileges as Catholics, and felt that they must, so far as society is concerned, hang down their heads and be silent. The most they dared hope was to be connived at, and permitted to hold fast to their religion for themselves, without having their throats cut, or being hung, drawn, and quartered as traitors. They hardly dreamed of making a convert, and if they heard a Protestant speak of their faith without blaspheming it, or insulting them, they were ready to fall down and kiss the hem of his garment. Everywhere Catholics felt that they were an oppressed people, and that from their oppression there was no deliverance but in death. It was a day of trial, and far be it from us to judge harshly of the policy adopted. Their silence, their meekness, their submissiveness, their perseverance, were precious in the sight

of Heaven, and have brought their reward in the altered position of Catholics at the present day. But to every day its own work. The day of apology has passed away, though not the day of trial. The time has come for Catholics to feel and act as freemen of the Lord, to resume, in a bolder and more energetic spirit, the unceasing war which the church wages against error and sin, and to go forth as Christian soldiers to attack, as well as simply to defend.

We know that the policy we insist on has its disadvantages. It excites controversy. The high-toned Catholic doctrines we contend for give great offence to the age, and create some difficulties for our friends, especially if they deem it necessary to reply to every paragraph non-Catholics may indite against them. We may sit in our closet and write and publish, and from our retired position feel no inconvenience, while we are creating serious embarrassments for those whose position and duties bring them in daily and hourly contact with embittered non-Catholics. All this we have considered, and if only non-Catholics were concerned, or if the highest-toned Catholicity were not necessary for Catholics themselves, or were not to a great extent even rejected by them, we should pursue quite a different course, and be as tame and commonplace as any one who charges us with being ultra-Catholic could desire. But it is for Catholics we write, and it is to maintain sound doctrine in all respects in their minds, and to guard them against the lying spirit of the age, the subtle and dangerous heresies to which they are everywhere now exposed, that we pursue that course which, no doubt, embarrasses many who consult only tranquillity, and to gain it half fall in with the dangerous popular political and social doctrines of the age and country.

It is not in mere wantonness that we have expressed our dislike to M. Gosselin's book. We do not attack Gallicanism, and assert the temporal authority of the popes by divine right, for the sake of showing our courage or our indifference to public opinion. If we found in this case, as in others, merely an omission to take the higher ground, without denying that higher, stronger, and more tenable ground, we certainly should deem it our duty to be silent, for in our own country there is at present little room for its practical application. If we had not found Catholics bringing out an erroneous doctrine on religious liberty, and endeavoring to prove

that Catholicity approves of religious liberty in the sense it is asserted by non-Catholics, we should not have taken up the subject. If, in refuting error, we have been obliged to oppose to it an unpalatable truth, the fault is theirs who paraded the error, and made its denial necessary. If we have attempted to assert and vindicate authority against the licentious spirit of the age, and to defend vested rights against the wild and destructive radicalism of the age, it has been because we found Catholics imbibing that spirit, and hurrahing for that radicalism. As a denial of the spiritual authority soon leads to a denial of the temporal, so the denial of the temporal soon leads to the denial of the spiritual. When we found democracy even by nominal Catholics embraced in that sense in which it denies all law, and asserts the right of the people, or rather of the mob, to do whatever they please, and making it criminal in us to dispute their infallibility, we felt that we must bring out the truth against them, and if scandal resulted, we were not its cause. The responsibility rests on those whose obsequiousness to the multitude made our opposition necessary.

So it is with Gallicanism. It is not even with us an abstract, but a terribly practical question. If our friend McGee, who is now doing such noble service to the good cause, had not been brought up a Gallican and taught to believe that his religion had no concern with his politics, he had never occasioned those scandals which nobody now deplores more than he does; if the brilliant T. Francis Meagher had been instructed from his youth up in the true temporal supremacy of the church, we should not have now to seem to treat him with inhospitality, and to guard against him as the most dangerous enemy, in proportion to his influence, of his countrymen naturalized or domiciled in the United States, that we have amongst us. If in other countries, in Ireland, England, France, and especially in Lombardy and Piedmont, the youth had not been suffered to grow up with a conviction that the pope has no temporal authority, and that politics are quite distinct from religion, we should have seen very few of the deplorable scandals which so deeply afflict every Catholic heart. In proportion as we wish to save religion and society, we must raise our voice against Gallicanism, turn to the Holy Father, and, instead of weakening his hands and saddening his heart by our denial of his plenary authority, reassert his temporal as well as spiritual prerogatives. We have no hope but in God, and God helps

us only through Peter, and Peter helps us only through his successors, in whom he still lives and exercises his apostolate. Blame not us, then, if there are scandals, but them rather whose errors, whose timidity, whose indolence or wordly-mindedness, have caused them, and made our course a painful duty.

TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1854.]

We regret the retirement from the editorial department of *The Metropolitan Magazine* of the Rev. Dr. White, a most worthy divine, for whom we have a high personal esteem and affection, and to whom our Catholic literature is under far greater obligations than have as yet been generally acknowledged. We are glad, however, to learn that his place is to be supplied by Dr. J. V. Huntington, a distinguished literary gentleman, a convert from Episcopalianism, and well known as the author of *Lady Alice*, *Alban*, and *The Forest*. Under his editorial management, the *Magazine*, our only monthly periodical, will no doubt sustain its reputation, and not unlikely become even more popular, if not more useful.

The two numbers published since the accession of the new editor present an agreeable variety, and seem in general well adapted to the tastes and capacities of that numerous class of readers who want something more than the newspaper and something less than the quarterly review. We think, however, that we detect in the editor an intention of combining in his periodical the characteristics of a review with those of a magazine. We doubt the propriety of such a combination in the present state of our Catholic public, as we do the combination of theological discussions and glowing love-scenes in a work of fiction. We also are sorry that he should have judged it necessary to place the very first number of his magazine in an attitude apparently

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**The Metropolitan Magazine.* Edited by J. V. Huntington. Baltimore. Monthly. February and March, 1854. *Temporal Power of the Popes.*

of hostility to our *Review*. There is room enough for his periodical without displacing ours, and we do not think that to wage a controversy with a Catholic periodical so well known and so long established as ours, is the best way either to win laurels for himself or to contribute to the edification of the Catholic community. He may indeed, by so doing, diminish in some degree the influence of our labors with the carnal Jews of the age, but he will not unlikely impair in the same or a greater degree his own influence with the stanch friends of our holy religion.

In the numbers for both February and March we are assailed with great warmth and vigor, and, as we think, very unnecessarily; for we are not aware of having in our discussion transcended the legitimate limits of a Catholic reviewer, or brought out any peculiar system or opinion of our own, whether in metaphysics or in theology. The opinions assailed we hold in common with the greatest and most approved Catholic doctors, and they are undeniably such as we may hold without any impeachment of our orthodoxy. If we have erred at all, it has been in claiming too much for the spiritual order, and in placing Peter too far above Cæsar. An error of this sort, if error it be, in these days of statolatry, carnal Judaism, and political atheism, is not likely to do much harm, or to gain any very alarming popularity. It is far safer to err on the side of the spiritual than on the side of the temporal, and in exaggerating the powers of the church, than in exaggerating those of the state. The temporal as distinguished from the spiritual has all the passions and inclinations of human nature in its fallen state to support it, and is never in danger of being unduly depressed; the spiritual is always opposed by them, and can sustain itself only in overcoming and subduing them. If a writer of good intentions and acknowledged orthodoxy, in defending the prerogatives of the spiritual order, should happen to go even a little too far, if such a thing be possible, the scandal is far less than that which must result from the attempt, by public controversy, to bring him back within more moderate limits. The *Metropolitan*, by attacking us, has the appearance, in the popular mind at least, of taking the side of the temporal against the spiritual, of the state against the church, of Cæsar against Peter, the people against God. The practical effect of its protest against us will not stop with a simple protest against what it regards as our ultraism, but will go fur-

ther, give aid and countenance to all the adherents of political atheism, and strengthen that fatal tendency of all modern society to rebel against God, which it, we presume, deplores no less than we, and to arrest which our *Review* has labored with all the force we could give it, ever since it became a Catholic review. In exciting a controversy and arming popular prejudice against us, the *Metropolitan*, we must think, has judged unwisely, and can hardly fail to do harm.

We could not and would not say this, if we were or could be accused of heterodoxy, of bringing out novelties of our own, or of broaching subjects prohibited to a Catholic reviewer. But nothing of this is or can be pretended. No one accuses us of heterodoxy, and the *Metropolitan* itself hardly goes even so far as to question the truth of the opinions it finds fault with us for having set forth; for it does not even attempt to discuss them on their merits. The real purport of the charge against us is that we go too far,—not that we are uncatholic, but that we are too Catholic; not that we are heterodox, but that we are too orthodox. The opinions which we are assailed for defending, it is conceded, are not against faith, or in any sense incompatible with sound Catholic doctrine; and it cannot be denied that they have been and still are held by the great body of theologians most esteemed at Rome for their orthodoxy. No doubt Rome has tolerated the opinion held by the *Metropolitan*, but no one will pretend that it is the opinion which she favors, or that her sympathies are not with the doctrine we defend. She has never uttered a word in favor of the opinion espoused by the *Metropolitan*. Not a syllable in any official document from the Holy See can be tortured into an approbation of it; and the *Metropolitan* itself concedes that the language of the popes on several occasions may seem to imply, and perhaps does imply, the doctrine we contend for. It finds its opinion supported chiefly by temporal princes, jurisconsults, bureaucrats, courtiers, demagogues, and those theologians who, in the contests between the temporal and spiritual powers, sided with the temporal, and sustained Cæsar against Peter, or who have found themselves so situated that it was necessary, in order to escape the wrath of Cæsar and to practise their religion without having their throats cut, to go as far as they possibly could in restricting the papal prerogatives; and the most that it can pretend is, that the language of the sovereign pontiffs, councils, and doctors *may* be explained in a sense

not absolutely repugnant to its doctrine. This is evident from M. Gosselin's book. In order to be able to maintain the opinion contrary to ours, its advocates have a host of documents to explain away, while we have nothing of the sort to do; for it must be conceded that the more obvious and natural sense of the documents in the case is in our favor. No author was ever placed on the *Index* for asserting the indirect temporal power of the popes, and yet Sixtus Quintus placed even Bellarmine on the *Index*, for denying their direct, and maintaining *only* their indirect, temporal authority. The presumptions throughout are unquestionably on our side, and if suspicion attaches to either opinion, it certainly is not to ours. It is they who take the contrary opinion that have the labor of vindicating their orthodoxy, not we. Such being undeniably the state of the case, and the doctrine we have defended being unquestionably the one more directly opposed to the fundamental errors of our times, we cannot think that the *Metropolitan* was doing a service to the cause of sound doctrine by entering the lists against us, and treating us almost as if we were committing some grievous sin against religion, or some outrageous crime against the peace and welfare of society.

But however this may be, we assure our respectable contemporary that we shall enter into no controversy with it, either in the field of metaphysics or in that of theology. We have other things to do, and we are persuaded that we can employ our time and our pages more to the advantage of truth and to the edification of Catholics in some other way. The matters on which it assails us we think we have sufficiently discussed, and we can now foresee nothing that will make it our duty to discuss them further. If the article directed against us in the *Metropolitan* for March last, on the *Temporal Power of the Popes*, had treated the subject so as to have permitted us, with justice to our friends or without discredit to the cause we defend, to remain silent, we should have passed it by without a word of comment. Such, indeed, was our intention, on learning that it was to appear, and we expressed as much to those who spoke of it to us. But on reading it, and taking the advice of those we usually consult in such matters, we have felt it our duty, not to offer a formal reply to it, which might provoke a rejoinder, but to make some explanatory remarks on the state of the question, the real doctrine we have en-

deavored to defend, and the bearing of that doctrine on the great controversies in which Catholics in our times are engaged.

The article we refer to professes to controvert the doctrine of our *Review* regarding the temporal power of the popes. The question, it must be understood, is not a question as to what is or is not Catholic dogma on the subject, although in our opinion it is not very remotely connected with faith. The question, as taken up and presented by the *Metropolitan*, lies, it is assumed, outside of faith, and is an open question. Its opinion is tolerated, and we cannot call it heretical in maintaining it, although we may think that the logical consequences of that opinion, if carried out, would be repugnant to Catholic dogma. On the other hand, we are certainly free to hold and defend our opinion, as an opinion, though not as Catholic dogma; for we cannot assert that the precise point made against us has been decided in our favor, or decided at all. The *Metropolitan* proves—saving some late condemnations of books at Rome, of the exact sense of which we are not fully informed and are not competent to speak, that its opinion is tolerated, and therefore that one may, if he see proper, hold and defend it,—a fact we have never denied. We have said that we believe Catholic dogma requires us to maintain at least the *indirect* temporal authority of the popes, or to forswear our logic; by which we evidently mean, not that it is Catholic dogma, but a strict logical deduction from it. This may be the case, and yet one who denies it not be a heretic; for the church does not hold a man to be a heretic because he happens to be a poor logician. These explanations will suffice to show that the question pertains not to the department of faith, but to that of opinion, in which both parties are, or at least are conceded to be, free, and therefore each opinion is to be accepted or rejected on its merits.

We regret that the *Metropolitan* has not seen proper to discuss the question it raises on its intrinsic merits. It states what it supposes to be our doctrine, and then shows that the contrary doctrine extensively prevails and is deeply rooted in several portions—the best portions, it says—of the church. We do not see what this has to do with the case. If by this it was intended to prove that the doctrine contrary to ours can be held by Catholics without falling under the censure of the church, it was quite superfluous, for that we have never denied, but have conceded time and again, and even

in the last number of our *Review*. If it is adduced to prove that the opinion ought not to be controverted, it is not conclusive; for if the opinion be unsound and of dangerous tendency, as we hold and are free to maintain, it would be a good reason for discussing and endeavoring to refute it. They are popular, not unpopular errors, that are most necessary to be controverted. If it is adduced to prove that the opinion is a *sententia ecclesiæ*, it proves too much; for it is conceded that we are free to oppose it, and can hold and defend the contrary doctrine without incurring any suspicion of not being rigidly orthodox. The *Metropolitan* contends that, seeing the doctrine is so widely held and so deeply rooted, and has even been incorporated into the oaths taken by the Irish and English bishops, with the knowledge and silence of the Holy See, we cannot now controvert it without bringing a reproach against Rome for having tolerated it, and charging her with culpable remissness for not having condemned it. This argument, if any thing, would prove too much, for it would prove that the opinion is not controvertible, and that we are not free to advocate the contrary doctrine, which cannot be pretended. The principle implied would moreover stop all discussion of opinions tolerated, or not condemned, by Rome. By what right, then, does the *Metropolitan* discuss and controvert ours? Has not Rome always tolerated diversity of opinions among Catholics on matters not of faith? And is she to be charged with negligence or remissness, because she does not judge it proper to thunder her anathemas against every error not immediately against faith, that happens to obtain among Catholics? If we had maintained that the opinion we oppose is immediately against faith, and therefore a heresy, the reasoning of the *Metropolitan* would have been conclusive; but as we have done no such thing, we see not with what propriety it can be adduced against us. We regret, therefore, that the *Metropolitan*, since it judged it necessary to discuss the subject, did not enter into its intrinsic merits, and forbear to urge those extrinsic considerations, which, however effectual they may be in bringing the weight of popular prejudice to bear against us, really decide nothing one way or the other as to the subject-matter in dispute.

The *Metropolitan* does not, moreover, give a fair and adequate statement of the real question we have been discussing. It takes an incident of the main question for the

main question itself. Its readers, unless they have also read and studied us, can form only an erroneous conception of the question as it lies in our mind, or as we have ourselves presented it. It writes as if it felt we were doing immense injury to the cause of religion, and as if it was manifestly its duty to avail itself of the most ready means in its power to arrest us. Its object does not appear to have been to enlighten us, to correct our alleged errors, or to elucidate and settle the question raised, but at any rate to stop us, not from hostility to us personally, we readily and cheerfully concede, but from a most praiseworthy desire to silence an enemy to the Catholic cause, or at least to neutralize his influence. Now we do not believe that we are such an enemy, nor that the cause was so urgent, that time might not have been taken to have done justice both to our views and to the subject itself. We had, we humbly submit, a right, if we were to be opposed at all, to insist that it should be done with fairness to our views, and also to the questions involved. The writer seems to us to have taken unnecessary alarm. He gives his readers the impression, that we have been engaged in discussing the temporal power of the popes as a simple isolated question, and that we have wantonly, without rhyme or reason, revived an old, exploded theory, generally abandoned by all Catholic theologians, and perhaps by Rome herself, and defended in our days by only here and there an individual, of questionable orthodoxy or soundness of judgment, and in so doing have provoked an entirely useless controversy, and one which can have only the most unpleasant results. Will it be permitted us to say, this is not a fair and adequate statement of the case?

We have asserted the indirect temporal power of the popes by divine right, we grant; but not as an isolated point, nor in the sense nor on the principles the *Metropolitan* induces its readers to suppose. It was not fair, we must think, to take our doctrine from a brief article in our last *Review*, the principal object of which was not, as our contemporary alleges, to discuss that doctrine, but to reply to an objection that had been often insinuated against us, of going too far, or of being ultra in some of our views. The doctrine we stated in that article had been almost from the first the doctrine of our *Review*, and had been discussed in its extent and limitations in three elaborate articles expressly devoted to it in our volume for 1853. The state-

ments in the article in our last number should, it seems to us, have been taken in the sense, and with the qualifications, which we had previously given, especially in the three articles referred to. If this had been done, it would have been clear, we think, that the discussion of the deposing power is not treated by us as an isolated, or as any thing more than an incidental, question; that we touched upon it only as connected with our general doctrine as to the relation of the two orders, temporal and spiritual; and that, properly speaking, our *Review* has never claimed or defended any temporal or civil power or jurisdiction at all for the pope out of the ecclesiastical states. All the power our *Review* has ever claimed or defended for the pope is that which we maintain is inherent in the spiritual order by the fact that it is the spiritual order, in the church as representative of that order on earth, and in the pope as supreme visible head of the church. If this had been attended to, it would have been seen that with us the real question regards not the deposing power as such, but the rights and powers of the spiritual in relation to the temporal.

The question which we have all along been discussing, and which in one form or other is almost the only question discussed in our *Review*, is precisely this question as to the relation of the two orders, the rights and powers of the spiritual order in relation to the temporal, and of the church, as the representative of the spiritual, in face of the state, the representative of the temporal. We have never confounded the two orders, never merged one in the other, or denied the substantive existence of either; we have simply asserted that the temporal exists not for its own sake, but for the spiritual, and that the spiritual order is by its own nature supreme over the temporal. In this we do not deny the temporal, or make the spiritual temporal. We do not deny the existence of man when we maintain that he exists for God only; nor do we make God human when we assert his supreme authority over man. If the temporal is for the spiritual, if the spiritual is supreme over the temporal, if the church represents the authority of the spiritual, and if the pope be the supreme head of the church by divine right, as all Catholics, we suppose, must hold, then the pope must have supreme authority over the temporal order, and therefore the power to judge princes in temporals, not indeed precisely as temporals, but as spirituals. This is the

doctrine we have maintained,* and the whole doctrine of our *Review* on the subject. Is there any thing in it to which a good Catholic can really object? If we mistake not, the *Metropolitan* itself concedes it all, for it asserts (p. 115) that every Christian admits "the subordination of temporal things to spiritual things," and the obligation of kings as well as others, even in their official acts, to be guided by the law of God as expounded by the church, and to be subject to her censures when they disregard it." What more in reality have we ourselves insisted on? And what was the necessity of raising an outcry against us? But we have asserted the deposing power, by divine right, which the *Metropolitan* denies. If it will give us credit for understanding and meaning what we say, it will perhaps find that it imagines even here a difference which is apparent, not real. The deposing power, as we have explained it, is the right of the pope as supreme head of the church to judge whether the state "does or does not conform to the conditions of its trust, and to pronounce sentence accordingly; which sentence *ought* to have immediate practical effect." Can the *Metropolitan* say what it does without going as far?

The doctrine we insist on† is that the prince incurs deposition, not by the will or legislation of the church, but by virtue of the natural law, or the law of God, under which he holds, and that the deposing power of the pope is simply judicial and declarative. What he does is to declare and apply the law of God to the particular case, and what he decides is the spiritual question involved, and therefore in doing it he transcends not the limits of his spiritual functions. The power of the pope in regard to princes is limited by the law of God, but of that law he is the guardian and judge for states as well as individuals, and therefore has the right to judge of its infractions by princes as well as by subjects, and both are bound by his judgment, and *ought* to give practical effect to his sentence; but if they refuse, the pope uses only spiritual arms to compel them, for he has no other. He can pronounce the sentence of forfeiture, and declare subjects absolved, but practically there his power ordinarily ends. Here is all our *Review* has ever contended for, and we should like to know how a good Catholic, save at the expense of his logic, can say less.

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* See pp. 20—23, *ante*. † *Ante*, pp. 80—85.

We have never maintained for the popes temporal and civil jurisdiction, properly so called, out of the ecclesiastical states, and though we would not, we could, consistently with the doctrine of our *Review*, take the oath taken by the English and Irish bishops as cited by the *Metropolitan*. We recognize, as we have always said, the substantive existence of the state as distinct from the church, though not its absolute independence of the spiritual authority. It depends on the church in the sense that the church is its superior, and defines its powers, and interprets for it the law under which it holds, and to which it is amenable in its acts. In all other respects it is independent. There is therefore nothing in our views to frighten people with the bugbear of theocracy. We recognize in the state the same liberty and independence of action that we do in the individual in matters of private and domestic economy. Within the limits of the moral law, as interpreted and applied by the church, it is free to do as it pleases. We claim no authority for the pope to interfere with the constitution of a state not repugnant to the divine law, or to disturb the rights or relations of property as settled by the same law. He has the right to judge whether an individual, public or private, acquires and holds property unjustly, and if so, as supreme director of conscience, he has the right to order restitution to be made to the rightful lord, but he has no right to appropriate it to himself. He no more than we can go into the White House at Washington and take President Pierce's new carpet, and he is as much subject to the law of God, revealed and natural, as the lowest of his spiritual children. His power is a power to declare and protect right, not to violate it; to direct its observance by all men and nations, not to disregard it or to abrogate it.

There is in all the reasoning against our doctrine, it seems to us, an in-concealed distrust of the spiritual power, or a secret fear that, if we concede it the supremacy, it will tyrannize over or oppress the temporal. They who oppose us seem to imagine that it is necessary for the safety of the temporal order, and to be able to prevent or resist the encroachments or usurpations of the church, "the rapacity of popes and insolence of churchmen," to maintain the entire separation of the two orders, and to assert the full freedom and independence in temporals of the civil authority. What, if your doctrine be true, we are asked, is the protection of the state against the encroachments of the church?

What is to prevent the ecclesiastical power from invading the civil, and appropriating to itself the functions of the temporal prince? The secret of their opposition seems to be the conviction that it is necessary for the protection of civil society to have some temporal barrier to the lawless ambition of the sovereign pontiffs. But there is nothing in the history of the popes, from St. Peter to the reigning pontiff, to warrant this distrust. Instances of weakness, of not resisting with sufficient promptness, energy, and firmness the ambition of Cæsar, may possibly be found on the part of some few of the sovereign pontiffs, but none of ambition to extend their states, or of encroachment upon the civil rights of temporal princes. The encroachments have always come from the other side, and the ambition to be guarded against has always been that of the temporal power, never that of the papal. This distrust, moreover, is very disrespectful to the Holy See, and even to our Lord himself. The church represents the divine order on earth, and the papacy was instituted by our Lord to introduce a divine element into the government of human affairs. It is absurd to suppose that he would or could leave this element a prey to all human passions, and make it necessary to clothe the temporal authority with power to resist it, and keep it in its place, or to prevent it from becoming a usurper and playing the tyrant. This distrust conceals all the venom of Protestanism, and needs only to be developed to justify Luther and Calvin in their war on the papacy. The *Metropolitan* agrees with us in condemning, though, as we think, if it has any thing to oppose to us, very inconsistently, the Four Articles of the French clergy in 1682, and therefore must concede that the pope cannot err in declaring or interpreting the law, whether for private individuals or states and empires, and also that his judgment, as supreme director of conscience, in applying the law to any particular case, is final and without appeal. It should therefore, it strikes us, understand that the papacy is by its very nature the surest and safest depositary of right, and guardian and protector of justice, that Almighty God has given us. Instead of distrusting the pope, and seeking in the state a counterpoise to his ambition and a safeguard against his injustice, we turn to him to learn what in such case is justice, and to obtain protection against the tyranny of princes and the injustice of states; for it is precisely his mission, given him by God himself, to declare what is just and right, and to use all his

power to make it prevail. Does the *Metropolitan* fear the unlimited power of God? Does it ask for a power in the inferior court to revise and reverse the judgments of the superior? Does it ask other guaranty than the divine commission, that the judgment of the supreme court, the court of final appeal, is not contrary to law and justice? If not, why distrust the ecclesiastical power, and assert the state as its limitation? As a Catholic, it has the pledge of God himself for the church and the papacy, both in teaching and judging:—"Going, teach all nations, ... teaching them to observe all things that I have commanded you; for behold I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." Our security is this *Ego vobiscum*, and it is security enough. Is there not in the partisans of the opinion opposed to us a slight tendency to overlook this *Ego vobiscum*, and to think and reason of the spiritual or papal power as if it stood on the same line with the temporal or civil power? Moreover, in the contests between the two powers, is there an instance in which the *Metropolitan* dares assert that the temporal power was in the right, and the spiritual power in the wrong? And is it not evident to every careful reader of history, that the temporal prince has asserted the independence of his order or the rights of the state, not in the interests of justice, but in those of his ambition,—not to resist "papal aggressions," but to justify his own? Why, then, distrust the spiritual, and confide in the temporal? The popes by their office are expounders and guardians of justice, and we must doubt the protection and assistance promised by God to his church in order to doubt them in the discharge of their proper functions; and what are their proper functions, they, not the temporal princes, are the judges. The supreme court determines its own jurisdiction and that of all inferior tribunals.

Perhaps the opposition manifested to us arises from not duly considering what it is we understand by the deposing power. The *Metropolitan* expressly objects to the inamissibility of power asserted by Bossuet, and therefore admits that sovereign princes may forfeit their powers, and be lawfully deposed. Thus far, it cannot object to our doctrine. But who has the right to judge of their forfeiture, and to declare them deposed? The people? That is absurd and anarchical. The people as subjects cannot, without the denial of the first principles of all government, judge their sovereign, and the people, considered in their sovereign capacity,

are the state, and the party to be judged. That a sovereign may be legally deposed, without anarchy, without revolution, it is necessary that there be a court above both sovereign and people, that has jurisdiction and may take cognizance of the case, and apply to it the law of God which governs it. This court, we hold, is by divine right the pope. But his functions in the case are purely judicial, that of declaring and applying the law, and pronouncing its sentence. When the sentence of deposition is pronounced, the tyrant we regard as deposed, for he is so in law, although he may still as a matter of fact sit upon his throne, and exercise the sovereign power. The *Metropolitan* seems to understand, by the deposing power, the power to execute as well as to pronounce sentence. But, as we have asserted and defended it, it extends simply to this judicial deposition, or pronouncing the sentence of the law. The execution of the sentence is another matter, which we have never maintained depended on the pope.*

As the judicial act in the case is a spiritual act, since it concerns conscience, we see not how it can be denied that the pope, as the spiritual power, has inherently the right to perform it; and being a spiritual act, we claim for the pope only spiritual jurisdiction in asserting it for him. As to his power to go further, and carry the sentence into execution by physical force, if requisite, as distinguished from spiritual censures, we have contended that practically he has it not. Yet that he has the abstract right we should be loath to deny, as long as we remember the crusades preached and authorized by the sovereign pontiffs against the Saracens and Turks. The popes in these crusades certainly assumed with regard to infidels a power which is, it seems to us, tantamount to the assertion of the right to dispossess *de facto* princes whom the law of God forbids to reign, and even to destroy them and their adherents if they refuse to submit, when required for the interests of religion. It was not by virtue of the civil constitution of Christian states nor in the name of *acquired* rights, nor in the interests of the temporal order, that the popes preached these crusades, and for so many centuries labored to rouse up all Christendom to repel the infidel hordes, but in the name of religion, and in the interests of the spiritual order. The history of the church is before the

*See the distinction suggested when discussing the subject *in extenso*, *ante*, pp. 6—8.

world, and we must be careful how we assume a position that makes that history on the part of the sovereign pontiffs for a long series of ages only a perpetual succession of scandals. Nevertheless, without either asserting or denying the power in question, we have limited ourselves simply to the assertion of the judicial power in the case of the pope, whose judicial sentence of course will be regarded as binding only by the faithful.

We have already said enough to show that the fears of some that we merge the state in the church, and recognize no substantive existence in the civil order as distinct from the ecclesiastical, are purely imaginary; but we will cite a passage from our last review, which may be regarded as the key to our whole doctrine on the subject. We are speaking of the differences between the two philosophical schools tolerated by the church. "These matters of difference lie in that sphere where the church wills us to be free, and where, as long as we advance nothing immediately against faith, or that tends immediately to weaken its defences, she leaves us to follow our own reason and will, as she does in *political or domestic economy*. . . . . Her authority is full and universal as representing the divine authority on earth, but her uniform practice is to leave men in philosophy, in *government*, in *social and domestic economy*, all the freedom compatible with the end for which she has been instituted." * Here is asserted the principle, and it applies to every department of human life. The temporal government has all the freedom and independence that the individual has in the management of his private and domestic affairs, and no more. This is the doctrine of our *Review*, and we think it will be hard for a Catholic, as such, to maintain a doctrine more liberal to Cæsar.

To pretend that we have revived the controversy concerning the indirect temporal power of the popes, strikes us as unjust and ungenerous. By the indirect temporal power of the popes, we understand their power, as vicars of Jesus Christ on earth, over temporals, in the respect that temporals have a spiritual character and are related to eternal salvation. In asserting this power, we assert two things: first, that all temporal things have a moral and spiritual relation; and second, that of this relation the pope is under God the supreme judge and governor;—two things which, as we have

*Vol. I., p. 278.

learned Catholicity, no good Catholic can deny, save at the expense of his logic. But both of these things are denied by our age, and in order to meet the errors of the day—errors which the *Metropolitan*, we are sure, will agree with us *are* errors—we are obliged to reassert and defend them. The great practical errors of our times are, that religion has nothing to do with politics, or that men in their political action are entirely independent of the spiritual order; and that the state is the supreme judge for itself of what is for the temporal welfare of its subjects, and, in seeking it, may go with or against the spiritual power, as it judges proper. These errors can be refuted, and their terrible effects counteracted, only by asserting against them the fact that no human act is, strictly speaking, morally indifferent,—that all human acts, in whatever order performed, have a moral character, and by that character pertain to the spiritual order and come within the jurisdiction of the spiritual power; and as the temporal is by the law of God subordinated to the spiritual, the pope, as the supreme representative of the spiritual, is the superior of the temporal prince, against whom the temporal prince has no right, under any pretext of promoting the temporal good of his states or his subjects, to attempt an act of hostility. Either, then, we were to be silent against the great practical errors of our times, or we were to take part in the controversy they provoked. The controversy was not raised by us, but was raised by the partisans of the errors of the day.

The *Metropolitan*, we are sure, is as much opposed to modern revolutionism as we are, and yet we have shown that modern revolutionism is all involved in, and flows as a logical consequence from, the Four Articles; and that the murder—we may say, with Pius VI. of glorious memory, the *martyrdom*—of Louis XVI. by the Convention, was but the legitimate conclusion of the Assembly of 1682. How were we, then, to refute modern revolutionism without attacking Gallicanism, and showing its radical unsoundness? To the disposition to restrict the papal authority, and to assert the independence of the civil order in face of the spiritual, as manifested by the Byzantine court, the Suabian emperors of Germany, the Plantagenets of England, and Philip the Fair, Charles V., and Louis XII., of France, we have traced historically and logically the rise of Protestantism, and the extent and disastrous consequences of Luther's rebellion, effected principally by and in the interest of tem-

poral princes and nobles. How were we then to oppose Protestantism, which has nearly abandoned whatever theological pretension it originally put forth, and become little more than a system of anti-papal politics, without discussing the relations of the two powers, and asserting the supremacy of the papal authority by divine right? We saw the Italian patriots, under cover of the independence of the temporal order, laboring to protestantize Italy, and carrying away large masses of the population by pretending that they opposed the pope only in temporals, and had no intention of questioning his power in spirituals. How were we to meet them but by asserting the authority of the pope in temporals as well as in spirituals, by virtue of the fact that the temporal is subordinated to the spiritual, and therefore that to war against the pope in the temporal order is really to war against his spiritual supremacy? Is there any effectual way of refuting an error, but by opposing to it and defending against it the truth which contradicts it?

We cheerfully recognize the learning, the research, and the value, in relation to a special question, of M. Gosselin's work, but his theory cannot answer our purpose, and is indeed in our way. On that theory we can defend particular acts of certain great and illustrious pontiffs from the charge of usurping power which has been preferred against them, but not that general supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the pope as its chief, which seems to be possessed, and which certainly is demanded by the exigencies of the times. Supposing the authority of the pope over temporal princes to rest only on a merely human basis, to be held only *ex jure humano*, we degrade the pope, in the sense it is necessary to assert his superiority, to the rank of a temporal prince, who may be opposed as any other prince without prejudice to Catholicity, and indirectly favor the error of the human and popular origin of power, against which every friend to religion and society has now to wage an unrelenting war. If the question had fallen into the past, and had ceased to be in our day and country a practical question, we might well have been content with M. Gosselin's theory. But such was not the case. The real question was never a more seriously practical question than at this moment, as any one may know who has attended to recent events in Great Britain, Holland, Piedmont, Baden, and New Granada, or has studied the doctrines of Mazzini, Kossuth, and the red-republicans throughout Europe and the United States. In

this or that locality there may be no especial call for the discussion, and nowhere can it be discussed without unpleasant consequences; but we conduct our *Review* with reference to the general state of the Catholic world, not with reference to a particular American diocese; and no discussion, save of superannuated questions, which have ceased to interest the passions of men, can be ever presented without unpleasant consequences, which one would wish to avoid if it were possible.

In former times it was necessary to discuss the question in relation to the pretensions of temporal princes. It is still necessary to do it in the same relation, as is evident from the refusal of the present emperor of the French to abandon the infamous organic articles of his uncle, annexed, against the protestations of Rome, to the concordat of 1802, and by the recent doings of nominally Catholic princes and governments in Piedmont, Baden, and New Granada. All the difficulties encountered by the Holy See in Catholic countries grow out of the assumption by the state of independence in face of the ecclesiastical power, and the want of a clear apprehension on the part of the faithful of the real relation of the two powers. If it is once conceded that the church may be lawfully resisted in her demand by the state, or that there is a sphere in which the church has no right to declare the law for the state, or in which the state may disregard the judgment of the church, the minds of the faithful will to a great extent be confused, and at a loss to decide where the line of demarcation between the two powers is to be drawn. They can rely on neither the church nor the state, and will be as if they had no infallible teacher and guide. If it is assumed that each judges and defines its own powers, how is the simple Catholic to know to which his obedience is due? The *Metropolitan* concedes that the state is under obligation to conform to the law of God as expounded by the church, but suppose the state does not, what is the subject to do? Obey the church? Very good. But suppose the question is of a mixed nature, and that the state declares that it is one over which it has supreme jurisdiction, and the church none. If the state is the judge of its own powers, independent in temporals, and free to decide for itself what are temporals, what then is the simple loyal subject and would-be good Catholic to do? Still follow the church? Then you contradict yourself, and deny the very independence of the state which you contend for

against us, and assume the very doctrine we maintain. Why, then, we ask again, raise an outcry against us? If you say, follow the state, you set up private judgment against the church, and fall into the fundamental error of Protestantism, besides asserting the principle of civil despotism.

The same doctrine which was formerly put forth by the German lawyers in behalf of the German kaisers, by Edward III. of England and the court party, by Philip the Fair, and more lately by Louis XIV., the Regent Orleans, and the parliaments of France, is now put forth on behalf of the people, as we have made quite clear in the subsequent article, as well as elsewhere. On this same doctrine the church is attacked in Italy, and in every country where modern radicalism or red-republicanism has gained a footing. Your modern democracy, as it calls itself, which burst forth in 1848 with such destructive fury in almost every capital in Europe, and threatened to engulf all modern civilization in irretrievable ruin, only transfers to what is termed the people—that is, the demagogues—the rights and powers claimed under pagan Rome for the emperors, and in most modern states by courtiers for the monarch. The pagan Cæsars claimed, and by their pagan subjects were admitted, to be at once emperors, pontiffs, and gods; and it was because they resisted the claim of being pontiffs and gods, that the early Christians were persecuted throughout the Roman empire, and led like sheep to the slaughter. The demagogues of our day put forth the same claim for the people. According to them, the people are the emperor, the *pontifex maximus*, and God. They array popular sovereignty against the spiritual authority in temporals of the church, and make war on Catholicity in the name of democracy. Hence the old struggle of the church with the temporal order is renewed in our days, with this difference only, that she has the people, or rather the demagogues, now for her opponents, instead of kings and emperors alone.

This false democracy, this blasphemous deification of the people, is not confined simply to those born and bred outside of the church. Not a few of the principal leaders and wire-pullers of the movement in behalf of what we call political atheism are or were nominal Catholics; and they justify themselves and impose on the faithful by appealing to that very independence and autonomy of the temporal order which the *Metropolitan* asserts, if it asserts any thing,

against us. If we undertake to oppose them in the name of the church, they tell us that the church has nothing to say on the subject, for she has no right to go out of the purely spiritual order, and they are moving only in the temporal order, entirely independent of her authority. How, with the doctrine that denies the indirect temporal authority of the church by divine right, or the authority over temporals in that they have a moral character and relations, is it possible to refute these enemies of God and man? Their doctrine seems to them, and to us, only a legitimate conclusion from that traditional doctrine of the courts against Rome which we are arraigned for having denied. Now are we to yield to these demagogues, and concede that the church leaves them free to profess their political atheism without impeachment of their orthodoxy? or are we to resist them, and show the faithful the innate falsity of their doctrine, and its utter incompatibility with Catholicity? The former, we presume, will not be pretended. Then how in the world are we to do the latter without engaging in the controversy the *Metropolitan* so earnestly deprecates?

The doctrine we oppose was bad enough when put forth in behalf of kings, but it is much worse when it is put forth in behalf of the people, that is, the demagogues. It has done and is doing in our own day immense injury. The Holy Father has time and again denounced it, at least in principle, as it seems to us, and at his suggestion the Jesuits established their periodical, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, to oppose it. No attentive reader of that periodical can, it seems to us, pretend that the controversy is discountenanced at Rome. It may not there assume the precise form that it does in our pages, because there no Catholic professedly defends the church, in relation to the authority we claim for her, on the ground it has been customary to defend her on in Great Britain and this country. It has been customary here to deny in the most positive terms all authority of the pope in temporals *ex jure divino*, and to indulge in no little abuse of the sovereign pontiff hypothetically. We have read in Catholic journals, and heard from the rostrum, and even from the pulpit, expressions with regard to buckling on one's knapsack and shouldering one's musket, and marching against the pope, in case he should do so or so, that have made our blood run cold,—expressions which we should hardly have ventured on ourselves even when a Protestant. The writers or speakers knew very well that the case they supposed could

never occur, and that therefore they were safe; but they little considered, we must believe, the impression they conveyed, or the effect they were producing on the minds of the simple Catholic public, or that they were teaching, or at least favoring, that very doctrine of courtiers and demagogues which creates so many difficulties for the Holy See, and which apparently justifies the non-Catholic world in their war against the papacy. The papacy is the one grand object of attack, because it is well understood that without the papacy the church is not a kingdom, cannot be the kingdom of God on earth, and must sink to the level of the sects. It has seemed to us, therefore, that the true Catholic should apply himself specially to the assertion and defence of the rights and powers of the papacy. Our Lord founded his church on Peter, and if we assert, or leave to be asserted without contradiction, a power in the state that in any contingency may lawfully war against Peter in his successors, we deprive ourselves of all power to assert the independence of the church, and to maintain true religious freedom. The controversy has been forced upon us, therefore, by the denial, public as well as private, of what we suppose to be the rightful supremacy of Peter. Blame not us for the controversy. Let the adherents of the opposite opinion as well as the partisans of political atheism remain silent, and we will remain silent too; but as long as they are assiduous in inculcating their opinions, and let slip no opportunity of directly or indirectly denying ours, it can be hardly fair to forbid us to speak, since our opinion is at least as free and as defensible as theirs.

It is a great mistake, in our judgment, to represent the doctrine we advocate as an exploded theory, and as defended in our days only by men of questionable orthodoxy or mental soundness. This is going, we think, a little too far. It was held and defended by La Mennais, it is true; but it was also held and defended, if we are not in error, by the elder Görres and the illustrious Count de Maistre. We find it brilliantly defended by that influential journal, *L' Univers*, and in the main by the *Dublin Tablet* and *La Civiltà Cattolica*. It is asserted to the full extent, and on the same ground that we assert it, by his Eminence the present cardinal archbishop of Rheims, in his *Théologie Dogmatique*, and is stated and taken by Padre Cercia', in his *Tractatus de Romano Pontifice*, published at Naples in 1851, as unquestioned and unquestionable, and adduced as an unanswer-

able reason why the pope should not be subject to any temporal power, but should have an independent principality, and the *status* of an independent and sovereign prince. Moreover, the Abbé Rohrbacher, a doctor of theology and a most learned French theologian, defends it throughout his *Universal History of the Catholic Church*, the second edition of which has just been completed, under the eye and with the express encouragement of Rome. Indeed, we had supposed that there was throughout the whole Catholic world a decided reaction, since the disastrous effects of the old French revolution, against Gallicanism, and in favor of ultramontanism, and we had supposed that we were ourselves only obeying the common tendency of the Catholic *renaissance* of the nineteenth century.

The *Metropolitan* does us injustice in alleging that we, in our defence of ourselves against the charge of going too far, accuse those who deny or fail to assert the doctrine for which we contend of a want of courage to resist popular errors. That there are persons whom the *Metropolitan* is bound to respect, who, though they agree with us in our theology, yet doubt the wisdom or prudence of agitating certain questions which we have discussed, we have the very best possible reasons for asserting. We can well understand that they may do so, without any suspicion of lack of zeal or of courage, for it is a question on which men equally eminent, equally firm and bold, may honestly come to different conclusions, and we should not dare on our own judgment alone to act in opposition to the wishes of those who regard us, though sound in our theology, yet imprudent in the line of policy we have adopted. We have not adopted that line of policy rashly, nor on our own personal convictions alone. It was prescribed to us in the beginning, and we believe it has met with very general approbation from the American hierarchy. Its object was to impart a freer and more elevated tone to Catholic thought and discussion, and to abandon the tone of apology, and put those who objected to the church and her doctrines, or to the papacy and its prerogatives, on their defence. Its intention was, instead of laboring to explain away as far as possible the doctrines most offensive to non-Catholics or lukewarm Catholics, or to answer objections drawn from ecclesiastical history on a low ground, to bring out these doctrines in their strongest form, and to assume the highest Catholic ground of defence. That this course had not been previously adopted in this

country was admitted, and it was admitted also that the circumstances previously existing neither required nor warranted it, because, as long as the Catholic body was small, the main object to be aimed at was their defence against non-Catholics, and the formation of the public sentiment of the Catholic community was only a secondary consideration. But it was thought, when we were called to our present post, that Catholic questions might and should be henceforth discussed among us in reference not so much to the non-Catholic as to the Catholic community, for it was believed that the higher the tone of Catholics, the more salutary would be their public influence in checking the destructive radicalism of the country, and the more advantageous would it be in the long run to the cause of Catholic truth. Change of circumstances, it was believed by our advisers, demanded and authorized a change of policy, without however, implying any censure upon the previous policy for its time, or upon those who adopted or adhered to it. No doubt, in adopting a new line of policy, as had been done in France and Germany, and copying after the old fathers of the primitive centuries, we were liable to be misapprehended at first, and to be thought imprudent by such as did not watch narrowly the signs of the times. That we should excite fears and encounter opposition in the ranks of our friends was to be expected; but strong in the purity of our motives, and sustained by those who had but to open their lips to secure our silence or to change our course, we felt prepared for it. That there has been and is an honest difference of opinion among Catholics as to the wisdom of our course, we do not conceal from ourselves, and have no wish to deny; but we have been far more deeply affected by the cordial and generous support we have received from the great body of the bishops and clergy, than we have been by the occasional dissatisfaction which individuals have expressed. They who know us personally know that our natural disposition is mild and conciliatory, and that nothing but deep conviction and what we regard as the stern demands of duty could lead us ever to write or publish any thing that would excite unpleasant feelings in any one. No doubt, some whom we sincerely respect honestly think we go too far; others no less respectable and high in authority think differently, as the following extract from a very kind letter, sent us, since our last issue, by a most holy man and illustrious prelate, late a sojourner at Rome, may testify:—

"You do *not* go too far, I tell you. Your writings are useful to all;—to good Catholics, whom they enlighten and confirm; to tepid and lax Catholics, whom they stimulate and put to shame; and to Protestants themselves, whom they confound and frighten. Then I tell you again that you do *not* go too far. *Tales ambio defensores veritatis.* Therefore I never cease to pray God to preserve you, and to continue to assist you in your labors."

We trust the right reverend author will forgive us for making use of his kind encouragement in our defence, and our readers will pardon us the vanity of publishing what is too complimentary to ourselves. Such a letter from one who but slightly knows us, save through our *Review*, is at least a fair offset to the protest of the *Metropolitan*.

We have endeavored in these remarks to present fairly and honestly the real question we have discussed, the real doctrine we have put forth, and its intimate relations with the great practical controversies of the day. We hope we have said nothing to provoke a rejoinder. It will be seen, that, whatever private opinion we may have hinted or refrained from denying, the power we have insisted on for the popes is not properly a temporal power or civil jurisdiction, which would imply that the pope is the temporal lord, Cæsar as well as pope, but a spiritual power supreme over temporals, on their spiritual side, and for a spiritual end. But it is the pope as the spiritual power, not the prince, that draws the line between the spiritual and the temporal, and decides authoritatively for conscience where the one begins and the other ends. To deny this, is to subordinate the church to the state, or at least to leave conscience without a guide; to admit it, is to admit all that we insist on. The *Metropolitan* virtually does admit it, as we have seen, and therefore it has no real ground of opposition to us, and has vehemently protested against us, we must believe, in consequence of having misapprehended us. There can be no further occasion of misapprehending us, and therefore no further occasion, we trust, of controverting us.

THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1855.]

This publication by an able and learned Protestant divine is one which we cannot, with our sense of duty as a Catholic reviewer, pass over in silence. The authority of the pope in relation to temporal princes and governments is the great question of the day, and we cannot blink it out of sight, if we would. We must meet it fairly and fearlessly, let us offend whom we may. In open questions among Catholics, each party must be free, and silence must be imposed on both or on neither. But at present our controversy is with non-Catholics rather than with a school in our own church.

Dr. M'Clintock proves in his nine letters to Mr. Chandler that it is idle to attempt to ward off the objections of non-Catholics to the papal power on the ground assumed by that gentleman in his well-known speech, apparently the ground taken by the learned and excellent M. Gosselin; for it is a ground widely rejected by Catholics themselves. It cannot be asserted as Catholic doctrine, and no non-Catholic, for no Catholic, can be required to accept it as such. At best it is an opinion in the church, not of the church; and if Catholics may hold it, they may also reject it. When Mr. Chandler urges it as Catholic doctrine, he assumes authority which does not belong to him, decides a question which the church has not decided; and it is sufficient for the non-Catholic to tell him, that no Catholic is bound to hold it, and they who follow Rome rather than Paris, as Paris was in the last century, do not hold it, but reject it as incipient Protestantism, tending in fact to political atheism. Whether we are ultramontanists or not, till ultramontanism so called is condemned, we must in our arguments with non-

**The Temporal Power of the Pope; containing the Speech of the Hon. Joseph R. Chandler, delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 11, 1855. With Nine Letters, stating the prevailing Roman Catholic Theory in the Language of Papal Writers, by* John M'Clintock, D. D. New York: 1855

Catholics, if they insist on it, defend our church as if it were true.

Every Catholic controversialist knows that the question of infallibility is much embarrassed by the Gallican doctrine that the papal definitions are reformable till accepted by the church; but in our arguments with non-Catholics we are not at liberty to relieve ourselves by denying that doctrine, since it is tolerated and they who hold it may receive absolution. We must defend the infallibility of the church even on the supposition of its truth, for if it were absolutely incompatible with that infallibility it would not be tolerated. So with regard to the so-called temporal power of the pope. That power has been asserted on very high authority, defended by doctors of the greatest respectability and weight, and acted on time and again by the greatest and holiest pontiffs that have ever sat in the chair of Peter. You may say, no Catholic is obliged to assert it, but at the same time you must concede that every Catholic may assert it, and therefore in relation to those without, you must defend the church, if they insist on your doing so, as if every Catholic were obliged to maintain it. In regard to non-Catholics, we must defend the church in what she allows, or gives a tacit consent to, as well as in what she commands. We cannot, in dealing with them any more than when dealing with Catholics, treat our church as if she were a human institution, changing her spirit or modifying her doctrines with the times, or as a fallible institution, tacitly countenancing in her children errors which strike at her very existence, or which, if practically carried out, would change her essential character or unduly enlarge her powers. With the greatest respect for the good intentions of Mr. Chandler, we doubt, therefore, the wisdom and propriety of the ground he takes in his speech. He reopens in it an internal controversy among Catholics, for only a portion of the Catholic body, and they not those in best repute at Rome, will accept that ground; and it counts for nothing with non-Catholics, for they look upon it, not as a ground sanctioned by the church, but simply as the opinion of those whose devotion to the papacy is not very deep or ardent, and upon the whole as evasive and unsatisfactory. They do not believe Mr. Chandler's statement to be frank and straightforward, and it creates in their minds a doubt of Catholic sincerity and candor. Every intelligent Protestant knows how the Gallican doctrine has always been regarded at

Rome, and when we put it forth as the ground of our defence, he suspects we do it not so much because we hold it as because we shrink from incurring the odium of the opposite opinion. He may be wrong in this, but as a matter of fact it is not unfrequently his conclusion.

Prudence is a cardinal virtue, and there is a wise and allowable policy that should never be neglected. But whoever has read the history of the church knows that she does not stand in human policy, and that her worst enemies have always been those of her children who relied the most on human prudence. The general impression of non-Catholics is that Catholics are deficient in frankness, candor, and plain, straightforward dealing. They regard our apologists as special pleaders, evading the real points at issue by their logical subtlety and refinements. In a word, they believe us, in the Protestant sense of the term, *Jesuitical.* It is their prejudice against us on this account that creates a greater obstacle to their conversion than any prejudice they have against the most high-toned Catholic doctrines ever put forth. They think that we do not deal frankly, honestly, with them; that when we speak for them we trim, smooth down the asperities of our doctrines, round off their sharp angles, and present them something quite different from what we really hold. Unquestionably in this they do us foul wrong, but such is undeniably the fact. They lack confidence in us and in our statements. This is the state of mind which we have to deal with, and we submit, if the best method of dealing with it is to do our best to make our doctrines appear as near like their own crude opinions as possible. Policy, true prudence, it strikes us, is to deal frankly with the non-Catholic portion of our countrymen, to place a generous confidence in their understanding and in their love of truth, and to shrink from the avowal and defence of no doctrine we hold, however offensive it may be to them, whenever it is called in question. Mr. Chandler would have pleased us better, and have, in our judgment, better served the cause of Catholicity, if he had in his place repelled the charge brought by Mr. Banks against Catholics, and shown that, even on the highest-toned ultramontanism, so called, there is nothing in Catholicity incompatible with the loyalty of the subject, or the autonomy and independence of the state in its own order. That would have been high-minded and manly, and would have commanded confidence and respect. It would have

met the question openly and fairly, and carried with him the sympathies of the whole Catholic body, whether Gallican or anti-Gallican.

Dr. M'Clintock attempts, and we think successfully, to show that the doctrine defended by our *Review* on the temporal power of the popes is the prevailing theory among Catholics, and that the opinion defended by Mr. Chandler is not the proper Catholic doctrine on the subject. He has done this in an able and scholar-like manner. He cites largely from our pages, it is true, but he cites fairly, and he states our view correctly, which is more than we can say of some of our friends. He concedes that the power we claim for the pope is not a civil or temporal power, but spiritual, and is a power over temporals only in the respect that they are spirituals. He shows that Mr. Chandler's authorities are not to the purpose, for they simply disclaim what no Catholic does or ever has asserted. This is all true. We could ourselves say, with the exception of his hypothetical abuse of the pope, all that Mr. Chandler and his authorities say, for neither he nor they disclaim the doctrine we assert; they only disclaim the doctrine which Gallicans accuse us of asserting. But with Dr. M'Clintock all this fairness, this apparent honesty, has a purpose. He thinks that to prove that Catholics do hold the doctrine we maintain is enough to condemn the church forever in the estimation of the American people. He calls the doctrine "a fearful doctrine," and thinks that all he need do in order to render the church odious is to convict her of holding it. He offers no argument against the doctrine itself, for he regards it, like vice, as

> "A monster of so frightful mien,
> That to be hated needs but to be seen."

But we are disposed to argue this point with the learned doctor. We are inclined to think that he has overshot the mark, and we believe that, after the passions of the moment have subsided, his hate will serve powerfully the cause it was intended to ruin. We have great confidence in truth, and we believe that, whatever the motive for which it is told, it will always, if told, tend to gain credit for itself. We are as much of an American as Dr. M'Clintock, and know the American people as well as he does. We are of them, were brought up with their sentiments and opinions, and till forty years of age our own heart responded, beat

for beat, to every pulsation of theirs. A very considerable portion of them are now carried away by this or that fanaticism; but at bottom they are a noble people, high-minded and honorable, and naturally love what is clear, strong, and consistent. They are not a timid people, frightened at their own shadow, nor an unreasoning people, scared at the first sparks of logic and sound sense. Their most marked characteristics, when left to themselves, are plain, honest good-sense, and a love of fair play. They are strong rather than acute, bold rather than subtle, and practical rather than speculative. They are un-Catholic, often anti-Catholic, but naturally disposed to be religious, in fact, no people more so. They have lost their religious faith, but not the heart which Tertullian says is naturally Christian. Though immersed in business and apparently sunk to the lowest depth in the worship of Mammon, there is a large fund of latent chivalry at the bottom of their character, and a deep sense of the superiority of the spiritual to the material.

Now we believe the doctrine we set forth is precisely that view of Catholicity most likely to arrest their attention and win their respect. If there is any thing which is a settled conviction with them, it is the incompetency of the state in spirituals, and that there is a law higher than the civil constitution, a law of eternal justice, which binds the prince no less than the subject, the state no less than the individual. There is not an American fifty years old who did not suck in this conviction with his mother's milk, and has not grown up with it. Dr. M'Clintock believes it as firmly as we do, and, if a natural-born American citizen, would fight to the death for it. All our institutions presuppose it, our system of law consecrates it, and without appealing to it we could not justify our separation from Great Britain, the country of our ancestors.

We are well persuaded that Dr. M'Clintock has not well weighed his words, when he calls the doctrine we advocate an abominable doctrine, and we are equally well persuaded that he has mistaken the convictions, the intelligence, and the spirit of the American people. He does them infinitely less than justice. They all, with one accord, subscribe to the doctrine which forms the principle of the argument in the Declaration of Independence, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance, and that there is a moral order above the civil, to which the temporal

authority is subjected. Is there a single American who does not believe in the reality of such moral order, who would make right and wrong mere creations of the civil government? The American people solemnly asserted that power is a trust, not an indefeasible right, when they declared the colonies absolved from their allegiance to the British crown, for the reason that George III. had proved himself a tyrant, and they reassert it every Fourth of July, when they publicly read the Declaration of American Independence. They assert the reality of the moral order, superior to the civil, and independent of it, in their doctrine of the rights of man, or when they precede their constitutions by a Bill of Rights. These rights are not created or conferred by the state or the civil society; they are older than civil society; they are derived not from the state, but from Almighty God, and are held under the law of nature, or the divine law in the natural order, and are founded in what is called natural right. They are the natural and inalienable rights of which the congress of 1776 spoke in their Declaration of Independence, and the state, so far from conferring them, is bound by them, and has for its chief office to guaranty and vindicate them for each individual citizen. The private citizen may come into court and plead these rights against the state, and any enactment of the legislature that invades them or conflicts with them is null and void from the beginning, and the court is bound to set it aside as contrary to natural right, to natural justice,—as a violence, in the language of St. Augustine, rather than a law. It is because our government by its very constitution is supposed to recognize and guaranty these rights, the natural rights of every man, that it is called a free government, and we who live under it are called a free people.

Dr. M'Clintock is a Protestant divine, of what particular denomination it matters not, but he is a Protestant divine of some sort, and evidently a man of intelligence, learning, and ability. Is it necessary that we should tell him that every Protestant sect in this country asserts the very doctrine, in principle, that we maintain? Every man who has any religion at all, whether Catholic or Protestant, Jew or gentile, holds his religion to be for him the law of his conscience, therefore the highest of all laws, *lex suprema*,—in fact, the law of laws. No man claims the right to worship God contrary to religion, but every man does claim before

the state the right, the inherent and inalienable right, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, or the prescriptions of what he holds to be the religious authority; and when the state law comes in conflict with the solemn obligations of his religion, he answers with the apostles of our Lord, "it is necessary to obey God rather than man." Whenever the civil law comes in conflict with the religious law, the civil, not the religious, must give way. No Protestant, no Mahometan, no gentile even, will deny this. The American people have asserted it in declaring, not religious toleration, but religious freedom. The state does not grant or confer this freedom, but recognizes it as a right, which it is bound to respect and to protect. Should the state ordain something against this freedom in any sect; should it command Methodists to become Presbyterians, Presbyterians to become Episcopalians, Episcopalians to become Catholics; should it forbid Baptists to baptize by immersion, or Presbyterians to baptize infants, or prohibit any sect from governing in all ecclesiastical and religious matters its own members according to its own discipline, would the sect feel itself bound to obey? Would it not tell the state, you transcend your province, and meddle with that which is above your power, and independent of it? Most assuredly. Then every Protestant sect asserts the spiritual order as above the temporal, religion as superior to politics, and therefore a law higher than the civil law, and to which, in case of conflict, the civil law must yield. Here, in principle, is the whole doctrine which Dr. M'Clintock and those who cry out against us call "abominable." Is this doctrine abominable in the eyes of the American people? Are they prepared to declare the state omnipotent, supreme in both spirituals and temporals, and surrender their consciences to its keeping? We do not believe it, and we are sure that Dr. M'Clintock and his friends do them foul wrong, and also wholly misrepresent themselves. They may wish to use the state as an instrument of propagating their religion, or of suppressing others opposed to it; but surely they would not suffer it to change or modify it.

To deny the supremacy of the spiritual order is the denial of both civil and religious liberty. What is tyranny but a denial of this supremacy, the denial of right, and the violation of justice between man and man, or between sovereign and subject? There is no tyranny where there is no violation of liberty, and no violation of liberty where there is no

violation of justice. Justice, we need not say, pertains to the moral order, or rather is that order itself. The essence of tyranny, therefore, consists in that it is an encroachment of the political upon the moral order, that is to say, upon the spiritual order, which includes as the one law of God for the Christian both the natural law and the revealed. If we understand by liberty true liberty, not license, its necessary condition is in the maintenance of the independence and supremacy of the moral order, the supremacy of right over might, the spiritual over the material, the divine over the human. The very end of government is the maintenance of justice in all political, social, and domestic relations, and all its powers are given it for this end, and no other. It is the reason and end of the state; and therefore the very idea of the state presupposes the supremacy of the moral, that is to say, the spiritual order.

Dr. M'Clintock is, in his own estimation, whatever he may be in ours, a minister of the gospel, and as such, his whole labor is to impress upon those who come within the sphere of his influence the superiority of the spiritual and the subordination of the temporal. The *Westminster catechism*, which we learned before we were yet able to read, tells us, "The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him for ever." All religious instruction, all moral culture, has for its object to introduce and sustain in individuals and nations the supremacy of the moral order, of reason over passion, right over brute force. Nobody does or can doubt it. It is not necessary to undertake to prove it to the American people; none of them are so stupid as not to recognize it. Assuredly, then, we may assume it as a settled American conviction, that the spiritual is supreme, and the temporal subordinate. Can we suppose, then, that they are such poor logicians as not to perceive that, in case of conflict between the two, the temporal, not the spiritual, politics, not religion, the state, not the church, must give way?

Let us take the old Puritans of New England. We say Puritans, not Pilgrims, too often confounded with them. The Pilgrims, founders of Plymouth Colony, were a small band of English dissenters, who had separated from the English establishment and formed themselves into a separate sect before leaving England. They were independents, which the Puritans never were. The early Puritans who founded the Massachusetts Colony, in our early history distinct from that of Plymouth, or the Old Colony, as we now

call it, were not dissenters in England. They belonged, up to the moment of their leaving England, to the English establishment. They were Anglicans, and they brought with them the intolerant and persecuting spirit of the Anglican church. The persecutions which are so deep a stain on our early colonial history were not the work of the Pilgrims who landed at Plymouth, nor of their descendants, but of the Puritans of the Massachusetts Colony, under the Endicotts, Winthrops, and other early colonial governors,—a fact which we would commend to the attention of Mr. Marsden, a recent historian of the Puritans, who confounds the persecutors of Boston with the "Pilgrim Fathers," as does also the *Dublin Review*. But this by the way. We will take these Puritans, who, after they came to New England, set up an ecclesiastical establishment for themselves. And what was their principle? What was their objection to remaining in England, and members of the Anglican establishment? It was, that the church of England gave to the state or temporal authority jurisdiction in spiritual matters. The principle of their separation was precisely the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order. This they asserted; and, that they might maintain it, they submitted to exile, and dared brave all the hardships of a new settlement amidst merciless savages on a bleak and inhospitable coast.

If there are any people in the Old World with whom the larger portion of our American Evangelicals more especially sympathize, they are the old Scottish Covenanters and the modern Free Kirk. The old Covenanters separated from their brethren on the very principle we assert, and the Free Kirk is a solemn protest of a large portion of the Scottish people against the Erastian heresy. In both, the solemn assertion is of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order. The Free Kirk asserts with all its energy the incompetency of the state in spirituals, and the old Covenanters asserted with even more energy the obligation of the state to conform to the teachings and precepts of the church. Who then will dare maintain that the assertion of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and the subordination of the temporal, is the assertion of an abominable doctrine in the estimation of the American people? Have the American people become a body of atheists, denying God as King of kings and Lord of lords, denying moral justice, and the supremacy of right? Has not Dr. M'Clintock

in his insane hostility to the Catholic Church forgotten himself, and unwittingly branded as abominable the very principle he asserts and must assert, in every sermon he preaches, or else shock all the moral convictions of his hearers. Has he, or any other who cries out against the doctrine we in our humble way have defended, the audacity to maintain before his class as a professor, or an assembly of Americans as a citizen, the contrary doctrine, that is, the independence and supremacy of the temporal, and the subordination of the spiritual,—that the political law over-rides the religious, and that conscience must submit to the civil magistrate? No man not in need of physic and good regimen has the effrontery to do it. He who should do it would be hissed as a fool, abhorred as a moral monster, or confined as a lunatic. The native instincts of the human heart, the simplest common sense, would pronounce him a demon rather than a man. There is not a human being, be he who he may, that has attained to the first glimmerings of reason, who does not hold that the spiritual order, that is, truth and justice, ought to prevail. Even the fool who has said in his heart, There is no God, dares defend his atheism only by alleging that it is true, and tends to promote true morality. He can deny God only in the name of God, truth only in the name of truth, justice only in the name of justice. Falsehood whenever advocated is advocated as truth, not as falsehood; wrong whenever defended is defended as right, not as wrong. He who would deny the moral order must pay homage to it, must assert its supremacy; for man is a rational animal, and has inherently a moral constitution. They who oppose the principle we assert, are themselves obliged to assert it as the very principle of their opposition. Here as elsewhere our Protestant ministers, in their eagerness to raise objections to Catholicity, forget to examine whether the principles on which they must rest them are not principles which they no more than we can consistently maintain. It is neither fair nor honorable, neither logical nor just, to assume principles of reasoning against us which they reject the moment they are put upon their defence.

Christianity is unquestionably supernatural, but it does not oppose or supersede the natural. It enlightens and elevates natural reason, purges and extends its vision, but it does not contravene it. It recognizes and consecrates every principle of natural justice and equity, every truth appre-

hensible by natural reason; for it is adapted to our rational and moral constitution, and presupposes and sustains with all its supernatural energy, instead of subverting it. Nothing really true in natural reason is or can be false in Christian revelation, any more than what is true in Christian revelation can be false in natural reason. In no instance does the Christian abrogate the natural law. Whatever is really just and true, right, and obligatory under the natural law, is equally so under the revealed law. God is consistent with himself, and does not assert one principle in one part of his works and a contradictory principle in another. All his words, whether of nature or grace, harmonize, as proceeding from one and the same eternal and immutable reason, and one and the same eternal, supreme, and unchangeable will. This great principle of the independence of the spiritual and the subordination of the temporal, which we have found it necessary to assert under the law of nature, and the denial of which is simply atheism, must equally be asserted under the Christian or revealed law. No Christian, as no moralist, can then assert the independence and supremacy of the temporal in face of the spiritual. So much the American people assuredly hold, at least in theory, and so much Dr. M'Clintock will himself, no doubt, cheerfully concede. Where, then, is the difference in principle between us? And wherefore is the doctrine we advocate more fearful or more odious than the one he does and must advocate as a professedly Christian minister?

Let us fairly understand the matter. Dr. M'Clintock charges Mr. Chandler with evading the real question, and maintains that all the authorities he cites to prove that the pope claims no civil or temporal power or jurisdiction, out of the Ecclesiastical States, by divine right, that is, as vicar of Christ on earth, prove nothing to the purpose, for nobody contends that he does. Here we must let the learned doctor speak for himself.

"My dear Sir,—Five hundred years and more have passed since Pope Boniface died a miserable death. From that day to this, the popes of Rome have either explicitly avowed doctrines equivalent in substance to his, or, by silence, have given them a tacit consent. No pope has authoritatively denied *the indirect temporal authority* of the holy see: I defy you to produce the instance. Your speech promises one, and I looked for it with eager eyes; but could find nothing nearer to it than the *declaration of the cardinals* (made in 1791, to serve a pressing political ex-

igency in Great Britain), that 'the see of Rome never taught that an oath to kings separated from the Catholic communion may be violated; or that it is lawful for the Bishop of Rome to invade their temporal rights and dominions.' Begging your pardon, this does not touch the point at all, and you know it. Appeal no more, then, to the POPE, 'lest a worse thing come unto you.'

"But you bring up, with some degree of parade, the opinions given by the Universities of Paris, Douai, Louvain, Alcalá, Salamanca, and Valladolid, in view of a certain proposition submitted to them, at the request of Mr. Pitt, by the Catholics of London, in 1789. They make a fair show on paper, I grant you; but a few simple statements will make manifest to you their utter want of bearing on the real question.

"1. These universities were, at the time, under the influence of Gallicanism; and of course their answers were of the Gallican sort. But between 1789 and 1855 there has been a great 'revival' in European Romanism; and Gallicanism is now, in these universities, nearly if not quite defunct. The University of Louvain, for instance, which gave so strong an opinion then, is now strongly ultramontane; the very Dr. Rohrbacher, of whose fidelity to the papal theory Brownson speaks so strongly, in a citation given to you above, is now, and has been for many years, one of the Louvain professors. [Not fact.]

"2. But even had the universities been at that time ultramontane, they might have answered Mr. Pitt's questions (or rather the questions proposed by the Romanists at his request) without touching the real point at issue at all. The first and most important question asks whether the pope 'has any civil authority, power, jurisdiction, or preëminence whatever, within the realm of England.' The answer is, of course, in the negative; for every tyro knows that the pope never claimed any 'civil or political authority' out of his own dominions. The question is whether he has an 'indirect temporal authority' over kings and people, 'in virtue of his spiritual authority'; and this point the universities do not touch at all" (pp. 118—120).

Here Dr. M'Clintock, more just to us than have been our Catholic opponents, concedes that the power we claim for the pope is not civil or temporal, but spiritual, and that it is only a power in regard to temporals claimed for him as the representative of the spiritual order on earth. Let this be remembered, no Catholic claims any but spiritual authority for the pope as vicar of Christ, and no authority at all save as the supreme representative on earth of the spiritual order. Whatever his powers, they are simply the powers of that order represented by him in the plentitude of its authority. At bottom, then, the question is simply a question of the rights and prerogatives of the spiritual order in face of the temporal. That order we have found to be by

its own nature independent and supreme. Every Christian, every moralist, every man, does and must concede it, however by so doing he may reflect on his own practice. If, then, that order be represented on earth in its plenitude by the pope, he must necessarily be independent and supreme in face of the representative of the temporal order, that is, in face of the secular authority, the prince or state. This is evident, and nobody in reality does or can deny it.

The difficulty men feel on this point arises from their confounding the church on the one hand with the spiritual order, and on the other the state with the temporal order. They forget to recognize the spiritual order as back of the church, and the temporal order as back of the state. The church is not the spiritual order, does not make that order, but simply represents it. The pope is not God, he is only his vicar. The state neither is nor makes the temporal order, it simply represents it. Both orders exist prior to their representatives and independent of them. The mutual relations, then, of the respective representatives must be precisely the mutual relations of the two orders themselves, or those which naturally subsist between the spiritual and the temporal. Naturally the spiritual is independent and supreme, so then must be its representative; naturally the temporal is dependent and subordinate, and then so must be its representative, the state.

Thus far there is and can be no controversy. Gallicans and Protestants, who have the air of disputing us, do not correctly apprehend the question, or, if they do, fail to meet it fairly. They seem to us, in fact, to lose sight of it, to run off into details, and to bewilder themselves with vain subtilties and a mass of disconnected facts. They seem to us to forget to recur to first principles, and to discuss the question in the light they furnish. The question for the American people does not lie where even some of our friends suppose. They concede without a dissenting voice the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and therefore necessarily of its divinely authorized representative, if such representative there be. The controversy does not lie there, but is elsewhere. The real question is, Has Almighty God instituted a representative on earth of the spiritual order? If so, Who or what is it? Suppose such representative to have been instituted, suppose it to be the pope as supreme visible head of the church, and no intelligent American, Catholic or non-Catholic, will deny him all the power we assert for him.

Now as to the fact that the spiritual order is represented on the earth, there really is no doubt in the minds of the American people. For let them say what they will, they in the bottom of their hearts believe in the reality of the spiritual order, and in the distinction between it and the temporal order, and they need not be told that the spiritual unrepresented in the government of human affairs is practically null. Every man who believes in the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, believes that it has even on earth a representative of some sort. Here the Protestant and the Catholic, the churchman and the no-churchman, are agreed. Every Protestant sect is for its members a representative of the spiritual order. Even those who reject all ecclesiastical organizations, all creeds and confessions, and plant themselves on pure individualism, still recognize private conscience, and hold it to be representative of the spiritual order, the voice of God in the soul. All in principle recognize and insist on the fact that the spiritual has an organ of some sort, and a representation on earth through which it may make itself heard in human affairs. The Holy Scriptures clearly prove that our Lord did not leave the spiritual without any organic representative. He was a king, and came to set up his kingdom on the earth. He himself said so. He established his church, and that church is called his body. It is spoken of in prophecy and sacred history as a kingdom, as the city of God, and these words mean something or nothing. No man who believes in the inspiration of the Scriptures will dare assert that they mean nothing. Then they mean something. The words *kingdom* and *city* are words expressive of authority, and mean with the ancients what we mean by the word *state*, when used to express the secular authority. They mean that our Lord founded a city or kingdom, organized a body, which represents the spiritual as the state represents the temporal. There is no use in denying this, and in reality no American who believes in Christ at all does deny it, when presented to his understanding as a distinct proposition.

We run counter to no American prejudice, then, when we assert that the spiritual order is represented on the earth. We say no more than every one claims in principle, when we assert that this representative is independent and supreme in relation to the secular authority. We know no Americans who do not, unless in a moment of mental confusion or forgetfulness, deny the competency of the state in spiritu-

als. Some may wish, as we have said, to use the state as an instrument for suppressing a religion they do not believe, or for promoting their own, but no one recognizes the authority of the state to determine what shall or shall not be his religion, or to interfere with its free expression and exercise. They who go furthest in denying all spiritual organizations, and in asserting private conscience as the only representative of the spiritual, are most strenuous in asserting the independence and sovereignty of conscience, at least for themselves. Not one of them but will say to the state, "My conscience bounds in my regard your power, and where that begins your authority ends. Before you my conscience is independent and supreme." So says every sect, however small or insignificant. It is for its members the representative of conscience. It holds itself for them free, independent, sovereign, for it represents for them the spiritual authority in its plenitude, of which conscience is the interior expression. Wherein then do we, in asserting the independence and supremacy of the pope as vicar of Christ in face of the secular authority, assert any thing that is not asserted in principle by the American people? What right has Dr. M'Clintock to assume that our doctrine, when they understand it, will be regarded by them as "fearful," or as in any sense objectionable?

We think that Dr. M'Clintock and our Gallican friends not a little mistake the American people. The American people do not and will not object to the church because she asserts the independence and supremacy of her sovereign pontiff, but they object to the assertion of that independence and supremacy because they do not believe that she is the church of God. We cannot believe them so stupid as to suppose that a man can consistently assert a divinely commissioned representative of the spiritual order, and not claim for that representative the independence and supremacy which inhere in that order itself. Here our Gallican friends lose their labor, for they do and can gain no credit with our non-Catholic countrymen. Non-Catholic Americans have enough of logic and good sense to see that the Gallican theory, if it means any thing in opposition to us, is inconsistent with the inherent powers of the church as the divinely commissioned representative of the spiritual order,—enough of logic and good sense to see that, if the pope be the vicar of Christ on earth, representing in the government of human affairs him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, he must be in-

dependent and supreme before the secular authority. To pretend the contrary is to sport with their understandings, and to gain their contempt, not to win their confidence. The Gallican argues always the question on a false issue, and proves, when he proves any thing, what nobody denies, and refutes, when he refutes any thing, what nobody asserts. He argues as if the papist asserted for the pope independence and supremacy in the temporal order, that is, independence and supremacy as a temporal power,—as a secular sovereign or prince. But in this he is inexcusable. Neither they who assert the indirect, nor they who assert the direct temporal power of the pope, maintain any thing of the sort. There was never a Catholic of any note at all, who denied the independence and supremacy of the state in its own order. The question is not there. The state has no superior in the temporal order. *That* no Catholic denies. What is denied is that the temporal order itself is independent and supreme, and no Catholic dares assert that it is; for whoever holds to any religious ideas at all holds that it is subordinated to the spiritual. If the sovereign prince has no superior in the temporal order, he still has a superior in another and a superior order, in him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. Even Bossuet and the English Solomon, James I., acknowledged that the king is responsible to God for the exercise of his kingly power. It is absurd, then, if you distinguish between church and state, and make the pope as head of the church the representative of the spiritual order, that is, the vicar of Christ on earth, to deny that the state is subordinate to him, as the temporal is to the spiritual. You may deny it as much as you please, but you will never gain credit for your denial with the American people. One thing we look upon as certain, that the American people, if they become Catholics, will never become Catholics of the Gallican stamp. They have too much logic for that.

The American people see clearly enough that, if we assert the church as the divinely constituted representative of the spiritual order, and the pope as its supreme visible head, the sovereign pontiff must, from the nature of the case, from the very fact that he represents the supreme order, be independent and supreme in relation to the temporal power. They do not in reality object to this, and if once convinced of the premises, they would by no means shrink from the conclusion. An old Catholic people, trained under monarchical despotism, and feeling the necessity of managing the susceptibilities of

power, may gradually lapse into Gallicanism, for Gallicanism was born and brought up in the courts of despots, and is essentially a courtier or a slave. But we are a new people, a republican people, accustomed to treat our rulers as our servants, not as our masters. We are strangers both to the timidity and to the servility of the Gallican, and do not fear to offend his majesty, lest we compromise the civil *status* of the church. Our Gallican friends do not take sufficiently into the account the stern, independent, and inflexible republican character of the American people, so different from that found under the old monarchies of Europe. They are unconsciously affected by the traditions of the court of Louis XIV., or of Elizabeth of England. The non-Catholic American people hold from Puritanism, rather than from Anglicanism, and are more ready to resist the temporal power than to quail before it. Gallicanism and republicanism will not and cannot go together. When the Gallican becomes a republican he becomes an apostate and a Jacobin, as the European revolutions during the last seventy years amply suffice to show. A republican people can be Catholic only on ultramontane principles, for it is only those principles that comport with their national independence and love of liberty, or that can sustain true republicanism if once established. Take the Catholic laity in our own country who have been accustomed to assert the independence of the temporal power, and to abuse the pope hypothetically, and you invariably find them incapable of appreciating legitimate republicanism. True to their Gallican instincts, they are courtiers of the people when they cannot be courtiers of the monarch, and run off into wild and destructive radicalism. The republicanism they advocate is the red-republicanism or Jacobinism of the French revolution, which asserts for the ruling majority the absolute power claimed by Louis XIV., in his famous *L'état c'est moi*,—I am the state. Their political tendency is to establish either an absolute monarchy or an absolute democracy,—the despotism of the one or the despotism of the many. Always do they tend to magnify the secular power, and to enlarge the sphere of its action, whether that power be vested in the king or in the people. Even the excellent Chief Justice of the United States has not escaped this tendency, as may be seen in his decision in the Charles River Bridge case, some few years since,—a decision, if we are not much mistaken, which strikes a severe blow at the security of vested rights.

The characteristic of American republicanism is the limitation and responsibility of power. Its aim is to restrict power to the narrowest sphere compatible with the maintenance of order, and to leave the broadest margin possible to individual freedom and activity. One of its maxims is, "The world has been governed too much." Another is, "That is the best government that governs least." It may even have gone too far in this direction; but if it has, it is a less evil than to have gone too far in the opposite direction. Now, what is there under Gallicanism to keep power within its constitutional limits, and to resist it when it transcends them? In this respect it is no better than Protestantism, nor in fact so good as modern Protestantism; for modern Protestantism allows rebellion and revolution, at least it does so in Great Britain and the United States, but Gallicanism does not. It says: "Let every one be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore, whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." It thus binds the conscience, with the whole authority of the church, to submission, and denies to her all authority to loose it when the power abuses, and by its tyranny and oppression forfeits, its rights. Never was conceived a doctrine more favorable to despots, or more hostile to civil and religious liberty, than that of the Four Articles of the assembly of the French clergy in 1682. It does not assert simply the independence of sovereigns in their own order, which nobody denies, but in the constitution and government of society the independence and supremacy of the temporal order itself. American republicans will never accept a church which commands them on pain of damnation to submit to the civil ruler, and is incompetent to release them when the civil ruler becomes a tyrant, and uses his power only to outrage and oppress his subjects. It is because the Catholic Church has been represented, though falsely, as such a church, that many of the friends of republican liberty throughout the world are in arms against her.

What the American people want in the church under a political and social relation, if they are to have a church at all, is a spiritual power invested with plenary authority to assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and to confine the state within the strict limits of the temporal. They want something which limits the sec-

ular power, and can call it to an account when it usurps what does not belong to it, or forfeits its rights by abusing them. This, we take it, is regarded by the whole American people as essential in a church, and this is what they are continually seeking. But where is this to be found? In the people? But what if the people,—as they may, since they are no more infallible or impeccable collectively than individually,—abuse their power, and themselves encroach on the rights of individuals and the prerogatives of the spiritual order? Where is the power to maintain the sovereignty of conscience, the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, against popular despotism? To declare the people supreme and absolute, is only another form of declaring the temporal order independent and supreme, and is just as much to declare civil despotism, as to declare the king or emperor supreme and absolute. You have changed the form, but not the nature or extent, of the civil power. We see every day that the people may be misled by demagogues, by their own ignorance and passions, to trample on the rights of conscience, and to perform acts of gross injustice and cruel oppression. A party at this very moment is laboring to make the government an instrument of injustice to a portion of the community, of oppressing conscience, and violating at once the rights of property and of family. Let the Know-Nothing party but succeed in securing a majority of votes, and all this will be done. It is plain, then, that democracy alone does not and cannot furnish the check on power so much needed.

What is needed is a representation of the spiritual order strong enough to retain its independence in face of the representative of the temporal order, and to restrain it within its legitimate sphere. The people evidently cannot be this representation, for they, at times, need resisting and restraining themselves. It cannot be the individual or private conscience, because the individual or private conscience is that which needs protection, because it is not strong enough to resist the action of the state, and because, if it were, it would, since it is fallible and variable with almost every individual, render civil government itself impracticable, and conduct to anarchy and barbarism. The state must have authority sufficient to maintain order, and to protect and foster the interests of temporal good; but this it would not and could not have, if the individual could effectually resist its action, for often the public good requires the indi-

vidual to be restrained, and even punished. It cannot be found in the state itself, for the state, no less than the individual, needs to be restrained; and every people loses its liberty just in proportion as the state absorbs the church, or arrogates to itself spiritual functions. Pagan Rome lost the last vestige of its liberty when the imperator became *ex officio pontifex maximus*. England sunk into oriental despotism, when, breaking from Rome, she recognized her king as supreme head of her church establishment, and suffered him to declare himself supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals; and she recovered some portion of her ancient freedom only as the progress of dissent and recusancy reduced those who recognized the spiritual supremacy of the crown to a minority of her population. English liberty is sustained now, as far as sustained it is, by those who make light of the queen's supremacy; not by genuine Anglicans, whose doctrine was and is, "the divine right of kings, and passive obedience."

The sects, though intended as organic representatives of the spiritual order, and regarded as such by their devout members, are obviously insufficient, and in reality tend rather to exaggerate the evil than to prevent or to cure it. They are all creatures either of the civil power or of their individual members, and have no authority not derived from either the one or the other. This fact renders them impotent to maintain, even if we could suppose them to represent, the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order in the practical government of human affairs. They may, in this or that locality, influence or perhaps control the action of the commonwealth for a brief time; but sooner or later they must yield to the changes of public opinion, or fall under the domination of Cæsar. No national church can maintain its independence. It must submit to the national authority, or cease to exist. The Scottish Kirk, so proud and haughty in the face of Queen Mary, supported as it was by the turbulent barons backed by the power of Elizabeth, was obliged to yield to the secular arm under a Protestant sovereign. The established church in England is a slave of the state; and the same church in Ireland would long since have succumbed to the national spirit of the Irish, if it had not been sustained by the power of England,—a power decidedly foreign to Irish nationality. In this country, where the sects are left to themselves, they are so divided and so weakened by their division that

they are comparatively powerless. Each tries, in its own fashion, to assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order; but they neutralize one another, and leave the secular authority, so far as they are concerned, free to do very much as it pleases. They have, in fact, in order to save themselves, to pander to public opinion; and their ministers are obliged to study and practise all the arts of the demagogue. Not directly sustained by the state, their only resource is public opinion, is to do all in their power to influence the people regarded as back of the state or the administrative authority. In this way they become exceedingly dangerous to the stability and perpetuity of our republicanism; because, instead of wedding themselves to justice, they waste their virtue in wooing a temporary expediency. They avail themselves of every popular tendency, every popular excitement, every popular *ism*, every popular fallacy, and push it to the most dangerous extreme.

The real danger we Americans have to apprehend is social despotism,—the absorption of all power by society, to the extinction of individual freedom. Protestantism as representing the spiritual order is with us as good as dead. Its religion does not, speaking generally, rise above philanthropy, and under pretence of promoting great philanthropic objects, such as the abolition of slavery, and the suppression of intemperance, the sects are urging the state to usurp and exercise powers which are incompatible with the moral freedom and the natural rights of individuals. In this the sects are subjected by a public opinion, which sprung up in the last century, outside of Christianity, and which seeks to embody itself in legislative enactments. Philanthropy is the sentiment which unbelievers substituted in the last century for the charity of Jansenists and Calvinists, which they confounded with the charity of the Gospel. The sects have undergone notable modifications, in consequence of the popularity given to this sentiment by infidel writers; and they rely almost solely on that popularity to extend their credit with the people, forgetful that every human sentiment, however pure and good, in the natural order, necessarily becomes despotic in proportion as it becomes exclusive. Forgetful again of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, which they have the air of asserting, the sects continue to court and exaggerate the popular anti-Catholic prejudices of the country, and aim through those prejudices to direct the action of the state against Catholic-

ity, without seeing that in this they contradict their own deeply cherished principles, and subject the spiritual to the temporal. In fact, the sects are obliged to follow the fluctuations of popular opinion, at least to a degree, and thus, while they may aid the government in doing the same, they can never resist its encroachments upon the liberty of conscience or the rights of individuals. They are not strong enough to be logical, are too weak to be firm, and are carried away by the popular tendencies they foster. The very means they take to strengthen themselves destroy their influence as representatives of the spiritual order, and eventuate in confirming the independence and supremacy of the secular power in spirituals, the principle of all tyranny.

It is clear from these considerations, that the American people cannot find in the state, in private judgment, or private conscience, or in the several Protestant sects, taken separately or collectively, a representative of the spiritual order adequate to the practical assertion of that independence and supremacy which they themselves, in general thesis at least, claim for it, and without which it is impossible to preserve our republican freedom, either from running on the one hand into civil despotism, or on the other into pure individualism, anarchy, and therefore barbarism. Not a few of them see this, and are as firmly convinced of it as we are. There are sober, thinking men among our non-Catholic countrymen, who, though no alarmists, see and feel the dangers to which we are exposed. They see at work a strong tendency to sweep away every institution in the land, every thing that rests upon a fixed and solid basis of its own, and is capable of imposing a momentary restraint upon popular will or popular passion, inflamed and excited to frenzy by the declamations of unprincipled and selfish demagogues, or ignoble aspirants to place and power. The independence of the judiciary is destroyed in most of the states, the common law is tampered with, and to a fearful extent deprived of its efficiency as a protection to individual liberty, and a war to the knife is waged upon the Catholic Church, solely because she is an institution not controllable by popular passion, will, or opinion. Think you these men do not see and feel that our only salvation is in the *institution* of the spiritual order, in an organic representation of it, distinct from the political organization, independent of the national authority, which is secular, and

superior to it? No representation of the spiritual order within and confined to the nation will suffice. It must be one and catholic, above and over all nations; and, moreover, it must be a divinely constituted and divinely protected and assisted organization, not a mere human device or contrivance. Such an organization the church claims to be, and such a church, governed by the sovereign pontiff, the real vicar of Christ on earth, is precisely what we want. The whole thinking portion of the American people, the non-Catholic full as much as the Catholic portion, to say the least, feel this, and in their confidential conversations acknowledge it. We therefore must believe that Dr. M'Clintock is mistaken in his conviction, that to prove that the church claims the independence and supremacy we assert for her, is to insure her rejection by the American people. We believe, on the contrary, that it would in a certain sense recommend her to their respectful consideration; for it is precisely what they would naturally expect her to claim, and what, if they are to accept her as God's church, they would wish her to possess, since it is that which they more especially feel the want of.

Dr. M'Clintock's implied objection is not well taken. The great body of the American people are unquestionably strongly opposed to the Catholic Church,—have an almost invincible repugnance to her,—are in fact as anti-Catholic as any people on the globe; but there is not one among them who would deliberately argue that she cannot be the church of God, *because* she asserts her independence and supremacy as the representative of the spiritual order; for every one feels in his inmost heart that, if such representative, she must be in relation to the secular order independent and supreme, and therefore it is that the Gallican explanations gain so little credit with them. Reason and common sense tell them this. We do not need revelation to teach us that the temporal is subordinate to the spiritual, for it is a simple dictate of natural reason; nor do the American people fear the independence and spiritual supremacy of the church, in case she is God's church, founded by him, and protected and assisted by the indwelling Holy Ghost, for they have sense enough to perceive that she then would be divinely commissioned, and that God, who cannot countenance error or injustice, would vouch for her, and himself take care that, as a faithful and obedient spouse, she should always do the will of her Lord.

God would himself be sponsor for her, go, so to speak, security for her, and that is security enough for any reasonable man. The real objection lies further back. The doubt or disbelief is as to her being the church of God, instituted and sustained by him as the representative of the spiritual order on earth. Satisfied on this point, they would have no difficulty in yielding all the rest, because then all the rest would appear to them just and desirable,—precisely what they see to be necessary.

It does not enter into our present purpose to discuss the question as to the divine origin and constitution of the church. That has been done sufficiently in the pages of this *Review*. But at the very lowest, her claim to be God's church is as good as that of any of the sects. They are all confessedly of human origin, founded either by individuals or by states, acting without any divine commission. Yet they all claim each for itself to represent the spiritual order, and seek to be independent and supreme, wherever they are not practically repressed by the secular authority, tyrannically exercised as they must regard it. Why then should the power we assert be more dangerous in her hands than in theirs? Because in her hands it may be efficient, while in theirs it must always be practically inefficient? Whoever heard a man objecting to a power he demands on the ground of its efficiency, and defending it only on the ground of its practical inefficiency? The Presbyterian sect claims all the independence and supremacy for itself before the secular power that we claim for the Catholic Church. Will the Presbyterian step forward and argue that his sect is to be accepted, and our church rejected, because it can never practically assert its claim, while she can practically assert hers? This would be to stultify himself. Other things being equal, he should infer directly the contrary. A power incapable of serving a practical purpose is as good as none at all; and a power whose practical efficiency would be dangerous, is not and cannot be legitimate, and ought never to be asserted at all. The Presbyterian either believes the power he claims for his sect a power that ought to be practically efficient, or he does not. If he does not, he condemns his sect for asserting it; if he does, he equally condemns it in asserting its practical inefficiency.

But one thing we may remark as not ill adapted to allay the fears of non-Catholics. We suppose it is the common doctrine of our countrymen, that power is a trust, and may

be forfeited by abuse; therefore that there may arise cases in which princes may be justly deposed, and subjects released from their oath or obligation of fealty. Now we claim to have read history, both as a Catholic and as a Protestant, with at least ordinary diligence, and we venture to assert that in no instance in the contests between the two powers have the secular authorities been in the right and the sovereign pontiff in the wrong. Whatever may or may not be said of their title, the sovereign pontiffs have invariably used their power on the side of justice, and never have they deposed a prince who did not for his tyranny, his oppressions, his frightful iniquities, deserve to be deposed. They whom they struck were moral monsters, and the cause for which they struck was that of religion, virtue, and innocence. Those emperors of Germany and those kings of France and England against whom the popes had to exert all their apostolic authority, were not meek, peaceful, wise, and just sovereigns, seeking only the common good of their subjects; they were licentious tyrants, cruel oppressors, for whom no right was sacred, no virtue a protection. They were not patriotic monarchs, seeking to defend their crowns against the arrogance of pontiffs and the insolence of churchmen, as their unscrupulous defenders and traducers of the popes would persuade us; but insolent and ambitious seculars, seeking to usurp the rights of the spiritual order, and to make themselves popes as well as princes, to absorb the spiritual order in the temporal, so as to be able to outrage and oppress the souls as well as the bodies of their subjects. All who have read history with any degree of honesty and discernment now know it, and none but the ignorant or the uncandid pretend to the contrary.

If during eighteen hundred years the popes have never encroached on the just rights of the secular authority, have been in no case guilty of injustice to the representatives of the temporal order, what reason have you to fear that they will change hereafter? You agree at least, we believe, that the church does not change, and that the policy once adopted is the policy she always pursues. The past is a sufficient pledge of the future. True, she asserts the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and so do you; true, she asserts the supremacy of the law of God for princes and states as well as for individuals and subjects, and so do you, when you do not turn political atheists; true, she seeks by all the means in her power to maintain the supremacy of

that law in the practical government of society, and so do you, if you have any reverence for God or respect for morality; true, she aims to do, and where her action is free does do effectually, what every sect professes to have at heart; but this is a reason why you should love her and give her your confidence, not why you should distrust and oppose her. With her, religion, order, liberty, justice, may be maintained in our republic, and without her they cannot. Are the American people so blind, so bereft of common sense, as to fear her, because she is fitted to accomplish their most ardent wishes and the purest and holiest desires of their hearts?

It is not very wise, in opposing a church we happen to dislike, to deny the only principles on which we can defend the one we like. We are not a Protestant, but we will go as far as any Protestant in asserting the freedom and independence of the sects before the secular authority. We cannot in our horror of them consent to throw doubt on the great principles we plead in our own defence. As long as they do not trample on the equal rights of others, as long as they do nothing to disturb the public peace, we will maintain their freedom before the state, and deny in their case as much as in our own the right of the secular authority to interfere with them. It is madness to deny the freedom and supremacy of the spiritual order for the sake of opposing Catholicity. The American people may allege that the church is not the divinely commissioned representative of the spiritual order on earth, and for that reason oppose her; but to oppose her because she asserts her independence and supremacy in face of the temporal power, the very thing she should do, and must do if she is what she professes to be, is to deny the independence and supremacy of the moral order, and to give up the world to the government of lawless passion or brute force.

That a portion of the American people, misled by their prejudices and influenced by the misrepresentations and calumnious charges brought against us by no-popery publications, are violating against us some of their own most deeply cherished principles, and for which in their own case they would fight unto death, is unhappily too true. Of them we may truly say, "They know not what they do." The American mind at the present moment is all out of joint on religious matters, and they are like an army in the dark, thrown into confusion, and unable to distinguish

friends from foes. They fire as often upon the former as the latter, yet at bottom they are a brave people and mean well. Their confusion will not last for ever, we hope, and they will recover themselves when the day, not far distant, begins to dawn. They will then see distinctly that society reposes on the maintenance of the independence and supremacy of the moral order in its practical government, and they will see that there can be no greater madness than that of warring against the only institution which is able to maintain that independence and supremacy. Religion and morality do not hold so high a rank with us, that we can afford to reject any help in their favor offered us. There is with us a sad want of high moral principle, of strict honesty, of conscientiousness. In public life we look to the expedient rather than to the right, and honor success rather than integrity and justice. In private life we abandon ourselves to the world, forget God and duty, and think only of multiplying sensible goods. We are becoming material, and rapidly falling into practical atheism. One half of our adult population are unconnected with any religious denomination, and probably a still larger proportion have grown up without having even been baptized. Everybody now sees that Protestantism can neither make nor keep a people practically religious. Lord Shaftesbury stated in the House of Lords not long since, that there are five millions of the adult population of England and Wales that never attend any place of religious worship. To a Christian mind, nothing can be more horrible.

All is not as we could wish it in Catholic countries. Owing to the jealousies of the governments, and to the power heresy and schism have given them to oppress the church, she has not even there been able to do all her work. The tyranny of despots has restricted her freedom and lessened her practical efficiency. But in no Catholic country is the moral and religious state of the people so deplorable as in Great Britain and the United States. Catholic populations, however far below what they might be and ought to be, have yet a sensibility to moral ideas and to religious considerations that we look in vain for in Protestant populations. They are more under the influence of the spiritual order, and are more easily affected by appeals to conscience. In our own country they almost alone keep alive in practice the memory of religious ages, and whatever may be the

estimate in which a worldly-minded community may hold them, they are the main hope of our country. They have their faults, their vices even, but they are a Christian people, and feel that man's first duty is to God, and his dearest hope is hope of heaven.

UNCLE JACK AND HIS NEPHEW; OR CONVERSATIONS OF AN OLD FOGY WITH A YOUNG AMERICAN.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1854.]

Uncle Jack, as he is familiarly called, is a hale old man nearly seventy years of age, though in appearance not much over fifty. His form is erect, his step elastic, and his dark, thick hair has as yet no sprinkling of gray. His disposition is mild and gentle, and his feelings are youthful and buoyant. He is not precisely a scholar, but he has travelled, mingled a good deal in society, read some, observed much, and reflected more. He lives now very much retired, surrounded only by a few young persons, of whom he is very fond, and with whom he delights to converse on the various things which he has seen, or of which he has read. He is averse to all display of superior knowledge, but whenever he does chance to open himself, you see that he is well informed on most topics, has a cultivated mind, and a rich and varied experience.

His most intimate companion is a young nephew, the only child of his youngest and favorite sister. This nephew was graduated at the early age of sixteen at the oldest and most renowned of our American literary institutions, with the first honors of his class, and as the general favorite of his classmates. He subsequently spent five years at a celebrated German university, under several famous German professors, and afterwards visited Berlin, Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Venice, Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Naples, spent six months at Rome and Florence, and a year at Paris, whence he has returned home to take an active part in the affairs of his own country. He is a tall, finely proportioned young man, with handsome features, an open and manly countenance, and modest and prepossessing manners. As his father and mother are both dead, he for the present lives with his Uncle Jack. He has won the heart of the kind old man, but does not fail, nevertheless, to give him much uneasiness. Uncle Jack is called an old fogy, and

he certainly sees very little in modern notions and movements to approve, while his nephew is a genuine son of the nineteenth century, having thoroughly imbibed its spirit and fully adopted its ideas. He shares its good and its bad qualities,—is liberal, philanthropic, fond of action, indifferent to religion, impatient of restraint, enthusiastic for social regeneration and progress, and carried away by a sort of revolutionary mania. It may very well be believed there are few topics on which he and Uncle Jack do not take opposite views. Their conversations are long and frequent, and sometimes assume almost the form of elaborate discussions. Minutes of some of these conversations have been furnished us, and a portion of them we venture to offer to our readers. They will be read, we doubt not, with eagerness, and perchance with much pleasure and some profit, as they touch subjects of deep interest at all times, but more especially at the present.

Conversation I.

"I like best, my dear Dick, the rule that leaves it to old men to counsel, and young men to execute. Your Young America, Young Ireland, Young France, Young Italy, and Young Germany forget this rule, settle your plans, form your resolutions, call upon us to help you carry them into execution, and then denounce us as old fogies, or tell us that our eyes are on the backside of our heads, and that we dwell only among the tombs, if we refuse. Is it not possible that you youngsters, in your zeal for the rights of man, forget the rights of age?"

"Not intentionally, my dear uncle; but forgive me if I am unable to understand the rights of age to damp the holy ardor and generous zeal of the young. Those are noble words which Schiller puts into the mouth of the Marquis of Posa,—'Tell him, when he is old, not to forget the dreams of his youth.' Old age is sometimes cold and selfish, and feels too little interest in the amelioration of society and the progress of civilization."

"And youth in its rashness and inexperience often attempts what is impracticable, and indulges dreams which no wise man could wish to see realized. Age has no right to do wrong, and I admit that there are old men who have profited little even in the hard school of experience, and who are devoured by an insane ambition or an insatiable avarice

long after they have outlived every other passion, and when they have one foot already in the grave. Yet, old men for counsel and young men for war, remains as one of those precious maxims in which is condensed the wisdom of mankind. The young prince who, on coming to the throne, dismisses the experienced counsellors of his wise father, and surrounds himself with advisers of his own age, is generally regarded as on the high road to the ruin of himself, if not of his kingdom. Sometimes, indeed, we find a marvellous young man, wise beyond his years; but ordinarily the wise head is not found on young shoulders."

"But, Uncle Jack, you forget that the youth of our generation have advantages which those of former generations had not."

"I do not know that. The young fancy every succeeding generation superior, as the old regard it as inferior, to its predecessor. Both old and young are probably wrong. If the young were right, the world would by this time have made such progress that nothing would need amending; and if the old were right, it would have become so bad that there would be no enduring it. The young count all changes improvements, and the old count them deteriorations. Perhaps, if a just balance were struck, one generation would be found not much superior, nor much inferior, to another."

"At any rate you will concede that we better understand liberty, and are prepared to make more generous sacrifices to obtain it."

"Not in any worthy sense of the word. Our age perhaps surpasses all others in its skill in using good words in bad, or old words in new, senses. One not initiated into your philosophical, moral, and political doctrines can hardly understand you, even when you speak plain English. Oblige me by telling me what you mean by *liberty*."

"I mean by liberty, democracy, freedom from kings and aristocrats, tyrants and oppressors, the free and full exercise of all my rights as man."

"So you recognize liberty only under a democracy?"

"There can be none under kings and aristocrats."

"If among the rights of man you recognize the right to be governed, could you not conceive it possible that liberty might exist wherever man is wisely and justly governed, whatever the form of the government?"

"No man is free under a tyrannical and oppressive government."

"Yet, my dear Dick, you must settle the question what is liberty, before you can determine whether any given government is or is not tyrannical and oppressive. For aught I know, you may regard as oppressive what I regard as wise and salutary restraint, and as tyranny, what I hold to be just and legitimate government. We must know what liberty is before we can know what violates it."

"Liberty, I have said, is the free and full exercise of all my rights as man."

"It is undoubtedly that, but is it nothing more?"

"I can conceive no broader liberty than that."

"The rights of man as man are simply his natural rights, rights which one has by virtue of the fact that he is a man, and which every man has equally with every other man. If you recognize only these rights, you exclude from your notion of liberty your rights as a scholar, as a gentleman, as a citizen, as a proprietor, and, if such you were, your rights as a magistrate, as a senator, as a sovereign prince. Do you hold that there is true liberty where these rights, civil rights, adventitious or vested rights as they are called, are not secured to their possessors?"

"All men have equal rights, and liberty is enjoyed only where equal rights are secured to all."

"As men, all have equal rights, and there is no liberty where these are not secured to all, however high or however low, however rich or however poor, I grant; but do you wish to be understood to maintain that liberty excludes or denies all rights not included in those equal rights possessed alike by every man?"

"Liberty demands equality, and admits no unequal rights or special privileges."

"Regarded simply as men in a state of nature, as it is called, all that is very true. But men live in society, and are to be regarded not as existing in a state of nature alone. In civil society they have or are supposed to have unequal rights, special rights growing out of their special relations,—the rights of husband and wife, of parents and children, rights of property, rights of position or rank, rights of office, &c. Do you deny all rights of this sort, or do you hold that true liberty requires the free and full exercise of these rights, as well as of the natural rights, or the rights of man as man?"

"I know no rights but my simple natural rights as a man."

"And these rights being equal, every man has an equal right with yourself to your very large and desirable estate. Every man has an equal right to every man's wife. Either General Pierce has no right to fill the office of president, and to discharge its duties, or else every other man, no matter of what nation or country, has an equal right to call himself president of the United States, and to act as such. As much must be said of every governor of a state, of every senator or representative, of every magistrate, and of every public officer. There would be some confusion and disorder were we to admit all this. Government would be impossible, and civil society would be dissolved; for civil society is possible only on condition that there are civil rights, and that these rights are secured."

"As a democrat I assert universal suffrage and eligibility. All should be citizens and electors, and all should be eligible to any and every office in the gift of the people. One man has no more right to be elected president than another."

"Be that as it may, it is nothing to our present purpose. The question relates to the rights of the incumbent of the office. Now that he is elected to fill that office, and during the term for which he has been elected, has not General Pierce certain vested rights which no other man in the world has,—certain exclusive rights, which during that period no other man may claim or exercise? If you say no, you deny his exclusive right to officiate as president, and deny all civil authority, and all civil society, even democracy itself; for democracy asserts the right of the people to choose representatives to act in their name, and to clothe each of them with certain special and exclusive powers. If you say yes, you must concede a class of rights not included in the simple natural rights of man as man, that is, civil rights, or, in general terms, vested rights. Now, is there freedom in any broad and adequate sense of the term, where there is no security for the free and full exercise of these vested rights?"

"You know, my dear uncle, that we democrats are opposed to your old fogy doctrine of vested rights. It is in the name of vested rights that tyrants reign, and all abuses are perpetuated. It is precisely against what are called vested rights of kings and nobilities, that we rebel, and have sworn eternal hostility. It is in the name of vested rights that the people are enslaved, that social progress is arrested, reforms are resisted, and the noble and generous friends of

the people are martyred. How many of our brothers, free and noble spirits, who lived but to emancipate the people, have fallen victims to this bloody Dagon of vested rights! Their blood cries to us from the ground to avenge them, and avenge them we will, or die in the attempt."

"All very fine, my young revolutionist. But if these rights really are rights, it is not they who assert and maintain them that war against liberty, but you who deny and seek to destroy them. I understand by liberty the secure possession and enjoyment by every man of all his rights, whether natural or civil; and I look upon the man who seeks to rob me of my vested rights, whether he do it in the name of liberty or any other name, as a tyrant and a despot in heart and in deed. You are mistaken, my dear Dick, when you say that it is in the name of vested rights, that tyrants reign, for a tyrant is, by the very force of the word itself, one who has no vested right to reign, and one who exercises the supreme power in the city or state in opposition to vested rights. Tyrant, as the word is now used, means literally a usurper, one who deprives others of their vested rights, and reigns without any vested right to reign. It is precisely this fact that has rendered this word universally odious. You revolutionists are laboring to annihilate all vested rights, and against all such rights to grasp and wield the supreme power of the state, and you are consequently tyrants in the present strict and proper sense of the word. I cannot agree with you any more when you say that in the name of vested rights the people are enslaved, for it is no slavery to be debarred from robbing the state or individuals of their rights."

"But your pretended vested rights are merely usurpations, and in compelling those who hold them to abandon them, we do them no wrong, and are laboring only to restore the just and legitimate order of things."

"These vested rights are not usurped, unless they have been illegally assumed, or are in their nature contrary to the natural law. They are held by authority of civil society, and are not assumed in contravention of the civil law, and they are not contrary to the natural law, unless they violate some natural right of man, or some precept of the law of God. What precept of that law do they violate? To what natural right of man as man are they repugnant?"

"They are repugnant to the natural right of equality."

"I am not aware of any such natural right. All men have

certain equal rights, for all are equally men; but it does not follow from that fact, that all have a natural right to equality in all things. Even you yourself would shrink from so gross an absurdity. You do not pretend that all men have an equal right to be of the same height, and that those who are below a certain standard must be stretched, and those who rise above it must be lopped off. If it were so, your own head would be in danger. Neither can you pretend that all have a natural right to equality of intellect or genius. All have an equal natural right to property, but not therefore to equal property. All have an equal natural right to marry, but not therefore an equal right to demand of every woman the rights of a husband. Every one has an equal right to be himself, but not to be another; an equal right to his own, but not that his own shall be equal to every other man's own. Up to a certain point, all men have equal rights, and are to be treated by general and civil society as equals; that is, the rights which we possess in virtue of our simple humanity or as men are equal. These rights I hold to be sacred and inviolable, and there is no true liberty where they are not equally recognized and secured in the case of every one. But beyond these are the rights of individuals, not simply as men, but as such or such men. These rights are unequal, because men as such and such men are unequal; but these contravene not the other rights which are equal. The equal rights are general, the others are special, but the special does not contradict the general. I do John Smith no wrong when I employ instead of him Bill Thompson to be my coachman; I do no wrong to Peter Hagarty's nephew in leaving my estate to my own nephew instead of leaving it to him, although by so doing I make my nephew a rich man, and leave Peter's poor; for Peter's nephew has no natural or acquired right to my estate. If he is suffering, I am bound by the common ties of humanity and religion to relieve him, but not to enrich him.

"So you see, dear Dick, that your dream that men have a natural right to equality in all things is a dream, and a very silly dream, not worth relating. There are two classes of rights, natural rights and civil rights, or the rights of men as men and the rights of men as members of society, both as members of natural society and of civil and religious society. You and your associates recognize only the first class of rights, and regard liberty as restricted to the free and full exercise of them, and as a consequence, their right to make

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than we old fogies to speak in the name of the nineteenth century."

"But if we are the minority, we nevertheless represent the intelligence of this century."

"In your own estimation, very possibly; in reality, not so certain. You have given me no remarkable proofs of your superior intelligence, and when you have more years over your head, you will not need any one to tell you that much which you now call your wisdom is nothing but ignorance and folly. In my youth, I reasoned as you do, and prided myself as being superior to the prejudices of past ages. I gloried in the name of reform, and I was madder than you are in my zeal for political changes and social ameliorations. Hitherto, I said, the world has gone wholly wrong; nobody has really understood the true science of government and society. For the first time in the history of the human race, true science is possible, and true wisdom is conceived. I thought I and my radical associates were the only sages the world had ever seen, and that the hopes of mankind were centred in us, or rather in myself alone, as their chief. But I have lived long enough, Dick, to laugh at my folly, and to see that my egotism was the result of my feeble understanding and deplorable ignorance. There never was a time when the world could not have survived my loss, or when I could not have died without its suffering any serious detriment. He is a very ignorant man who fancies all ignorant but himself, and a very proud man who imagines that he is superior to all the world beside. No little of our lofty estimate of our own superior knowledge is the result of our real ignorance. We fancy we understand propositions, simply because we do not understand them, because we have not penetrated to their real significance, and comprehended them in their various relations with other propositions. In early life we take without examination the principles or premises which the popular sentiment of our age, our country, or our circle gives us; from these we draw conclusions, sometimes logical, and sometimes illogical, and then assume these conclusions as certain truths according to which the world should be constructed, society organized, and government constituted and administered. Finding, the moment that we look out of ourselves, that the world is constructed, society organized, and government constituted and administered on precisely contrary principles, we assume the attitude of hostility to all generally received principles

and usages, and believe it our mission to revolutionize the whole moral, social, and political world, and reorganize the whole according to the conclusions we have drawn from the premises furnished us by popular opinion.

"All this is very natural, and I am not disposed to be very hard upon the young men of our age. In nine cases out of ten, those who reject with horror their conclusions, maintain with a dogged tenacity their premises. I had the temerity when a young man to publish an essay in which I only pushed the principles stoutly contended for by all my Protestant and democratic countrymen to their logical consequences, and forthwith I was denounced from one end of the country to the other as holding horrible doctrines. They were horrible doctrines; I now see and own it; but they were doctrines which every Protestant and every democrat should accept, or renounce the premises he holds. My error was not an error of logic, for my conclusions followed necessarily from my premises, but in accepting false premises; the error of my Protestant and democratic countrymen was not in recoiling from my conclusions, and denouncing them as horrible, but in doing so while they held the premises which warranted them. I took some interest in the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island, and felt it my duty to support the public authorities against it. I even went so far as to visit the state and give one or two public addresses against the revolutionary movement and in favor of the party of law and order. My addresses were listened to with sufficient respect, and at their conclusion I was invited to eat an oyster with a club composed of several old dons of the state who had been the firm supporters of the government against Mr. Dorr and his party; and yet, to my surprise and very great scandal, I found myself obliged to defend in this club itself, against these old dons themselves, the only principles on which the Dorrites could be consistently condemned. The two parties adopted the same principles, and one of the most distinguished lawyers in the state, and who had signalized himself in defence of the constituted authorities, boldly maintained against me the popular right of revolution, and that the question between the government party and the Dorr party was not one of principle, but simply a question of expediency. The constitution of this commonwealth in the preamble to its bill of rights defines the state to be a voluntary association, and asserts the right of revolution in the broadest terms; thus denying all government in the very

instrument in which it constitutes it, and settles its powers. The majority of our people are Protestants, and Protestantism is based on the supposed right of rebellion and revolution, or the denial of all authority. I cannot therefore cast all the blame on you young men. Nay, I have a respect for you which I have not for the real old fogies who oppose you, for you have the merit of being faithful to their principles, which they have not."

"But it strikes me, Uncle Jack, that you are hardly consistent with yourself, when you say my views are embraced by only a minority of even our own age. It would seem from what you have last said, that the great majority embrace them."

"The majority embrace your premises, a minority only accept your conclusions; not indeed because your conclusions are not warranted by their premises, but because their practical good sense is stronger than their theoretical or speculative sense. It is never more than a small minority of mankind that have the courage to be consistent. I have been myself censured by even my Catholic brethren as "more Catholic than Catholicity," simply because I love consistency and venture to draw from the premises which every Catholic admits, and must admit, their strictly logical conclusions. To be more Catholic than Catholicity, is not to be Catholic at all, but a heretic or an infidel, and yet these good people who denounce me as being ultra-Catholic do not pretend, and dare not pretend, that, on the points even on which they represent me as ultra, I am heterodox. The meaning of their denunciation is, that I push Catholic principles further than they find it convenient to go with me. The sin which they would lay to my charge is not a sin of heresy, material or formal, but a sin of imprudence; and they, in order to guard against my assumed imprudence, not unfrequently fall into real heresy of doctrine. The spirit of compromise, of obtaining a settlement of difficulties by splitting the difference, as we see in our high-church Episcopalians, who try to find a *via media* between Catholic truth and Protestant falsehood, is a very prevalent spirit, and has done and does no little mischief."

"You forget, uncle, that I am a Protestant, as you yourself were at my age."

"I am not likely to forget it, since I pray day and night for your conversion. Yet Protestant as you are, you may

find young Catholics enough who go with you heart and soul six days out of seven. Some of the most rabid Jacobins in the country, and who push the democratic doctrines of our countrymen to the most dangerous extremes, were brought up Catholics. The worst radicals abroad are or were nominally Catholics. The founders of Protestantism had all been Catholics, Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Bacon, Henry VIII. and his daughter Elizabeth, and her secretary Cecil. There are a large number who will be damned as Catholics, as well as Protestants and infidels. Voltaire was reared a Catholic, and so were D'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and the majority of the French philosophers of the last century. Joseph II. of Germany, and, if I am not mistaken, his minister Kaunitz, were nominally Catholics. Comparatively few men, I tell you, Dick, have the courage to be consistent, and the majority seek by one set of principles to serve God and save their souls, and by another to serve Mammon and make sure of the world. Protestantism is essentially anarchical, at war with all authority and all vested rights, and yet there are Protestants who in practice are stanch upholders of authority, and able defenders of liberty in its truest and broadest sense. The church is conservative, every consistent son of the church must be conservative, and yet there are Catholic radicals as well as Protestant radicals."

"How do you account for this fact, uncle?"

"I account for it, in the first place, from the fact, that the flesh, with its concupiscence, remains in all men after baptism, and therefore in Catholics as well as in others; and the flesh seeks naturally the world, with its vanities and its pride, and to seek reason, to seek always God, the right, the truth, demands self-denial, a warfare against the flesh, a strong and continued effort, which few have the resolution to make. I account for it, in the second place, by the prevalence of false notions in all modern communities, which supply a set of false premises and dangerous maxims to both young and old. Protestantism grew out of the old heathen doctrines in regard to the mutual relations of the spiritual and the temporal orders, or the Manicheism propagated and transmitted by various heretical sects, and the civil authorities and their supporters. Protestantism gave birth to the Baconian philosophy in England, and to the Cartesian philosophy in France. These two philosophies have passed into general literature, and

given Protestant premises to the great body of the young in all countries, whether Catholic or Protestant. All general literature has become pagan, and therefore Protestant. Protestant philosophy has permeated the whole modern world, and hence, save in what is expressly of dogma and ritual, the whole thought of our times has become uncatholic. Uncatholic premises, in relation to society, to politics, to earthly felicity, are the first premises adopted by our educated youth, and from these they are diffused to a frightful extent even among the uneducated. In our own country, the tendency, you well know, is to a wild and rabid democracy, and Catholics have felt it dangerous to resist that tendency; and some have even attempted to show that Catholicity favors it. Your great standing charge against our religion is, that it is incompatible with democracy. We naturally seek to repel this charge, and our easiest way to do it is to show ourselves extremely democratic. Moreover, the majority of our Catholics are emigrants from foreign monarchical states, where for ages they had suffered the most cruel oppression. Nothing more natural than that they should ascribe their oppression there to monarchy, and the liberty they enjoy here to our democratic form of government, although nothing is further from the truth.

"Then, again, you must remember, my dear boy, that men are governed more by their passions and their interests than they are by their principles. Catholics are not seldom worse than their principles, Protestants are sometimes superior to their principles; or rather Catholics often abandon certain Catholic principles which some Protestants now and then adhere to. Lord Aberdeen showed more Catholic principle in opposing, recently, in the English Parliament, the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, than did Lord Beaumont or Mr. Chisholm Anstey in denouncing the measure which called forth that bill. We often find, in reading history, courtly prelates who side with the court against the church, and seldom do we find a Catholic statesman or politician that has not at least a dash of Manicheism, and is not disposed to uphold the temporal against the spiritual power. Worldly interests have, over most men, during the more active portion of their lives, a predominating influence, and in pursuing them they forget their God and their religion, and in their intercourse with the world live and act as if there were no God, or as if God had no

business to meddle with the temporal order. Nobody can doubt that James II. of England was sincerely attached to the Catholic faith, but he was far enough from maintaining Catholic morals and manners; and at the very moment that he was risking his crown for his faith, he kept his mistresses, and was very remote from listening as a dutiful son to the prudent advice of the Holy Father. We find thousands of Catholics in our days who would die sooner than renounce their faith, who yet are real atheists or pantheists in their politics. Interest, passion, false philosophy, triumph over their faith in practice, and leave them to act in real hostility to their religion. It is in this way I account for the fact that so many Catholics are Protestants six days out of seven."

"But how do you make good your assertion, Uncle Jack, that Protestantism originated in Manicheism?"

"I do not mean to say that it had an exclusively Manichean origin, for in some respects it had an atheistic origin; that is to say, in the assumption of the superiority of the temporal to the spiritual. But, practically considered, it originated in the quarrels between the two powers. Save at brief intervals, the leading temporal powers of Europe have been and are Manichean. The essence of Manicheism is the assertion of two eternal and independent principles, a dual first and dual final cause of all things. The doctrine almost always maintained, or at least acted on, by temporal governments, is what since 1682 has gone by the name of Gallicanism, and Gallicanism involves the essential principle of Manicheism. It asserts a dual end or final cause of man, and therefore by implication asserts a dual first cause or origin. It assumes the church and the state to be two distinct and independent powers, or that the secular and the spiritual have each an end of its own distinct from and independent of that of the other. If this be true, the two orders cannot have had the same first cause. Unity of the first cause implies unity of the final cause. If you assert the unity of the final cause, you must assert that the temporal and the spiritual are ordered to one and the same end, and then it is absurd to assert them as two coexisting and mutually independent orders. One must be subordinated to the other, and either the spiritual must be for the temporal, or the temporal for the spiritual, and subject to it. But as Gallicanism denies this subordination, it must admit two ends of man, each absolute, one secular, the

other spiritual; then it must admit two mutually distinct and independent first causes of man; then two eternally distinct and independent principles, which is the essence of Manicheism.

"Protestantism is only full-blown Gallicanism, and Protestants are distinguished from Gallicans only in being a little more daring, and drawing one or two conclusions which the Gallican shrinks from. Protestantism not only asserts the two principles, but it completes its Manicheism by making one good and the other wicked. According to it the secular or principle represented by the state is the good principle, and the spiritual or principle represented by the church is the bad or wicked principle. Hence it calls the church the 'mystery of iniquity,' and the pope 'the man of sin,' 'Antichrist.' Protestants claim to be the descendants of the Albigenses, who were the descendants of the Paulicians, who were, as is well-known, Manicheans. I might prove Protestantism to be Manichean, when not atheistic in its character, by an examination of its early dogmas, but it is not necessary."

"You would then maintain that Gallicanism contains the germs of all that you find to condemn in us liberals of to-day."

"Most assuredly. You are all children of the old French revolution, and that revolution was only the last word of Gallicanism. The Gallican bishops in the first place, emancipated the temporal order from the spiritual, and asserted its independence; and in the second, by undertaking to define the extent and limits of the papal power, they practically asserted the right of subjects to judge their sovereign. They transferred to the spiritual order the principles on which the English rebels had acted in the civil order, and deprived authority in both orders of all its sacredness. The convention, in judging Louis XVI. and condemning him to death, only applied to the civil order the principles asserted by the assembly of 1682. The assembly consecrated the principle of rebellion by sitting in judgment on the powers of their spiritual chief, and the principle of rebellion once consecrated, all authority is denied, all vested rights are annulled, and nothing can be asserted but the simple natural rights of man as man, which ends either in pure individualism, or in pure social despotism; that is, either in atheism or pantheism. All the dangerous heresies of our times were in principle sustained, almost from the first, by the leading

monarchies of Europe, in spite of the anathemas of the church, and these monarchies are now reaping their reward. It is perhaps fitting that they should be punished by their own sins."

"But I thought Gallicans were Catholics, and the better class of Catholics."

"They are, doubtless, Catholics against whom Protestants have the fewest objections to urge, which to a Catholic mind is not much to their credit. Gallicans who do not push their principles to their logical conclusions, who really submit to the sovereign pontiff as supreme pastor and governor of the church, and neither in theory nor in practice deny his spiritual supremacy, are, doubtless, Catholics; but that does not say that Gallicanism, logically developed, is not an unsound opinion, and destructive of all legitimate authority, and incompatible with that reverence and submission which we owe to the Holy See. The four articles may not have been formally condemned; indeed, we are told that they have not been, but the Holy See has shown, on more occasions than one, that it disapproves them. Innocent XI. annulled them, and declared them of no authority; and Pius VI., in his bull *Auctorem Fidei* against the acts of the Synod of Pistoia, seems to me to come very near expressly condemning them. Pius IX. seems also to have condemned the very principle of the first of them, which I regard as the worst, in his recent condemnation of Professor Nuytz's work on Canon Law, and Bailly's *Theology* heretofore used in several French ecclesiastical seminaries. However, of these matters I am no judge. I only know that these articles are not, and never were, accepted at Rome; and I seek to be a Catholic as they are Catholics at Rome, not merely as they are at Paris, for Rome, not Paris, holds the chair of Peter. Yet the French are not the worst Gallicans in the world, and it would be wrong to suppose that Gallicanism, save at the court, predominates in France. The doctrine, since it was attacked by De Maistre, has lost ground, and the immense majority of the French bishops and clergy reject it as strenuously as I do. It is retained now by very few anywhere, except by the laity, and they, it is hoped, will soon abandon it. The ultramontane doctrine is, no doubt, very odious to the civil power, and to non-Catholics; but it is the Roman Catholic doctrine, and all odious as it is, we are not a little indebted for the wonderful increase of Catholicity during the last thirty years to

its fearless and energetic assertion. Gallicanism is a species of old fogyism, in the proper sense of the word, and as such is powerless. Even non-Catholics are forced to respect the Catholic who is not afraid nor ashamed to be true to the most rigid doctrine of his church."

Conversation III.

"Forgive me, my dear uncle, but you seem to me as little satisfied with things as they are, as I am. To you, as well as to me, the world is out of joint. The child is the father of the man, and I suspect you have still, as in youth, the spirit of a reformer."

"There is some truth in what you say, my dear Dick. We retain usually through life our early characteristics. St. Paul retained the same zeal, the same energy, the same earnestness, the same unreserved devotion to what he regarded as the cause of God, that had distinguished the young Saul of Tarsus. St. Augustine, the Catholic bishop, retained the tenderness, the activity, the inquisitive and penetrating intellect, the same tendency to give himself up heart and soul to whatever he undertook, that had characterized Augustine the rhetorician; and St. Francis Xavier, as a priest and missionary, had the same desire of excelling that he had shown in his literary and philosophical studies. Conversion does not change one's nature, or the original bent of one's character; it changes simply the direction of his affections, the objects on which he places them, and the motives from which he acts. No doubt I am the same man that I was before my conversion, with the same mental and moral characteristics. I am just as little contented with what I see that is wrong, and just as earnest in pursuit of those ameliorations which I regard as necessary and practicable, as ever I was; but I hope from higher and purer motives, and with a juster understanding of the changes to be effected, and the means of effecting them. I am an old man, but not in reality an old fogy, though it pleases my young friends to regard me as one, and to them I perhaps am one. An old fogy is one who, from indolence, interest, or cowardice, refuses to push the principles he holds to their legitimate consequences, or condemns his more consistent brethren for laboring to effect those changes which are authorized by the principles which he and they hold in common. Thus a Protestant who opposes those who push

their denials to the absolute rejection of Christianity, an Episcopalian who wars against dissent, a Protestant churchman who throws up his hands in holy horror at the Puritan, the English whig that frowns upon the English radical, the American democrat that talks of law and order, or the Cartesian, that objects to private judgment, and appeals to authority, is an old fogy, because he will not follow out nor suffer others to follow out his principles. He says two and two, but will neither add nor suffer you to add, *make four*. Indeed, all except strict, thorough-going Catholics have more or less of the old fogy in their character. For myself, I love the free, bold, consistent mind that pushes its principles to their legitimate conclusions, and recoils from an inconsequence as from a mortal sin, even when it is in error; and I have more respect for the young Sauls who breathe forth threatenings and death against the disciples of the Lord, than I have for the Gallios who care for none of these things. There is always hope of a man who has the courage or the energy to be consistent; such a man has principles, and is capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood. You have only to show him that his premises are false, to lead him to embrace the truth.

"But if things are out of joint with me as well as with you, they are not so for the same reason, nor do I seek to set them right by the same means. You are a Cartesian, and would begin by destroying all existing institutions and denying all existing beliefs. You would annihilate the old world, and create a new one. I am less ambitious. My notions of reform are restricted to the right use of the world as it is, and hearty conformity to the institutions which God has already given us. You would make yourselves gods, and be always annihilating old worlds and creating new ones; I would have men understand that they are creatures, and that their business is to love and serve their Creator, and and to seek the ends he had ordained by the means he has provided. My work is much humbler than yours, but perhaps in the end it will amount to somewhat more."

"I do not precisely understand you, uncle, nor can I conceive why you should call me a Cartesian. I have no respect for that shallow Frenchman. I have studied, you know, in Germany, where we have little respect for any thing French."

"Descartes regarded it as his mission to reform philoso-

phy, to take away all uncertainty in regard to philosophical questions, and to put an end for ever to all the scandalous wranglings of philosophers. A great and noble mission, perhaps; but he began, or laid it down that we ought to begin, by doubting all things,—all our previous scientific notions, all our religious beliefs, the universe, and even God himself,—and to admit nothing save as we demonstrate its truth. Consequently he compelled himself to begin in nothing, and from nothing to reconstruct God and the universe, religion and science, man and society. The poor man carried his doubt as far as he could, but his egotism was too great for him to doubt himself, and so he exclaims, *Eureka! Cogito, ergo sum*,—I think, therefore I exist. Having thus by a miserable sophism proved his own existence, he proceeds from the conception of his own *ego* to demonstrate, after the manner of the geometricians, God, man, and the universe, which of course could on his hypothesis be only modes or affections of himself. You adopt his method. You begin by doubting or denying whatever exists, by sweeping away the existing world and starting with your new world from nothing, or what is the same thing, from your sublime self. But as man has no proper creative power, you can obtain by your labors only nothing, or at best only self. He who begins in philosophizing by denial or doubt, can never arrive at an affirmation, and that the Cartesian philosophy, a product of the seventeenth century, had much to do with the doubt and incredulity of the eighteenth, can hardly be questioned. It reduced to almost nothing the sphere of revelation, enlarged beyond all bounds that of natural reason, and at the same time threw doubt on reason itself. How it could ever have obtained the vogue it has among men who have no sceptical tendencies, is to me a mystery. I find its method defended in the most popular text-books of philosophy used in the schools of France and this country even at the present moment, and I have been much pleased to find the *Civiltà Cattolica*, at Rome, during the last year, opening its batteries against it. He who would philosophize must begin, not by denying, but by affirming, in truth, not in falsehood, if he means to arrive at truth for result."

So he that would reform what is amiss in society or in the administration of government must begin with a truth, something positive, and proceed to maintain it, and labor not for organic changes, but for the simple correction of

abuses; that is, to bring men to the right use of the institutions God in his providence has founded for them. In beginning by destroying, you deprive yourself of the spot on which to rest the fulcrum of your lever; you have nothing to work with, and therefore can substitute nothing in the place of what you destroy. Luther imagined abuses in the church and he sought to remedy them, not by laboring to remove the obstacles which the church everywhere encountered to her free and salutary action, not by exerting his gifts to induce men, cleric and laic, to conform to her discipline, but by attacking the church herself, casting off her authority and founding a new church of his own. You know the result. Others followed him, and thought his church was quite imperfect, and set to work to make a new one in its place. These were followed by others who treated their work as they had treated Luther's, and thus on down to our time, till you more advanced Protestants have found yourselves without any church, and, giving up church-making in despair, boldly maintain that no church is necessary, and, indeed, that the grand mistake committed by all Protestants since breaking away from the old church has been in supposing a church of some sort is needed. Luther's work, which started with destruction, has resulted only in destruction. Neither he nor his followers have been able to construct any thing. The case is the same with regard to dogmas of faith. Luther thought that he must reform the creed of Christendom. He began by denying a few articles, though retaining the larger number. His followers thought he retained too many, and they denied a few more; their followers thought the denial ought to be carried a little further, and each new generation has carried it still further, till now the great body of living Protestants have denied the whole creed, from the *credo in Patrem omnipotentem* down to the *vitam æternam*. You reject all dogmatic theology, resolve Christianity into a sentiment of the heart, which many of you are beginning to resolve into mere lust. Beginning by destroying, you can end only in destruction; beginning by stripping off one garment after another, you needs must find yourselves at last reduced to simple nakedness. In society you arrive at the same sad result. You begin by attacking the government and its institutions, denying all vested rights, and you find yourselves thrown out of civil society, out of a well-ordered state, back into a state of pure nature, below that of our American savages. All this is

inevitable, if you start as destructives, and the more logical and daring you are, and the fewer old fogies you have among you, the sooner you will find yourselves at this sad termination of all your labors.

"Count, my dear Dick, the history of the past as worth something. You know that I have been stating to you only simple historical facts. You have the history of the reformation before you. In religion Luther engendered Voltaire, in philosophy Descartes, in politics Jean Jacques Rousseau, in morals Helvetius. In religion you have ended in the rejection of the supernatural, in philosophy in doubt and nihilism, in politics in anarchy, in morals in the sanctification of lust. Here is the fact which you cannot deny, which stares you in the face, and with which all Protestantdom groans. This fact ought to have followed, it is a logical consequence of your premises, and you need not imagine that you can, by going through your process again, arrive at any other result."

"You may be shocked, my dear uncle, but I do not wish to arrive at any other result. I read history as you do, and I acknowledge that the movement of the reformation has been precisely as you describe it. I accept the result obtained by the more advanced Protestant party. That result is what was implied in Luther's movement, only he knew it not, and it brings us back to pure and primitive Christianity, to Christianity as it lay in the mind of its Author, though his ignorant and superstitious disciples, with their minds obfuscated by their Jewish prejudices, never understood it. The church has never done justice to the free and noble thought of her Master. She has applied to a future world, to a supposed life after death, what he understood of this world, and applied to an extramundane God what he affirmed only of God in man. He taught that God has come in the flesh, and that the God we are to love, worship, and obey is the God that lives, moves, and speaks in the instincts and aspirations of man's own nature,—those very instincts and aspirations which the church condemns and commands us to mortify. It is the man-God that Christianity proposes to the worship of man,—God in the flesh that she bids us adore. To be true followers of Christ, then, we must renounce all your sacerdotal doctrines and spiritualistic dreams, and put man in the place you assign to your God, the earth in the place of your imaginary heaven, and the flesh in the rank you claim for the spirit.

Here is the true and genuine doctrine of Him whose name you wrongfully usurp, and to this the reformation has, perhaps against its intention, conducted us, and therefore we honor it. This is the mighty progress it has enabled us to make."

"A progress, by the way, in losing,—a sort of progress which you cannot continue much longer, for I do not see what more you have to lose. You have reached the last stage this side of nowhere, and another step, and you must vanish in endless vacuity. In plain words, if I understand you, my dear Dick, and I ought to understand you, for—I blush to confess it—I once held your very doctrine, you would have me hold that the divine Founder of our religion came into the world to teach us that there is for us no God but man, to free us from all religion, from all moral obligation, and to bid us live as we list,—atheism for doctrine, and Epicureanism for morals. You have, indeed, made a marvellous progress—backwards. Why, my dear Dick, the devil must be in his dotage, or else he finds you very easily duped. Your so-called Christianity, under the name of heathenism or carnal Judaism, is a very old doctrine, and has long since been condemned by the common sense of mankind. Satan preached it six thousand years ago to our first parents, and your enlightened nineteenth century is just able to revive it. Well, well, Solomon was right when he said, 'There is nothing new under the sun; the thing that is has been, and the thing that has been shall be.' Even the devil has failed to invent a new delusion, and you with all your wonderful progress have fallen into his old snare. I am almost ashamed of you, Dick. I did hope that, if a heretic you were resolved to be, you would at least embrace a heresy not wholly discreditable to your intellect. If you recognize Christianity at all, or in any sense the authority of Jesus Christ, you must admit that he never taught the vile heathenism you ascribe to him. It was not because he sought to establish an earthly kingdom, and to promote the worldly prosperity of mankind, that the Jews rejected him, and refused to own him as the Messiah, but because he came as a spiritual prince, and taught men to mortify their lusts, to crucify the flesh, to trample the world beneath their feet, and to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. It was because he did *not* teach what you allege, but the exact opposite, that they crucified him between two thieves. He con-

demned the doctrine you ascribe to him as heathenism, as you must know if you know any thing of his teachings. If there is any one thing certain with regard to our blessed Lord, it is that he taught that our true good is not derivable from this world, and is enjoyed in this world only by promise; that the good of the soul in all cases takes precedence of the good of the body; that, if we will be his disciples, we must deny ourselves, take up our cross, and follow him; that we are to set our affections, not on things of the earth, but on things in heaven, and that we are to lay up treasures, not on the earth, where moth and rust corrupt, and thieves break through and steal, but in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal. He bids us not fear him who can kill the body, and after that hath no more power, but him who hath power to destroy both body and soul in hell. No, my poor boy, you cannot shelter your heathenism and your worship of the flesh under his august name. On this point at least there is no difference between his teaching and that of the church, and the Jews rejected him for precisely the same reasons that you reject her. You must either renounce your doctrine of the earth, earthy, your deification of man and the worship of lust, or not have the audacity to call yourself a Christian or to pretend that you embrace Christianity."

"You may be right, Uncle Jack, but we of the movement party have prejudices enough against us already, and more than we can easily overcome. A large portion of so-called Christendom have indeed outgrown the church, become indignant at Christian asceticism, and attained to the very rational conclusion, that man is placed in this world to enjoy himself, that his present concern is with this present life, and that, if a heaven hereafter there be, the best way to secure it will be by making sure of a heaven on earth; but still many retain a sort of reverence for the name of Christ, and, bold as they are, would not dare to avow the truth itself under another name. Truth indeed is truth under any name, but not every name is equally good to conjure with. To a great extent even the far advanced are still the slaves of names, and require for the present to be treated as nurses treat sick children. If we should come out and boldly disavow the name of Christ, and declare what we are aiming at is in direct opposition to what he taught, the majority would shrink from going with us, and we should fail to accomplish the emancipation of mankind.

It is in the name of Christianity that we must proceed to emancipate the world from Christianity. This is the way taken by the reformers themselves. It is very likely that they had views which reached much further than their adherents imagined, much further than their age could bear. There are expressions to be found in Luther which lead one to suspect that he saw the truth; but he would have ruined his whole cause if he had brought it out clearly under its own name. He avowed no hostility to Christianity; he even professed a profound reverence for it, and to be more Christian than the papists themselves. He comprehended how much his age would bear, and he made his principal war on the pope and the papacy, in which he could make sure of the sympathy of a large portion of his countrymen, and of the open or secret support of the greater part of the temporal princes of the time. Having demolished the papacy in the name of Christ, the church, and the Scriptures, he broke the authority of the spiritual power, and prepared the way for his successors to go further. These successors distinguished between Christianity and the church, as he had distinguished between the church and the papacy, and in the name of Christ denounced the Christian church, whether Catholic or Protestant, and made war on all organized Christianity, resolving Christianity into mere doctrine and sentiment, to be determined by each one for himself, by his own private interpretation of the Scriptures. These were followed in turn by a new generation of reformers, who distinguished between Christianity and the Scriptures as the former distinguished between Christianity and the church, and in the name of Christ denied all authority and all revelation except man's own spiritual nature. We act on the same principle in distinguishing between man's spiritual nature and his carnal nature, and asserting always in the name of Christ the supremacy of the latter. It is a wise and necessary policy. For ourselves, indeed, it makes no difference whether you call the truth by the name of Moses, Zoroaster, Confucius, Christ, Arius, Manes, Mahomet, Luther, Joe Smith, or Saint-Simon, but by taking the name of Christ, as the Christian world does, as the symbol of truth, and proclaiming the truth in his name, and our own doctrine and purposes as the real significance of his, we prevent suspicion, we disarm prejudice, and induce multitudes to cooperate with us, who otherwise would stand aloof from us, perhaps oppose us."

"There is no doubt of what you say. If you can make the world believe that what you teach and are aiming at is what our Lord *meant*,—and there are not wanting fools enough who can be made to believe so, as I can testify from my own experience,—you can bring to your aid whatever authority his name still retains. But, my dear Dick, what right have you to do so, knowing as you do that what you seek to make the world believe is false? Do you not feel degraded even in your own eyes by the deception you practise?"

"I regret, my dear uncle, that it is necessary to practise it, for I avow I prefer open and manly dealing. I love the straightforward and ingenuous policy which says what it means, and means what it says. But you must take the people as you find them, and the world as it is, and when you cannot do as you would, you must do as you can. The people will have something to worship, and when they can have nothing else, they will worship a log or a stone, a crocodile or a calf. We must humor them, if we would do them any good. It is always right to emancipate them from the thraldom in which the church for so many ages has held them, to free them from the priestly domination which degrades them, and to use such means as are necessary to this end. If deception is necessary, then we have a right to practise deception. If we deceive the people it is for their good, to emancipate them from those who have so long abused them."

"After all, Dick, you hardly dare accept your own doctrine. If you had full confidence in it, why labor to prove that your cause is not repugnant to moral principle? You aim to emancipate the flesh, nay, to elevate the flesh to the rank of the supreme divinity. You propose as your God, God in the flesh, not in the Christian sense of the incarnation, as you would fain make fools believe, but in the pantheistic sense that the flesh is God and lust is his worship. Why then should you apologize for following the flesh, and doing its works? 'Now the works of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcraft, enmities, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrels, dissensions, sects, envy, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like.' These, though mortal sins in view of the Christian, must be heroic virtues in yours. On your principle there can be nothing in lying, deceiving, cheating, robbing, stealing, murdering, assassination, to be ashamed of, to

apologize for, or to defend, as your European friends very clearly show by the means they adopt for carrying out their plans of political and social regeneration. Do they not make a free use of the stiletto, and have they not instituted the worship of the dagger? You reverse the whole moral code of mankind, and call by the name of truth what has hitherto gone by the name of falsehood; a holy act what has generally been punished as a crime; virtue what old-fashioned morality has stigmatized as vice. In all this you are consistent with yourselves, and loyal to your principles. Your doctrine consecrates vice and divinizes crime. If you are right in principle, your conduct needs no defence. But I suspect, Dick, that your good sense and better feelings disavow your doctrine, and refuse to worship the idol you set up."

"You wrong us, uncle. We do not advocate even what you call vice, and we abhor what you name, after Paul, as the works of the flesh. We love and venerate virtue, and our sole object is to render all men sincere, honest, virtuous, and to enable them to live together in a holy society, in a loving brotherhood, in peace and friendship, each loving his brother as himself. We would realize on earth the sweet vision of paradise."

"All very fine—in words, my poor boy; but the mischief is that you miscall words, and are the dupes of your own cunning. You are really seeking to emancipate the flesh. One of the ablest of the fathers of young Germany was Heinrich Heine, who praises Luther's reformation because it was, as he says, a noble assertion of sensuality, of the rights of the flesh against the spirituality of the church; and he contends that we ought to institute festivals in honor of the flesh, to atone to it for the wrongs and indignities for so many ages heaped upon it by Catholicity. You cannot emancipate the flesh without asserting your right to do the deeds of the flesh. These deeds are never good; they are always bad, and destructive of both soul and body. The experience of all ages proves that the works of the flesh are what the apostle asserts, and that virtue, that love, that friendship, that peace, domestic or social, private or public, is possible only on condition that the flesh is resisted and kept in subjection to the law of the spirit, appetite and passion are subjected to reason, and reason to the law of God.

"Time was, my dear Dick, when I thought and reasoned as you do. I imagined that the whole world had gone

wrong from the beginning, and because men had set out with the persuasion that the inclinations of the flesh are to evil, and that to be virtuous we must resist them and practise self-denial. I placed the evil I saw and deplored in restraint, in the restraint which moralists teach us to impose upon ourselves, and to which priests and magistrates always labor to subject us. Only give us liberty, only leave us free to follow our instincts, the natural sentiments of our own hearts, the promptings of our own natural affections, and vice and crime will disappear, wrongs and outrages will cease to be committed, and the whole world will live in peace and love. But, alas! I found by a painful experience that the heart is deceitful above all things, and exceedingly corrupt, that human nature, whose praises I had chanted, is rotten, and that the sweetest and apparently the purest sentiments easily become the most degrading and disgusting lusts, and that to give loose reins to the flesh is only to be precipitated into unbridled licentiousness. I found peace, and recovered self-respect, only in proportion as by the grace of God I was enabled to practise self-denial, and to return and conform to the very doctrine which I had regarded as the origin and source of all the evils flesh is heir to. Be assured, my dear nephew, that the evil originates not in the restraints imposed by religion and morality, but in breaking through them, and following wherever our natural inclinations lead."

Conversation IV

"At the bottom of what you say, my dear uncle, is the assumption that man's nature is corrupt, and that his natural inclinations are to evil. This is the grand error of the religious world. It was invented by the priests as the foundation of their doctrine of redemption and expiation, and, I may add, of their power and influence. If it were once admitted that nature is good, and that all its instincts and tendencies are pure and holy, there would be no place left for a priesthood; the whole fabric of superstition would fall, and man would have free scope to display his divine and deathless energies. Just see what he has done since Luther struck down the pope, Descartes demolished the schoolmen, and Voltaire exploded the Bible. The mind of man has taken a sudden bound, and displayed a might and a majesty never before dreamed of. New arts and

sciences have sprung up, as if by magic. The heavens have been mapped; the globe has been explored, the earth forced to disclose her secrets; the minutest particle of matter has been analyzed; mind has become omnipotent over matter; and man by his inventions has annihilated time and distance, made the winds his servants and the lightnings his messengers. Commerce spreads her white sails over every ocean, manufactures flourish, science multiplies man's productive power a million-fold, wealth unfolds her exhaustless treasures, and luxury finds its way even into the cottage of the humble peasant."

"Bravo! Bravissimo! my dear Dick. Nevertheless, let us leave these marvels of which you boast till we are at leisure to consider them, and have found some criterion by which we can determine their value. I agree with you, that, if we reject the doctrine of the fall, and assert the purity and sanctity of all our natural propensities, instincts, and tendencies, there is no place for a priesthood, and the whole fabric of the Christian church falls to the ground. All that is plain enough to every one with half an eye. But if the sacerdotal doctrine be an error, and nature as pure, as holy, and as efficient for good as you pretend, there are certain facts which perhaps you would find it not easy to explain. How, indeed, would you explain the existence of that doctrine itself?"

"It was invented by the priests, and taught as the means of maintaining their existence and power."

"But priests could not invent it before they existed, and according to you there can be no priests without it. How will you explain the fact that there were priests to invent it, when, till its invention, there were and could be none."

"Pardon me, my dear uncle; I did not use the word *priest* in its strict and proper sense. I know a *priest* is one who offers sacrifices, who really or symbolically makes an atonement or expiation by the victim he offers upon the altar, and therefore presupposes that man has fallen, and can be restored only by sacrifice. But we Protestants sometimes use the word to designate simply a public teacher, for in the strict sense we admit no priests. There may have been public teachers at a very remote period of the world's history, and among them there may have been ambitious and designing men, who naturally studied to magnify their office, and to extend and consolidate their power. These

were not precisely priests before inventing the doctrine, but they became priests on its invention."

"But if human nature be pure and holy in all its instincts and tendencies, how do you explain the existence of these ambitious and designing public teachers? The world, in point of fact, is very much depraved, and men are very corrupt, as you and your party not only concede, but stoutly maintain; for you demand everywhere what you call moral, political, and social reforms. You complain, in season and out of season, of tyranny and oppression, of wrongs and outrages, and that nothing in the world has hitherto gone right. Every thing you see is out of joint; every individual you meet, you regard as needing to be reformed. Your whole movement proceeds on the assumption of the general prevalence of evil, and of evil so deep, so aggravated, as to excuse, nay, to demand, the application of the most violent remedies. How, with such a human nature as you assert, do you explain this terrible fact?"

"It is all the work of crafty priests and ambitious and selfish rulers, who have made it their business to keep nature in chains, to repress its native energies, and restrain its pure and noble operations."

"But that, my dear Dick, only removes the difficulty a step further back; it by no means solves it. These crafty priests, and these ambitious and selfish rulers, with such wicked principles as you ascribe to them, whence came they? Whence originated their craft, their ambition, and their selfishness? On your own principles, they are the spontaneous products of human nature. Yet prior to them, nature, according to you, must have been free, her operations unimpeded, and her energies unrepressed. Nature was then left to herself, and had free and full scope to display her divine instincts and her noble energies. But if nature left free spontaneously produces crafty priests, ambitious and selfish rulers, tyrants, and aristocrats, how can you maintain that all her propensities, instincts, and tendencies are pure and holy, and that all that we need, in order to create and secure a paradise on earth, is to emancipate human nature from all restraints, and leave it to its own spontaneous and unimpeded operations? It is very easy to ascribe existing evils to bad governments, to falsely organized society, to superstition, to the craft of priests or the wickedness of rulers; but always does the same ques-

tion recur,—Whence these bad governments, this falsely organized society, this superstition, this craft of priests, this wickedness of rulers? These things must have had some origin, and, according to you, could have originated only in the free, spontaneous workings of a human nature which is pure and holy, which is divine, and which, when free, always leads to pure and noble, just and holy results. Here is something, my dear Dick, which needs explanation,—a mystery which you are required to clear up."

"Whether there be here a mystery or not, it is no more a mystery, my dear uncle, for me than it is for you. The question in the last analysis is one which you must meet as well as I. You are no Manichean, and must explain the origin and existence of evil with a single original principle, and that a pure, holy, and divine principle. Man, according to you, when he came from the hands of his Maker, was perfect. His body was held in subjection to his soul, and his soul in subjection to the law of God. Explain to me, then, how he could sin? Do not tell me of Satan who tempted him, for Satan was himself created pure and holy, and the same question will recur as to him."

"You mistake the point of my objection. You assert the impeccability of man by nature, and assert the sufficiency of nature for herself. You assert that nature tends always to her true good, and, if left to herself, will always go right, and yet are obliged to concede that she has gone wrong from the beginning. According to you, she was and always has been left to herself; for whatever has controlled or attempted to control her, you must regard as having been her own spontaneous production, therefore as natural, included in nature, not something foreign or extrinsic to her. It is, therefore, impossible for you to explain the origin of evil, of wrong, of sin, or iniquity; for on your principles nothing could possibly go wrong. I have no difficulty of this sort to solve. Neither man nor the angels were created impeccable. They were created free, with free will, and therefore capable of obeying or disobeying, of standing or falling. When we say man was created perfect, we mean that he was perfect of his kind, perfect as man, not as God. His nature and faculties are limited, and this limitation is an imperfection of his being. Imperfect as being, and endowed with free will, he could sin and err. He was created with all his present nature,

his present appetites and passions, in so far as they are natural; but they were not then morbid, as they have since become, and were held by the supernatural grace of God, in subjection to reason, and moved only as reason, itself conformed to the will of God, moved and directed them. Having sinned, he forfeited and lost that grace; the appetites and passions then escaped from their subjection to reason, and, operating each according to its special nature, carried away both reason and will into captivity. There was no physical change or corruption of man's nature. The nature of the appetites and fashions was not altered; they only escaped from their subjection to reason and the law of God, and followed what was their original natural tendency, or what would have been their natural tendency if they had not been restrained by the gifts and graces with which man was favored. The flesh tends naturally, when left to itself, to the creature, and therefore from God. If from God, certainly from good; for God is the supreme and only good. As evil is the privation of good, so man, abandoned to his appetites and passions, to the empire of the flesh, tends continually to evil. He can, then, tend to good only in breaking the empire of the flesh, in restraining his appetites and passions, mortifying his lusts, emancipating the soul, and walking according to the spirit. A little reflection on these points must convince you that your retort is not admissible, and that, though the origin and continuance of evil are easily explained on Christian principles, they are wholly inexplicable on yours, or on the assumption of the divinity of the flesh. The very way to continue and aggravate the evils man endures is to emancipate the flesh from the restraints imposed by Christianity, and to give loose reins to appetite and passion. You and your party are, in fact, under the pretext of reforming society and improving man's earthly condition, really laboring to increase the evils now suffered; and if you could succeed, we should have only those works which St. Paul enumerates as 'the works of the flesh.'"

"You do not seem to me, Uncle Jack, to explain the doctrine of total depravity in the sense I was taught it by my old Puritan pastor."

"Very likely not. The Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, or total corruption of man's nature by the fall, is no doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is a heresy which she condemns. Man's nature at the fall

underwent no physical change, and is instrinsically what it was from the beginning. It lost no natural faculty, and received no new appetite or passion. As pure nature, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, it is what it always was, and always will be in this world. But what you are to bear in mind is, that our nature never was intended to operate well, or to attain to its beatitude, save as the flesh was subordinated to the spirit. On this point Christianity introduces no new law, but simply asserts what was the law from the beginning. Always was the same law necessary and obligatory, and all the difference is, that before the fall the flesh did not rebel, and obedience required no effort, no interior struggle; but since the fall it has become rebellious, and it is only by effort, by struggle, by a painful and unceasing interior warfare, that we can subdue it, and bring ourselves into conformity with the law of God. By the fall we lost, with the supernatural grace which elevated us to the plane of our supernatural destiny, what theologians call the *indebita*, that is, the integrity of our nature, exemption from sickness and death, and, more especially to our present purpose, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, or exemption from that interior conflict between inclination and duty, the flesh and the spirit, which makes our whole earthly existence one continual warfare, and originates all the tragedies of life. What was before easy is now painful; what was before done without effort is now possible only by self-violence, self-denial, mortification, interior crucifixion."

"There you are again, uncle, back in your Christian asceticism, preaching your eternal war against nature, and anathematizing all that is sweet in our natural emotions, and ravishing in our sentiments. You will tolerate nothing that is natural. You will not permit a bird to sing, or flower to bloom. All nature must be silent and drab-colored. No heart must be allowed to expand with joy, no fresh young love must be tasted, no sweet, intoxicating sentiments indulged."

"I understand you, Dick, but you do not understand the religion I profess. I anathematize nothing that is good, war against no pure and ennobling sentiment, and I love, even more than in my cold and stormy and heretical youth, the blithesome song of birds, and the beauty and fragrance of flowers. To the Christian, nature is neither drab-colored nor silent. It is clothed with the beauty of its Creator, and

vocal with the music of his love. Christian love purifies our sentiments, and gives them new sweetness and power. All experience proves that Christian asceticism, as forbidding as it may appear to you, is the highest wisdom, nay, the only true philosophy of life. No life is so miserable as that of the unrestrained indulgence of our appetites and passions, which grow by indulgence, and become all the more importunate in their demands the oftener they are gratified. There is no appetite or passion of our nature that does not become morbid by indulgence, and therefore a source of torment. Heathen wisdom taught that, if we would make a man happy, we must study to moderate his desires. The philosophy of the Porch was defective, because it substituted pride for humility, and therefore the self-denial of the Stoics is not to be named with the self-denial of the Christian; but it was far superior to the philosophy of the Garden. Such is the nature of man, quarrel with it as you will, that he cannot attain to real good without imposing a severe restraint on his appetites and passions, without keeping them under, and maintaining in spite of them the freedom of the spirit,—that true freedom wherewith the Son of God makes us free, and which none but the true Christian ascetic ever attains to, or can even comprehend. Freedom of the flesh is the slavery of the spirit, and the emancipation of concupiscence is only another name for the subjection or slavery of reason. These, my dear Dick, are only commonplace truths; nevertheless, they lie at the foundation of all morality, of all science of virtue or beatitude, and that too whether you consider man individually or socially."

"You may think so, uncle; but you must allow me to tell you, that not so thinks this enlightened and advanced nineteenth century. You are behind the age. We have exploded all those notions. You still talk of reason, and profess to respect logic. We have learned better. We do not respect logic; we place very little reliance on reason. The reason or intellect, the logical understanding, is a very low faculty, and, as the inspired Fourier has taught, should serve as a mere instrument of the passions, which are the springs of action; not as their master. We have passed beyond the Petrine Gospel, that of authority, attempted to be realized in your old popish church, fit only for women and children or the infancy of nations; we have passed beyond your Pauline Gospel, or that of the intellect, reason,

or understanding, on which Luther and Calvin founded their churches, and which were fit only for a certain stage in the development of society; and we have passed on to the Johannine Gospel, the Gospel of Love, preached by St. John, 'the beloved disciple,' which never fails, but endures for ever. We rely on the heart; we place religion in the heart, and virtue in sentiment. We seek the man who has a soul, who can feel, who has pure, lofty, warm, gushing feelings, and who is moved by their noble impulses, not by the dry deductions of logic or the cold calculations of duty. We hate that word *duty*. It freezes our blood; it dries up the juices of our hearts. Give us the man who acts from love, not duty,—who devotes himself to the sacred cause of humanity, not because commanded, not because he sees that it is reasonable, or fears that he will be damned if he does not, but from love, from the promptings of his own free, warm, and loving heart. This, dear uncle, is the Gospel of the nineteenth century, the Gospel of to-day."

"And no great novelty, after all. It was preached in substance, by the fifth-monarchy men in the seventeenth century, the Anabaptists in the sixteenth, the followers of the *Évangile Éternel* in the fourteenth, and various sects of the Gnostics in the third. It is only a phase of antinomianism, virtually held by all so-called Evangelical sects. It is a very old, and not a very specious, heresy. Its revival does not say much for the progress of your boasted nineteenth century."

"No matter if it is old, if it be true. Undoubtedly the advanced spirits of past ages, indeed of every age, have had glimpses, as it were, a presentiment of it; but never was it generally embraced, or recognized as the authentic Gospel of the age, before our times."

"Be it so. It gives loose reins to all unlawful passions. The ministers of this Gospel, I take it, are your modern novelists, who celebrate fornication and adultery. Old-fashioned lawful love, the love of the husband for his lawful wife, or of the wife for her lawful husband, is too insipid for the taste of these modern evangelists. Duty is humdrum, what is lawful is cold and repulsive. Love, to be interesting, must be unlawful, must be forbidden, on the principle that 'forbidden fruit is sweetest,' and is pure and beautiful only as it is a violation of duty. Has not George Sand proved this? Has not Bulwer proved it? Have not

countless hosts of German and French sentimentalists proved it? How complacently they dwell on an unlawful passion, and follow it through all its windings, and how eloquently they extol its depth, its purity, its sanctity? There is no question but the greater part of your modern popular literature is written in the true spirit of your Gospel of love. That your Gospel of love is very generally embraced, and faithfully observed, may be safely concluded from the waning intellect of the age, the superficial character of its productions, and the general relaxation of morals. Your own party proves its prevalence in their war against all established authority, in their lack of common understanding, their ceaseless agitation, their violence, their despotisms, their cruelties, their assassinations, their worship of the dagger.

"But, my poor boy, why do you suffer yourself to be the dupe of words? God is Love, the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is a Gospel of love, and love—charity—is the bond of perfection, the origin, life, and end of creation. What Christian knows not that? But the love of which the Christian Gospel speaks is not the burning passion nor the watery sentimentality of your novelists and reformers. It is the love of the heart, not of the senses; the free, voluntary exercise of the rational nature, not the morbid cravings of the sensitive soul. It is the highest and purest exercise of the rational soul, and is on the part of man only another name for duty, or a true moral conformity to the law of God. The distinction you seek to set up between love and duty is founded upon the ambiguity of the word *love*, sometimes used to express a blind passion, with which one is carried away, or a simple affection of concupiscence, and sometimes an affection of the rational soul, reason and will, and therefore a free, voluntary affection. In the former sense it is irrational, involuntary, and therefore not moral. It is by resolving love into this affection of the inferior soul, making it an affection of the sensitive nature, as distinguished from the rational, that your popular authors are led to their immoral doctrine that love cannot be controlled,—that it submits to no law but the necessity of nature, and regards no considerations of duty,—that we love where we must, and that we cannot help loving where we do, or bring ourselves to love where we do not. Coupling with this the evident sanctity of love in the other sense of the word, they lay down the doctrine that even

the most irregular and licentious love, if strong, if intense, is pure and holy. The wife is not censurable for not loving her husband, or for seeking to fill up the void in her heart by loving another,—perhaps another woman's husband. Hence the whole force of modern literature is directed against the cruelty of those laws which seek to control the affections, and of those parents who interfere with the affections of their children, arrange their marriage, or cross them in their love affairs. The custom still prevalent in some countries, for parents to select a wife for a son, or a husband for a daughter, is condemned as absurd, as a treason to love. Parents may undoubtedly abuse their power in this respect, as they may every other, and the abuse is always to be condemned ; but there can be little doubt, that there were fewer mismatches and more domestic love and happiness under the old custom than there are under our modern custom, which leaves the most important affair of life to be settled by the inexperience, the fancy, the caprice, or the excited passions of youth, incapable of making a wise or prudent choice. Then youth grew up pure and innocent, and their hearts retained their virginity, and their imagination its chastity. Now the girl is hardly in her teens before her head is filled with thoughts of love and marriage, and she is on the alert to see who will love her, or whom she will love. All this grows out of your low and sensual view of love, of your making it an affection of the sensitive nature instead of the rational, and supposing that it does in no sense depend on reason and will to love wherever it is our duty to love.

"You do not know, my dear boy, how much misery results from this false notion of love. You know the popular literature of our age. It breathes the tone of unsatified love, of strong, ardent affections, which nothing can meet or satisfy,—a longing after something which is not possessed, which cannot be obtained. The heart is empty. The delights of home and of domestic affection are praised, are chanted in all tones, but are not realized. The husband finds it impossible to be satisfied with the wife of his bosom, and seeks to solace himself with his mistress; the wife is unfaithful in turn, or pines away in secret with an untold affection or an unsatisfied love. All your novelists touch upon married life only when it is criminal or miserable, and in general drop the curtain as soon as the marriage ceremony is over, as if conscious that the love which they have traced

thus far will not survive the honeymoon. The reason of all this is plain. The affections of the sensitive nature cannot be satisfied, and the object they crave, however worthy, is loathed as soon as possessed. They are morbid and capricious. You do not feel this truth yet, because you are young, and are just now engrossed with a passion for world-reform. The gloss of novelty has not yet worn off, and your emotions are still fresh. You have not yet learned to exclaim from the bitterness of your own experience, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas.* Yet you find no satisfaction; you find no repose; and you are hurried on, not so much by any real regard for the good of mankind, as by your own interior and unexplained uneasiness; you are moved by a craving for something you have not, for you know not what, and to be other than you are. You plunge into the work of political and social revolution as a dissipation. You will soon grow weary of it. Then you will seek to fill the void in your heart with woman's love, run a career of debauchery, and end by attempting to drown your misery in the wine-cup. Or if you recover, you will turn to Mammon, and die a miser; for avarice is the only passion that is sure to retain its power to the last."

"A sad picture, my dear uncle, and not very complimentary."

"Nevertheless, you need not doubt its fidelity. I have lived longer than you, and have had some experience. You will not believe me now, but hereafter, if God in his mercy touches your heart, you will see and own the truth of what I say. Our age is a sentimental age, and every sentimental age runs the career I have described. Sentiment distinguished from duty, and placed above it, or regarded as a higher principle of action, always runs into vice, and becomes the parent of a whole family of the most degrading and loathsome vices. Your error lies not in demanding love, but in demanding sensitive instead of rational love. Love, as an affection of the rational soul, an intelligent and voluntary affection, is something noble, something worthy to be lauded. Love in this sense is under our control, and in this sense we can love wherever it is our duty to love, and refrain from loving where and what we ought not to love. This love, the true Eros of the Greeks as distinguished from the Anteros, is always one with duty, or rather is the full and perfect discharge of duty. It surpasses by far in sweetness and generosity your sensitive love. What you call love,

the love that laughs at duty as something dry and cold, is selfish, heartless, and cruel, for it seeks always its own gratification, and never any thing else. But rational love, operating from a sense of duty, has in itself no taint of selfishness; it gives itself up entirely to its object. Your sort of love seeks to unite the object to itself; this seeks to unite itself to its object. All love is unitive, but only rational love seeks union by giving itself to the object, and making itself one with it. Sensitive love pursues its object, not for the sake of the object, but for itself; rational love seeks to possess the object for the object's sake, not for its own. The one will sacrifice itself for the object, the other will sacrifice the object for itself. What else is it to act from a sense of duty than to act from this love, which is the sacrifice of our own will, or, what is the same thing, the unification of our will with the divine will, of which law is the expression? Understand this, and you will see at once that duty and love coincide, are in fact one and the same; for to love rationally is to love what we ought to love, and because we *ought* to love it, and is the fulfilment of duty. There is nothing dry, cold, or forbidding in this, and it calls for and gives free scope to all the sweetest, purest, strongest, warmest, and most generous affections of our nature. Compared with the ages of faith and duty, our age is dry, cold, and heartless. We have nothing of that tender sensibility, nothing of those warm, gushing feelings, fresh from the heart, of that generous love of husband and wife, of parents and children, or that disinterested devotion to the welfare and interests of our neighbor, that we find in the old Christian romances. We have nothing of that simplicity, that freshness of feeling, that lightheartedness, that sunshine of the soul, that perpetual youth, which characterized the Christian populations of the middle ages. Our hearts are dark and gloomy, our spirits are jaded, our faces are worn and haggard. We have no youth of the heart. Life to us is a senseless debauch, or a heavy and hateful existence. Our affections are blighted from the cradle, and we live a burden to ourselves. O, give us back the good old times of faith and duty, when reigned the soul's love, and the heart's joy gave new melody to the song of birds, and new beauty and fragrance to flowers!"

Conversation V.

"It seems to me, my dear uncle, that you occasionally forget yourself. In our last conversation you seemed to regret the past, and to think that our lot is cast in peculiarly evil times. Yet you had told me previously that you considered one generation about as good as another."

"You are hypercritical, Dick, and make no allowance for the imperfection of the human mind, which ordinarily considers things only under special aspects. Evils that we see impress us more than those we merely read of. And the virtues of past ages loom up in our view far larger than those which are practised half in secret in our own times. We forget the evils of the past in the contemplation of those of the present, and the virtues of the present in the contemplation of those of the past. What if, when considering the worth of past times and the evils of the present, we speak out as we feel, without stopping to see whether, if a just balance were struck, the two periods might not upon the whole appear about equal? Moreover, when I contrast the nineteenth century with the thirteenth, I am really only contrasting your Protestantism with my Catholicity. Catholicity has not changed, and real Catholics are substantially now what they were then. Some things they have lost, which I regret; others they have gained, which may, perhaps, upon a general average, compensate for what they have lost. But this age, regarded as distinct from what is purely of the church, is Protestant, and the literature which is its exponent is non-Catholic. It is of our age in that it is non-Catholic I speak, when I contrast it with past times. It is, in so far as it has renounced reason for sentiment, rational for sensitive love, charity for philanthropy, law for rebellion, authority for anarchy, the church for humanity, God for the devil, that I speak of it, and tell you its real character and tendency. I wish to show you the shallow and destructive nature of the principles and maxims of this non-Catholic age, which young men, like you, mistake for truth and wisdom, and by which you are seduced from all good, and involved in misery and wretchedness."

"You speak of us, uncle, as seduced, and warn us against the fatal tendency of our principles and maxims; but you forget that the world has been governed for six thousand years on your principles and maxims, and that

during all that period vice and crime, misery and wretchedness, have abounded. The whole world rises up in witness against your kings, priests, and nobilities. You have had your day and done your best; let us now have ours. We can hardly make worse work of it than you have done."

"Spoken like a philosopher of the nineteenth century, or a foolish young man, my dear Dick. If, with the principles and maxims which have formed the basis of the moral order in the past, so much iniquity has abounded, and so much misery has been suffered, what would the world have been without them? If with priests and rulers the world has been so wicked and wretched, what would it have been if it had had none? You are mistaken in supposing that the world has in the past been really governed by the principles and maxims I contend for. They have always been asserted, but they have not always been obeyed. Indeed, only a small minority of mankind have been uniformly faithful to them. Though admitted in theory, the majority have generally violated them in practice, and yielded to the seductions of the flesh, instead of walking according to the spirit. But in so far as mankind have been faithful to the principles you and your party reject, they have been virtuous, prosperous and happy. The evils which have been done or suffered have uniformly resulted from disobedience to them, not from obedience. Your objection to the religious world is very shallow, and your excuse for yourselves is of no avail."

"But you ask me, Uncle Jack, to embrace your church. You tell me she is the divinely constituted medium for the regeneration of man and society. You claim for her a supernatural power, and hold that her omnipotent Founder, her celestial Bridegroom, is always with her, to aid her in accomplishing her work. And yet I find that political and social evils have always abounded in Catholic countries. There have been in Catholic countries kings and aristocrats, tyrants and oppressors, the distinctions of noble and ignoble, and of rich and poor. The history of professedly Catholic nations presents the same monotonous picture of vice and crime, violence and bloodshed, war and rapine, public and private misery, presented by that of heretical or infidel nations. Whence comes this, if your church be what she professes to be? Why does she not use her power to make sovereigns rule justly? Why does she not

assert the equality of all men, and compel all to live together as brothers? I listen to her magnificent promises, and my imagination, if not my heart, is captivated; I turn over the records of her history in vain to find their fulfilment."

"You are two sweeping in your assertions, my dear nephew. It is not true that you find no difference to their advantage between Catholic nations and non-Catholic nations. The immense superiority of Catholic nations over all others in all that constitutes the true wisdom and glory, the true greatness and happiness, of a people, is manifest, even to-day, to every one who knows how to observe. Compare Great Britain with Italy, the United States with Austria, Turkey in Europe with Spain, or any infidel or heretical country as it now is, with what it was when it was sincerely Catholic, and you will be satisfied that, however little you may imagine the church has done, she has infinitely surpassed all that infidelity or heresy can do. On this point I am quite at my ease. You Protestants are very untrustworthy as travellers and historians, and suffer grievously for lack of truth. You have so long and so confidently claimed the superiority for yourselves, and so long kept your eyes shut to your own defects and open to those of Catholic nations, that you are surprised if a Catholic ventures to deny that superiority. In purely material civilization, no Protestant nation has attained to any thing like that of ancient pagan Greece or Rome. And in all those points on which you claim superiority, you are surpassed by the existing Catholic nations. I concede the material or physical power of Great Britain,—a power of some fifty years' standing; but great as her power is, it is not superior to that of France, and is far inferior to that of Catholic Spain in the sixteenth century. In the arts, in moral and spiritual culture, in the morals, refinement, and temporal well-being of her operatives and peasantry, she is far below the lowest Catholic continental state. Her industry is great, and she manufactures for the whole world. Her commerce is extensive, and lays all nations under contribution. But her commercial and industrial system, while it builds up large fortunes for the few, reduces the many to a state of servile dependence and squalid poverty. It is opposed to the best temporal interests of mankind, and lays no solid foundation even for her own temporal prosperity. The duration of the greatness of all

commercial and industrial nations is short, and when a people has once based its power and existence on commerce and manufactures, the day of its decline is never far distant. The territory of Great Britain can no longer support her population; she has become dependent on foreign states for her food. The growth of a new commercial or manufacturing rival, a change in the marts of the world, or the opening of new routes or channels of commerce, will be fatal to her power. Her American daughter, spanning this immense continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, will in a few years transfer the commercial capital of the world from London to New York, and wrest from her the commerce of both oceans; while Russia will monopolize the inland trade of all northern and upper Asia as well as of northern Europe. France and Germany are extending their own manufactures, and driving her already from some of her best markets, while the emigration of her laboring population, going on at the rate of some three hundred thousand a year, must soon tell on her military force, and on her ability to undersell her rivals. The power of England, apparently great, cannot survive a single rude shock. We see that she herself is conscious of it, in the fear she betrayed of a French invasion a year and a half ago, and the timid, hesitating, and ridiculous policy she has, up to the present, adopted on the Eastern question. The *matériel* of her navy, in which lies her great strength, after her power as head of the modern credit system, is great, I admit, but its *personnel* is inferior to that of France. In a general naval war, she would lose her superiority on the ocean, and Russia has proved, within the last few months, that the continental nations are fast emancipating themselves from their dependence on her credit system. Most of her colonies hold to her by very feeble ties, and all that is necessary to wrest from her grasp her immense Indian empire, is for the native troops, who detest her, simply to disband themselves. I do not, therefore, regard Great Britain, under any point of view, as offering any justification of the arrogant pretensions of Protestantism. I see in her no signs of permanent prosperity.

"We are mixed Protestant, infidel, and Catholic people. The non-Catholic element, however, predominates; and owing to our vast extent of cheap and fertile lands, we are free from many of the material evils of older countries.

But in real well-being, in the refinements of life, in the culture of the soul, in the higher civilization, or in true national or individual virtue and happiness, we are far below the lowest Catholic state. We can boast only of our industry. Our literature is not worth naming; our newspapers, for the most part, are a public nuisance; our common schools amount to little, and cannot be named with those of Austria; we have not a respectable library or university in the country; and the liberty we boast is merely the liberty of the mob, to govern us as it pleases. There is perhaps no people on earth that has less of moral and mental independence, or less individual freedom and manliness. We are the slaves of committees, associations, caucuses, and a public opinion formed by ignorant and fanatical and lying lecturers, preachers, newspapers, and demagogues. A man can be a free man here, and speak and act as a true man conscious of his individuality, only at the expense of becoming a pariah, an outcast. No, my poor boy, refer not to the United States for evidence to justify the insane pretensions of self-deluded Protestantism.

"There are no other Protestant nations to be considered; for if these cannot compete with Catholic nations in real greatness, none can. But if you penetrate beneath the surface, or mingle with the mass of the people, peasants, artisans, and laborers, you will find that, in all that constitutes true domestic and individual content and enjoyment, there is a heavy balance in favor of Catholic nations. Nowhere in Catholic states do you find that abject and squalid poverty that you find in Great Britain, and even in many of our own externally thriving cities. The English operative or agricultural laborer is a mere animal beside the Italian or Spanish peasant, who never loses the sense of his manhood. The inmates of your English and American poor-houses are more than a set-off to the Italian beggars of which Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman travellers complain so loudly. Then you will look in vain through all Catholic countries for your English gin-palaces, or for that drunkenness so common in all Protestant countries, and which, with all your temperance societies and Maine liquor laws, you can do so little to prevent. Ireland is no fair specimen of a Catholic nation, for the Irish state is Protestant, and the greater part of its nobility Protestant and also foreign; and yet, in proportion to her population, she consumes only about one-ninth the quantity of ardent spirits

consumed by Scotland, that pattern of a Protestant people. In vain, also, will you seek in Catholic countries for that general impurity which is the shame of the modern Protestant, as it was of the ancient heathen, world. The crimes of Catholic nations are for the most part those which spring from sudden passion or emotion, and are crimes against persons rather than against property. You will seldom find with them those cool, deliberate crimes and frauds which prevail to such a frightful extent in all Protestant states. Among Catholics hypocrisy is a rare exception; among Protestants it is the rule. The Catholic fears God, if he fears any thing, and before men he is open, free, natural, easy, independent. The Protestant has seldom the fear of God before his eyes; he sometimes fears the devil, and generally is the slave of public opinion. If he can stand well with his public, he is contented, and he seldom looks higher. Hence he has a certain meanness and servility, which are alike foreign from true virtue and real personal independence. His morality stops with a low prudence, and a sort of external decorum. When once he shakes off his fear of public opinion, or the opinions of his friends and neighbors, he abandons himself to any vice or crime to which he finds himself attracted. The Catholic may disregard public opinion, think little of how he stands with his friends and neighbors, and still maintain his integrity, his virtue, his piety.

"Moreover, I do not deny, nor do I wish to extenuate in the least, the evils which abound and always have abounded even in Catholic states. All who know any thing of history know that the church wrought a great and marvellous change in the manners and morals and in the happiness of the people of the old Roman empire, and that she exerted a most salutary influence on the northern barbarians who overthrew and supplanted it, and who have been moulded by her into the modern states of Europe. Yet I do not pretend that, even when things were best, all went as it should in Catholic states. There was, even in what are called the ages of faith, vice, and crime, and suffering; there were tyranny and oppression, the pride and insolence of power; there were violence and outrage, wars and rapine, bad government, and terrible political and social evils. But you must bear in mind that it was not they who obeyed the church, who accepted and uniformly acted on her principles and maxims, that caused the evils. Those tyrannical princes, kings, and emperors, like Henry IV.

of Germany, Frederic Barbarossa, Frederic II., Louis of Bavaria, Philip the Fair, Henry and his son John, of England, Charles le Mauvais, and Pedro the Cruel, were not obedient, but most disobedient, sons of the church, Protestants before Luther, who made war on her and incurred her anathema. They oppressed her and their subjects in spite of her reclamations. As a general rule, the civil authority even in Catholic states has always been jealous of the ecclesiastical authority, and restricted as much as it could its free and full exercise. It has seldom shown itself willing to give the church an open field and fair play. In modern times they have done their best to trammel her exertions and restrain her movements. Charles V., who held his office of emperor on condition of being the protector of the church, and especially of the Holy See, favored her enemies by his selfish policy in Germany, made war on the pope, and took the city of Rome, which his troops sacked and occupied for nine months. The kings of the house of Bourbon, though professing great devotion to the church, from Henry IV., who was bred a Huguenot, down to the last of their race, have asserted and maintained against her the independence, and I might say the supremacy, of the temporal power. Louis XIV. was more the head of the church in France than the pope. Wherever the Bourbon family reigned, the church lost her freedom, and Catholic interests were sacrificed. Even Charles X. learned, in the long years of his exile, nothing beyond his Bourbon traditions, and when king lost the affections of the liberals by his Catholicity, and of Catholics by his narrow-minded Gallicanism. The house of Habsburg, with great personal piety, for the most part, has till our own day followed the general policy of the temporal authority. Joseph II., in his mad zeal for reform, almost completed for southern and central Germany what Luther and the princes who favored him had done for northern Germany. The tyranny and oppression of which you complain you must attribute, not to the church, nor to her docile and obedient, but to her indocile and disobedient, children. When and where her voice has been listened to, her precepts obeyed, her principles and maxims faithfully followed, she has fulfilled all her promises, and accomplished all that you or any one else can ask. Where she has failed has been where her authority was despised and resisted; and the evils

she has not redressed, and which are encountered in Catholic states, are chargeable to practical Protestantism, to the practical assertion by her disobedient children of those principles and maxims which you and your friends wish all the world to follow."

"But you evade the point of my objection, Uncle Jack. If your church be what she professes to be, how happens it that there were so many wicked princes and other persons in her bosom? Why did she not reform them, make them good and docile Catholics? I admit all you say; but these very persons to whom you charge all the evils I find recorded in the history of Catholic nations, had all been baptized and brought up Catholics. I do not deny, but assert, their wickedness. My difficulty is, how, if the church be as powerful for good as she pretends, and affords all the helps needed to virtue, they could be so wicked. I have read your Catholic histories of the reformers. According to these histories, the reformers were a set of as great rascals as ever lived, and I have no doubt of the fact. I think you fully prove it. But this relieves no difficulty. The more wicked and unprincipled you prove them, the more to my mind you prove against the church, the more completely do you establish her inefficiency, her inability to effect what is avowedly her purpose. These reformers had all been reared in her bosom; they had all, according to you, been regenerated in baptism, had been born again, received the gift of faith, the grace of the sacraments, and been elevated to the plane of a supernatural destiny. They had received all your church has to give. How, then, if she is able to fulfil her magnificent promises, could such a set of men come out of her communion, or possibly become so grossly depraved as they most undeniably were before they openly abandoned her? Here is my difficulty, and a difficulty which you do not meet. Is not the existence of such men, or such men as the Achillis and the Gavazzis, in the bosom of your church, a practical refutation of her claims?"

"I understood from the outset your difficulty, or the point of your objection, my dear Dick, and had no intention of evading it. The objection, though fatal to Protestantism as a religion, is in the non-Catholic mind practically the gravest objection to the church that can be urged; and I well recollect that I found it, after having rejected Protestantism, the greatest and last obstacle in my own

mind to be overcome in embracing the church. I had lived as a man of the world, as a non-Catholic man of the world, not unfrequently lives, and had strayed far from the path of virtue, and fallen far lower than I care to state. I tried to recover myself, but I found myself too weak. I was sinking, and I had no strength to arrest my fall. I wanted help, something to breathe life into my soul, give strength to my will, and light to my understanding. The church proffered me this help, or told me that in her sacraments, which were channels of grace, I should find precisely what I wanted. But could I trust her? If she communicates through her sacraments the graces she alleges, how comes it that so many who must have received these graces have lost their faith and virtue, and become the vilest and most abandoned of our race, as apostate Catholics usually are? These undeniably wicked men who had been reared in the bosom of the church, who must have approached her sacraments, and therefore received all needful supernatural helps, if such helps the church has to give, were to me for a long time a real stumbling-block, for their existence seemed to me an unanswerable proof that the church does not and cannot give the assistance which I needed and which she promises. But I became able finally to understand that my objection grew out of my Protestant and Puritan education, which had taught me that grace is irresistible and inamissible. Your difficulty is, Given the church as the medium of supernatural grace which supernaturalizes and sanctifies, how can one of her members fall away, or lapse into iniquity and unbelief? Or how can one baptized and reared in the bosom of the church ever be a bad Catholic and a bad man? The answer is easy. Man was created and intended to be a free moral agent, and the church was never intended to take away his free agency, or to deprive him of his free will. Man in the church, as out of her, retains his free will, and therefore the faculty of obeying or of disobeying, as he elects. This free will the church respects, and therefore, whatever assistance she renders, it must be assistance which is compatible with it. She can aid, but not compel, and the power of resistance is always retained by the Catholic. Consequently, the question, How can there be a bad Catholic? is no other than the question, How can there be a bad man, or a sinner at all? There is then no special difficulty in the case. There is only that general

difficulty with regard to the origin of evil, which we have already considered and disposed of.

"You do not readily see this, because, having been reared a Protestant, you have no conception of grace that does not operate irresistibly, or of grace that aids and assists free will without superseding it. Sufficient grace that is inefficacious strikes you as an absurdity, and you relish Voltaire's ridicule of it. But grace can always be resisted. To concur with grace, indeed, demands grace, but to resist grace does not. We are always competent to do that of ourselves alone. The grace we receive in baptism imparts to us the habit of faith and justice or sanctity, but the habit is not the act either of faith or justice. It gives us, as to faith, the power to elicit the act, or actually to believe what God has revealed when duly propounded to the understanding, which is beyond our natural ability; but it does not compel us to elicit that act, and we can refuse to do so. By this refusal—a formal refusal, I mean—we lose the habit, and thus become infidels, or heretics. The point you are to bear in mind is, that the grace or gift of faith does not compel us to believe; it only gives us the power to believe, and a certain facility in believing, what God reveals and the church teaches. We are aided, not forced by it. If we formally refuse, we lose that power and facility, and our understanding becomes darkened. We then lose, not only our love, but even our perception of the truth, as is perhaps always the case with confirmed heretics and apostates. They fall anew under the power of Satan, and become the prey to all his delusions, so that it is possible that they really persuade themselves that their errors are truths, and become so deluded as actually to believe a lie, that, having pleasure in iniquity, they may be damned. This explains how men who have received the gift of faith may lose it, and become heretics and apostates. But generally, perhaps always, the refusal to elicit the act of faith is preceded by the loss of justice. Sanctifying grace, when no obstruction is offered on our part, places us in a state of justice, but it does not compel us to remain in that state. We are still free agents, and therefore may, instead of eliciting acts of holiness, resist the grace of God, and fall into mortal sin. By mortal sin we lose that grace, all that it gave us, and come again under the power of Satan. Thus nothing prevents the Catholic, if he chooses, from rejecting all the graces of the sacraments, all the aid his church affords him, and running a

wild career of incredulity and iniquity. All in the church are not of the church. She is that gospel net which, cast into the sea, gathered fishes of all sorts, both good and bad, and hence we find among Catholics all sorts of persons, good, bad, and indifferent. We should not therefore be surprised to find men passing for Catholics who yet have in reality no more faith than Protestants, and no more virtue than heathens. This makes nothing against the church, if you once understand that grace does not take away free will, and is not inamissible."

"I can understand all that, but it does not remove my whole difficulty. If people can, with the church, lose their faith and their virtue, I do not see what mighty advantage she is to mankind."

"That is chiefly because you are thinking only of good or evil in relation to the natural and temporal order, and do not at all take into the account the supernatural providence of God, and man's supernatural destiny, in the world to come; but also in some respects because you have no conception of free will. Your humanists, who worship a people-god, to use the barbarous expression of your Italian chief, have no just conception of the dignity and freedom of man. You do not, perhaps you cannot, understand the immense superiority of a being endowed with free will over a creature that acts solely from intrinsic necessity. Your highest conception of liberty is freedom from coercion, or from external restraint or compulsion. You never rise above the conception of the animal man. Man is for you only a superior sort of animal, standing at the head of the order of mammalia, and it is only for man as an animal that in all your plans of reform you seek to provide. You recognize in him no rational soul, and you place, as you have avowed, his highest worth in his instinctive and involuntary activity. Hence you place instinctive and impulsive love above duty. With these low and grovelling conceptions of man, it is not easy for you to understand the importance which is to be attached to free will. But you would prize an homage freely and voluntarily offered you by one of your friends, more than an homage offered you through compulsion or necessity. You should know that

> God made thee perfect, not immutable;
> And good he made thee, but to persevere
> He left it in thy power, ordain'd thy will
> By nature free, not over-rul'd by fate

Inextricable, or strict necessity:
Our voluntary service he requires,
Not our necessitated; such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find; for how
Can hearts not free be try'd whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose?'

Without free will man would not rise in the scale of being above the ox or the hog, the beaver or the ant, and virtue would not differ in principle from gravitation or chemical affinity. The freedom you talk so much about, and for which you set at defiance the laws of God and man, would be but an unmeaning word. There is freedom conceivable only for a being possessing free will, without which there is only invincible necessity. The glory of man's nature is in his free will, which is the highest expression of his rational nature, partaking at once of intellect and volition. This free will God himself respects, and never does or suffers violence to be done to it. God redeems man, and governs him as endowed with free will. The grace he confers, the aid he vouchsafes in his church, are all granted and operate in accordance with it, and therefore may be resisted. But this does not imply that the church is of no value. If she furnishes the aid needed to enable man to be and do what were impossible without it, you cannot say she is of no importance because a man wilfully rejects it, or refuses to avail himself of it. She does all that can be done without depriving men of their free will, that is, without making them cease to be men. That is all that she ever promised to do, all that is or can be required of her. You have but to listen and obey, and even not that in your own strength, and the end is gained. Your objection is futile, for it is always something that help is at hand."

"Still I want something more."

"Probably you want the impossible, or the absurd."

"I want the church, if church I am to have, not merely to enable men to save themselves, but actually to save them."

"That is, you want the state of probation or trial should be a state of reward and beatitude. You want an order in which men can be free, do as they please, and in which they cannot go wrong, can make no mistake, commit no sin, and suffer no pain. You must go out of this world to find such an order, and seek a human nature different from

ours. What you ask is incompatible with man's present state. The church has never promised the world any thing, except on condition of obedience. She teaches us the truth, tells us what is our true good, points out the way that leads to its possession, entreats us with maternal affection to walk in that way, and affords us all the helps we need in order to do so; but the act of doing it must be *our* act. She does not carry us without our concurrence, without our active assent, in spite of ourselves, and against our will. If she did, you would be among the first to cry out against her, as violating the freedom and dignity of human nature. She does all that can be done with respect for our dignity, or without violence to our free will, which would not be free will if it did or could suffer violence. This is all she has ever promised, and her promise she has always kept. If then there have been moral evils in Catholic nations, if men reared Catholics have abandoned their faith or lived as heathen, and run to fearful excesses of vice and crime, it is not owing to any weakness or inefficiency of hers, but to the perversity of their own wills, to the malice of their own hearts."

"Still I do not see, if your church really imparts the light and strength you pretend, what could induce men enlightened and strengthened by her to abandon her, to act against her precepts, and to become vicious and criminal. They have neither ignorance nor weakness to plead in their excuse."

"That only proves the depth of their malice. You do not seem to have any conception of such a thing as malice, and you imagine that no one can do wrong against his better knowledge, unless through weakness. Hence you have no conception of sin, and in your own mind really deny its possibility. In your philosophy sin is an excusable error, an amiable weakness, a pardonable mistake, and therefore you revolt at the idea of its eternal punishment. But sin is not a mere imperfection; it is not something involuntary, but always a free, deliberate act, and, in so far as it is sin, an act of malice. The man had both the light and the strength to avoid it. It is impossible for us to estimate the degree of malice every mortal sin implies, and you will never have any adequate conception of its turpitude till you have learned at what cost the incarnate Son of God has made satisfaction for it. You are very much mistaken in supposing that men always act as well as they are able, or know how."

"But I should suppose their knowledge and sense of their own interest would prevent their fall."

"You are a very young man, or you would not say that. Men are surely not incapable of going contrary to what they know is for their own interest, both here and hereafter. They do it every day, almost every hour."

"But if I recollect aright, your St. Thomas teaches that the good is the object of the will, and that the will is appetitive of good only."

"The will has for its object good, and wills an object only because it views it as good of some sort, I admit; but not therefore does it never will that which is not true good. St. Thomas teaches that every man naturally desires happiness, which is true; but he may will that which he knows is contrary to his happiness, not precisely because it is contrary to it, but from aversion to that which it is necessary to do in order to gain it. A man wills evil because he hates good, and to refuse what one hates has itself some reason of happiness, inasmuch as it affords a certain gratification. To contradict that which is hateful to us is always a greater or less pleasure, and nothing is more hateful to the malicious than genuine virtue, although they well know its superiority to vice, and that they would be better and happier if they were themselves virtuous. The malicious call evil good, and good evil, not from mistake, but from sheer malice. You yourself would say, with Satan,

'Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven.'

The perverse mind makes to itself a sort of good in its refusal to obey God. Did you never observe how Mammon works out this thought in Milton's *Paradise Lost?* The fallen spirit would dissuade his associates from the further prosecution of the war against the Almighty, as utterly vain. They cannot 'heaven's Lord supreme o'erpower,' and thus regain their lost glory. But

'Suppose he should relent
And publish grace to all, on promise made
Of new subjection; with what eyes could we
Stand in his presence humble, and receive
Strict laws impos'd, to celebrate his throne
With warbled hymns, and to his Godhead sing
Forc'd halleluiahs; while he lordly sits
Our envy'd Sov'reign, and his altar breathes
Ambrosial odours and ambrosial flowers,
Our servile offerings? This must be our task

In heav'n, this our delight; *how wearisome*
Eternity so spent in worship paid
To whom we hate! Let us not then pursue
By force impossible, by leave obtain'd
Unacceptable, though in heaven, our state
Of splendid vassalage, but rather seek
Our own good from ourselves, and from our own
Live to ourselves, though in this vast recess,
Free, and to none accountable, *preferring*
Hard liberty before the easy yoke
Of servile pomp. Our greatness will appear
Then most conspicuous, when great things of small,
Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse,
We can create; and, in what place so e'er,
Thrive under evil, and work ease out of pain
Through labour and endurance.'

Milton had a happy knack of interpreting the thoughts of devils, for he was himself a superb rebel, and a spirit kindred to Satan. You, my dear Dick, if you will search your own heart, will find yourself sympathizing with the devilish sentiments put into the mouth of Mammon. Now Mammon knew perfectly well that he ought to love God, and that to those who do love him, what he calls 'a wearisome task' is the highest bliss. But he preferred hell to heaven, because he hated God, and was too proud to submit to bear his 'easy yoke.' So it is with men. The pride, the malice of their hearts is such, that to do what they will, to have their own way, and to feel that they resolutely refuse to acknowledge a superior, though bringing with it all the pains of hell, is a good, and for them less painful than humble submission. It is so with you, and with all the chiefs of your party. Even you, with all your gentle manners, warmth of feeling, and amiableness of disposition, can say and do say to yourself, with Satan, at this moment,

'All is not lost; th' unconquerable will,
And study of revenge, immortal hate
And courage never to submit or yield
And what is else not to be overcome;
That glory never shall his wrath or might
Extort from me: to bow and sue for grace
With suppliant knee, and deify his power.
. . . .
That were low indeed,
That were an ignominy and shame beneath
This downfall.'

Through satanic malice, evil is changed to good, and good to evil; for nothing can seem a greater evil than to bow the suppliant knee and sue for grace to one we hate, and hence it is the will can be appetitive of evil without changing its nature, which is to be appetitive of good.

"The church, I have told you, does not take away free will; let me say also, that baptism does not destroy concupiscence. The flesh remains after the infusion of justifying grace, and we are free, if we choose, at any time to yield to its solicitations. These solicitations are not in themselves sin, and are permitted for our trial, and as occasions of merit. They are sin only by virtue of our voluntary assent to them. Catholics as well as others have these solicitations, and though they know that they ought not to assent to them, and have the power in the sacraments to resist them, they can yield to them. They yield a little, a very little, at first; become slightly negligent of their watch; then they yield a little more, become a little more negligent, and less vigilant in prayer, less frequent in their approach to the sacraments; and then they grow weaker, yield more and more. One concession prepares the way for another, till the soul falls anew under the dominion of the flesh, and we are prepared to do its deeds of iniquity. If you had attempted to lead a truly Christian life, if you had become acquainted with the malice of the natural heart, with the operations of the flesh, and had felt how severe is the internal combat that has to be maintained without a moment's relaxation, you would never have looked upon it as difficult for those who have been enlightened and strengthened by the grace of God, to fall away. But, after all, why speak I thus to you, who hardly believe in God, look on the Gospel with contempt, and regard the church with the profoundest hatred? Yet let what I have said suffice to convince you that, if the church is what she professes to be, and furnishes the helps she promises, she is, in spite of the scandals of bad Catholics, all we need for our true good here as well as hereafter."

"I cannot say that you have fully convinced me of that, my dear uncle, but you have convinced me that more may be said in defence of the church than I had supposed, and that the evils which undeniably subsist in Catholic countries do not necessarily invalidate her claims. So much I am bound in candor to concede. Yet I cannot give up human nature, or regard its instincts and tendencies as an unsafe

guide to what is best for man. Every animal is directed by its natural instincts and tendencies to its end, to its destiny, which is its good, and why not man?"

"Simply because man is something more than an animal, and was never intended to act from mere instinct or natural tendency. Here is the grand mistake which you all commit, and hence the absurdity of your famous Phalansterian maxim,—Attractions proportional to destiny. Man is an animal, if you will, but he is something more; he is a rational soul, and in him the rational morally transforms the animal. He is not to be moved and guided by natural instinct, but by reason. Instinct and natural tendency direct him only to an end that lies in the purely animal order, and he was intended for an end that lies above that order, in the rational order, an end worthy of a rational soul. To 'follow nature,' as you understand it, is the unwisest maxim that can be laid down, for you understand it to mean to follow our animal nature, as if man were a pig or an ass. The maxim is true only when applied to the rational nature, and to follow the rational nature is to subject the animal to the rational, and make it serve or conform to the end approved by reason. Here, then, comes in the necessity of self-denial, of self-restraint, or interior government, and also the necessity of divine assistance in maintaining this government.

"Society is, as Plato teaches you, only the individual on a larger scale, and the reason of government in the bosom of the individual is the reason of government in the bosom of society. Your scheme emancipates the beast, and enslaves reason and will, that is, the man. The doctrine you oppose teaches us to emancipate reason and will—the man—from the slavery of the appetites and passions, and to subject the beast. For the same reason that the appetites and passions need to be governed in the individual in order to maintain internal freedom and peace, they need to be governed in society in order to maintain external freedom and peace. Hence, if you speak of rational freedom, you see that government, so far from being opposed to it, is its necessary condition. What you probably are aiming at, though you hardly know it, is the freedom, so to speak, of both the man and the beast, or the conciliation of the freedom or license of the appetites and passions with the freedom of reason and will. But this is not possible. One or the other must serve, and the question for you is which.

Shall the man serve the beast, or the beast the man? shall the flesh rule the spirit, or the spirit the flesh? The whole question comes to this at last, and as you answer this, so will you either assert the supremacy of God or the supremacy of Satan."

Conversation VI.

"It is worse than labor lost, my dear uncle, for you to attempt to arrest the onward march of man and society, and to restore the dark ages, now happily passed away for ever. Your religion in its time was no doubt well enough, and exerted a salutary influence in taming and civilizing the wild barbarians who overthrew the western Roman empire; but the race has outgrown it, and can no longer be served by it. The dead are dead, and cannot be recalled. You mean well, no doubt; you speak in a clear, distinct, and strong voice, but your words fetch no echo from the heart of the age. You put forth great strength, but the age refuses to stop at your resistance, and rolls on in its destined career, as heedless of your efforts as the horses in the fable were of the buzzing and tugging of the fly at the wheel."

"The fly, I believe, Dick, was ridiculed in the fable, not for supposing it could arrest the coach, but for imagining that, by its buzzing and tugging at the wheel, it assisted the horses to draw it through the deep ruts, and is a much better emblem of young Americans like you, than of an old fogy like me. If the human race is carried on, as you suppose, by an irrepressible instinct, an irresistible force, your efforts must count for about as much in its progress as those of the fly at the wheel of the coach."

"But if my efforts to aid progress are ridiculous, it by no means follow that yours, to arrest it, are any the less so."

"That is very true, if, as you assume, I do labor to arrest it. But, my most acute and logical nephew, I deny that I labor to arrest progress, or in any way oppose it. You pretend I do. Here we are at issue. What is the fact? Be so good as to tell me what you mean by progress, and then perhaps we shall be able to determine."

"I mean by progress—the—the continuous advance of the race."

"That is, by progress you mean progress. Progress is progress, no doubt of that; but what *is* progress?"

"It is the continuous development and realization of the latent virtuality of humanity."

"The development and realization of the virtuality of the race to be what? Virtuous or vicious? Good or bad? Wise or foolish?"

"You press me too hard, uncle, with your dry scholasticism, and fail to seize my deeper and truer meaning. Logic kills to dissect, and to insist, in all cases, on clear, distinct, precise, and exact definitions, is to deprive thought of all its freshness, life, and vigor. The human mind is not a mere logic machine. We should give it free play, and let our thoughts gush up and utter themselves in all the life, vivacity, and force of brilliant fancy and creative imagination. The poet, not the logician, is the *maker;* poetry, not dialectics, transforms the world; and poetry delights in the vague, in the obscure, the unintelligible, and dies in the effort to draw sharp outlines, and give distinct and exact definitions. Poetic thought must always shade off into the indefinite, the obscure, the infinite."

"Nonsense, my poor Dick. I am not precisely a poet, but I love and all my life have loved poetry, when poetry it is, and I believe myself a passable judge of its essential qualities. Whatever else poetry may demand, it demands good sense, clear and distinct thought, and as rigid logic, and as much intelligibility, as prose itself. Your modern æsthetic writers, who place the essence of poetry in dark utterances, vague sentiment, or mere sensibility, are as far out in their reckoning as those who placed it in fiction or imitation, and classed it as an imitative art. It is no more imitative than prose, and deals no more in fiction. Its essence is not merely subjective. It is always truth vividly conceived and expressed in its unity and under the form of the beautiful; and if it demands soft and delicate, it still demands clear and well-defined, outlines.

"Yet you greatly mistake me, if you suppose that I am a slave to scholasticism, or the dry and barren forms of logic. What passes for scholasticism is mere analysis, a mere dissection of its subject, and seldom gives us more than a mere skeleton of truth, and the skeleton itself only as disjointed and scattered bones. I love and revere as much as any man can the great scholastics of the middle ages. The *Summa Theologica* of the Angel of the Schools has for me as many miracles as articles, and, when studied as it should be, it gives one the sum of all theology and of all philosophy. But, after all, few study it with sufficient care and diligence to seize its theology in its unity and totality. The method

of treatment is analytic, that of division, which is exhaustive. The subject is first divided into parts, then the parts are divided into questions, and then the questions are subdivided into articles. Nothing in the world can be more convenient for the professor or the learner; but the student, if not on his guard, is liable, in thus studying a subject, to lose sight of unity and synthesis, and to master it only in its details. St. Thomas had himself studied and seen theology in its unity and synthesis, and seldom if ever for a moment loses sight of truth in its unity and integrity; but this cannot always be said of feebler minds, who follow him, and still less of feebler minds yet, who follow *them*, and consult him only on special questions or in special articles, and even that at second or third hand. These often master all theology and philosophy in their details, without ever having a single conception of them in their unity and integrity, in their mutual relations, connections, and dependencies.

"Scholasticism has, undoubtedly, introduced just and accurate distinctions, and favored clearness, exactness, and precision in details, but it has, I think, at the same time, led to a neglect of synthesis, and tended to enfeeble, rather than to invigorate, thought. It has had not a little to do in producing, indirectly, that *frivolezza* so universal in the last century, and not wholly unknown in the present, and which made the philosophical, scientific, and literary world regard as its representative the shallow Voltaire, prince of persiflage, superficial erudition, and still more superficial thought. While insisting on exactness in details, while valuing the analytic method in its place, and continuing and extending the study of the greater scholastics, I would, if it were my business, urge upon those students who wish to qualify themselves to meet the scientific wants of our age, and to act powerfully on the public mind and heart, to go back and study the works of the great fathers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, those real masters of the human race, who stood at the summit of human science and of revealed theology; and study these great fathers, not merely in the prefaces and indexes of the Benedictines, but in their works themselves, as handed down to us from their authors. Then we should not have truth in mere detail, or as a mere *hortus siccus*, but in its unity and integrity, as a living, vivifying, and productive whole.

"Revelation is complete, the truth changes not, and the dogma is fixed and unalterable; but modes and processes

of investigation, study, and exposition may change with time, and vary with the varying wants and tastes of the age. The scholastic method was in accordance with the tastes and wants of the epoch when it was adopted, and must always be more or less the method pursued when only scholars are to be addressed, and the object is to act only on professional readers. But times with us have changed. Questions which formerly were discussed only by schoolmen, in the bosom of the schools and monasteries, are now brought before the public at large, and the profoundest principles of theological science have to be discussed for the laity, because the laity, no longer docile, and content to receive in humility the simple teachings of the catechism and the practical instructions of their pastors, have imbibed a habit of questioning every thing, and of denying every thing which they do not comprehend. It has become necessary to be truly theological when we speak *ad populum*, as well as when we speak *ad clerum*. But for the people the scholastic method will not answer, for they have neither the time nor the patience to go through with all the long and fine-spun analyses in which it delights. They turn away unedified, uninstructed, and even disgusted, from its *distinguos*, *concedos*, *negos*, *probos*, *respondeos*, *objectiones*, and *objectiones solvuntur*. To them the truth must be presented, not in its analytic, but in its synthetic form; not in separate details, but as a whole; in its living principle, as it is really, not as we make it for the conveniences of study. They whose office it is to teach, and to meet the insurgent errors of the times, which in our days assume almost exclusively a laical form, must be accustomed to contemplate truth in its synthetic character, or they will find themselves impotent before the enemies of truth, as they undeniably were before the terrible errors broached, and so widely and fiercely propagated, in the eighteenth century.

"These are times when something more than a knowledge of details, something more than mere scholastic minds, something more than respectable mediocrity, or men of mere routine, is demanded. We want men of strong, synthetic minds, who grasp truth in its fundamental principles, and have been accustomed to contemplate it in its living unity, and its several parts in their real, ontological relations to one another and to it as a whole,—men who think, who comprehend, not merely remember and repeat,—men of free, original, bold, and vigorous thought, who by their

own mental and spiritual action have made the truth their own, and are able to apply it to the insurgent error as soon as it raises its head above the wave. Such a man Gioberti might have been, had it not been for his pride, his ambition, and his worldly affections; such a man to some extent was the excellent Balmes, and such a man was beginning to be the late brilliant and lamented Donoso Cortés; such a man is the Jesuit Passaglia, and, in spite of his early training and his theory of development, such a man will turn out to be John Henry Newman."

"But how can you, Uncle Jack, a Catholic, bound to believe what and only what you are taught, and whose mind must run in the grooves hollowed out for it ages ago, talk of free, bold, original thought?"

"As well as you or any one else, and better than those who are not Catholics. I demand not free, bold, original thought in the construction of cobweb theories, in the formation of dogmas, or in the explication of inexplicable mysteries. It is not in the sphere of faith that I demand it. The dogma is revealed and imposed by authority, fixed for all time, and is to be received and adhered to without a question. But the mysteries and dogmas of faith have a mutual relation, a logical relation one to another, and to all scientific truth, to all that pertains to the natural order, to society, the state, the family, and to private life. Here, in understanding the relations of the dogmas of faith to one another, and their relations to all not of faith, is the scope for free, bold (not rash), and original thought; for here is a field for proper human science and comprehension, working at once with *data* furnished by the light of revelation, and by the light of nature. This field, if you are able to survey it, you will find is far more extensive than that which is open to those who deny the church and fall back on their private judgment and individual reason. Catholicity, instead of forbidding or hindering free, vigorous, and original thought within what is really open to human thought, encourages it, stimulates it, and affords it all the assistance it needs; and if the contrary would sometimes seem to be warranted by what is met among Catholics, it is to be attributed, not to Catholicity, but to the barren and chilling scholastic methods too exclusively followed. Who would ever pretend that the lawyer, because he neither makes nor as a judge declares the law, has no scope in the practice of his profession for free, vigorous, and original thought?

"But we have wandered from the point we were considering. You object to my demand for exact definition. I understand the objection. Put you young declaimers and dreamers to your definitions, and your occupation, like Othello's, is gone. All in your minds is vague and floating, and in your horror of scholasticism you have run almost beyond the opposite extreme. I am, as you see, far enough from being wedded to the modes and processes of the scholastics, but I cannot very well talk without talking something, nor intelligibly without knowing what it is I am talking about. So I will ask you again to define to me what you mean by progress."

"I mean by progress development and growth of humanity."

"That is, by progress you mean progress, very likely; but what, once more, *is* progress?"

"It is the growth or augmentation of man's being."

"You grow darker and darker, dear Dick. Pray explain yourself."

"It is not easy to do so, because the doctrine of progress which I hold is very profound, and is at the bottom of the profoundest philosophy of the age. To understand it, we must comprehend the philosophy of the absolute."

"Very well. Let us hear, then, what that very profound philosophy is. Perhaps, if it is not absolutely unintelligible, I may get some notion of it, and if it is, I may suspect that you hardly understand it yourself."

"What I mean by progress is, that there is a continual growth or increase of nature. You, before you became a papist, were accustomed to say, that *being* is in *doing*, and that *to be*, we must *do*."

"It were more correct, I should think, to say, that in order to do, we must be, for what is not cannot act."

"Do not interrupt me. In order to be, we must do, as you once said, and as your old friends, the transcendentalists, still say. Being, in some sense, must, no doubt, precede doing; but being, considered in itself, as anterior to doing, is not actual, but potential,—infinite potentiality, the infinite void of the Buddhists, the *reines Sein* of Hegel, absolutely indistinguishable from non-being,—*das Nichtsein*. It is possible, not real, and becomes real only in coming out of itself into existence,—*das Wesen;* and it becomes *plenum*, full, or the plentitude of real being, only in the pleroma of existence. The doctrine, you see, is very

profound. Plato had some conception of it; Buddha understood it very well, and his followers misapprehending it, have made it the basis of their doctrine of the metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls; several of the Gnostic sects, so profoundly philosophic, and combining as they do all the wisdom of ancient and recent times, and masters alike of the deepest science of the East and of the West, appear to have been familiar with it, and to have symbolized it in their Bythos, married to Sige, from whom issue Horos, Nous, and Aletheia; but the poor and illiterate Christians of the time, like Irenæus of Lyons, regarded it as a vague speculation or as a dangerous heresy, and separated its adherents from the communion of the church, and cursed them as heretics.

"Pure being, *ens purissimum*, *das reine Sein*, being in itself, regarded as distinct from and anterior to existence (*existentia* from *ex-stare*), *das Wesen*, being only void, or possible, becomes full or real only in passing to existence, or as realized and manifested exteriorly in existences. Consequently the growth of existence is a growth of being, in the sense of its realization, or the realization of the ideal, a progress in filling up the void, in rendering it *plenum*, and producing the pleroma, or universal fulness. Progress, then, as we philosophers of the movement understand it, consists in the continuous realization of being. It is progress, because it involves a procession from the possible to the ideal, and from the ideal to the real, and because it tends to the production of the pleroma. It is illimitable, because the being to be realized is infinite, and the infinite has no limits."

"I see nothing very profound in this, save its absurdity. It smells strongly of tobacco-smoke and lager-bier. There is, no doubt, a glimmering of sense in the expression *being* is in *doing*, that to be is to do, for what is not *in actu* is not at all, and hence all theologians say of God he is *actus purissimus*. Also, when taken in the order of the return of existences to God, without absorption, as their final cause, or ultimate end, it may express an important and wholesome practical truth; but, applied, as you apply it, to the procession of existences from God, and understood to mean that nothing is real only in that it produces something, or is a maker, it is false and absurd. It then implies that God is real as distinguished from possible being only in so far as he creates, or is manifested in existences; or, as

Pierre Leroux, the ablest philosopher you have on your side, expresses it, God is *living* God only in his creations or manifestations, and therefore, without those manifestations which we call the universe, he could not be real, but would be simply possible God,—that is, no God at all. God, according to him, is the infinite possibility, or, which with him means the same thing, the infinite virtuality of the universe, and is actual or living God only in existences, and only in so far as his virtuality is realized or actualized in them. To you this may seem profound, and the proof of the marvellous comprehension of your philosophers; to me it is only a striking proof of the pains they take to make themselves fools.

"Just observe, my dear Dick, that your philosophy places first bythos, abyss, void, the possible as distinguished from the real. Very good. The possible is simply *in potentia ad actum*, but is not *actus*, and therefore, by your own rule, not being at all, and therefore a sheer nullity, since between not being at all and nullity there is no medium. Hence you have this not very easy problem to solve. How from nothing to get something? or how from the infinite abyss of nothing to get existences? *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* How does your potential, which is null, contrive to pass from its potentiality to actuality, from *das reine Sein* indistinguishable from *das Nichtsein*, to *das Wesen*, or existence? Here is a trifling difficulty which I pray you to clear up. To my old-fogy understanding the real, not the possible, is primary, for without the real to reduce the possible to act, it can never become actual, unless you suppose nothing can make itself something."

"I see, uncle, that you do not fully comprehend our philosophy. You must know that the procession we speak of is logical, not chronological. It is not a progress *ad extra*, but a progress *ad intra*, to use the barbarous expressions of the schoolmen, and takes place irrespective of space and time,"

"It of course must come to that at last, but without affording you any relief. Your philosophers are divided on this point. Cousin and others, who wish to keep, or to have the appearance of keeping, some terms with the religious world, contend that God is being only in that he is substance, and substance only in that he is cause, and cause only in that he actually causes something *ad extra*, since a cause that does not cause is a dead cause, and as good as no cause

at all; hence that God can be conceived as real God only inasmuch as he produces or creates *ad extra;* therefore that he is a necessary, not a free cause, or free only *a coactione*, from external violence or compulsion, but not from intrinsic necessity;—which denies creation proper, substitutes emanation for creation, and resolves itself at last into sheer pantheism. Hegel adopts rather the view you take, and supposes the whole process to take place, so to speak, within the bosom of universal being itself. Hence he recognized no creation, no procession *ad extra*, and, while asserting universal progress, remained a stanch conservative, in which respect he is followed by the Hegelians of the Right. Others, however, not satisfied with this, regard the procession or progression as *ad extra*, and as a real growth or actualization of being in space and time. These are the Hegelingens, or Hegelians of the Left, as are the mass of the German radicals. These are real atheists, for they recognize as anterior to existences, either logically or chronologically, only possible being, which, regarded in itself, and not as the power or ability of the real, is a nullity.

"The Hegelians of the Right, with whom I am surprised to find you classing yourself, give us only an analysis of being, and really confine themselves to what you have rightly called a logical procession, or a procession *ad intra.* The relations they recognize are all within, and in their view somewhat analogous to the three persons who are asserted in the Godhead without prejudice to the unity of the divine essence. Their analysis of being gives them a trinity; pure being, *das reine Sein*, which is merely possible being; the ideal, or idea; and real or actual existence, *das Wesen.* These three comprehend or constitute a perfect whole, complete, self-existing, and self-sustaining. But these are all in the one whole, and do not break its essential unity or oneness. Hence for them them there is no creation, no exterior manifestation, no external universe, and all turns in the bosom of τὸ ἕν, and hence they assert the identity of thought and being, and resolve the universe into a system of pure logic.

"If you go with these, you must abandon all notion of progress. Cease to trouble your head about reforms, for the whole is, and the whole is the whole, and can be neither the more nor the less so. If you go with the others, you will find yourself reduced to greater straits than the Hebrews in Egpyt, who were compelled to make brick without

straw. You must get the real from the possible, without any real to reduce the potential to the actual, that is, something from nothing; a more hopeless task than that of those celebrated philosophers of Laputa, who were engaged in attempting to extract sunbeams from cucumbers."

"I have no answer to a sneer."

"I am glad, Dick, that you have the grace not to attempt to defend what your own good sense must tell you is indefensible."

Conversation VII.

"But, after all, uncle, you really deny all progress, and contend that the moderns have only retrograded."

"My dear Dick, always mind the categories, and get clear, distinct, and precise ideas. Progress, in the sense you asserted it in our last conversation, I of course deny, because in that sense it is impossible. I deny also the whole philosophical system which you present me as its basis, because that system is composed of abstractions and hard words, and is as baseless as the fabric of a vision. In the sense of a progress of being, growth, enlargement of the quantity of being of any particular individual or species, I deny progress; but a progress in attaining to the end for which we were made, I do not deny. I admit, and in my feeble way labor to make progress, where progress is conceivable, and by such means as are adapted to effect it. If, instead of studying to be profound, you would study to be simple, and would labor to clear up and simplify your own conceptions, there would be less difference between us than you suppose. You have never clearly and distinctly apprehended, and you do not so apprehend, what it is you mean by progress. Sometimes it is a progress in knowledge, sometimes in the physical sciences, sometimes in ideas, theories, systems, sometimes in virtue, sometimes in the quantity of nature, or the species, and sometimes simply in the monuments of the race. Now it is simply progress in achieving our destiny, in attaining to the end for which we have been created, and now it is a growth and enlargement of our substantive being itself. All these meanings are thrown together in glorious confusion, and lie fermenting in your morbid intellect, and produce a very disagreeable mental flatulency. Take a dose of ipecac and jalap, clear out your stomach and bowels, and be careful of your diet henceforth, put yourself upon regimen, and take plenty of

exercise in the open air, and you may hope to recover and maintain your health. But go near no quack, take no patent nostrum, and hold in horror all the boasted panaceas trumpeted forth in flaming advertisements.

"Let us understand ourselves. There are in the universe, in the cosmos, to speak in the manner of the ancients, two cycles, that of the procession of existences by way of creation from God as their first cause, and their return, without absorption, to him as their last end or final cause. In the procession from God the creature is not active, performs no part, and there is no activity but that of God, who by a free act of his omnipotent will, operating according to the ideas of his own infinite and eternal reason, produces the creature from non-existence and causes it to exist. All creatures in this procession from God, in the very fact of their creation, receive a specific and determinate nature, which is fixed and unalterable as long as they exist at all. A progress in their nature would be a progress in creation; and a progress here by the creature's own activity would imply that he has a self-creative power, and has lot and part in creating himself, which is impossible and absurd, for what is not cannot act. In the first cycle, then, there is and can be no progress as effected by the creature.

"Progress, then, must be restricted to the second cosmic cycle, the return of existences or creatures to God, without being absorbed in him, as oriental pantheism teaches, or in gaining or attaining to their ultimate end, or realization of their supreme good. Here and here only is the sphere of human progress, and here progress is not in the growth or enlargement of the human being, but in fulfilling the end, or gaining the end for which the human being exists. Progress is physically motion forwards, and morally it is going towards our end, or approaching it, more or less nearly."

"But, though that is all very clear and precise, it does not satisfy me; for the very end for which we exist is progress. Hence it is that the way is more than the end, the acquiring more than the possessing. The gaining of an end never satisfies, and there are few things that we can gain that are not spurned as soon as gained."

"I understand that. It is so because the ends you refer to are not the last end, and the things gained are not the soul's supreme good, and no more satisfy the soul in its craving for beatitude, than a secondary cause satisfies the intellect in seeking to get at the origin of things. But

progress cannot itself be the end, the supreme good, because progress consists precisely in approaching it. Hence St. Thomas refutes the notion of illimitable or endless progress, by saying, If there is no end, progress is inconceivable; if there is an end, progress cannot be illimitable, for it must cease when the end is reached. To say there is an end, and yet that it is not attainable, is simply a contradiction in terms. So all your fine rhetoric about the way being more than the end, the acquisition more than the possession, you may abandon to the use of those unenviable spirits who are always learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth, always seeking rest, and never finding it.

"Now to be able to judge whether this or that is really progress, you must first settle the question what is the end to be gained. See how philosophic is that child's catechism, into which I presume you have never looked:—

"'*Q.* Who made you?

"'*A.* God.

"'*Q.* Why did he make you?

"'*A.* That I might know him, love him, and serve him in this life, and be happy for ever with him in the next.'

"Here in the outset you find answered those great questions which torment the whole non-Catholic world;—whence came we? why are we here? whither do we go?—the origin, purpose, and end of our existence. The first and final cause of our existence is determined in the beginning, and then comes the purpose of our existence, and after that the way or means by which that purpose is to be accomplished. Nothing can be more scientific. Having settled the sphere of progress, having settled the end toward which we are to make progress, we can understand what is or is not progress, and what are or are not the means by which it is to be effected."

"I assent to this view, and say that progress is towards an end, and the end for which man exists, whatever that end be."

"That end you must, then, concede to be attainable, for if the distance between your starting-point and the goal can be shortened, and you advance nearer to it, it can be ultimately reached, if the progress continues; but if the distance cannot be shortened, there is and can be no progress, for where there is no nearing the goal, there is no progress towards it. Illimitable or everlasting progress is, then, an

absurd conception, and all progress contemplates an end in which there is rest, perfect repose, or the quiet and undisturbed possession of beatitude. They who deny such beatitude deny progress, and they who know not where it is to be found, and are ignorant of the means by which it is to be reached, cannot know what is progress, or whether they are going forwards or backwards, nearing the goal or receding from it."

"I will not at this moment object to what you say, but I suspect you intend to draw from it some conclusions that I am unwilling to accept."

"I have no wish to entrap you into concessions against your will, even if I were able. I leave the point then for your meditation. You have charged me with denying all progress. I have shown you that I do not; that I admit it where only it is possible, in the discharge of our duty, and fulfilling the purpose of our existence."

"But you do not admit any progress in ideas, any progress of society, or general advance of civilization."

"I do not know how you have come to that conclusion. I may not admit that all things which you call progress are progress. I do not believe, with you, that man commenced his career on this globe as an infant, and that the lowest savage state was the primitive state of mankind. I do not believe man was originally a mere gas, an oyster, a polliwog, or even a monkey. I do not believe that he was as weak, as helpless, as ignorant, as the new-born babe, and is and possesses only what has been acquired by his development and own activity. Such a doctrine is absurd, both unphilosophical and unhistorical. Go, study the savage, and you will find in him the marks, not of the primitive, the original man, but of fallen and deteriorated man, cut off from the moral and intellectual life of his race. I have no confidence in your modern science, which begins by analysis, and in studying man takes him not in that in which consists his manhood, but in that which he has in common with the lowest order of existence known, which analyzes his body before his soul, his physical and chemical affections before studying his mental and moral affections, and ends by placing him at the head of the order of mammalia. Man's body may be fed by the bodies below him, but it was formed originally as a whole, and at once. His mind was created with his soul, and not made up by successive conquests from the world around him. The true scientific way of studying

man is, to take him in his perfection as man, and to begin with his humanity; and first in his relation to his Maker, afterwards in his relation to his fellow-men, and last of all, in his relations to nature, animate and inanimate. True science begins with the essential, not with the accidental, and man's essential nature is in his peculiarly human nature. That is the substratum, on which all else is superinduced. Modern science makes the essential nature of man consist in that which is common to him and all existences, and therefore whatever is peculiar to him simply accidental. It therefore can never attain to a true conception of man.

"I believe, when God made man and placed him in the garden, he made him a full-grown man, so to speak, in the full perfection of body and soul, and infused into him language and all the knowledge necessary for his being and well-being as man, in the state in which he was intended to live. He has never had to invent language, or to manufacture intellectual ideas from simple sensible impressions. I do not think Helvetius, who contends that all the difference between him and a horse is that he has hands terminating in flexible fingers, whereas the horse has only hoofs, is to be regarded as a very profound philosopher, any more than is the excellent Cabanis, who defines man to be 'a digestive tube, open at both ends.' In the sense of progress analogous to that from infancy to manhood, I recognize no progress in the race, and none in the sense of progress from the savage state to the civilized. There is no instance known of spontaneous civilization. The most striking characteristic of the savage is the absence of all progress, and of all progressive tendency. Whatever progress is historically verifiable is always a progress in, not to or towards, civilization."

"But the civilized state could not have been the original, unless you suppose that God built a city as well as planted a garden for man s reception."

"If you insist on taking the word *civilization* in its strict etymological sense, I concede that the race did not commence in civilization. People undoubtedly led a pastoral and agricultural life before they dwelt in cities, and the rural system is older than the urban. But it does not follow from this, that the moral and intellectual principles and ideas which constitute the essential elements of what we call civilization were not known and observed from the beginning. Nor is it certain that the adoption of the urban system marks

a progress. The first man we hear of who built a city was Cain, the murderer of his brother; and the next was Nimrod, the mighty hunter, a man of violence, a tyrant, an oppressor, who led the people astray from the patriarchal religion. The Holy Scriptures do not seem to regard the founders of cities with a favorable eye, and we know that, if great cities contain much good, they contain also much evil, and are sources of corruption.

"But let that pass. Certain it is that there is no progress outside of what are called civilized nations. That in these nations there is often a relative progress, and often both relative and positive decline, I do not deny. In what you call civilization, that is, in material civilization, in material splendor, wealth, political organization, and power, in what pertains exclusively to the natural order, I doubt, as you often hear me say, if any modern nation surpasses, or even equals, some of the more renowned nations of antiquity. But, taking our point of departure in Europe in the beginning of the sixth century, there has, no doubt, been a progress, and the European nations in the nineteenth century, in a good as well as a bad sense, are far more highly civilized than were the barbarians who planted themselves on the ruins of the Roman empire, although religion, politics, jurisprudence, morals, the whole moral and spiritual part of civilization, were as well understood then as now, though not by the many, yet by the few.

"There is another sense, also, in which I admit a progress from the mediæval ages to the modern social and political system. I am no blind admirer of what is called the feudal system, yet I think it superior either to modern centralized monarchy, or to modern centralized democracy; and though I certainly would not labor to restore it, I may perhaps be permitted to regret that it was not preserved. But when one change is introduced, another becomes necessary, and the introduction of that second change relatively to the end contemplated by the first is a progress. Thus the measures which have been taken to centralize government, to introduce unity and harmony into legislation and the several branches of administration, are in this same sense to be regarded as progressive measures. In this sense most modern governments have made considerable progress, and are still advancing. Human institutions, owing to the vicissitudes of time and circumstances, grow old, cease after a while to be in harmony with the new state of things which comes

up, and what was wise and salutary in its origin finally becomes unwise and injurious. To cast off such institutions, and introduce new ones in harmony with the new wants, is relatively a progress, although the new wants themselves may mark a decline rather than a progress of society. For instance, when you introduced virtual universal suffrage and eligibility, it was necessary to abolish primogeniture and entail, and render the transfer of real estate simple and easy. When you had removed all moral checks from the feudal lords, it was necessary to subject them to the law, and to deprive them of their civil and criminal jurisdiction over their vassals, and to abolish the old baronial courts and dungeons. When crime had multiplied a thousand-fold, and imprisonment was considered rather as a penitentiary discipline than a punishment, it became necessary to multiply prisons, and to pay more attention in their construction to the health and comforts of the inmates. Prisons are now a sort of hospitals for morally diseased patients, and since society regards those inmates as patients rather than criminals, it is a progress, no doubt, to treat them as such. Still society may not, upon the whole, be in a better condition when it builds prison-hospitals than it was when, instead of them, it built churches and monasteries.

"In the fifteenth century men turned their attention with new ardor to the conquest, possession, and enjoyment of the good things of this world. Assuming that end as the end to be gained, several European nations have since then made very great progress. Physical conveniences and comforts have been much multiplied, and certainly luxuries have been placed within the reach, so far as these nations are themselves concerned, of a much larger number. But even in this respect, striking out the gain which has been effected by the discovery and colonization of the New World and the South Pacific Islands, it may be a question whether England, for instance, has gained so much as the nations which she has victimized have lost. In this sense, the creation of large industries, the extension of commerce, the construction of roads and canals, the introduction of railroads and steamships, labor-saving machinery, and the lightning telegraph, may be regarded as so many giant strides in the onward march of the civilized world. But under all this lies the question, whether the mass of the people are really better off, whether they find it easier to supply their physical wants than they did four hundred

years ago, whether they are really happier and more contented. And under this lies another question, whether in a moral point of view, that is, in the real business of life, gaining the end for which they were created, they have really made any advance. This, after all, is the main question, and here the difference, I apprehend, if difference there is, is not in favor of the present."

"But you make no account of the progress of ideas, in the understanding and vindication of human rights."

"Certainly not, any more than I do of the varying fashions in dress, for the most excellent reason, that in these respects, though there have been changes, I am not aware that there has been any progress. There is a vast amount of shallow and disgusting cant in the community, in books, periodicals, newspapers, and conversation, on this subject. It seems to be taken for granted that all changes are improvements. Everywhere we are boasting of progress, everywhere applauding ourselves for the new and important conquests we are daily obtaining over nature, and we look with pity and contempt upon all who lived before us. And this is not confined to non-Catholics. These boasts are caught up and published by Catholic journals, as well as by others. I read in a Catholic paper, the other day, a selected item, intended to show how scarce books must have been, and therefore how deep the ignorance, in the middle ages, by stating the enormous price which was paid in a certain instance for a single book. It never occurred to the editor, or may be the Protestant foreman in his office, that the case mentioned was an extraordinary one, and says nothing of the ordinary price of books at the time, or that even higher prices have been paid in our own day for a particular edition of a work to which bibliomaniacs attach a factitious value. A thousand guineas have been paid in our times for a single copy of an edition of a work which in another edition may be bought for a few shillings any day in the market. People generally accept without inquiry statements which accord with their convictions or prejudices, and are sceptical only with regard to those which do not so accord.

"In consequence of the general prejudice, very easily accounted for, or the prevailing impression, that there has been a mighty progress in these late centuries, youth take it for granted that it is so, and even men of some learning and pretension take no pains to examine whether it be so or not. We always accept what is popular, unless we have

strong reasons for rejecting it, and those reasons we do not seek, and we remain ignorant of them unless they force themselves upon our notice. From Erasmus to the Schlegels it was customary to speak of the middle ages as barbarous, and to laud to the skies ancient Greece and Rome. Catholics blushed at their own antiquity, and pusillanimously gave it up, or humbly apologized for it, in all except pure dogma, as indefensible, or as chargeable to the times or the opinions of the age. They grew ashamed of their old Gothic cathedrals, and Gothic architecture in general. They could not abide the popular literature which had charmed their ancestors, and conceded all but dogma to the proud, arrogant, but equally superficial and less erudite, Protestant. Now you know this has all changed, and in the higher literary circles we have no longer to defend or to apologize for the middle ages, but to moderate the excessive admiration of them. Mediæval art has become the fashion, and its obvious defects, even its monstrosities, are servilely copied and praised as exquisite beauties. Even traces of heathenism are detected in Raphael, and the most flourishing period of Italian art is looked upon as the commencement of a decline, while we go into ecstasies over the lean and pale creations of the school of Overbeck.

"We change our ideas as we do the fashion of our coats or our hats, and all that is according to the reigning fashion is judged beautiful and *comme il faut*. Six years ago, it was hardly safe for a man in France not to profess democracy, or at least republicanism. Even the present emperor was a republican, a democrat, almost a socialist. The most eminent prelates accepted the republic, and a very considerable school among the clergy preached the identity of Christianity and democracy, and seemed bent upon erecting democracy into a dogma of faith. Now no democratic voice can be heard in France; democracy is no longer today a Parisian *mode*, and one of the greatest and best men in the empire, the greatest living glory of France, is subjected to a vexatious prosecution, if nothing more, for a private letter to a neighbor, in which he expresses his firm dislike of a political *régime* that offers no guaranty for any sort of liberty, and which was maliciously published without his knowledge or consent. Thousands who abhor Russia because her government is an autocracy, admire Louis Napoleon, who is equally an autocrat, and pray for his success in sustaining the Grand Turk, the most godless

despot on earth, and whose government is, and has been for four hundred years, a blighting curse on the fairest regions of the globe, and, till its power was broken by Russian bravery and perseverance, remained a formidable enemy to Christian Europe. When I was a young man, the name *democrat* was a reproach in the United States, repelled with scorn and indignation by our most liberal politicians; but it is now a term of honor, a passport to popular favor, and whoever would be elected to office must profess to be a democrat, although he despises democracy in his heart, and is a thorough-going aristocrat in its worst sense in his practice.

"The rights of man were as well understood, as clearly and as accurately defined, as well as the nature, office, and sphere of authority, by the great mediæval doctors, as they have been in our day and country. You fancy the church favors monarchy. You have but to study the acts and monuments of the greatest pontiffs who have sat in the chair of Peter to know better. You hold the memory of Gregory VII. in horror, and yet he suffered and died in exile, because he opposed temporal princes in their tyranny, and dared raise his voice and use his authority in behalf of the wronged and oppressed. He told kings and princes of his time, that their power originated in violence, in successful robbery, and came from hell, not heaven; and yet you democrats, echoing the wrath of kings and their courtiers, declaim against him, and curse his memory. You speak of the progress of liberty. Confine your remarks to Europe, and the progress of liberty for four hundred years has been only a progress backwards. In no European country has it advanced. In England, the freest nation in Europe, there is not so large a liberty, and there is not so mild and humane a system of laws, as prior to the Norman conquest. In the northern nations, the ancient Scandinavia, the old estates have been suppressed, and the guaranties of the liberty of the subject have been swept away. The free institutions of Spain, far more republican in the beginning of the fifteenth century than those of England to-day, have nearly all successfully disappeared. Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV., the revolution, and the Bonapartes have succeeded in degrading France from a free, constitutional state to an unlimited monarchy, where all depends on the will or caprice of a single man. In Italy and Germany the old free institutions, operating as so many guaranties

of the rights of the subject, have nearly all disappeared, as they have in Russia, while Poland has been struck from the list of nations. Do not then mock me with your senseless babble about the progress of liberty. I would to God I could see some signs of such progress."

"You forget that the republican movement in 1848 in France had no more unrelenting opponent than yourself."

"I forget nothing of the sort. I urged on my friends in France the importance of sustaining the republic, and never have you or any one else heard one word from me in favor of the change from the republic to the empire. In no instance was it republicanism that I opposed. What I opposed was revolutionism, socialism, anarchy, infidelity, and irreligion. I opposed your party, not because you were in favor of republican institutions, or because you were the party of liberty, but because your movement, if successful, would have led to anarchy and barbarism; if unsuccessful, would result, as we see it has resulted, in strengthening the hands of the sovereigns, and rendering their power more absolute. In your wild dreams, or in the whirlwind of your revolutionary madness, you forgot the necessities of European societies, and the indispensable conditions of good government."

"At any rate, you forget our own country. Can you deny that there has been here a gain for liberty."

"As the result of national progress, I deny it, for the liberty we enjoy has not been obtained by a development and growth of anterior institutions, nor by political and social changes in our own original constitution. Understand me well. I deny not the liberty of my country as a fact, I deny it only as the result of progress. We were free from the beginning, and we have at best only maintained our freedom. Tyranny never flourished on our soil, and when a transatlantic power undertook to plant it here, we, though but a handful, flew to arms, and heroically and successfully resisted, as I trust in God we always shall resist. I do not believe a tithe of what you and your party say against the European governments, but I do not like those governments any better than you do, and if I could see any honest and practicable way of enlarging the freedom or lessening the burdens of the European populations, without causing them a greater evil than that which they now suffer, I would willingly sacrifice my life for them. But in our country, there is no question of conquering liberty, or of introducing

it; for liberty is here, as large a liberty, so far as the constitution and laws are concerned, as is compatible with the existence of necessary and wholesome authority. The question here is not as to introducing liberty, but as to preserving it. Understand this, and you will understand my position, and that it is any thing but hostile to liberty or the institutions of my country, which I love and honor far more than you do."

Conversation VIII.

"But how am I to reconcile what you said, my dear uncle, in our last conversation, with your violent tirades against the democracy of the country."

"My dear Dick, it is one of the most difficult things in the world to make a despot understand how we can oppose despotism without opposing authority, or a democrat understand how we can oppose democracy without opposing liberty. There are three simple forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Each of these forms, once adopted, tends to become exclusive, and each, when exclusive, is despotic, as Mr. Calhoun, our greatest American statesman, used so often to assert, and despotism, whether of the one, of the few, or of the many, is alike hostile to true liberty. In common with all the great authorities on the question, I regard good government, civil government I mean, as a matter of compromise between these three simple original forms; and the wisdom of a civil constitution consists in their nice adjustment, in so balancing one by another as not to embarrass the efficiency of the administration, but yet so as to secure an effective guaranty of the just freedom of the subject. Here I stand on true American ground, and in accordance with the men who won our national independence, and originally framed our several constitutions. Looking at our civil and political institutions in the light of their original character and intent, they seem to me the wisest and best that humanity can expect, and hence it becomes the religious duty of every American to preserve these institutions intact in that original character and intent.

"But I see, or seem to see, a strong and apparently overwhelming tendency in the country, among politicians especially, to render the democratic element exclusive, and to convert the government of the country into a pure democracy, which would, if we had powerful neighbors to con-

tend with, very soon resolve itself into a pure military despotism. Every thing tends to strengthen this tendency. Demagogues and parties appeal to it, the press encourages it, and it is more than any man's political reputation is worth to oppose it. He might as well attempt, by rushing before it, to arrest the railroad-engine going at full speed. Here I think I see a most grave peril for our republic.

"I have done something to admonish my Catholic brethren of this peril, and the great body of them are now on their guard against it, and prepared to sacrifice their lives to preserve American institutions. When you consider their numbers, every day increasing, as also their growing intelligence, wealth, and moral weight, you might see that, if united with the more sober and conservative portion of non-Catholics, they would be able to do much to check this dangerous tendency, and prevent you radicals from ruining the noble institutions of the country. Liberty is never preserved but at the price of eternal vigilance, and what I have wished to impress upon my countrymen is, that the danger to our liberty does not come from the side of conservatism, but from that of radicalism. But, unhappily, it is precisely here that they do not, and will not, understand me. Because I oppose radicalism, they insist that I oppose liberty, and am hostile to the institutions of my country. I would not mind this on my own account, but it prevents my warnings from being heard or heeded, and therefore I regret it.

"This is not all. While I and my friends are doing all in our power to enlist the whole Catholic body on the side of our institutions, and thus bring to them a most powerful support, the non-Catholic portion of my countrymen, even the conservative as well as the radical, sympathize only with the small party of nominal Catholics who are governed by decided radical and revolutionary tendencies, and suffer the most uncalled for and cruel movement to go on against us, as if we were enemies to the government, and ought not to be suffered to live in the country. You know that it is against Catholics who agree with me in these matters that the blows are aimed, while they whose declamations, rant, and imprudent conduct provoke the hostility to Catholics, especially to foreigners, are protected and promoted by the Protestant sentiment of the country. This, as Fouché would say, is worse than a crime, it is a blunder."

"You mistake the reason of this, uncle. You know that

we Protestants are perfectly liberal in our views to all religions, in so far as they relate only to the world to come. There is only one point in Catholicity that we care the snap of our finger about. You may believe all Catholic dogmas, and observe all Catholic practices, and be never the worse in our eyes, if you will only not be papists. If you choose to call the pope the head of your church, we care not, if you will only be satisfied with allowing him a primacy of order and honor, and not claim for him a real and effective power over the civil and political conduct of Catholics. These nominal Catholics, as you call them, engage our sympathy because we see that they are independent, men who dare think and act for themselves, according to the honest convictions of their own minds, without asking the pope's leave, and therefore we know that they will never desert or turn against the country at his order. They are not papists, and therefore are, in our estimation, as good as Protestants. But you and the main body of American Catholics are downright papists, and hold the pope to be the vicegerent of God on earth. You are bound hand and foot, soul and body, to the pope, and believe it your duty to obey his orders in preference to all others, even those of your country. We can tolerate Catholics who are not papists, but not you. You are the more consistent Catholics, perhaps, but therefore only the more dangerous. But it is not on account of your religion as it regards another world that we oppose you, and organize parties and associations against you, but on account of your political subjection to a foreign prince."

"The old story, inherited from English ancestors in the time of 'good Queen Bess,' and you really believe it, I suppose?"

"Believe it! why, as for myself, I cannot precisely say that I do; but rely upon it, that no small portion of our countrymen believe it, and you can never get them to believe otherwise."

"Do you place, then, no confidence in what your good friends, the Gallicans, tell you? They, you know, say the pope has no authority over temporals, and they tell you, in a bold and defiant tone, that in politics they recognize no spiritual authority, and that, were the pope to require of them to do any thing against their country, that is, what they think would be against their country, they would be the first to bind on their knapsack and shoulder their mus-

ket, and rush to the battle field to resist him? Place you no reliance on their hypothetical abuse of the pope? And have their reiterated and most solemn declarations done nothing to reassure you?"

"Pshaw! you know that we are not to be come over with that sort of palaver. Cannot we read history, and do we not know that popes have claimed authority over kings and princes, and that, as good papists, you must obey the pope?"

"I know, my dear Dick, that there has seldom been a time, when there was a call for them, that plenty of nominal Catholics have not been found to act as these say they would; and that, I think, might give you some assurance, even if you place no reliance on their professions and declarations."

"But you consider they have done so only at the expense of their duty as Catholics."

"Well, my patriotic nephew, I trust that you do not doubt that I am a thorough-going papist. Now I tell you that between my duty as a papist and my duty as a patriot, there is and can be no conflict. I owe no duties to my country but such as are prescribed by the law of God; and the only authority the pope has over me as a citizen is his authority as the spiritual guardian and judge of that law as binding on my conscience. He, at the very lowest, I think, is as likely to interpret and apply that law justly, as is Franklin Pierce, or Chief Justice Taney, or as I should be by my own private judgment. My political sovereign has no right to demand my obedience to any order contrary to the law of God, and he has not been constituted my judge to interpret authoritatively that law for me, or for any one else. He is not my ghostly father, nor my spiritual director. Said not our Puritan ancestors as much when they dissented from the English church as by law established? Said not the founders of the Free Kirk of Scotland the same thing, when they refused to acknowledge the authority of the queen and parliament in spirituals? My political sovereign is not the director of my conscience. My conscience is accountable to no civil tribunal; it is accountable to God alone, and is accountable to the pope even in spiritual matters only as he is the divinely commissioned guardian and administrator of the law of God. If he tells me that he simply as a man, or as a temporal prince, since I am not under his temporal jurisdiction, wishes me to do this or that, I am free to refuse. If, however, he tells me as pope, speaking officially

as judge of the law of God, that it commands me to do this, or forbids me to do that, then indeed, but only then, am I bound to obedience. Hence it is clear that his so much dreaded authority extends only to the morality, the right or the wrong, of acts in the temporal order."

"But you forget that that is precisely what we object to, If the pope tells you such a measure, the Nebraska Bill, for instance, is wrong; then you must oppose it."

"The pope can tell me that it is wrong only in case, as it does not happen to be, it is repugnant to the constitution or to the law of God, and if so, I certainly ought to oppose it; for as a good citizen I am bound to oppose whatever is unconstitutional and repugnant to the divine law. Whether, in deciding the question of the constitutionality or morality of a civil measure, I rely on the judgment of the pope or on my own judgment, is no affair of the government, for this decision touches conscience, and neither the government nor my fellow-citizens have, or ought to have, any authority over my conscience. If you had any conception of true liberty, you would understand that here precisely is its foundation. Do you not see, that, in asserting the freedom of conscience, and denying to the civil power all authority over it, all right to interfere with it, and restricting the authority of the state to the sphere within the limits of the divine law, or if you please, the moral law, I am asserting true liberty, and erecting the most formidable dike to civil tyranny?

"You claim to be friends of liberty, especially of civil liberty. Well, know you not that liberty is impossible where the authority of the state, the king, the prince, or sovereign, is absolute and unlimited? Know you not that the only way to secure it is to place an effective check on power, restraining it within a certain sphere, a certain province, and having a sufficient guaranty against its coming out of that sphere or province? Know you not that government tyrannizes over, interferes with, the liberty of the subject only when it transcends its proper sphere, and that, whenever it does so, it transgresses the law of God? Well, then, to secure liberty, some effective power is needed by the subject to protect him in the enjoyment of his rights against the encroachments of authority, and to absolve him from his duty of obedience whenever authority commands him to do that which is morally wrong? But the individual is not in himself

strong enough to find this in his own personal convictions of right and wrong. The state can overwhelm him, crush him, if he resists its orders, however unjust and oppressive. What, then, is the effect of this dreaded papal power? Why, it simply adds the combined strength of the church to the individual, to protect him in his rights, and to keep the state within its legitimate sphere. As a friend of freedom, you should, then, support, instead of opposing it.

"The truth is, my dear Dick, that you and your friends know not what you do. You are in contradiction with yourselves. You profess to speak in the name of liberty; you are moving heaven and earth to extend the area of freedom, and to secure to man the free and full enjoyment of his rights, in face of government and society. But, on the other hand, you rake up all the objections of corrupt and tyrannical courts against the church, and, following in the footsteps of the most lustful, cruel, and tyrannical kings of Christendom, labor to establish the absolute and unlimited authority of the state, which is the grave of all real freedom. You build up with one hand what you pull down with the other; assert freedom, and take away its indispensable conditions; struggle for it, and insist on opening the way to absolute civil despotism. This is worse than madness."

"All this is very plausible in theory, but how is it in practice? If the church is the guardian and protector of liberty, how happens it that we find her everywhere leagued with tyrants, and upholding despotism?"

"Be sure of your facts before proceeding to their explication. I deny your supposition. You nowhere find the church leagued with tyrants and upholding despotism. The church has never accepted the doctrine of your friends the Gallicans, nor is she to be held responsible for the political doctrines of Bossuet, who so often unhappily sunk the Catholic bishop in the French courtier. Was the church leagued with tyrants when she thundered her anathemas against the cruel, bloodthirsty, and tyrannical iconoclast emperors of Byzantium, when she withstood Henry IV., falsely called emperor, Frederic Barbarossa, Frederic II. of Germany, Louis of Bavaria, Philip Augustus, Philip the Fair, Louis XIV., and Napoleon I., of France, William the Conquerer, Henry II., Edward III., Henry VIII., and Elizabeth, of England,—ingrained tyrants all?"

"But in modern times she is found on the side of the governments against the people."

On the side of the governments to a certain extent, yes; against the people, no. Understand, if your wild radicalism, which is only the other side of despotism, has not deprived you entirely of the good sense you inherited from your mother, that two things are equally necessary,—authority and liberty. Authority may degenerate into despotism, and liberty into license. Two things, then, are to be maintained,—liberty and authority; and two things to be avoided or guarded against,—license and despotism. When authority tends to despotism, the church opposes it, and seeks to restrain it within its legitimate bounds; when liberty tends to license, it opposes it, and seeks to restrain the people in subjection to just authority. As a matter of fact, the church did not oppose the French revolution because it sought liberty or tended to democracy; it opposed it not in the beginning, and not at all till it transcended the civil order and invaded the spiritual, and even then only in defence of the inalienable rights of conscience and individual freedom. Its league with the monarchs against the people, imagined by the fanciful apostate De La Mennais, is all in your eye. No such league exists, or ever existed. The truth is, the church, though she submits to all forms of government, and leaves each nation free to establish the form it chooses, is opposed to absolutism in the state, and inclines to an effective constitutional order, and I think she would rather deal with the people than with kings. This much is certain, that, where she has had a predominating voice in the founding of states, she has resisted the introduction of absolutism, and has given the constitution substantially a republican character. It must not be forgotten that Pope Adrian I, introduced and established, through his legates, the noble old constitution of Saxon England, which, though suffering much from the Norman kings, the Tudors, and the Stuarts, to a great extent still survives, and makes the glory of the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, and what is worthy of note, survives in greater purity and vigor with us Anglo-Americans than in the mother country. A profound study of our institutions and of history would disclose the fact, that, in so far as we have in our political system deviated from other nations, we have only adopted principles that the popes for more than a thousand years labored in vain to induce the European nations to adopt, and, on the other hand, that we have more fully incorporated into our institutions the spirit of the papal recommendations and constitutions than any other nation on the earth."

"How do you account for that, seeing that the country has always been most thoroughly antipapal?"

"By the fact that our institutions originated with the people, whose political common sense had been formed by the papal instructions and teaching for over a thousand years. These instructions were all favorable to the people, to liberty, and to good order, and were generally displeasing to authority, and rejected by it. They sunk into the hearts of the people, and became their doctrine in distinction from the doctrine of the court, and too often of courtly prelates. The liberty we enjoy goes back to old Anglo-Saxon times,—times never really forgotten by the English people. Always, after the Conquest, is it, in the struggle with the Norman rulers, a demand for the revival of the Anglo-Saxon laws, the laws of Edward the Confessor, as they were called, because he was the last of the Anglo-Saxon kings. The memory of these laws, with the great principles asserted by the sovereign pontiffs, survived in the minds and hearts of the English people down to the time when our ancestors emigrated to this western hemisphere, and formed, as it were, their civil and political common sense."

"Why, then, do you not place more confidence in the people?"

"I would, if the people were now what they were then. But the people, during the last seventy years, have been corrupted, and induced to abandon their traditionary common sense for a Jacobinical common sense, which supposes the people are the original and immediate source of power, and that their innate wisdom is always to be regarded as the wisdom of God, from which there is no appeal. Yet it is not the people themselves that I distrust. When they are well informed, and not misled by miserable sophists and demagogues, I have great reliance on their good sense, and a very high respect for their decisions. The people at the epoch of our revolution were much more trustworthy than were their rulers, and would be now, if they had not been too much flattered, and made to believe that the work for them to do is to extend popular liberty, instead of preserving it. Having been made, to a fearful extent, to believe that their security is in enlarging the popular basis of our institutions, they have become fit tools for pushing liberty to license, and of substituting the mob for the state, the caucus for the convention."

"And whence hope you a remedy?"

"Through the people themselves, if you will, listening to wiser counsels, and recovering their former good sense. The first thing to be done is to brand with infamy the political atheism so boldly preached by tyrannical courts, and so fiercely and widely propagated by modern revolutionists, and enable the people to understand and feel that they hold their power as a trust, and are as much bound to conform to the law of God in their collective as in their individual capacity. The next thing for them to understand is, that a check on the power of the political sovereign, whether that sovereign be the will of the one, the few, or the many, is absolutely essential alike to good government and to liberty, and therefore that they must abdicate their own fancied omnipotence, and consent to wholesome restraints even on their own power. They must learn that it is an evil to govern too much, as well as to govern too little, and that a broad margin should always be left to the individual. We must have a free government, that is, a government that respects the freedom of the individual, and leaves him, not merely free to do good, but even free to do evil. Where the government extends its supervision over every act of a man's life, and leaves him scope only to do good, it exerts a most pernicious influence; it strikes a blow at all free and vigorous action, and reduces the whole population to a state of torpor. Under such *paternal* government, all stagnates and becomes putrid, as we see in the despotic East. There is no manliness, no vigor, no heroic activity. We are in all, except in commerce, trade, and industry, fast approaching such a state of things by the tyranny of public and sectarian opinion, and in our attempts at sumptuary legislation. If the legislature does not soon and firmly resist the tendency of our so-called philanthropists to embody their silly crotchets in legislative enactments, our individual freedom and independence before a great while will cease to exist even in name. I want government, strong and efficient government, when needed; but I want it to intervene as little as is compatible with the peace and good order of society. I am opposed to revolutionism, to radicalism, let it come in what shape it may, but I am equally opposed to cæsarism. When democracy, a free press, and publicity were unduly magnified, I opposed the exaggeration; but I am not to be driven from my principles now France has become an absolute monarchy, any more than I was when she was deafening the world a few years

ago with her shouts of *Vive la République démocratique et sociale!* I am a constitutionalist, and demand for the body of the nation a real and effective voice in the government, a real and not an illusory check on the administration, a free press responsible for its abuse, publicity, and free discussion of public men and public measures. I know all these may be abused, as there is no good thing that may not be, but I accept them with all their liability to abuse, as essential to the life, progress, and well-being of modern society, especially in my own country."

"But in religion you allow no freedom."

"Just as much as the mathematician allows in his axioms and definitions. In what is purely human in religion, I assert and maintain the same freedom that I demand in politics. In what is purely divine, I freely accept what God reveals, and in what is mixed, I leave the discussion and decision to those whom God has placed over me to be my pastors and teachers. For the church I demand freedom, full, entire freedom; and I am not so young or so foolish as to suppose that her full and entire freedom can be maintained without conceding the full and entire liberty, before the law, of contradiction. Before the state, the sects must be as free as she, and therefore, while I would allow them no special political privileges, I demand none for her. Whatever may be the abstract rights of the church, or whatever may be in other circumstances the duty of the civil power acting under her authority, certain it is that the only practicable rule in most modern states, if not in all, is to concede the liberty of contradiction, and to allow to others the liberty you ask for yourself. Kings are not now nursing fathers, or queens nursing mothers, of religion. The most we can ask of the state, in our country at least, is to let us alone, and not make or adminster laws against us. As a Catholic, I am willing to accept this order of things. The church can stand without being propped up by the state. It is the state that needs her, not she that needs the state. We Catholics demand for our religion simply the same facilities that are allowed the sects, and no more. We demand in the name of our right as citizens and inhabitants of the country, the protection of the laws against external violence. We admit the right of the state to arrest us, if, under the pretext of our religion, we become disorderly and disturbers of the public peace, and we demand that it shall arrest those who, under pretext of devotion to their religion, become

the same. We demand even-handed justice. Our rights are equal to the rights of any other class of citizens, and should be held equally inviolable. If we trespass on their rights, punish us; if they trespass on ours, punish them. But do not, when their crazy and fanatical street preachers, followed by gangs of ruffians, go into the quarters inhabited almost exclusively by poor Catholics, and get up a row, throw all the blame upon these poor Catholics, and arrest only some poor Irish Catholic, who, provoked by the insults offered to his religion and country beyond what flesh and blood can bear, attempts by force to abate the nuisance. If we go to hear your blackguards, let us be held to keep the peace; but if your blackguards come to us, into our quarters, to cram their nauseous stuff down our throats, and to compel us to hear all that we hold dear and sacred vituperated, reviled, and blasphemed, we maintain that it is your duty to hold them to keep the peace. You have no right to force your Protestantism upon us, as we have none to force our Catholicity upon you. Silence, then, these street preachers, not because they are Protestants, but because they are blackguards and peacebreakers, and do the same by our street preachers of like character, if you ever find us having such. Be just, and you will never hear us complain."

Conversation IX.

"I am far from being as hostile to the Catholic religion as you suppose, my dear uncle; I am quite willing to tolerate it as explained by Gallicans, for, so explained, it can never interfere with the power or action of the temporal authority. We Protestants have no wish to step in between a man and his God, and we recognize the right of every one to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. As long as your church confines herself to purely spiritual matters, to preaching her doctrines and administering her sacraments to those who choose to adhere to her communion, as Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun contended she should, we are required by our doctrine of religious liberty to tolerate her; but not when she claims to be a government, a kingdom set up on the earth, superior to the temporal power, and to have authority, even indirect, over the whole temporal order. She thus becomes political as well as religious, and her existence is incompatible with the

distinct existence and the autonomy of the state. She then must be regarded either as an *imperium in imperio*, or as being at once, indistinctly, both church and state. She absorbs the temporal in the spiritual, and leaves no state standing. It is not against Catholicity, but against ultramontanism, which pushes the papal power to a sort of universal monarchy, that we make war, and as Gallicans make war also against that, we have no hostility to them, and are naturally drawn into a friendly alliance with them."

"Even Gallicans, my dear Dick, repudiate, or profess to repudiate, the heresy of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, and will not consider themselves honored by the preferences of 'Young America.'"

"You do us less than justice, and are very imprudent. You certainly wish to convert us; but how can you hope to do it without beginning by conciliating us?"

"I certainly wish your conversion to the church, not that of the church to you. I wish to treat you as men, who have the full possession of your natural faculties, and have no wish to begin by giving you sugar-plums, or a dose of chloroform. What I want is, that you should embrace the truth as God has revealed it, and submit yourselves to the authority which he has instituted for your government. I have no wish to aggregate you to the external communion of the church without any change in your present moral dispositions and beliefs or no-beliefs. To profit by the church you must be *of* her communion, not merely *in* it. The real question is, not what will best conciliate non-Catholics, but what is the church which God has instituted, and the truth she teaches? If God has really established his church as a governing as well as a teaching church, with coercive as well as simply directive power, to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to spiritual and eternal good, the only real end for which, *in hac providentia*, they exist, you must accept her in that character, or otherwise you do not accept her at all.

"Even your Gallican friends, though in my judgment they assert principles which, if logically carried out, would result in the Marsilian heresy, assert, in common with the papists, that the church is a government, a kingdom set up on the earth and clothed with authority to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, and they could not be Catholics if they did not. The difference between them and ultramontanes, or, as I prefer to say,

papists, does not consist in the formal assertion by the one and the formal denial by the other, of the church as a kingdom or goverment, but in regard to the relation in which they respectively suppose she stands to the state. The difference may be collected from the charges which they bring each against the other. The Gallican charges the papist with absorbing the state, or making the church herself the state; the papist charges the Gallican with subordinating, in principal, the spiritual to the temporal, which would lead to the assertion of man as God, or of the two governments as absolutely distinct, separate, and independent in regard to each other, which involves the Manichean dualism."

"But that last charge might be easily repelled. Why might not the Gallican reply, that the one and the same God has established two governments, each independent and supreme in its own order,—the church for the government of spirituals, and the state for the government of temporals?"

"Because he would thus assert only what the papist himself concedes. The papist even asserts and maintains as strenuously as the Gallican, that God has instituted two distinct governments for human society, each holding all its powers from him, and each independent and supreme in its own order, as Pope Gelasius says in his letter to the Emperor Anastasius. The difference between the Gallican and the papist is not here, and the Gallican, to have something to oppose to the papist, must go further, and assert each government to be independent and supreme in relation to the other, and therefore, either that the state in certain matters has spiritual jurisdiction, which is a manifest denial of the principle he contends for, or else that the temporal is separate from the spiritual and independent of it, which is Manicheism."

"I do not see that. You concede the two governments; how, then, can you maintain that the assertion of the independence of each involves the Manichean dualism?"

"I concede, nay, I assert, two distinct governments, each independent and supreme in its own order, but as bearing that relation one to the other which naturally exists between the spiritual and the temporal. The temporal order represented by the state is naturally subordinated to the spiritual order represented by the church. The spiritual stands for the divine, for God the creator, and the temporal for the

creature; and the creature in the very nature of things is and cannot but be subordinated to the creator. As the creature is subordinated to the creator, so must the temporal be subordinated to the spiritual, and therefore the temporal authority to the spiritual authority, or the state to the church. So reasons the papist. Now this the Gallican must either concede or deny. If he concedes it, *and still asserts* the absolute independence and supremacy of the state, he must claim for the state, in itself and independently of the church, the authority to direct temporals to spiritual and eternal good, to which by the law of God they are all to be referred, which is to contradict himself and to claim for the state, *pro tanto* at least, spiritual authority, and to deny the independence and supremacy of the church in all things spiritual. If, on the other hand, he denies the natural subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, he must assert its independence of God. Then he must maintain that it is not God's creature; and then, that it has had another origin than God, and depends on a principle independent of him, therefore on another principle, external and independent, than that on which the spiritual order depends. Therefore there must have been two original, eternal, distinct, and independent principles, which, as I understand it, is precisely the Manichean dualism.

"The Gallican has no tendency to Manicheism in that he simply asserts two distinct orders, one spiritual, the other temporal, or two distinct governments, each independent and supreme in its own order. He so tends only when he asserts their mutual independence in regard to each other, and denies the subordination, not in excellence and dignity alone, but in authority also, of the temporal to the spiritual. What I regard as the error of the Gallican arises from a disregard of the natural relation of the two orders. Temporals are naturally subordinated to the spiritual, as the body to the soul, and are always to be referred to a spiritual end. This is as true under the natural as under the revealed law. In the natural order as well as in the supernatural, God is the final cause, and man is morally bound to refer all his actions to him as to their ultimate end; therefore to an end not temporal, but spiritual. The revealed law does not abrogate the natural law, but presupposes and confirms it. All theologians agree that man is bound by the law of nature to worship God, and even to worship him according to the requirements of a supernaturally revealed law, if God gives

such a law, as soon as it is promulgated and sufficiently made known. God can, unquestionably, establish two powers for the government of human society; but these two powers must have the same relation to one another that is borne by the two orders which they respectively represent.

"The mistake is not in regarding the two orders as distinct, for that they are; but in regarding them as separate, for that they are not. All spirituals in this world have temporal relations, and all temporals have spiritual relations, inasmuch as they are and must be related to a spiritual end. To govern temporals in their relation to this spiritual end is necessarily a spiritual function, and if you claim it for the state, you claim for the state, up to a certain point, spiritual jurisdiction, which all Catholic theologians, so far as I am aware, agree in denying. They are unanimous, I believe, in asserting, that, under the New Law, the state has no spiritual jurisdiction whatever. Either, then, the Gallican must, in violation of the principles he professes to concede, and which as a Catholic he must hold, suffer the temporal government to exercise spiritual functions, or with the papist extend the authority of the church over temporals *in the respect in which they are to be referred to a spiritual end*, or, as theologians say, to spiritual and eternal good."

"But as you say that all temporals have spiritual relations, under your doctrine the power of the church would extend to every thing, and you would claim for her all the functions of government, both spiritual and temporal. She would thus be the only real government of society, would absorb the state and leave it no autonomy. Here is the objection which both Gallicans and we Protestants bring against you, and unless you can show that it is unfounded, you must stand condemned."

"I understand you. The papist, as I have told you, asserts two distinct orders, one spiritual and the other temporal, and two distinct governments, one the church and the other the state, each independent and supreme in its own order, for governing them. Therefore he says, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's.'"

"Wherein, then, do you differ from the Gallicans?"

"In nothing, if they consistently carry out one set of their principles; but when they do not, we differ from them in the respect that, while we assert the independence and supremacy of the state in its own order, we deny its indepen-

dence and supremacy in relation to the spiritual order. In relation to that order, we hold that it is subordinate and dependent."

"But you seem to me now to contradict yourself. After having asserted the independence and supremacy of the state in its own order, now you assert its subordination and dependence in regard to the spiritual order."

"Things are not always what they seem to those who understand them not. I assert that the state is independent and supreme in its own order, by which I mean that in the temporal order, which is its own order, the state has no superior, and holds its power from no other,—the only sense in which any man, not an atheist, can pretend that the state is independent and supreme. The state holds its powers from God, for *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, therefore depends on him, is subject to his law, and of course, in relation to him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, is not independent and supreme. If we would not fall into absolute political atheism, the sense in which we must understand the independence and supremacy of the state is, as Suarez defines it, that it holds from no other and has no superior in its own order, while in relation to another and superior order it is subordinate and dependent. 'Quia vero felicitas temporalis, et civilis ad spiritualem, et æternam referenda est, ideo fieri potest, ut materia ipsa potestatis civilis aliter dirigenda, et gubernanda sit in ordine ad spirituale bonum quam sola civilis ratio postulare videatur. Et tunc quamvis temporalis princeps, ejusque potestas in suis actibus *directe* non pendeat ab alia potestate ejusdem ordinis et quæ eundem finem tantum respiciat, nihilominus fieri potest, ut necesse sit, ipsum dirigi, adjuvari, vel corrigi in sua materia superiori potestate gubernante homines in ordine ad excellentiorem finem, et æternum.' *

"The contradiction you imagine does not exist, because the independence and supremacy of the state denied are not in the same order with the independence and supremacy asserted. Even the authority of the spiritual over the temporal, which I assert, is only *indirect*, and the dependence of the state on the church is not direct, that is, for the sake of temporals as such, or as directed to a subordinate and temporal end, as Suarez says in continuation of the

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* *Defensio fidei Catholicæ et Apostolicæ adversus Anglicanæ sectæ errores.* Lib. III, *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Cap. V, Tom. xxi, p. 123.

passage I have just cited: 'Illa dependentia vocatur *indirecta*, quia illa superior potestas circa temporalia *non per se*, aut propter se, sed quasi *indirecte et propter aliud* interdum versatur.'"

"But, my dear uncle, this distinction Gallicans will tell you is of no value. If the spiritual power extends to the government of the whole temporal order, it evidently matters nothing in what respect this is done, or by what name it is called. It is the substantial claim that is important. The title or classification of the power is of no consequence:—

'A rose
By any other name will smell as sweet.'"

"Not by the name of skunk's cabbage, I am inclined to believe, Shakespeare to the contrary notwithstanding. But the Gallican, if he goes so far as to say this, forgets his philosophy."

"That is severe."

"None too severe, if he should express himself in the sense you suppose. Suarez believes, as we have seen, the distinction very real, and he is as high authority as any Gallican or *quasi* Gallican you can cite. Even you yourself ought to be ashamed to bring forward such an objection, either as your own or another's. What, indeed, is its assumption? It is, that to assert the plenary authority of the church over temporals in the respect that they are *not* temporals, but spirituals, that is in the respect that they are related to a spiritual end, is identically the same thing as to assert her plenary authority over them in every respect. Authority governing a matter in relation to one end is authority to govern it in relation to every end! The objection itself denies all distinction between the temporal order and the spiritual, for it proceeds on the assumption, that to govern temporals in relation to a spiritual end is the same thing as to govern them in relation to a temporal end, which can be true only on the supposition that the spiritual and the temporal are identical.

"The assertion of the authority of the church over temporals in the respect that they are spiritually related, is simply her authority to direct and govern them as to their morality. No Catholic, unless carried away by the heat of controversy or a mistimed zeal, will pretend that the church has not, under God, plenary authority with regard to the morality of all human actions, whether of states or of indi-

viduals. This Pope Innocent III. in his letter to Philip Augustus, king of France, very distinctly asserts. 'We do not intend,' he says, 'to judge of the fee; that belongs to the king of France. But we have the right to judge of the sin, and it is our duty to exercise it against the offender, be he who he may.' *Non intendimus judicare de feudo, ... sed decernere de peccato, cujus ad nos pertinet sine dubitatione censura, quam in quemlibet exercere possumus, et debemus.** Here is the distinction I contend for, since the holy pontiff, while he disclaims all intention of judging the temporality, as related to a temporal end, claims it as his right and his duty to judge it in the respect that it is related to a spiritual end.

"But this is perhaps too old an authority. Take, then, a recent authority, a living authority, the illustrious Cardinal Gousset, archbishop of Rheims, a man highly esteemed at Rome, and venerated through all France. He teaches in his *Observations sur le Premier Article de la Déclaration de* 1682, if I understand him, the very doctrine I contend for, and I will ask you to listen to what he says:—

"'This article begins by laying it down that "St. Peter and his successors, that the church herself, has received power from God only over spiritual things and concerning salvation, and not over things temporal and civil," and proceeds to prove it by Scripture. But no pope, no Catholic doctor, has ever denied the real distinction between the spiritual power and the temporal, nor their independence in what pertains respectively to their own sphere. The church intervenes in respect to the acts of a government only when those acts are contrary to justice, to morality, or to religion; even then she intervenes only in her quality of interpreter of the divine laws, natural and positive, and as governor or director [*régulatrice*] of what has a relation to conscience, to eternal salvation, and consequently to the spiritual order. It was quite unnecessary to remind us that the *kingdom* of Christ is not of this world, or rather that it *does not come from this world*, for it has for its mission to govern the things of this world only in the order of salvation, *Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo;*—quite unnecessary to remind us, that we are to "render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and to God the things which are God's"; that "every soul must be submissive to the higher powers;" that "there is no power but from God;" and that "whoso resists the power, resists the ordination of God." This has never been disputed in the church of Jesus Christ. Assuredly the Christian world had not awaited the Declaration of 1682, drawn up by order

Apud Suarez., *Ibid.* Cap. XXIII., p. 172.

of Louis XIV., to know the sense of the Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul.

"'After having cited the Holy Scriptures, the Assembly adds: "We therefore declare, that kings and sovereigns are subjected by the order of God to no ecclesiastical power in things temporal; that they cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the authority of the keys of the church, nor their subjects be absolved from their oath of allegiance." This consequence, which does not appear to be deduced from the principles set forth, that is from the distinction between the two powers consecrated by Scripture, consists of two parts. The first is, that "kings and sovereigns are subjected by the order of God to no ecclesiastical authority in things temporal." This proposition taken literally and in all its extent is false and erroneous, and cannot be maintained without falling into the error of the modern innovators, which reduces the power of the church to acts purely spiritual and internal; which destroys entirely her authority. *A Catholic can never admit that they who govern a kingdom or a republic are subject to no ecclesiastical authority in temporals.* In point of fact, the exercise of the civil power is itself only a series of moral actions, and sovereigns may commit offences against morality in those actions which regard the government of the state, as well as in their private actions. Now in *all these actions*, which for the most part have for their object temporal things, they are, if Christians, subjected to the church,—*not by reason of the relation of these actions to temporal well-being, but by reason of their relation to eternal happiness.* [Here is the precise distinction which you ridicule, and sneer at me for making.] What! cannot the church attempt, when she judges it expedient, to arrest by spiritual pains the tyrant who oppresses his people? Who dare make it a crime in St. Ambrose, archbishop of Milan, that he forbade the Emperor Theodosius to enter the church, and subjected him to public penance for the massacre at Thessalonica, which he had ordered? But let us rather acknowledge a defect in the compilation of the article, than ascribe to the bishops of the Assembly of 1682 sentiments which they did not hold. Bossuet, who drew up the declaration, says himself, in the discourse which he pronounced at the opening of the Assembly, *All is subjected to the keys, all, both* KINGS *and peoples.*

"'The second part of the conclusion is, that "kings and sovereigns cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the keys of the church, nor their subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance." We remark here, that the popes have never pretended to possess as to temporals any other than a spiritual power, and they have used that spiritual power only in favor and on the demand of the people oppressed by the tyranny of their sovereign. Never have they claimed temporal jurisdiction [*un droit réel*] over the temporality of kings, which has so many times been falsely laid to their charge. A pretext for rendering them odious was desired, and this was chosen. "There is no argument," says Fénelon, "by which critics have excited a more violent hatred against

the authority of the Apostolic See, than those which they draw from the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. They allege that this pope has defined in that bull, that the sovereign pontiff in his quality of universal monarch may give or take away the kingdoms of the earth at his will. But Boniface himself, against whom this accusation is brought on account of his difficulties with Philip the Fair, justifies himself in a discourse before the Consistory, and says: 'These forty years we have been versed in the laws, and have known that there exist two powers ordained of God. Who then can believe that such a folly, such a madness, ever entered our head?' The cardinals also, in a letter written from Anagni to the dukes, counts, and nobility of France, justify the pope in these words: 'We wish you to hold for certain that the sovereign pontiff, our lord, has never written to the said king that he must be subjected to him in the temporal of his kingdom, or that he holds his kingdom from him.'"

"'Gerson certainly cannot be accused of exaggerating the rights of the papal power; and yet he has expressed himself in the same sense. Here are his words: "It must not be said that kings and princes hold their lands and heritage from the church, in such sense that the pope has over them a civil and judicial jurisdiction, as some falsely accuse Boniface VIII. of having meant. However, all men, princes and others, are subjected to the pope *in so far as they abuse their jurisdiction, or use their temporalities and their sovereignty against the divine and natural law*, and this superior power of the pope may be called directive and ordinative, rather than civil and judicial,—*et potest superioritas illa nominari potestas directiva et ordinativa potius quam civilis et juridica.*"*

"'Indeed, as Fénelon again says, "It was a received principle among Catholic nations, and profoundly engraved in their hearts, that the supreme power could be confided only to a Catholic, and that it was a law, or condition of the (tacit) compact between the people and their prince, that they were bound to obey him only inasmuch as he should himself obey the Catholic religion. In virtue of this law, all thought that the nation was absolved from its oath of fidelity, when in contempt of this fact the prince turned against religion." Yet, lest they might be misled by an illusion, and wishing, besides, to avoid the horrors of civil war, they recurred to the pope,—the legitimate interpreter of the oath, which is a religious act, and of all pacts considered in their relations to morality and conscience. "Thus," adds the immortal archbishop of Cambray, "the church does not deprive or institute lay princes; she simply responds to the people who consult her on a matter which by reason of the oath and the compact touches conscience," *Itaque Ecclesia neque destituebat neque instituebat laïcos principes, sed tantum consulentibus gentibus respondebat quid ratione contractus et sacramenti conscientiam attineret;* adducing afterwards the example of the first general council

* *Sermo de Pace et Unione Græcorum*, Consid. V.

of Lyons, in regard to these words of Innocent IV., who declared the Emperor Frederic II. had forfeited the empire: "*We declare that all those who were bound to him by the oath of fidelity*," &c. The same eminent prelate remarks, that it is as if the pontiff had said, "We declare the emperor, on account of his crimes and impiety, unworthy to govern a Catholic people." This is in fact what this pontiff did say himself:—*Propter suas iniquitates a Deo ne regnet vel imperet est abjectus; suis ligatum peccatis et abjectum, omnique honore vel dignitate privatum a Domino ostendimus, denuntiamus, ac nihilominus sententiando pronuntiamus.*

"'In fine, the first of the Four Articles terminates by the declaration, that the doctrine which it expresses "is necessary to the public tranquillity, and not less advantageous to the church than to the state; and that it ought to be inviolably followed as conformed to the Word of God, the tradition of the holy fathers, and the example of the saints." Aside from the anathema from which the assembly should have abstained, it is impossible to condemn, in a manner more express, not merely the opinion of the doctors who do not happen to think with the authors of the declaration, but also the acts of the popes and councils who have believed that subjects may be released from their oath of allegiance to princes when they abuse their power, or when the common good of a nation imperatively demands a change of dynasty or of government.

"'It is said that the doctrine contained in the first article is necessary to the public tranquillity and the good of the state; but of two things, one: either the supreme power once acquired is inamissible, or it is not. The former hypothesis, although maintained by some Gallican authors, is evidently untenable; it is anti-social, absurd, revolting; no, we can never admit that a prince, whoever he may be, may use or abuse the lives and property of his subjects with impunity. In the latter case, who is to pronounce on the differences which may arise between the people and the depositaries of power? Force, you say. But what is there not to fear from the prince, or from the people, when either reigns only in the name of the law of the strongest? As it regards kings, can they seriously believe their crowns in danger, because the vicar of Jesus Christ recalls them to their duties and to their oaths? There is no middle course. It is necessary, either that they be absolutely independent in the exercise of their power, which can be asserted, after God, only of the church, because she, and she only, has the promises of God himself; or, renouncing the intervention of the spiritual power, that they depend on their subjects. But, in this latter case, what is to be expected? Bossuet, who drew up the article in question, shall answer. "It is clearer than the light of day," says he, "that, if it is necessary to compare the two opinions, that which subjects temporal sovereigns to the pope (in the sense we have just explained it), and that which subjects their power to the people, in whom predominate passion, caprice, ignorance, and wrath, the latter would be unquestionably the most to be deprecated. Experience has shown this in our own age, which has offered us among

those who have abandoned their sovereigns to the caprices of the multitude more and more tragical examples against the persons of kings, than can be found during six or seven hundred years among the nations who on this point have recognized the authority of Rome." We cite this passage from Bossuet, simply to show, in view of the impossibility of asserting the absolute independence of sovereigns or those who govern, that Louis XIV. had no cause for provoking the declaration of 1682, and that the bishops of France had no reason for conceding him what he asked.' "*

"I have listened, my dear uncle, with both my ears; but I do not see any practical difference between the doctrine of Cardinal Gousset and that of M. Gosselin, which I understand you to reject."

"It shows that my distinction between governing temporals in the respect that they are spiritually related, and governing them as related to a temporal end, has high authority. The difference, moreover, is very obvious, as well as important. M. Gosselin contends that the power exercised over temporal sovereigns by the popes was a concession made to them by Catholic princes and nations; the illustrious cardinal holds it to be spiritual, within the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the sovereign pontiff; a power which he holds and exercises, not as temporal sovereign, or as sovereign in temporals, but as the vicar of Jesus Christ; therefore *jure divino*, and not, as M. Gosselin maintains, if I understand him, simply *jure humano*."

"But the cardinal does not sustain you in your doctrine, as to the deposing power, for he cites with approbation Fénelon, who denies that the pope either deprives or institutes lay princes."

"As supreme temporal lord, or by virtue of an act of his own will, at his own pleasure, agreed; but as the interpreter and judge of the law under which the prince holds and to which he is bound to conform, he does not deny it, but in effect asserts it. The doctrine of Fénelon is, that the pope cannot deprive or institute a lay prince by an act of his own will and pleasure; and that he can only declare a prince deprived, when he is so by the law under which the prince holds; and then it is not the pope who deprives him, but the law, of which the pope is simply the divinely appointed minister, or judge. The pope has no proper civil jurisdiction, and can intervene in reference to the action of

* *Théologie Dogmatique*, Tom. I., pp. 732–737.

the temporal government only when a moral or spiritual question arises, and there is a reason under the divine and natural laws for his intervention in his quality of sovereign pontiff, or as the vicar of Jesus Christ. This is the sense in which I understand Fénelon, and as he concedes that the pope may as *spiritual* sovereign declare a prince fallen from his dignity, and his subjects absolved from their allegiance, he evidently concedes the deposing power in the only sense in which I or my friend of *Brownson's Review* have ever asserted it. His eminence, Cardinal Gousset, certainly goes as far, as is evident from the principles he establishes in his remarks on the first part of the first article of the declaration of 1682, and in his claiming for the pope the authority to pronounce judgment in the case of disputes between the people and their temporal sovereign."

"After all, the cardinal asserts only a directive and ordinative authority in regard to temporal sovereigns, as Gerson does; and if you go no further, what more do you assert than the directive power conceded by M. Gosselin and his school?"

"That the words cited from Gerson are as strong as the cardinal would prefer may be doubted, for they are the words of an opponent, and cited as a concession; but, however that may be, he evidently holds it to be a real and effective power. Whether I assert more or not than M. Gosselin conceded by the *potestas directiva*, depends on how much or how little he understands by it, and that I am not able to determine. When he opposes it to the indirect authority asserted by Bellarmine and Suarez, he seems to make it simply directive, merely advisory and monitory; but when he has to explain away the letters of St. Gregory VII., the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII., and certain tough passages from St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, and other high authorities, he seems to mean by it almost, if not quite, as much as I contend for. If this directive power be merely advisory and monitory, it would be no more than might be exercised by any bishop, priest, or even layman, any one of whom has the right to advise, exhort, entreat, or admonish the temporal authority; and I have often done as much myself, though without much effect, I confess. The power, to be a real effective power, must be coercive as well as directive, and every Catholic must concede that the church has a coercive power, and therefore with regard to kings and princes, in spirituals, or temporals in the respect that they

are related or to be referred to a spiritual end. The denial of all coercive power to the church is a step beyond the heresy of Marsilius of Padua, for he conceded, it is said, that the church might coerce even princes with spiritual pains and censures, but was declared a heretic because he denied to her the right to go further. Kings and princes are as much subject to the authority of the church as private persons, and, as Cardinal Gousset maintains, in their public as well as in their private acts; and she must have the same power of coercing them that she has of coercing others, and in their public as well as in their private capacity, unless, which cannot be done, some rule be pleaded exempting them. Hence Suarez asks three questions: 'Prima est, An summus pontifex personas regum et principum temporalium habeat sibi *spiritualiter* subjectas? Secunda, An pontifex habeat sibi subjectam non solum personam regis, sed etiam ejus potestatem temporalem quantumvis supremam, ita ut possit illius actus præcipiendo dirigere, exigere, supplere, vel impedire? Tertia his consequens est, An pontifex ratione suæ spiritualis potestatis possit, Christianos principes non solum dirigere præcipiendo, sed etiam cogere *puniendo etiam usque ad regni privationem, si opus fuerit?*" *

"Suarez answers at full length these three questions in the affirmative. The last question is the one on which the principal controversy hinges; and the affirmative answer to this he says, flows as a logical consequence from the affirmative answer to the other two.

"'Quia vis directiva sine coactiva inefficax est, teste Philosopho; † ergo si pontifex habet potestatem directivam in principes temporales, etiam habet coactivam si justæ directioni per legem vel præceptum obedire noluerint. Probatur consequentia, nam quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt et optime instituta; ergo si pontifici dedit potestatem directivam, dedit coactivam, quoniam institutio aliter facta esset imperfecta, et inefficax. Unde contraria ratione docent theologi non habere ecclesiam potestatem actus mere internos præcipiendi, quia de illis judicium ferre non potest, et consequenter neque pro illis pœnam imponere, quod ad vim coactivam pertinet, ut author est D. Thomas.‡ Ergo a converso, cum pontifex possit imperando efficaciter dirigere potestatem temporalem in actibus suis, potest etiam *cogere*, et *punire* principes sibi non obtemperantes in iis quæ juste præcipit.'§

* *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III., Cap. 21.
† *Ethic.* Lib. X., Cap. ult.
‡ *Primæ Secundæ*, Q. 91, A. 4, et 100, A. 9.
§ *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III., Cap. 23.

"Suarez, Doctor Eximius, is at least respectable authority, especially when backed by Cardinal Bellarmine, and the practice of the church in every age. Father Perrone maintains as of Catholic faith the proposition, 'Ecclesia *divinitus* accepit potestatem independentem atque supremam sanciendi per leges exteriorem disciplinam, cogendique fideles ad earum observationem, et *coercendi* salutaribus *pœnis* devios et contumaces.'

"Pope John XXII. says, in his condemnation of the third heretical assertion of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, that 'Christian emperors acknowledge that, instead of being judges of the pontiff, *they are judged by him.*' These heretics maintained as their fifth assertion, that 'neither the pope nor the whole church together can punish any person, however wicked he may be, with a coactive punishment, without the authorization of the emperor.' The same pope condemns this as a heresy, and says, that 'it is contrary to the doctrine of the gospel, for our Lord said to Peter, Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven. Now not merely those who are willing are bound, but also and chiefly those who are unwilling. Moreover, the church has the power of constraining by excommunication, which excludes not merely from the sacraments, but also from the society of the faithful. Peter did not wait for the consent of the emperor to strike Ananias and Saphira with death, nor Paul to smite Elymas with blindness, or to deliver over the incestuous Corinthian to Satan for the destruction of the flesh and the salvation of his soul. Hear also the same apostle saying to the Corinthians: "What will you? Shall I come to you with a *rod*, or in charity, and in the spirit of kindness?" In which he very expressly assumes that he has a coative power. He assumes the same when he writes, "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God (that is to say, given by God) to the destruction of fortresses, subverting counsels, and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God. . . *We have in readiness wherewith to punish all disobedience.*" Whence it is evident that Paul received a power, even a coactive power, not from the emperor, but from God.' *

"I could cite authorities without number to the same effect, but authorities are nothing to young America. I

* Rohrbacher, *Histoire Univ. de Église Cath.*, Tom. XX. pp. 124, 125.

will only add, that the point is one that a Catholic cannot deny; for the contrary is a condemned heresy, as the following from the constitution *Auctorem Fidei* of Pius VI., condemning the pseudo-synod of Pistoja, sufficiently establishes. I will read you titles IV. and V. of this constitution.

"'IV. Propositio, affirmans *abusum fore auctoritatis Ecclesiæ transferendo illam ultra limites doctrinæ ac morum et eam extendendo ad res exteriores, et per vim exigendo id quod pendet a persuasione et corde,* tum etiam, *multo minus ad eam pertinere, exigere per vim exteriorem subjectionem suis decretis;* quatenus indeterminatis illis verbis *extendendo ad res exteriores,* notet velut abusum auctoritatis Ecclesiæ, usum ejus potestatis acceptæ a Deo, qua usi sunt et ipsimet Apostoli in disciplina exteriore constituenda et sancienda; HÆRETICA.

"'V. Qua parte insinuat, Ecclesiam non habere auctoritatem subjectionis suis decretis exigendæ aliter quam per media quæ pendent a persuasione; quatenus intendat ecclesiam *non habere collatam sibi a Deo potestatem non solum dirigendi per consilia et suasiones, sed etiam jubendi per leges, ac devios contumacesque exteriore judicio ac salubribus pœnis coercendi atque cogendi;* ex. Bened. XIV. in Brevi, "*Ad assiduas,*" anni 1755, primatibus, archiepiscopis et episcopis regni Poloniæ; *Inducens in systema alias damnatum ut hæreticum.*'"

"But in proving that, you do not prove that the pope may, even according to Catholic doctrine, deprive temporal princes of their authority."

"I prove by it, first, that the authority conceded to the church by the institution of Christ is not simply directive, but also coercive; that is, she has authority to enforce *in foro externo* obedience to her decrees 'salubribus pœnis.' I prove by it, in the second place, that, if temporal princes, as to the morality of their public as well as their private acts, come within her ordinary spiritual jurisdiction, she has with regard to them not merely a directive, but also her ordinary coactive or coercive power, and therefore may *de jure divino* judge and punish them, according to the nature or magnitude of their offence. This is all I had to prove. If temporal princes in the government of their estates are exempted from the obligation to conform to the divine and natural law, and therefore as to the morality of their acts from the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the church, it is for those who so contend that they are to prove it. I say with Bossuet, *Tout est soumis aux clefs de Pierre, tout,* ROIS *et peuples.*"

"But would not a Catholic remind you that there is a

distinction between the internal court and the external court of the church, and that these two are not coextensive in their jurisdiction?"

"He must think me a novice indeed, if he thinks it necessary to remind me of so well known a distinction. Of course she does not and cannot *in foro externo* take cognizance of private sins, secret sins, or internal acts, which come to her knowledge only in the confessional; but public sins, open and public offences, and especially such as by their very nature are public, fall necessarily within the jurisdiction of the external court. Such certainly are the public acts of public powers, which, if judged at all as public acts, must be judged *in foro externo*. Therefore the distinction, though very real and very important, has no application to the case before us."

"But why then has your friend, the editor of *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, labored to prove that the church may judge temporal princes in their public acts, by proving that she has authority over all temporals, at least so far as they are spiritually related?"

"My friend, I presume, is able to answer for himself, and I do not pretend to know his secret reasons. I suppose, however, that in his articles on this subject his main design has been to prove the extent and superiority, not in dignity only, but also in authority, of the spiritual order, and the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, and therefore to the church as the representative of the spiritual on earth. I suppose his real purpose has been to refute that pernicious maxim, so popular in our days, that 'Religion has nothing to do with politics,' by showing that it has something and a great deal to do with them, because all our acts are to be referred to a spiritual end. If this be so, then politics, as related to such end, as to their morality, necessarily fall under the authority of religion and within the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the church. As incidental to this main purpose, not as an incident of a still vaster power, as some have interpreted it, he treated the power of the church with regard to temporal princes, and showed, that, if the power of the church extended to all temporals in that they are related to a spiritual end, it must extend to princes in their public as well as in their private acts, and that she must have the same power of spiritual jurisdiction over them that she has over private persons, and therefore the same right to judge and punish

them, without troubling himself with the irrelevant question, from his point of view, whether it was to be *in foro interno* or *in foro externo.* He did not fall into the sad blunder of concluding, from the fact that she takes cognizance of all offences against natural and positive law *in foro interno*, or the tribunal of penance, that she can take cognizance of all *in foro externo.* From the fact that *in foro interno* she takes cognizance of all offences, he concluded that her spiritual authority as judge extends to all, and from the fact that it extends to all, he concluded that it extends to offences of temporal princes, on the principle that the whole includes the parts, and therefore that she had authority to judge and punish them according to the nature of their offences, *in foro externo* when their offences were of a public and external character, and could be reached only by a public sentence, and *in foro interno* when they were not. The doctrine I contend for is the very moderate doctrine which is contained in the passages I have read you from Suarez and the cardinal archbishop of Rheims,—a doctrine which it is certainly lawful to hold and in a lawful manner to defend, and which it is in my judgment absolutely necessary to defend, if we would defend in any satisfactory manner the teachings of the great Catholic doctors of past times and the uniform practice of the church in all ages. There are, however, different points of view from which the doctrine may be defended. We may defend it with a view of vindicating the church from the charge of absorbing the state, as I am now doing, or it may be defended in opposition to those who assert formal or virtual political atheism, as is apparently the case with the editor of *Brownson's Review;* that is, either as an explanation or an apologetic defence of the claims of the church in relation to the state, or as the assertion of the positive rights of the spiritual in relation to the temporal. The language used, and the form of the statements made, will, although the doctrine remains the same, vary not a little as one or the other of these points of view is adopted by the writer, and those who write from the latter will almost invariably seem, to those who are intent only on the former, to go too far. The one wishes to make the rights and prerogatives of the church fully accepted by her children, who seem to him in danger of forgetting them; the other wishes to persuade the enemies of the church that they may very safely tolerate her, notwithstanding the claims which in this respect have been

put forth for her. The former would vindicate her power, because it is practically needed; the latter would disarm prejudice, and relieve the church of the odium cast upon her by her enemies. Both, I apprehend, are governed by proper motives. Either is a good object, but in seeking either exclusively there is danger. The apologist, in his zeal to explain away an offensive doctrine, may obscure in the minds of the faithful, perhaps even in his own, the truth itself, and though not killing faith may render it weak and sickly,—a result which I think has at times followed the attempt to manage the susceptibilities of Cæsar. On the other hand, the papist, in his zeal to bring out in all their clearness, distinctness, and strength the rights and prerogatives of the church, and therefore of the pope as her visible head, may, if not on his guard, give gratuitous offence, and excite unnecessary hostility against the papacy. Yet what he aims at doing is necessary to be done, and if he does his best not to be gratuitously offensive, he cannot be justly censured.

"My friend, the editor of *Brownson's Review*, evidently believes that, in these times, it is more necessary to assert the authority of the church in regard to temporals, in order to lead back the age to morality in politics, than it is to labor to explain away that authority, or to make it appear as a matter of small moment; although, if attentively read and understood, I think it will be found that he sufficiently qualifies his strong statements, and qualifies them as far as possible without wholly defeating his purpose. The misfortune is, that his readers, overlooking or disapproving the object he has specially in view, being themselves chiefly anxious, it may be, to disarm prejudice, pay no attention to the explanations and qualifications he never fails to offer, so far as I am aware, and which, if duly considered, would quiet the most susceptible among his Catholic brethren.

"For my own part, I agree with him in both his doctrine and his policy. Moreover, as a Catholic, I believe my church one in time as well as in space; her honor in any past age is as near and as dear to me as her honor in the present. I cannot concede that she modifies her doctrines as time proceeds, that she does not know her powers as well in one age as in another, or that her practice in any age can be held by a Catholic as reprehensible, or as justifiable only by the opinions of the times. I do not believe that Rome has ever abandoned a doctrine which she has once held or

favored, or that she has ever disavowed a spiritual claim which she has ever once insisted upon. The history of the church is before the world, and must be accepted in what is unpopular to-day as well as in what is popular. While, therefore, I concede, nay, contend, that the state is independent and supreme, in the sense that it has no superior and holds from no other, in its own order, I shall insist that it is subordinate and dependent in relation to the spiritual power."*

Conversation X.

"What you have said, my dear uncle, may, for aught I know, suffice for the question concerning the temporal authority of the church, as between you and your Gallican brethren, but that does not suffice for me. I prefer the views of the Gallicans to those of the papists, because I think them more liberal, more advanced, and approaching

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* We have been blamed for bringing out this doctrine, which we are told is now defended by no Catholic theologian, and is abandoned even by Rome. But we have not been the first or the only one in recent times to insist on it. The doctrine as we defend it, as we have repeatedly explained it, is distinctly set forth in the extract which "Uncle Jack" has introduced from the learned and highly esteemed *Théologie Dogmatique* of the illustrious cardinal archbishop of Rheims, the firm supporter of that decidedly papistical journal, *L'Univers Catholique*. It is also set forth in that truly Catholic work, *Histoire Universelle de l'Église Catholique*, by the learned and able Abbé Rohrbacher, a Doctor in Theology of the University of Louvain. It is the central doctrine of that remarkable work, and we may almost say that the history was written expressly for the purpose of illustrating and defending it; it appears prominently in nearly every one of the twenty-nine volumes of which the work consists, and the author lets no opportunity pass of bringing it out, or of combating the contrary doctrine. It was under the inspiration of this history, by a living author, and the second and revised edition of which was completed only last year, that we wrote our articles on the relations of the two powers, and in which we have done nothing more than to reproduce its doctrine and reasoning. In what estimation this work is held at Rome may be gathered from the *Preface* to the first volume of the second edition, an extract from which we subjoin.

"A more precious encouragement still," says the author, "is that of the learned and illustrious Cardinal Mai, Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, to which the *Universal History of the Catholic Church* had been denounced in a series of attacks by a journal of Liège, which had begun by commending it. The Marquis de Narp, whom all the Catholics of France know and esteem, wrote, therefore, from Rome, on the 6th of February, 1846: 'I have also been to see Cardinal Mai, the most important of all, because he presides over the Congregation of the Index. He received me in a manner still more affable. "I am acquainted," said he to me, "with the whole affair. The denunciations have been sent to me. I have read all, and have found nothing that merits the least blame in

Protestantism; but whether they or papists are the truer Catholics is to me a matter of perfect indifference. What I want is, that you should show that the authority you claim for the church does not destroy the autonomy of the state, and absorb the civil power in the spiritual."

"I have done that already."

"You have asserted it, but you have not shown it to my satisfaction."

"Bear in mind, then, that the power which I assert for the church over temporals is spiritual, not temporal. *I claim for her no temporal or civil jurisdiction.* The power which I maintain for the sovereign pontiff, as vicar of Jesus Christ, or by the institution of Christ, does not lie in the same order with the civil power. The prince does not hold from him as suzerain, and is not accountable to him as lord paramount in the temporal order. The papal power is not a temporal power or jurisdiction over the temporal of princes and states, but simply a spiritual jurisdiction.

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the work of the respectable abbé, whom we highly esteem (*que nous vénérons*). Tell him, from me, not to be disquieted; that I have written to the bishop of Liège that these chicaneries must be put a stop to. Tell him to be of good courage so as to complete his work, of which we feel all the importance. I will read the new pieces you bring me, but repeat to him that he need not feel any uneasiness, and that he may communicate with the bishop of Liège, whom, I have reason to believe, he will find equally well disposed." M. le Marquis de Narp wrote again from Rome, the 16th of February, 1847: 'Cardinal Mai has spoken to me with the same interest of the great and admirable work of our dear Abbé Rohrbacher. "I continue to read it," said he to me. "Will it soon be completed?" I believe it is nearly finished. "So much the better," he added. "He ought now to experience no longer any opposition, for I have written to the bishop of Liège to put a stop to it, and to come to an understanding with him. We have not up to the present found a word in it to blame." Will your Eminence authorize me to say that to him? "Yes, that he may feel no inquietude." He has for some time wished to make known the encouraging words which your Eminence has spoken in his favor. "He may do it," said he to me.' Such were the kind expressions of Cardinal Mai, Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, which we have been authorized to publish."

We do not pretend that this is a warrant that there is no error or inaccurate statement in the Abbé Rohrbacher's history, but it seems to us highly improbable that the illustrious Cardinal Mai, in his position would or could have expressed himself in such terms of a work in which the doctrine in question holds so prominent a place, if that doctrine was disapproved at Rome, or its assertion and defence by Catholic writers discountenanced. We do, therefore, regard this favor shown by the Prefect of the Congregation of the Index to that history as very good evidence that the doctrine is in no bad repute at Rome, and that her sentiment is with us rather than with those who oppose us for holding and maintaining it.

Temporals have a twofold relation; the one to a temporal end,—terrestrial happiness; the other to a spiritual end,—celestial and eternal beatitude. The church has jurisdiction over them only under the latter relation; the state, only under the former. Under their relation to the temporal end, the state has independent and supreme jurisdiction, and is therefore independent and supreme in its own order. Consequently, my doctrine does not destroy the autonomy of the state or absorb it in the church."

"But you subordinate the state to the church, not in dignity and rank only, but also in authority."

"Certainly I do; but subordination and identity, in my philosophy, belong to different categories. Man is subordinated to God, and owes him submission in all things. Has man therefore no autonomy? Is he absorbed in God, or is God by this fact declared to be man? Of course not, for man in obeying acts from his own centre, and it is he, with the divine concurrence, that acts in the obedience, not God. Does my learned nephew need to be told that where there there is identity there is and can be no subordination, for nothing can be subordinated to itself? The assertion of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual necessarily implies that the two powers are distinct. Moreover, even when the church intervenes in temporals, according to the doctrine I am defending, she does not intervene directly; she intervenes *indirectly*, through the civil power, by directing it to refer them to the spiritual end. It is it, not she, that so refers them."

"Still, as you extend her jurisdiction to all temporals, I cannot see what you leave for the state to do but the bidding of the church."

"Even if as you suppose, since I admit that the state holds from no other and has no superior in its own order, and therefore that none but it can do what the church bids it do in that order, I should neither absorb it in the church nor destroy its autonomy in temporals. But you forget that I claim for the church no temporal jurisdiction over the temporal, I claim for her only spiritual jurisdiction."

"So you constantly repeat, but as you confess that it extends to all acts of man in the temporal order, as well as in the spiritual, I cannot see what difference it makes. What difference does it make whether you *call* her jurisdiction spiritual or temporal, since it is precisely of the same extent, and covers the same acts, in either case?"

"If the difference were only a difference in name, it would amount to nothing. I suppose I am capable of understanding so much. As you put the case, it can make no difference in the world whether you call it the one or the other, and you might have presumed that I could know as much without your telling me. You might, I should suppose, have concluded, when you found me insisting with so much emphasis on the distinction, that it had for me a real significance, although a significance not apparent to you. It is not always safe to infer that a man is a fool, because we fail to catch his sense. I have already told you over and over again, that temporals have a twofold relation, the one to temporal good, and the other to spiritual good. If, after the example of most Protestants, I were to identify the church with the state, I should be obliged to say that the state has jurisdiction of temporals under both of these relations; if, as you suppose, I identified the state with the church, and claimed for her real temporal authority over the temporal, I should subject temporals under both of these relations to the papal power. Now it so happens that I do neither. When, therefore, I tell you that I defend for the church only a spiritual jurisdiction, your conclusion ought to be that I defend for her jurisdiction in regard to temporals only in the respect that they are related or to be referred to a spiritual end. The distinction is real, not merely verbal, as you suppose, and necessarily implies a real distinction between the two powers.

"To make this plain to the dullest understanding, suppose a prince holds that it is for the temporal prosperity of his subjects that a railroad be constructed from his capital to the seaboard. Now if the church had temporal jurisdiction, she could say to him, No, you shall construct a canal, not a railroad; or, You shall construct neither; but as the construction of either is not *per se* contrary to the law of God, if she is assumed to have only spiritual jurisdiction she has nothing to say on the subject, and the prince, possessing in his own right the temporal power, may or may not authorize the construction of either a railroad or canal, or both, as he judges best for the good of his subjects. If I claimed temporal or civil jurisdiction for the pope, I should hold that congress ought to consult him on the question of authorizing or constructing a railroad to the Pacific; but as I claim for him only spiritual jurisdiction, I do no such thing. But suppose the prince authorizes a company

to take the land owned by private individuals for their railroad, without either their consent or making them any compensation. Here the church would have the right to step in and say, Stop there, my dear son; you cannot do that, for it violates the right of property, and is contrary to justice, to spiritual good. Here is a fair illustration of the distinction of the two powers. The state judges supremely of the railroad as to temporal good, and the church as to spiritual good. So of any act of the government. The church has jurisdiction of it in its spiritual relation, because in that relation it is spiritual, and necessarily falls within the jurisdiction of the spiritual power; she has not jurisdiction of it in its temporal relation, because she has only spiritual jurisdiction.

"If you are debarred by no previous contract or duty, you may be a farmer, a sailor, a soldier, a lawyer, a physician, a merchant, a mechanic, according to your taste, inclination, or judgment, marry or not marry, as you regard it most for your temporal good, for none of these things are unlawful or forbidden by the law of God. The church here may advise you, but has not authority to command you. But suppose you to take it into your head to pursue the profession of a gambler, a pickpocket, a pirate, or a highwayman, all of which are forbidden by the law of God, she would have a right to intervene and prohibit you, and, if you refused to desist, to call upon the secular government to compel you to desist. It is the same in regard to the state. If the state should make unprovoked war on its neighbors, pursue towards them a course of constant and unprovoked aggression to their serious injury, endangering their independence and existence, or should make war on religion and humanity, and oppress its subjects, she would by virtue of her spiritual jurisdiction have the right to summon it before her tribunals, because in all these spiritual good is impugned, and the law of God is violated. The question is not solely a temporal, but also a spiritual question, and as a spiritual question it comes within the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts.

"Your mistake arises from not considering that, though distinct, the spiritual and the temporal are not separate or separable in this life, any more than soul and body. You reason, and so do my Gallican friends, as if the two orders existed apart, and as if the church could point to one class of things and say to the state, These are spiritual, touch

them not; and the state to another class of things and say to the church, These are temporals, exclusively within my domain, touch them not, on your peril. But such is not the case. Man is composed of soul and body, and lives, and must live, as long as a denizen of this world, a twofold life, the one in relation to temporal good, and the other in relation to spiritual good. Every act he does or can perform has relation to both ends, is under one aspect spiritual and under the other temporal. No individual act of man, we are taught by the theologians, is morally indifferent, and the most purely spiritual acts we can perform, such as prayer, meditation, religious vows, &c., have temporal relations and a bearing more or less direct, more or less remote, on the temporal welfare of individuals and nations. So it happens that often the two powers, though distinct, are concerned with the same matters, but under diverse relations. Hence it is impossible, not to distinguish, indeed, but to separate the matter of the two powers, so that they may act apart, in not only distinct, but entirely separate, spheres. The two orders are in nature interlaced, run the one into the other, and are in reciprocal commerce with each other, as the soul and body of man, and nothing affects the one without in some measure affecting the other. God has therefore established for Christian society two governments, and ordained their mutual harmony and coöperation. It is impossible to conceive the perfect government of society without the two powers, or without coöperation and mutual concert, as the church not obscurely insinuates in calling her arrangements with temporal powers *concordats*. The errors to be avoided are, on the one hand, the *unity* or identity of church and state, an error to which Protestantism almost universally tends, and, on the other, the *isolation* of church and state, to which Gallicanism tends, when it does not tend to the subjection of the church to the state. For the complete and normal government of society, you must have the *concurrence* of church and state, that is, their harmonious coöperation, the church governing all things in the respect that they are spiritual, and the state temporal things in the respect that they are only temporal. This, if I understand it, is the Catholic doctrine, and of course supposes the state to be Catholic and animated by the Catholic faith and spirit. The state, on this supposition, would give civil effect to the canon law, and the church would give her consent to all reasonable measures proposed by the state for the temporal good of the

community. Thus each discharging its proper functions, both would move on in harmony, for the common good, temporal and spiritual, of society."

"But if the two governments are equally necessary to the government of society according to the divine ordination, why do you assert that the state is subordinate to the church!"

"Because the temporal by the law of God is subordinated to the spiritual, and because the state, which represents the former, cannot but be *de jure* subordinated to the church, in case she represents the latter. I do it also, because otherwise I must practically subject the church to the state. As all human acts have temporal relations, the absolute independence of the state in regard to the spiritual power would give it authority, under pretext of governing the temporality of temporals, to extend its power over the whole spiritual order. The state might think that monastic vows, celibacy, religious houses, and such like things, affecting as they certainly do questions of political economy, are incompatible with the temporal good of the community, and so it would, under pretence of governing the temporality, proceed to forbid them; it might be annoyed by the number of holidays instituted by the spiritual power, and proceed to suppress them, as we have lately seen in the kingdom of Sardinia; it may take it into its head that it is contrary to its dignity and the welfare of the empire to allow the church to have the supreme control of ecclesiastical seminaries, or the bishops and clergy within its dominions to have a free correspondence with the spiritual chief of the church, and therefore forbid all communication with Rome except through the secular administration, and proceed to place the ecclesiastical seminaries under the control of the state, as did Joseph II. of Germany; it may regard the spiritual dependence of the state on a power whose chief does not happen to reside within its dominions as contrary to its temporal dignity and independence, and therefore separate the national church from the centre of unity, as did Henry VIII. and the parliament of England in the sixteenth century, as Louis XIV. seemed for a moment disposed to do in the seventeenth, and as the French people actually did by their constitutional church in the eighteenth; it may allege, that to acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the pope is incompatible with loyalty to the republic, and therefore forbid the profession and observance of the Catholic religion.

within its dominions, as you and your rightly-named Know-Nothing friends are attempting to do here, and as was long done in every Protestant state in Europe. If you will believe English history, the devout English government did never fine, imprison, exile, massacre, or hang at Tyburn, Catholics as Catholics, but only as traitors to the throne. If we may believe its apologists, it always respected religious liberty, and has persecuted Catholics only because, being Catholics, they could not but be traitors. Moreover, the government may say, that holding and professing such views as yours, my dear Dick, is incompatible with the temporal welfare of the state, which I think is perfectly true, and for that reason forbid you to hold them, and subject you to pains and penalties if you publish them. If we allow it to be independent in face of the spiritual power, as all these things certainly have temporal relations, we cannot deny its right to govern them as it pleases, and therefore we necessarily subordinate their spiritual relations to their temporal relations, and thus the spiritual to the temporal, which, in principle, is the subordination of the soul to the body, eternity to time, God to man."

"But I might retort, and say, since you extend her authority over all human acts, that the church might, under pretence of governing spirituals, appropriate to herself the whole government of temporals; and this seems to be what is supposed by some to be the necessary result of the views of your friend, the editor of *Brownson's Review*."

"We have seen what would result, nay, what has resulted and is every day resulting, from the assertion that the temporal power is independent of the spiritual. See now what would result, if we asserted the mutual independence of both powers. The church says, and says truly, that all these things ordered or forbidden by the state are spirituals; the state says, and says truly, that they all are temporals, for they all have a temporal relation; both are independent, each of the other; each is equally supreme, and each commands the contradictory of the other. Here is a decided conflict of rights and duties. Two coequal authorities, both from God, commanding contradictory things! Tell me which I am to obey, since to obey both is impossible, or how I can with a good conscience disobey either? Here is a very grave practical difficulty, and every man of common sense knows that it can be removed only by denying the relation of equality between the two powers, and asserting

the subordination of the one in authority, as well as in excellence, rank, or dignity, to the other. You Protestants subordinate the spiritual to the temporal; we Catholics subordinate the temporal to the spiritual. One or the other must be done, and nobody with any just claims to a religious apprehension can doubt which is the true course."

"But you have not yet met my objection."

"The church claiming only spiritual jurisdiction, and knowing precisely and infallibly where the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal lies, neither will nor can encroach on the domain of the state."

"What security have you of that, when you hold the state to be subordinate to her?"

"When the question is asked by a Catholic, I answer, I have the security of the fact that she is God's church, and is indorsed by him, which is as good security, I think, as there is to be given, or as any reasonable man can ask. If the question be asked by a non-Catholic, I answer, that I claim for her the presumption of innocence till guilt is proved. In eighteen centuries she has never in a single instance encroached on the domain of the temporal, and if she has not in that long period, it is not likely that she will in any future time. In return, I remind you that, if you do not subordinate the state to her, you must subordinate her to the state. What security have you to give me that the state will never encroach on the domain of the spiritual? I am as much entitled to security for the good behavior of the state, as you are to security for the good behavior of the church, and you cannot offer me the guaranty of past good behavior, or the presumption of innocence till guilt is proved, for unhappily the guilt is but too notorious, and proofs of innocence, I think, are not forthcoming. The encroachments of the temporal on the spiritual have been with the state the rule, and its submission the exception. You need not attempt an answer, for there is no answer to be given. To avoid the conflict of rights and duties, and to solve the difficulties on both sides, we must assert both church and state indeed, but the state in subordination to the church,—the temporal in subordination to the spiritual, not the spiritual to the temporal; for the temporal is *for* the spiritual, and by the law of God is to be referred to a spiritual end. Both moving on in harmony, with this subordination, that is, the church as the superior and the state as the inferior, things will go on as God intended, and this

is what the church always teaches us. With the church alone, society would want its executive arm; with the state alone, it would want morality, and we should have civil despotism; without either, we should have both spiritual and temporal anarchy, what you revolutionists are laboring to introduce. With both moving on harmoniously and in mutual concert, or, if I may so speak, reciprocal commerce, you have both spiritual and temporal order, peace of conscience, and freedom of action. Here would be no absorption of the state by the church, nor of the church by the state. Both would be retained, as distinct, though not hostile or separate powers, each operating according to its own constitution, and fulfilling its own mission in its own order."

"But that doctrine presupposes the state to be Catholic, as well as the church."

"Undoubtedly. I cannot understand how there can be perfect harmony and concert of action between the two powers where one is of one religion and the other of another or of none, and as a Catholic I cannot, of course, believe that the government of society is normal and complete unless both powers are Catholic. I certainly hold that the state ought to be Catholic, for a nation should profess the true religion collectively as well as individually."

"However, the state here is not Catholic."

"So much the worse."

"That may or may not be; but it is not, and is not likely to be in either your day or mine."

"That is probably true. Really Catholic governments were never very plenty, and there is a decided scarcity of them now."

"But how will your doctrine apply where the state is not Catholic?"

"It remains the same *de jure*, but *de facto*, so far as the state is concerned, is inapplicable."

"What will you do in such case?"

"What the early Christians did under pagan Rome, adhere to our religion, practise it in all respects so far as the state permits, and die for it where it does not. We have nothing else for it. We submit to what is inevitable, use our freedom so far as the state does not restrain it, and where it attempts to restrain it, we adhere to and defend our faith as martyrs and confessors. If the state leaves us free, exacts nothing of us contrary to our religion, and only

refuses to profess it or to give us positive aid, we can get along very well, and shall make no complaint. But this is aside from the real question. You wish me to prove that the church does not absorb the state or destroy its autonomy. I have shown that it does not, and that the state, where Catholic, has, to say the least, nothing to apprehend from her. This is all that the objection requires me to prove. If the church does not endanger the state where the state is Catholic, it certainly does not where it is non-Catholic.

"To this last consideration I beg you to attend. Where the state is not Catholic, and the majority, as with us, are strongly anti-Catholic, Catholics are the only party in danger. Their rights may be denied, their liberty infringed, and their consciences oppressed; but the state, the political order, has nothing to fear from them, because it holds them at its mercy. However ultramontane our views, we cannot in this country, and Rome cannot, since she can act on the American public only through us, take possession of the government and through it oppress the non-Catholic majority. We are less than one in ten of the whole population; a large portion of us are poor foreigners, strangers, some to the language, and the majority to the manners and customs of the country, without material, moral, or political weight in the community, unable even to protect our own rights and legitimate interests. Any measure we should oppose as peculiarly hostile to us as Catholics would be fastened upon the country by an overwhelming majority, and any measure we should support as favorable to us would for that reason, if for no other, be defeated by a majority equally overwhelming. We are, save on election days, treated, even though native-born, with a few individual exceptions, as aliens, as pariahs, and the slaves of the south are treated with more consideration than the Irish Catholic laborers in the Northern and Middle States. Any appeal we might make to public opinion, to the justice of the country, would be treated with contempt. Associations may be formed against us all over the Union; we may be insulted, hooted, mobbed in our own houses, or shot down in the streets by armed ruffians, led on by jail-birds and the dregs of American and European society, all with impunity. The local authorities seldom interfere, and when they interfere, it is invariably against us, and to arrest only us, the assailed and wronged party. What more ridiculous,

more disgraceful to your own manhood, than to pretend to fear our getting possession of the government, or that we and our religion are at present menacing to American independence and republicanism. Out upon such cowardice, or rather such malice and hypocrisy!"

"Of course, my dear uncle, we do not fear your present strength. The prudent man foreseeth the evil, and guardeth against the danger. It is the prospective danger we fear, what with your ultramontanism you will do when you become the majority and have possession of the government."

"I have shown you that you have nothing to fear then, for the state and the church, since the state is republican, will move on in harmony, for the common good, temporal and spiritual, of American society."

Conversation XI.

"What you have heretofore said, my dear uncle, may quiet the apprehensions of a Catholic, but you must concede that it offers no adequate security to us Protestants. The Catholic majority may take care of themselves, conceded; but what protection will there be for the Protestant minority under dominant Romanism?"

"At the very worst, as good a protection as the Catholic minority has in a Protestant state, under a non-Catholic majority, or dominant Protestantism."

"I think not, for Protestants recognize the rights of conscience, and assert religious liberty; Catholics do not."

"You are joking, Dick. That Protestants profess religious liberty may be true, but I have yet to learn that they ever practise it. Individual Protestants have written ably in defence of religious liberty, and our own country has incorporated it into her institutions and laws; but no Protestant state, no Protestant community, has ever yet been known to practise religious liberty in regard to Catholics. You and your friends understand by religious liberty simply the liberty to deny Catholicity and to oppress Catholic conscience. What are you trying to do in this country at this moment? Do you not in the name of religious liberty seek to deprive us of our civil rights on account of our faith? Do you not proclaim it from Maine to Florida, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, that the profession of the Catholic religion is incompatible with loyalty to the re-

public; that no Catholic can be an American citizen; that every Catholic should be disfranchised, killed, or driven from the country? Have you not a secret organization all over the Union, called 'Know-Nothings,' 'Know-Somethings,' 'United Americans,' 'Guard of Liberty,' or something else, whose avowed object is the extermination of Catholics, or the suppression of the Catholic religion in this country, and who either have, or are struggling to have, the entire government, national, state, and municipal, at their command, to be wielded expressly against Catholics? Are you not doing all in your power to exasperate Catholics, to get up riots in every quarter where they are numerous, for the express purpose of obtaining a pretext for shooting them down? You know perfectly well that it is so, and you know that your professions of religious liberty are a mere mask for carrying on the meanest and most cruel persecution against Catholics that history records. Here is the sort of protection the Catholic minority receives from an American Protestant majority. It must go hard if a Protestant minority cannot find as desirable a protection under a Catholic majority, in a Catholic state."

"Did the Huguenots find any better protection in Catholic France, under Louis XIV.?"

"Perhaps not, for Louis XIV. was one of your friends,—a thorough-going Gallican, very nearly a Protestant,—and at the time of the revocation of the edict of Nantes was at war with the Holy See, and on the eve, as it seemed, of following the example of Henry VIII. of England, and converting the church in France into a snug little national church, with himself as sovereign pontiff. This is a case which I might cite against you, but not one which you may cite against me; for you have expressed your sympathy with Gallicans, and have acknowledged that you can tolerate Gallicanism. It is only ultramontanism, you tell me, that you oppose."

"Do you mean to say that Louis XIV. did not dragoon the poor Huguenots in obedience to Rome?"

"Certainly I do. His revocation of the edict of Nantes and his persecution of Protestants occurred precisely during the period of his quarrel with the Holy See, and while he acted in defiance of Rome, and would have scorned to obey any of her orders. Mr. Weiss, a Protestant writer of great ability, who has just given us an admirable history of the French Protestant refugees, contends that religion had

little or nothing to do with the revocation of the edict of Nantes and the persecution of Protestants, and that the king acted from political and social motives. The Protestants formed, as it were, a distinct people, in the bosom of French society, a sort of foreign colony, planted on French soil, and he was unwilling to tolerate them, as your friends the Know-Nothings are unwilling to tolerate Catholic foreigners here. He wished to have the whole population of France form one homogeneous society, and attempted to suppress the Huguenots for their social rather than their religious differences. This is no doubt a just view of the case, and proves that Gallicans and Protestants approach even more nearly in their practice than in their doctrines. If Louis had been a good papist, he would have consulted the Holy Father, who would have told him to keep the faith he had sworn, and to labor for the conversion of the Huguenots by peaceful missionaries, not by armed soldiers; that even a lawful end may be gained only by lawful means."

"After all, that persecution by Louis XIV. only proves that Gallicans cannot escape the infection of Rome, and can in reality no more be trusted than papists."

"I have never said they could, and have never believed that those who take up with Gallicanism on the ground of its being less offensive to you than ultramontanism gain any thing, even on the score of simple policy. I believe it is as prudent to be papists as Gallicans, providing Gallicans retain the Catholic faith. But you have no right to say that it was Roman *infection* that led the Gallican king to do what he did. He acted on his own responsibility, and in the spirit of his favorite maxim, *L'état, c'est moi*, which would be the maxim of every prince, if your doctrine of the absolute independence of the state were accepted.

"You Protestants have of late years made such loud professions of religious liberty, that I am not certain but you have really persuaded yourselves that you are not its most deadly enemies. There never was, if it really be so, a grosser delusion. There is not a word of truth in your professions, nor so much as the shadow of truth. There is not a country on earth where you are in the ascendency in which you treat the Catholic minority as having equal liberty with yourselves. I need but refer you to England, the model Protestant country. Where in all history will

you find any thing blacker than her treatment of Catholics? Read her penal code against English Catholics, those loyal descendants of English heroes, who refused to desert the religion of their fathers and of their fathers' God at the bidding of Henry, the wife-slayer, and of his godly daughter Elizabeth. If not satisfied, cross the English Channel, and examine the penal laws of Ireland, and the blessed effects of Protestant ascendency on the warm-hearted and loyal Catholic population of the sister island."

"But that is all done away with now. We have granted Catholic emancipation."

"That is to say, at a moment when Protestant fervor abated, you took off from the backs of the Catholic minority a part of the burden which Protestant zeal and Protestant bigotry had imposed upon them. But dare you say that the Catholic religion is free in Great Britain and Ireland?"

"Yes, so far as compatible with the maintenance of the Protestant religion for the state."

"That is, so far as it does not interfere with your Protestantism and your Protestantism is free to maintain everywhere its ascendency! The English government tolerates Catholicity just so far as it cannot help it, or just so far as it believes its Protestantism has nothing to apprehend from it, and no further. In no Protestant state are Catholics placed on an equal footing with Protestants, before what in fact is the governing power. Where was the protection of Catholics in the Gordon riots? Where was it in the late whirlwind of excitement in England occasioned by Lord John Russell's famous letter to the Anglican bishop of Durham? In God, where it always is, and nowhere else."

"It was where the protection of the Protestant minority is in Tuscany and Spain."

"I was not aware that in either of those countries there was any Protestant minority. All that I have seen proved against the grand duke of Tuscany is, that he did not choose to permit the emissaries of Exeter Hall to stir up disorder and sedition among his subjects. I have never heard that he disturbed Protestants, residents in his dominions, in the free and full exercise of their religion, in case they conformed to the laws of the land. As to Spain, I have not heard of her interfering with the conscience of Protestants."

"She denies Protestants burial."

"In consecrated ground, very likely."

"But she will not allow them to be buried at all."

"That, begging my nephew's pardon, is not true. What she refused was the pomp and parade of a public funeral, a thing required by no Protestant conscience whatever; and that she forbids for a temporal reason, on the ground that it might cause a breach of the peace. You can find no fault with this, for you assert the competence of the state in spirituals, so far at least as they affect temporals. Catholic funerals with processions are forbidden by the British government, and the right which that government demanded for foreign Protestants in Spain, she denies to her own Catholic subjects at home."

"But, according to your account, we Protestants are a cruel, persecuting, hypocritical set."

"You are, according to me, just what your history for three hundred years, written in the blood of Catholics, proves you to be; that is to say, when you follow your religion, which I am happy to own is not always the case. You are very nearly as bad as you are in the habit of representing us poor papists. Just recall the manner in which your anti-popery lecturers, editors, and pamphleteers speak of us and our religion, the hard names they call us, the foul-mouthed declamation they indulge in against us, the crimes, the dishonesty, the perfidy, they lay to our charge, the indignation, the spite, the venom, they vent on all occasions against us and Romanism as they call it, and then think what we must be if what they say is true, and in what estimation we must hold them, knowing as we do that what they say is false. You never rebuke them, you gloat over their filthy columns, and yet your blood is up, and you think yourselves mightily ill-used, if we just remind you that 'all is not gold that glisters,' and that you are yourselves no better than you should be. Your history is written, and you have writ yourselves down—what you are. Protestantism, you need not be told, was conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity, and it has always, at least with our blessed Anglo-Saxon race, maintained the honor of its birth."

"But if you think our Protestantism so horrible, how could you, if you had the power to prevent it, suffer it to be professed in a state under your government?"

"If carried away by my human zeal, and unrestrained by my religion, I could not. Here learn the security that a

Protestant minority would have in a Catholic state under a sovereign who is really a papist,—a security that I would not dare promise from a Gallican monarch. The mode in which a state shall deal with heretics is a spiritual question. A papist monarch will be guided by the pope, and therefore by his religion, in dealing with them. No doubt such a sovereign would grieve to find a portion of his subjects Protestants, but his religion would tell him that he can use only lawful means for the suppression of their Protestantism. Their Protestantism is a mortal sin, no doubt, but there are a thousand mortal sins which the temporal monarch must so far as he is concerned tolerate, and not undertake to punish,—which he must leave to the spiritual physician, and to the spiritual authority. There are many evils in this world that authority cannot prevent, cannot cure, and which it must tolerate. Heresy is to be dealt with as other sins, and heretics as other sinners. The temporal authority must be guided in its action by the church, which always acts on the principle that 'the Son of Man came to save souls, not to destroy them.' What she seeks is the salvation, not the destruction, of the sinner. Here, whether you believe it or not, here, in the maternal spirit of the holy Catholic Church, is your best security, and as a matter of fact Rome has always been remarkable for her mildness, and her forbearance towards all classes of sinners. When kings and princes would call down fire from heaven to consume the adversaries of her heavenly Spouse, she has always rebuked them, and told them that they knew not 'what manner of spirit they were of.'"

"That may do to tell the papist, but believing your church to be nothing better in relation to the temporal than the 'mystery of iniquity' or the 'the man of sin,' it will not do for me."

"That is your fault, not mine, and I have no consolation to offer you but your own prediction, that the state will not become Catholic in your day or mine, if ever; and till then we are the party who need security, not you. When that time comes, if it ever come, the Catholic majority, being Catholics, will have nothing to fear. As for the Protestant minority, if a Protestant minority remain, they will at least have as ample security as the Catholic minority have now; for you cannot place less confidence in Catholicity than we do in Protestantism. Turn about is fair play, and I know not that you Protestants are moulded of finer clay, or have

richer blood in your veins, than we Catholics, that you shall be entitled to demand stronger guaranties than you are able to give. If the Protestant minority would be at the mercy of Catholics, it is no more than is the case with the Catholic minority now. If you find yourselves hereafter under a Catholic state, you will find nothing worse than Catholics have suffered and still have to suffer in every Protestant state; and it will perhaps bring you to your senses and lead you to repent of the abuse you made of power when it was in your hands."

"But the laws protect you here."

"Hardly, and you are even agitating to alter them."

"But we are not required to persecute you by our religion."

"If not by your religion, you contend you are by your politics, which is as bad. We are required neither by our religion nor by our politics to persecute you, and we are as long as the world stands much more likely to be persecuted, whether the state be nominally Catholic or Protestant, than to persecute. We know, indeed, in whatever land or condition we are, persecution awaits us. No one who follows Christ can escape it.

"But in the present prevalence of statolatry, the church can expect from the state at most only that it will not oppress her. The normal government of Christendom has pretty much everywhere been broken up, and there is little to choose between nominally Catholic governments and others. The church is to-day very nearly in the condition she was in under pagan Rome. The most she can now hope for is liberty, and liberty for good, only at the expense of liberty for evil. I have asserted her powers and prerogatives *de jure*, because it will not do for her children to forget or to deny them, and because they have a practical importance for Catholics in governing their own conduct; but I do not forget the actual state of the world, or the actual triumph of Cæsar. In practice, I am content to give what I take, and I would be among the last to ask of the government of my country any thing more than to grant to my religion the same protection it extends to the sects."

CONVERSATIONS OF OUR CLUB.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1858-9.]

Your reports, Mr. Editor, in your volume for 1854, of the Conversations of Uncle Jack with his nephew, have emboldened me to send you some reports of the conversations of Our Club, which, in my judgment, fully match those of the old fogy with the young American. When Our Club was formed, where it meets, and what are its special purposes, are matters of no importance to the public; but I may tell you that it is not a political club, a revolutionary club, a sporting club, a drinking club, or an eating club, but simply a talking club. All the members talk, and talk precisely as they please, on any or no subject just as it happens, with no other restriction than that each one shall receive the talk of the talker civilly, courteously, and good-humoredly. Every member is free to "free his mind," and any discourtesy towards any member by another is a legitimate cause of expulsion from the club.

Our Club consists of five members, all laymen except the president, Father John, who, by the way, was the founder of the club and is its president. Father John is a Jesuit, and a fine rotund specimen of the monk. In what country he was born I have never been able to ascertain, although I have my suspicions that his early life was spent in England, Ireland, America, or some other part of the world. He speaks English without an accent, like a native, but so he does German, French, Italian, and Spanish. He is well versed in ancient and modern learning, is at home in any of the sciences, a respectable metaphysician, and a profound theologian. He has not only studied, but thought, and compelled whatever he has read to pass through the alembic of his own mind. He has digested, assimilated, made his own whatever he has learned, and always speaks out from his own living heart and mind. With all his rare learning, original genius, and ability, he is as simple as a child, and within the reach of the humblest with whom he converses, avoiding with great care all show of learning, science, or genius.

After Father John comes Monsieur de Bonneville, a native of France, and a Catholic after the good old French fashion, a legitimist, who loyally accepts the God and the church of his king, but is prepared to swear by any or no religion as his king bids. After M. de Bonneville comes Mein Herr Diefenbach, a man of learning, a dark and profound genius, a Catholic indeed, but inclined to mysticism, and to rely on the inner witness in preference to the external authority of the church. Next in order comes Mister O'Flanagan, a genuine, warm-hearted, impulsive Hibernian, who takes life easy—is a Catholic and a patriot, full of faith, and of trust in God, carrying out literally the injunction of our Lord, "Take no thought for the morrow." In the last place comes William Winslow, a descendant of the Pilgrims, a thorough-going Yankee, not long a convert, and still in the first fervor of his Catholic faith and zeal. He feels that he must maintain not only the authority and sanctity of the church, but the Catholicity, wisdom, and holiness of every thing that has been a custom among Catholics, or practised by Catholic nations.

Here, in brief, is the *personnel* of Our Club; yet we all, owing to the harmonizing influence of Father John, who, as Father Hecker would say, is not only a "many" but an "all-sided" man, coalesce marvellously, and are warm and devoted friends,—all of us having wisdom, good-nature, and good breeding enough to bear with each other's peculiarities, and to express freely each his own opinions without wounding the self-love of another. In Our Club we use great freedom, and allow ourselves a wide range of remark. We talk on all subjects that present themselves, and sometimes our conversations become real discussions, and are neither uninteresting nor unimportant. As I am allowed to be a good reporter, and am seldom absent from the meetings of the club, I have been authorized to furnish you with reports of such conversations as I judge the least unimportant, and, as you are growing old, and getting a little prosy withal, to send them to you for publication in your pages, trusting that they will prove not only a relief to you, but a God-send to your readers, who must be growing tired of reading always the lucubrations of one and the same mind. Subjoined to this note you will find the reports of two conversations. If you find them acceptable, others will follow in due season.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

A Member of Our Club.

Conversation I.

"I am at a loss, Father John," said Winslow, "to understand how it is that you, who in 1848 were a strenuous opponent of European democracy, and severe against the democratic tendencies even of our own country, should now take a stand in favor of liberty against authority, and defend with all your might republican institutions and constitutional government against the friends of monarchy. Then you were conservative, almost ultra-conservative, and now you are well-nigh a radical, almost a revolutionist. Then you denounced revolutionism in the strongest terms, warred nobly against the red-republicans and socialists; now you war only against those you then supported."

"I think," replied Father John, "that you misapprehend me. We should always direct our attacks against the party that is the more immediately dangerous, which in 1848 was the revolutionary party. To-day the more immediate danger is despotism, which, if not resisted by the friends of religion, will soon provoke a new and more destructive revolutionism. In 1848 the tendency was to identify Catholicity with democracy; the tendency since the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, has been to identify it with cæsarism. As I opposed the former then, I oppose the latter now; for each is an error, and if suffered to prevail would be deeply prejudicial to the true interests of religion and society."

"I am glad," interposed De Bonneville, "to find that France is still monarchical, and I prefer the empire to the republic. If Henri Cinque were on the throne instead of Napoleon, I should find no serious fault with the imperial government or its general policy. My objection to Louis Napoleon is, that he is a usurper, and not the legitimate sovereign of France."

"For my part, added O'Flanagan, "I care little about the question of legitimacy, and it is indifferent to me whether the sovereign of France is a Bonaparte or a Bourbon, if he is only a good friend to the church and old Ireland, and the enemy of England. I do not like the Anglo-French alliance, which enables England to continue her nefarious policy towards my native country."

"Forms of government," remarked Diefenbach, "are indifferent in themselves. If the French imperial system grows out of the spiritual life and deeper wants of the

French, and is their true exponent, it is the best system for Frenchmen, and for that reason legitimate. The French are a light, frivolous people; they live an outward life, and find their pleasure in outward show, pomp and parade, and in my view are just fitted to their present government, as it is just fitted to them."

"Your judgment of the French nation," interposed Father John, who will never allow any sweeping charges against any nation, "is neither liberal nor just. That there is much frivolity in the French character is undeniable, and that they are to a great extent attracted by the showy, the external, and the theatrical, is no doubt true, and so in one form or another is every people; but the French character has its graver elements, and deeper faith or more solid piety can be found nowhere than in France. But it seems to me the real question for us lies a little deeper, and should be taken up on a broader ground. National differences, national peculiarities, there are the world over, always have been, and always will be. Religion tolerates them, and addresses herself to that which is common to all men and nations. It is catholic, not national, and varies not as you pass from nation to nation or from age to age. A great struggle is going on in the bosom of the Catholic people of all nations, between the old order and the modern, and in this country between Americanism and Europeanism. This is not a struggle between one nationality and another, or between one form of political organization and another, but between one system of policy, and one order of civilization and another."

"I am an American," said Winslow, "descended from the Pilgrims who founded the Old Colony, but in becoming a Catholic I renounced my Americanism. Americanism is Protestantism, and Protestantism is rebellion against God, involving, in its principle, the rejection of all authority, human and divine. There is no compatibility between democracy and Catholicity. Democracy asserts the sovereignty of the people, Catholicity asserts the sovereignty of God; democracy asserts the right of the people to elect and commission their own rulers, Catholicity asserts our duty to obey the prelates whom the Holy Ghost places over us. Under democracy, the people have rights and no duties; under Catholicity they have duties and no rights. Hence, democracy, wherever you find it, is opposed to Catholicity, and its friends are everywhere the bitter enemies of the

church. All through Europe you find them warring against the church as almost the only obstacle to the realization of their wishes. In this country, you see that Catholics as they come under the influence of our democratic order, cease to be humble, submissive Catholics, half lose their faith, imbibe the licentious spirit of the country, place their politics above their religion, and are more intent on obtaining a place in the customs than on obtaining for themselves a crown of life, eternal in the heavens."

"The American spirit," added O'Flanagan, "is a persecuting spirit. It hung witches and Quakers, banished Baptists, and bored the ears and tongues of Dissenters. It is a Puritanic spirit, and would banish music and dancing, all joy and mirthfulness, and forbid us to take even a social glass to warm the heart, or to make merry with a friend. It puts on a long face, speaks with a nasal twang, and wears all its religion on the outside."

"Much may, no doubt, be said against Puritanism," interposed Father John, "but the worst policy for a Catholic to pursue in this country is to rail against it or to turn it into ridicule. You may vituperate or ridicule the young and thoughtless out of religion, but you do not by that bring them nearer to the church, or make them better men and women, or better citizens. This country was far more moral, far more patriotic, far less corrupt, in the old Puritan times than it is now; Puritanism has been laughed out of countenance, it has receded, but Catholicity has not advanced to take its place. The drinking, carousing, swearing, rake-hell cavaliers, have succeeded to the stern and staid old Puritans, and with what gain to our morals let the daily records of our police tell. Where morality is wanting you cannot expect to find religion, and even outward decorum will always be found some protection to morality. I am no friend to Puritanism, but I believe it some gain to morals when we can compel vice to conceal itself, or prevent it from appearing with all its effrontery on the public streets. Much that we have done to undermine Puritanism has resulted only in undermining natural virtue and manners. We should never seek to displace a false religion any further than we are prepared to supply true religion, or attack even Protestantism except on the principles or from the point of view of Catholicity. It is a grave thing to attack what others hold to be sacred, and should never be done in a light and thoughtless manner.

The true should be advanced as fast as the false recedes, so as to save the purity of the religious sentiment and the delicacy of conscience."

"That, I suppose," interrupted O'Flanagan, "is intended as a sly hit at my mirth-loving countrymen."

"I aim," replied Father John, "to hit what is wrong, whose countrymen soever may be guilty of it, but I have nothing to do with nationalities. I am of no nation. I am a Catholic and a Jesuit. As such I speak. I defend the truth, which is truth for all men of whatever race or nation, and condemn what is wrong, let who will practise it. In this club each is free to retain his nationality, but no one is free to impose his nationality upon another; Mr. O'Flanagan and Mein Herr Diefenbach meet here as equals, and neither has any right to require any exception to be made in behalf of his nationality, or to suppose because an error is commented on that his countrymen are specially aimed at; we should interpret an honest speaker's language according to its plain import, not by our suspicions or prejudices. I speak of Catholics without reference to their nationality, and I say that we cannot advance our religion in this country by vituperating or ridiculing Puritanism; or, if you please, New Englandism. Religion in the minds of the unevangelized American people is associated with a decorous carriage and a sober exterior, and they do not and will not believe that it does or can exist in its purity and strength where these are wanting. That altogether too much stress is laid on these, and that room enough is not given to light-hearted innocent mirth, is, no doubt, true; yet you cannot attack the prevailing conviction on this subject in the spirit and manner of the old cavaliers, without having the dissoluteness of morals and manners that followed the restoration of Charles II. We must take the religious mind of the country as it is, and where it is, if we would lead it to Catholicity, and above all things, must we beware how we teach it to laugh at what it has been brought up to regard as sacred. It is the sincere, the earnest, the moral portion of non-Catholic Americans that we must address; the sincere, earnest, conscientious Protestants, from whom we are to expect conversions; not that mass of unbelievers who are ready to join with us in denouncing Protestantism, and with Protestants in denouncing Catholicity, and who, for themselves, regard neither God nor man. It is of no use to destroy men's confidence in Protestantism, unless

we can at the same time bring them to the church, for after all it is better for society that men should be even Protestants, Puritans, than that they should have no religion at all."

"Father John is right, as he always is," said De Bonneville. "The Protestant missionaries in the East, by their tracts and their schools, have had some influence in detaching individuals from their old beliefs and superstitions, but none in making them Christians. Their converts have lost their false religion without having embraced the true religion, and are the very worst people one meets in the East. Much has been said of the reforms in Turkey during the last twenty or thirty years. The Turks, we are told, are becoming liberal. Many of the higher classes certainly have learned to laugh at the Prophet, and to ridicule the Koran, and can drink wine or arrack and eat pork with any Christian; but they have neither the restraints of the Koran nor of the Gospel, and are the most licentious, corrupt, and unprincipled set of rascals on the face of the earth, infinitely worse than the honest old believing Turk, who has learned neither to scoff nor to doubt. I would never disturb a heretic in his heresy, without some reasonable prospect of converting him to orthodoxy. I am a Catholic, but I am for not unsettling the faith of others."

"M. de Bonneville, I presume," interposed O'Flanagan, "does not consider it of any vital importance to a man's soul whether he lives or dies in one religion or another."

"I am a Frenchman," replied De Bonneville, "a loyal Frenchman, and I am of the religion of St. Louis. It is un-French not to be a Catholic, and I will never renounce my faith or my king; but I have nothing to do with the religion of others. As a Frenchman, I can be saved only as a Catholic; as for others, I do not trouble myself about them, I leave them in the hands of the good God."

"Richelieu," added Diefenbach, "thought very much in the same way, when he suppressed, as far as he could, the Huguenots in France, and leagued with the Protestants of the North against Catholic Germany. France, who boasts of being the eldest daughter of the church, is chiefly responsible for the continuance of the Greek schism, and the existence of the Protestant heresy. I do not recollect, in the whole history of France, an instance in which the government has supported Catholicity for the sake of Catholicity. Its policy has always been to use, not serve, the church, to

be Catholic for the glory of France, not for the glory of God; or, perhaps, the Frenchman considers the glory of God is included in the glory of France."

"Perhaps," replied Father John, "Mr. Diefenbach is right as it regards the government of France, but all civil governments have either persecuted the church or merely sought to use her for their own purposes, except the government of the United States. I am aware of no government that has, as a general rule, adopted the policy of serving the church from love of God or devotion to spiritual interests. In this respect France forms no exception, and is far from deserving to be singled out as a special object of censure. Francis I. of France used the Turks against the Emperor Charles V., and the emperor used the Protestants against the pope, Clement VII. Philip II., whose severity against the Protestants of the Netherlands lost him the sovereignty of the United Provinces, and has called forth the condemnation of the civilized world, sought in his support of the Catholic cause to make the church his stepping-stone to universal monarchy. Charlemagne and a few of the Anglo-Saxon sovereigns do really seem to have had some regard in their policy to the glory of the church; but as a general rule, temporal princes seek to subordinate religion to temporal ends, to their personal or national aggrandizement, and the princes of France not more than the princes of Germany, Italy, or Spain. France, with all her faults, has rendered in trying times no unimportant services to religion, and I am never willing that she should be spoken against as having been specially false to her God. If she has done much against the church, she has also done much for it.

"I do not agree with Mr. Winslow that Americanism is Protestantism, or that there is necessarily any incompatibility between it and Catholicity. The great majority of our people are non-Catholic, and their spirit is, if you will, anti-Catholic; but the American system of government and society can adjust itself to Catholicity as well as to Protestantism, and perhaps better. Catholicity recognizes and confirms the law of nature, that is to say, natural justice, denied by the stricter forms of Protestantism, and therefore recognizes the equality of all men before the natural law, the true basis of liberty. Man has no natural right to govern his fellow-man, and therefore only a delegated power over him—a power which he holds as a trust, and for

the exercise of which he is responsible. All Catholic doctors teach that power derives from God through the people or the nation, and that the king is the first officer of the state, not, as Louis XIV. impudently claimed, the state itself. The right of the nation to depose its chief magistrate, and to bring him to justice, was amply proved by Milton in his defence of the English people against Salmasius, for he is in reality not the master but the servant of the nation, and responsible to it—although I regard the trial and execution of Charles I. as eminently unjust. These are the fundamental principles of civil liberty, and these principles are recognized and defended by all our doctors whose authority is worth citing. Hence the sovereign pontiffs, as the ministers of the divine law for Christian nations as well as individuals, have at various times and in various countries deposed faithless, tyrannical and oppressive princes, and absolved their subjects from their oath of allegiance.

"Now, these principles are the foundation of what I call Americanism; they are the basis of our American order of civilization; and the mission of the American people is to develop and realize them in their practice. It seems to me absurd, then, for either a Catholic or a non-Catholic to contend that an American on becoming a Catholic must denationalize himself, and labor to introduce Europeanism as the Catholic order. That European Catholics should naturally retain, or wish to retain, here the order to which they have been accustomed, and that they should suppose that religion requires them to do here as they do in the old countries, is not unnatural, and should excite neither surprise nor rebuke. That Americans trained by professors wedded to Europeanism, should distrust, to some extent, Americanism, and doubt the practicability of evangelizing the country and sustaining Catholicity here in its purity, integrity, and independence, without kings for its nursing-fathers and queens for its nursing-mothers, is also to be expected, because the past history of the world shows no example of a Catholic people placed under institutions exactly like ours. It is to be expected that the recent convert, who finds very few of his countrymen Catholics, should mistake facts for principles, effects for causes, and conclude that whatever has been prevalent in Catholic countries and approved by Catholics, must needs be Catholic; yet a more careful study of history, a calmer and more thorough knowledge of his religion

in its relations to society, will enable him to understand that Catholicity does not impose upon him the necessity of defending, or even permit him to defend, every thing that has been done by a professedly Catholic people, or every thing he finds in the regimen or the administration of so-called Catholic states."

"But you find," remarked De Bonneville, "that faithful princes have done much to defend religion against its external enemies, and to facilitate the conversion of heathen nations. Constantine the Great delivered the church from persecution and gave her peace and a civil STATUS. Charlemagne defended her against the Saracens, and from the combined forces of paganism in his wars against the Saxons. The conversion of the Franks and of the Anglo-Saxons began in the courts of the reigning princes. Catholic monarchy has been and is now the external defender of the church,—under God, her main support; and where monarchy has been weakened, Catholicity has declined; where the monarch has apostatized, the nation has apostatized with him, as in the case of the German princes, the kings of Sweden and Denmark, and the king of England. There were republics in the middle ages, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, &c., but these republics in their glory were sorry friends of the papacy."

"Yet better friends than were the greater part of the emperors of Germany, the kings of France, of England, or of Spain," replied Father John. "Indeed, there were times when the papacy had no human power on which it could rely to defend its independence, but the republicans of Italy. But for them, humanly speaking, the Hohenstaufen would have absorbed the spiritual power in the temporal, and revived the old pagan order of Rome, under which Cæsar was at once emperor, sovereign pontiff, and God. Constantine did little for the church but undo the iniquity of his predecessors; Charlemagne did nobly, I grant, but his successors in France and Germany are answerable in great part for the Greek schism, besides other incalculable evils to religion. The nations that were first converted after the example or through the influence of their princes have for the most part apostatized; only those nations, unless Ireland be an exception, that were fertilized by the blood of martyrs and evangelized by the humble missionary, are Catholic to-day. It is a bastard Catholicity that is taken from the prince, and given up at his bidding. Not to princes,

but to humble fishermen, was given the command to evangelize the nations, and they have injured more than they have served religion by assuming to themselves spiritual functions. The best service they can render to religion is to maintain peace and justice in their realms, and leave religion free under the management of those to whom the Holy Ghost commits the spiritual authority."

"But," rejoined Winslow, "if there is no incompatibility between Catholicity and republicanism, how happens it that all through Europe the enemies of monarchy are the enemies of the church, and the stanch defenders of the church, like Louis Veuillot, are at the same time stanch defenders of monarchy?"

"That is is a question," added De Bonneville, "that I should like to have Father John answer. Nothing is more certain than that the European liberals are anti-Catholic. They were so in the old French revolution; they were so in 1848; they are still more so in 1857. They drove the Holy Father out of Rome, and they would overthrow the papal government again to-morrow, were it not for the troops which France generously sustains in the Holy City."

"One extreme," replied Father John, "begets another. Catholics have an infallible church, that by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, teaches infallibly the truth in faith and morals, but they are not themselves infallible. The first thing for a convert to learn is that not all that is done by Catholics is Catholic, and the fact that we find them wedded to this or that political regimen is no proof that it is a regimen for which Catholicity has any special affinity. The church recognizes every legal government, whatever its form, and teaches her children to demean themselves as loyal citizens or subjects. She prescribes and proscribes no particular form of government. But Catholics, not as Catholics, but as men, may have, as other men, their preferences, and may support their preferences against all contestants.

"In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries absolute monarchy became the ruling order throughout nearly all Europe, in Catholic as well as Protestant states. There were rebellions against it, indeed, in Spain, France, and England —in France in favor of the nobility, in Spain and England in favor of the commons; but they were suppressed, and at the opening of the eighteenth century absolute monarchy had gained the victory. Cæsarism, unless Great Britain

and Holland be an exception, was triumphant, under the hegemony of France. A reaction against this in favor of liberty could not fail to follow. The triumph of monarchy was followed by general corruption of manners and morals in the courts and upper classes, while the peasantry were ground down with exorbitant and still more vexatious taxes, despised by the privileged classes and neglected by the government, which neglected almost every one of its duties, except that of imposing and collecting taxes. Moreover, monarchy had under Louis XIV. revoked the edict of Nantes, persecuted the Huguenots, interfered in the Jansenistic quarrels, and thus excited against it, wherever it professed to be Catholic, and especially in France, the prejudices and passions of the whole heretical and non-Catholic world. Hence the movement in behalf of liberty assumed an anti-Catholic character, under the lead of the bitter but able enemies of Catholicity. Being directed against the church and monarchy at the same time, sincere and earnest Catholics were in a measure forced to make common cause with monarchy, to uphold despotism, and to denounce the liberal movement.

"On the breaking out of the revolution in 1789, the Catholic party could do no better than to prove themselves royalists, and link the defence of the altar with that of the throne; but the consequence of their doing so has placed Catholics in dependence on the sovereigns as defenders and protectors of the church, and deprived them, on pain of being forced to join the liberals against their church, of all freedom to oppose absolutism, and given the liberals an apparent reason for opposing the church as the ally of despotism. In fact, it has become, through the force of circumstances, very nearly impossible to defend religion without defending cæsarism, or to oppose cæsarism without opposing Catholicity."

"Father John, I believe, is correct in his facts," remarked De Bonneville, "but I cannot accept his inferences. The progress of European society has kept pace with the progress of monarchy; monarchy is in civil society what the papacy is in the ecclesiastical society. The men who had developed modern monarchy from the barbarian chieftainship, and made it the representative of the majesty of the state, were Catholics, and we must suppose that in doing it they acted from conviction, not from mere policy, and that in defending it at one time against the papacy, at another time against

the nobles or overgrown barons, or, at still another, against the commons, they acted in accordance with their religious as well as with their political views. They really believed that the interests of the throne and the altar were inseparably connected, and that not accidentally only, but in the nature of things, an attack upon the one is an attack on the other. The European Catholics did but follow their religion as well as their loyalty in rallying around the throne, and placing themselves under the lead of their legitimate sovereign against the liberals, the *sans-culottes*, the Jacobins, who were the sworn enemies of both."

"What the liberals wanted was not liberty," added Winslow, "but license. They were impatient of all restraint, whether civil or religious. They were warring equally against religion and society, and no man who regarded either could do otherwise than oppose them."

"All that is easily said," remarked Diefenbach; "but the inner life of the age was developing itself on the side of freedom, and true wisdom would have taught the Catholic party that resistance would be vain, and that to place external obstacles in its way would only tend to give it a false and unnatural direction. It was the unwisdom of the sovereigns, who mistook their own power and the spirit of their times, that gave to the liberal party their infidel tendency, and the union of the Catholic with the monarchical cause could only strengthen that tendency. The old forms of political organization, the cut and dried formulas of the schools, the puerile and absurd conventionalisms of the times, restrained the workings of the interior spirit, and prevented the growth and expression of the deeper life of men. The whole system which had grown up tended to make life external and mechanical, to dwarf the intellect, to check the growth of free, manly thought, and to hinder the free movements of the heart and soul. Society had lost its naturalness, had become artificial, and life was losing itself in outward forms. The living principle of Christianity could no longer work through those forms; it was too large for them, and must break them or be broken by them. If it could not work with monarchy and the ecclesiastical society, it would work without them, or, if necessary, even against them. Your Richelieus, Mazarins, Louises, Bossuets, and others, who managed affairs for church and state in France, were blind to the real wants of their age, gave to the Catholic mind a false direction, and prepared the way for the

destructive movements of the eighteenth century. They overlooked or warred against the deeper instincts of the Christian soul, and constituted, or labored to constitute, a system of things that made it in the following century almost impossible to defend the cause of legitimate freedom in the nominally Catholic world without seeming to oppose the whole Christian religion. The liberal party erred in identifying liberty with infidelity, as the governmental party erred in identifying religion with monarchy and absolute power. Yet these liberals were not so totally depraved as our friends Winslow and De Bonneville would have us believe. At bottom they had something good, something right, inspired by true religion, and the governments and sincere Catholics should have seen it in time, separated it from the false and the evil with which it was associated, and freely and frankly accepted it."

"The church," added Father John, "never errs, or fails to understand the wants or the movements of the times; but she has to deal with men as she finds them. It is no reproach to her that in matters of human policy Catholics are as blind or as short-sighted as other folk, for she has never had the complete and entire training of any people. She is not of the world, but is placed in the world, and must deal with men *more humano*. Human nature with its virtues and infirmities remains in all men, in Catholics as well as in non-Catholics. The great error of the Catholic populations of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was in suffering the sovereigns to place the civil government above the church, the temporal power above the spiritual. They found Catholic princes their external support against the declared enemies of the church, and they forgot the admonition of the Holy Ghost, 'Put not your trust in princes.' They yielded every thing to their sovereigns, and instead of resisting, aided them in their attempts to grasp absolute power. They relied on the temporal sovereigns to take care of the interests of religion as well as the interests of the state, and naturally regarded opposition to the sovereign as alike rebellion against the state and the church. Hence they became unable to perceive any thing good in the party clamoring for freedom. At least this was true of the majority of the dignified clergy and of the higher classes of society. Finding themselves in the ruling party, and the recipients of the favor of the court, they forgot the poorer and more numerous classes, and pursued blindly the rash policy of re-

sisting along with much error the really just demands of the liberal party.

"The sovereigns of Europe have availed themselves of this political blunder to the fullest extent, and while they have, through the concessions of Catholics, kept their control of Catholic interests, they have asserted their independence of the Catholic party. No European sovereign fears any opposition on the part of Catholics as such, while the Catholics in every Catholic country are dependent on the sovereign to defend them from the irreligious movements of the liberals. He is therefore not obliged to keep terms with them, though they are obliged as they love their religion to keep terms with him. He plays them off against the socialists, or the socialists against them, as it suits his purpose. Hence we find them without independent weight in countries where they are, nominally at least, the overwhelming majority. In France less than a million of the population, out of thirty-six millions, belong to other religions than the Catholic, and yet Catholic interests as such have not the slightest weight with the government. The emperor may outrage the Catholic conscience to any extent he pleases, and even gain in strength and popularity by so doing. The press is free to attack in the most blasphemous manner every thing the Catholic holds dear or sacred, while it is sure to be visited with a *warning* if it presumes to assert the independence of the church and to vindicate the freedom of religion. Under the constitutional government of Louis Philippe, and the republic of 1848, Catholics could speak freely, and boldly and energetically assert the rights of the church; but now there is no freedom, except to eulogize the emperor, the empress, and the imperial *régime*, and such men as Louis Veuillot think the only way to serve religion is to separate it as widely as possible from the cause of liberalism, and link it to the car of triumphant despotism, while they are absolutely impotent to impose the slightest restraint on the despot."

Conversation II.

"I cannot understand Father John's spite," remarked Winslow, "against Louis Veuillot, the most intrepid defender of Catholicity in Europe. I should naturally suppose him a man after his own heart. He is a high-toned papist, a bold and earnest ultramontane, a fearless defender of those very things in ecclesiastical history which timid Cath-

olics seek to conceal or to explain away—a straight-forward journalist, who fixes his eye on the right and pursues it steadily in spite of friend or foe."

"With Louis Veuillot as a man, I have nothing to do," answered Father John. "I owe him no spite and only wish him well. He is, as a Catholic journalist, a power, and a power for evil as well as for good. His journal has acquired an influence over the Catholic mind of France and elsewhere, that I believe injurious to the interests of religion."

"It seems to me, Father John," interposed De Bonneville, "that if it were so, the French bishops and clergy, and especially the pope, would detect the fact, and caution the faithful against it. Are you likely to be better informed, to be sharper sighted, and more devoted to the interests of religion than they?"

"Your *argumentum ad verecundiam*," answered Father John, "admits no reply, and if insisted on puts an end to all discussion. The *Univers* is not a dogma of faith; it is not the Holy See, nor an integral institution of the church; and whether its policy is favorable or unfavorable to religion, I suppose is an open question, on which I am free to express my honest opinions, without offending either the pope or the French bishops and clergy. To a great extent it leads the Catholic mind of Europe, because it appeals to its fear of liberalism, its dread of socialism, and its traditional devotion to absolute monarchy. It is on the winning side, and defends not a noble though a lost cause, but a triumphant despotism. It opposes, too, much that is really bad, really dangerous both to society and the church, and so far really deserves the support of Catholics. But I do not like its spirit, which lacks breadth and discrimination. It is often able, and furnishes many admirable essays on subjects of great importance; but it has a fanatical hatred of parliamentary government, and fails to be fair, honorable, and just to its friends."

"There is no doubt in my mind," interposed Diefenbach, "that the *Univers* represents the popular sentiment of the larger number of European Catholics. Catholics of Europe have suffered immensely from revolutionists, and naturally wedded to order and averse to all public agitation, they honestly conclude that the real interests of society and the church require them to rally around the government and strengthen the hands of power. In 1848 the governments were too weak, and for the moment were obliged to yield

to the mob. Order has been restored and peace maintained only by strengthening the government and arraying it against the revolutionists."

"Very true," replied Father John. "But the weakness of the governments in 1848 arose precisely from the fact that they had neglected to march with the sentiment of their respective nations, and had failed to use their thirty years of peace to give the nations constitutions in harmony at once with the rights of the people and the stability of power. Their present policy is to render their power more absolute, and by more rigid measures of repression to keep down all opposition. This policy may do in moments of actual rebellion, if it can be carried out, but it will not do for the governments of Europe to rely on it as their permanent policy. The system of repression will fail in the most critical moments, and no government is stable that sustains itself only by its army. The real and ever-growing public sentiment of Europe is opposed to absolutism, and that sentiment you cannot change. You may suppress for a day, a month, a year, perhaps years, its expression; but it exists, and is every day gathering strength, and at a moment when the governments least expect it, it will break out with resistless force, and fill the whole earth with terror. Certain that the policy of repression cannot, in the long run, be a successful policy, I am opposed to those one-eyed and short-sighted publicists who would commit Catholicity to its keeping, and involve Catholic interests in its maintenance. The revolution is not ended, and it is perfectly idle to dream of extinguishing it by armed force. The Catholic should feel certain of this, and do his best to guard against a new outbreak by removing the cause. Catholicity is not needed to sustain cæsarism, and it cannot do it effectually, because between it and cæsarism there is an innate incompatibility, and Catholics when they attempt to do it, do not and cannot carry with them the force of their religion. They are as Samson shorn of his locks. But it is needed by the liberals, because an infidel republic, with or without monarchy, can never sustain itself in Catholic Europe. It would lack the essential element of order, and degenerate at once into *démagogie* and anarchy. The true policy of the Catholic who looks to the real interests of both religion and society, is to labor to detach liberty from its present unnatural alliance with infidelity, and the Catholic cause from its present forced alliance with cæsarism, so

as to prove to the world that it is possible to maintain social order without despotism, and liberty without infidelity or rejection of the church. The liberals of Europe cannot be brought back to the church so long as they suppose returning to her communion involves their submission to cæsarism, or political absolutism,—except by a miracle of divine grace, which no man has a right to expect. Humanly speaking, the thing is impossible."

"You would have Catholics join the opposition, and get up a revolution then?" asked Winslow.

"By no means," replied Father John, "yet they might as consistently make common cause with the liberals as with the despots. I am no revolutionist, but I have great confidence in the power of Catholicity, though given solely in reference to spiritual good, to work out all needed social and political reforms, when Catholics will take their cue from the church instead of the secular order, and be willing to apply the principles of their religion to the state and society. All I ask of my European brethren is not to sustain despotism, or to condemn liberty or free government in the name of Catholicity,—not to attack in season and out of season constitutional or representative government, not to decry and do their best to render odious every prominent man among its friends, and finally not to labor to form a public opinion favorable only to absolutism. To a fearful extent Catholicity has lost its hold on the population, even of Catholic countries, and Europe is, I was about to say, more Voltairian than Catholic. What may be called public opinon, is at least uncatholic, and nowhere is the Catholic cause the popular cause, or that which kindles the enthusiasm and calls forth the energetic activity of the mass of the people. It never will be the popular cause so long as the more influential Catholics in Catholic countries exert themselves only in behalf of authority. The reason why the European liberals are almost universally anti-Catholic is not to be set down exclusively to their wickedness and licentiousness. Catholics—not Catholicity—themselves are to some extent responsible for it, and might without proving in any degree unfaithful to their religion, or deficient in true loyalty, do much to render them less hostile to the church. They have some truth and justice on their side, or else they could not sustain themselves as they do, though they certainly have at the same time great and most mischievous errors. Yet Catholics in their controversies with

them and opposition to them have not, it seems to me, been always disposed to concede them the truth and justice they really have, and have not shown themselves as ready to accept and defend their cause, so far as true and just, as they were bound in sound policy and by their religion to have done. They have sometimes denounced where they should have reasoned, and silenced their arguments by authority instead of solid reasons. This has driven them farther than they originally intended, and provoked a hostility towards Catholicity they did not in the beginning entertain. I respect and uphold legitimate authority with my whole heart and strength, but I have observed that holy popes and saintly prelates never bring forward their authority till the appeal to reason and conscience has failed. I am not willing to abandon all European liberals to Satan, and to despair of all efforts to recall them, or at least the larger portion of them, to milder and juster feelings towards the church. I would even stretch a point and go out of my way to convince them that Catholicity treats them with more forbearance than does a certain class of Catholic publicists, and that her sympathies are with the poor and oppressed, and her predilections are for freedom."

"But you seem to me, Father John," said De Bonneville, "to be merely advocating the movement commenced in France by La Mennais, and which you are aware was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI."

"I am not aware that I am advocating any thing the church has condemned in La Mennais. Not all that La Mennais said was false, or all he proposed was wrong. His philosophy was unsound, and I do not hold it; he required the church to place herself on the side of the revolutionary party in opposition to the sovereigns, and raise, as it were, democracy to an article of faith. I do no such thing. I ask neither the church nor the people, Catholic or non-Catholic, to make war on the kings and emperors of Europe. I do not ask her to break her concordats with the sovereigns, and to cut herself loose from all connection with the state. I am not myself a democrat in the ordinary acceptation of the term, or opposed to monarchy where it is the legitimate order. There is no government in Europe, which, in my judgment, its subjects, Catholic or non-Catholic, are not bound to obey, and defend if attacked by violence. The point with me is not there. I wish Catholics, as politicians and statesmen, to accept the great principles of justice and

equity recognized by their religion, insisted on by the great doctors of the church, and labor in a legal and loyal way to restrict the temporal authority within their limits, and to recover for the nation the rights which monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during the great religious wars usurped. Monarchy has concentrated in itself powers once held by the papacy, the nobility, and the commons, and has thus become too strong for freedom, and I would gradually, by the force of public sentiment, restore these powers to the rightful owner. What I ask of Catholics everywhere is, to aid in the growth and efficiency of this public sentiment, that they discriminate in the demands and theories of liberals what is true, just, and practicable, and frankly accept it, and use their influence in a loyal way to gain it a legal recognition and guaranty.

"No one can have studied history, and comprehended the present state of the world, without perceiving that society in Europe is undergoing, nay, since the epoch of Luther's rebellion has been undergoing, a deep and radical transformation. The old order of the middle ages has been demolished; and the absolute monarchy which succeeded it, and which maintains by its army only a fitful and even artificial existence, cannot endure, unless Europe is doomed to follow the example of the Asiatic world, and lapse into a state of semi-barbarism. A radical social change is taking place, which renders the permanent and healthy existence of the old order impracticable, if not undesirable. I say not that this change is a progress—I say not that it promises us any thing better for the world than we before had; but I do say, that it is too late to oppose it with permanent success, and by opposing it, Catholics practically place themselves in the attitude, under a temporal point of view, towards the new order springing up, assumed by the old pagan world of Rome towards the new Christian world that was forming in its bosom, and will inevitably undergo a defeat. What I ask is, that European Catholics take pains not to involve the interests of their religion in the fate of that old superannuated order, and prepare themselves to accept the new state of things that is springing up, and to turn it to the advantage of religion."

"It seems to me," replied Winslow, "that Father John is recommending Catholics to compromise with the spirit of the world. The church is immutable and immovable. It is for her to govern the spirit of the world, not to succumb

to it, or to be governed by it. She cannot change as the world changes, but must be always the same in all times and places. She represents the divine element in human society, and is established to maintain the supremacy of the divine law in human affairs. She can make no compromise with the world."

"Very true," rejoined Father John, "but I am asking for no change in the church, in her dogmas, her morals, her constitution, her policy, or her mode of dealing with individuals or nations. She is infallible and holy, and never errs in her policy any more than in her dogmas. God forbid that I should ask of her any modification of her principles or policy, or any compromise to the spirit of the age. I am not, in my remarks, speaking of the church, nor even of Catholics under their spiritual relations. I am speaking of Catholics only under their temporal relations, of their conduct only in relation to the secular order. In most Catholic states, I find them wedded to what is called in the language of the day the party of the past, and losing their Catholicity in proportion as they approach the party of the future. You find them, if not affected more or less by unbelief, poring over the dead past, living on their traditions, exploring catacombs, deciphering half obliterated inscriptions, and writing history, as if they had no sense of the present, no hope of the future. They seem to give up the present and the future to Cæsar and the enemies of the church, and to feel that the most glorious epoch of Catholicity has passed away. They are without influence in affairs. France, with her thirty-five millions of nominal Catholics, is governed by the non-Catholic mind, as much so as our own country. In Naples, the monarchical rather than the Catholic mind governs. In Austria, the emperor would seem to have a regard for Catholic interest, but the Austrian bureaucracy is Voltairian, and Catholics as such have very little if any weight in the administration. So in all Catholic countries. The governing mind is non-Catholic. Even in Belgium, where the great majority are Catholic, the effective power is in the hands of the non-Catholic or anti-Catholic minority. These are facts which are, no doubt, unpleasant to Catholic ears, but facts they are, and it is idle for us to seek to conceal them or to explain them away. The non-Catholic world know them better than we do, and find in them their only effective argument against us. Count Cavour, the elder, is pious, said to be a good

Catholic, but without talent, force, or energy; his younger brother is prime minister of Sardinia, an able statesman, but a sorry Catholic."

"But our Lord did not come to found a temporal kingdom," said Winslow, "and we are not to look for his earnest and humble followers in courts or the high places of the state. The spirit of our holy religion is that of self-denial, humility, prayer, mortification, and detachment from the world. It stifles worldly ambition, gives men a distaste for affairs, and a relish only for the unseen and the eternal. The true Catholic does not live for this world; he withdraws from it, and devotes all his time and thought to the only really important thing, the saving of his soul."

"The Catholic," added O'Flanagan, "takes no thought for the morrow, and has learned, in whatever state he finds himself, therewith to be content. Why bother one's head with affairs, as though the government of the world was intrusted to our hands, and there was no God to take care of it or of us? Let us leave the world to Providence. Providence will take care of religion, of the church, and of society. We trouble ourselves unnecessarily, and think the Lord cannot manage his own affairs without our assistance."

"And yet," replied Father John, "Mr. O'Flanagan is a patriot, and is ready to make any sacrifice for the liberation of Ireland from the oppression of England and the Orangemen. I understand his and Mr. Winslow's arguments, and the principle on which they are based cannot be gainsaid. Certainly our Lord did not come as a temporal prince to found a temporal kingdom; but he did come to found a church which should teach all men and nations, and in process of time gather all within her fold. Temporal government is indispensable to individuals and society, and when a whole nation becomes Catholic, in whose hands, if not in those of Catholics, is the government to be placed? Undoubtedly, the true Catholic subordinates all his thoughts and actions to eternal good; but there is nothing in his religion that unfits him for taking an active and effective part in temporal affairs. Our Lord did not give us a religion that unfitted us for our duties as men, or as members of natural society; and the peculiar Catholic virtues only render one all the more capable of discharging them wisely, honestly, and faithfully. There is no incompatibility between humility and magnanimity, between weakness and energy, between the absence of worldly ambition and the presence of political hones-

ty and capacity. Our religion requires us to be children in innocence, but at the same time requires us to be men in understanding. It detaches us from the world, but it does not forbid us to serve the true interests of society for God's sake. It never could have been the intention of our Lord to give us a religion which would require a class of non-Catholics, or proud, greedy men of the world to take charge of our temporal interests. The present position of Catholics in so-called Catholic states, is not imposed upon them by their religion, and it is not the effect of their faith, piety, or spiritual-mindedness. It is the result of social, political, industrial, and commercial changes, of which they have not been the first to avail themselves. They have suffered the government of the world to slip from their hands, and they find themselves now deserted by the active, living world, which, by going on without them, is fast hastening to destruction."

"There are," remarked Diefenbach, "many things which were good in their time, which formerly were of great service to religion, and to which the churchmen are still attached from habit of routine, and half identify with religion itself, which must be abandoned. The emperor can no longer be expected to shape his policy in the interest of religion. The recent reception of Turkey, the leading Mahometan power, into the European family of nations, proves that political Christendom is effaced and no longer exists. The Christian law of nations has been abrogated by the treaty of Paris, at least so far as it concerns the principal powers of Europe, and Christianity and Mahometanism are henceforth to be regarded as standing on the same legal footing. The Christian empire ceases to exist, the consecration of nominally Christian kings or emperors would now be an anomaly, nay a gross absurdity. No sovereign now, on acceding to the throne, assumes any Christian obligation; even Russia, by consenting to the peace of Paris, has abandoned her Christian claims, and the Emperor Alexander II. holds by the same title as the padishah of Constantinople. All the governments that were parties to that treaty cease to be Christian governments, and are to be regarded as having thrown off the Christian law. There is no Christian government in the world now, unless it be Spain and Naples, any more than there was when St. Peter established his chair at Rome. The peace of 1856 has definitively changed the relation of the church to the secular authority,

and compelled her henceforth to treat all secular governments as simply non-Catholic; we must, therefore, regard the old union of church and state as everywhere dissolved, and the state as declaring, in principle, that it is no longer bound to govern according to the Christian law. The peace of Westphalia was a compromise; that of Vienna was a partial return to the Christian state; that of Paris marks the definitive victory of the secular order, and the complete emancipation of the empire from the sacerdocy. This last peace has a reach which few have suspected, and must be regarded as a total effacement of the order founded by Charlemagne. It places all religions, Christianity, Protestantism, Mahometanism, Budhism, all the various forms of gentilism, on a footing of perfect equality before international law, and henceforth there is no Christian state, no Christendom, save in the purely spiritual order. All state religions or ecclesiastical establishments become an inconsequence, and must give way before the invincible logic of the human race. No state that adopts the principles of that treaty and the new principles of international law it has introduced, can logically or consistently recognize any religion or treat with any religion as a corporation, as a power. It can guaranty the freedom of religion only in guarantying that of the citizen or the subject."

"That treaty certainly has changed in principle the entire relation which has heretofore existed in Catholic countries between the church and the state, as well as between Christian and infidel powers," added Father John. "The public law of Europe, before that treaty, extended only to Christian powers; it forbade an infidel power to hold a Christian people in subjection, and authorized, as in the crusades, all the powers of Christendom to arm in defence of the Christian against the infidel. Christian princes had the right to make war on infidel powers, and compel them, not to embrace the Gospel, but to receive its missionaries, and to permit their subjects to become Christians if they chose. This right is abandoned now, and the right of the padishah over his Christian subjects is recognized to be as full and as complete as over his Mahometan subjects. All right of interference for the protection of Christians against the persecutions and oppressions inflicted on them by their infidel masters is now disclaimed, and the right of interference now is only in behalf of the freedom of commerce. I regard the treaty of Paris as a solemn declaration by the great powers of

Europe that they officially ignore the Christian law, and are no longer held to govern as Christian powers. The state henceforth professes no religion, and rejects, as the state, all religion; hence the new danger of political absolutism to religious interests. Religion can now be free, not in its own right, but only in the right of the citizen or subject, as included in the number of his private or personal rights. Under absolutism the subject has no rights, and, therefore, under absolutism the church has and can have no freedom, because there is no freedom of the citizen or subject in which it can be included. It can now be free only in a free state, a state which recognizes and guaranties to all its members the freedom of conscience as a natural and inalienable right. Whatever was the duty of Catholics before the treaty of Paris, there can be no question now that it is to labor to convert the European governments, as far as possible, into free states. Of course they must reject the revolutionary principles of the red-republicans and the insane and licentious theories of the socialists, but they must in other respects, however unpleasant it may sound, make common cause with the liberals."

"Father John seems to me," replied O'Flanagan, "to push the matter too far. I am for liberating oppressed nationalities, and restoring Ireland, Poland, Hungary, and Italy to their national independence, but I see not why the church cannot be as free under one form of government as another, why the monarch should be more disposed to oppress the church than would be the people. It seems to me, as I have often heard Father John himself maintain, that the true policy is to seek the freedom of the state in religious guaranties, not the freedom of religion in political guaranties."

"That," answered Father John, "in one sense I still maintain. The monarch would be as good security as the people, providing that he held his throne by a Christian tenure, and acknowledged himself bound to reign as a Christian king, as in the middle ages; for then the church, as the interpreter and judge of the Christian law, would be acknowledged by the civil law to be supreme, and her canons would bind the civil courts. If the king infringed her rights, she could excommunicate him, and deprive him of his authority. But there is no excommunicating the sovereign who places himself as sovereign out of the Catholic communion, and the church cannot deprive a king

that does not hold his power by a Christian title. She did not deprive the Roman or even the Greek emperors. Cæsar is, though privately a Catholic, now, as Cæsar, of no religion, and is therefore in his official character not under the Christian law, but outside of it, and his title remains legally the same, whether he is a Mussulman or a Gentoo. The church cannot touch him. The pope may indeed absolve the Catholic subject from his allegiance, and even forbid him to obey his orders, but this, however good *in foro conscientiæ*, would not be recognized *in foro exteriori*, and the subject would be liable to be condemned in the civil courts, and executed as a traitor, because no law of the state recognizes the legal authority of the pope. The sovereigns of Europe have rejected the old European law so far as it imposes restrictions on the temporal power, and it is idle for us to dream, in the present state of the world, of reviving it. Leave, then, the sovereign absolute in face of the subject, and you have and can have no ground on which you can legally or constitutionally, that is, in the civil courts, assert the freedom of religion.

"By the treaty of Paris the principal powers of Europe have adopted on one side, in relation to the church, the American system, and freed themselves from all obligation to her or to any religion. Whether this is to be regarded as a gain or a loss to religion, I pretend not to decide. Much may be said on both sides. I will only say that it is in harmony with the modern world, which puts trade in the place of the church, and material civilization in place of religion, and whether we like it or dislike it, we cannot help ourselves. We must accept it and do the best we can with it. But, if we acquiesce in absolutism emancipated from the church, we leave our religion without protection, and all her temporal interests as well as the consciences of Catholics at the mercy of the despot. We must insist on carrying out the American order, in the respect that it guaranties individual liberty and entire freedom of conscience, as well as in the respect that it emancipates power from its obligation to govern as a Christian power; so that the civil courts will be legally obliged to protect the church, because obliged to protect the liberty of the citizen or subject, as is the case in this country, and to a certain extent in Great Britain. Mr. O'Flanagan will see, then, why I so earnestly insist on constitutional guaranties for freedom in opposition to the new-fangled cæsarism, defended by Louis Veuillot and a certain number of French and other Catholics.

"I regard it as certain that henceforth the church can count on no protection, as a church, from the civil power,—that she will, even in Catholic countries, soon be compelled to stand before the state on a footing of equality with Protestantism, Mahometanism, Gentooism, or any other form of religion or no religion, and to rely solely on her own intrinsic divinity and excellence. She has, like all other religions, to throw herself into the great current of modern life, and struggle as best she may, asking and receiving no special favor or protection. This situation is in some respects new, and it is no reproach to the ecclesiastical authorities to say that neither here nor elsewhere have Catholics been universally trained either to comprehend or to meet it. In this matter, as in all matters of importance, the few are in advance of the many. The few in Europe see, or think they see, the inevitable tendency of the modern spirit, and are urging upon their brethren to adapt themselves to the new position of things. They are looked upon with distrust, as restless or innovating spirits, by those who do not see that tendency, or who, seeing it, still hope that it may be arrested, and the old order reëstablished. Hence, a sort of division, not in matters of faith, not in morals, obtains among Catholics; one party are for accepting and conforming to what they regard as inevitable, and seeking elsewhere a substitute for the old order which now fails us; the other party are either blind to the changes that are going on, or denounce them and do all they can to resist them. It is here as elsewhere my good or bad fortune to be with the few, though with real fraternal affection for the many. In our own country we have freedom for our church, and that is much, but aside from protection by the laws of our rights as citizens and men, we have nothing. It is clear, then, to my judgment that the old training, which was very proper when the people counted for nothing in the state, will not answer for us. Not only the clergy but the laity have here a work which formerly they had not. Every Catholic layman has to be to his church now, in his own sphere, what in other times the good Catholic sovereign was. The age is a fast age, and is sure to outrun Catholics, unless they quicken their pace, and endeavor to keep up with it. They must be behind in nothing, except sin. They must recover, and take the lead of the age, and do so by their real superiority in mental and moral activity, by their foresight and energy, by their large views and generous enthusiasm. The church

must regain through the people what she has lost or is losing through the sovereigns. You see, then, the nature of the struggle in which we are engaged, and why, while my principles remain unchanged, I do not and cannot use in all respects the same language I did in 1848. We are no longer in the same world. As the sovereigns have asserted their freedom in face of religion, the people must assert their rights in face of the sovereigns, in the interest both of civil and religious liberty."

"I think I understand Father John's doctrine, and I freely accept it for the United States," replied De Bonneville, "but I am not prepared to accept it for old Europe. Here your state leaves religion, as such, to itself, and takes no care of it. It is in accordance with your order that it should do so. Your federal constitution contains no recognition even of God, except by implication in the instances in which it demands an oath, and with that exception would be as suitable to a nation of atheists as to a nation of Christians. Here, I grant, the church rests for its support on the individual conscience, and can claim or receive protection only as being the conscience of the citizen. But this order can never be admitted in Europe. There the sovereigns are more or less affected by tradition, and they will never consent to surrender their surveillance of ecclesiastics and ecclesiastical affairs. Moreover, the Catholic population, accustomed to governmental control, assistance, and protection in religious matters, if abandoned by the state and thrown upon their own resources, would soon cease to be Catholic, and lapse into heathenism. If the government should withhold its salary from the clergy, and leave them for their support to the voluntary offerings of the faithful, more than half the churches in France would be closed in six months. The union of church and state is a political and a religious necessity in every Catholic country in Europe, and if in fact dissolved, the mass of the people would live and die as heathen."

"Every transition from one order to another," interposed Diefenbach, "is always attended by more or less of evil, and there can be no doubt that the introduction of the American order into the old Catholic states of Europe would be at first very injurious to religion. But we must recollect that religion is already at a low ebb in all Catholic Europe, and that the majority of educated men, not priests or religious, are little better than nominal Catholics. They

may not wholly break with the church, but they are governed neither by her teachings nor by her spirit, while the mass of the peasantry in France never dream of so absurd a thing as going to confession. What is needed is to recover the mass of the population to a living, energetic faith, and that you will never do so long as they associate Catholicity with the authority that visits them in the shape of the tax-collector. Neither ecclesiastical nor civil authority can restore them to a living faith. External authority in matters of religion does not and will not weigh with them. It is only through freedom, and the free development of the inner life, that they will once more become hearty believers. Without disturbing the present order, I would, as Father John recommends, begin to train them in reference to the new order which soon or late must come, as Sardinia proves to us, and which no earthly power can prevent. You must educate the people as you never yet have done; you must enable them to understand their own deeper wants, and lead them back to the church through science and high intellectual and moral culture."

Conversation III.

"I have been reading," remarked Mr. Winslow, "some articles in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, by an American in Rome, intended to enlighten the Roman court as to matters and things in this country,—our political institutions, the character and tendency of our people, and the prospects of their conversion afforded by the rise and multiplication of sects, the furthest removed possible from Catholicity. The writer has a hopeful disposition, is full of enthusiasm, and seems to see every thing *couleur de rose*. He does not seem to be aware that Rome is not likely to fall in love with 'Young America,' and that one of the worst methods he could take to gain her confidence would be to prove that Catholics here have a strong tendency to embrace the extreme democracy of the American people."

"Rome is wise," added De Bonneville, "and is not likely to see in the rejection of all revealed truth, in the falling back on pure nature, and seeking their good in the senses alone, a promise of speedy conversions to Catholicity. Rome, too, has had some experience of liberalism, and is strongly inclined to regard it as the exponent not of a Catholic but of an anti-Catholic spirit. An alliance of

Catholicity and modern liberalism does not strike her as natural or desirable. Men must be governed, and to be well governed they must have developed in them the spirit of loyalty."

"They must," continued Mr. Winslow, "have in them the spirit of obedience,—a clear, distinct recognition of authority and submission to it as authority. They must act, not from the spirit of self-sufficiency, of disobedience, but from the spirit of obedience."

"That is," interposed De Bonneville, "from true loyalty. But as far as I have been able to observe, your countrymen have no such word as loyalty in their vocabulary, no such principle as that word stands for in their hearts. To be 'leal-hearted,' is not, it strikes me, an American characteristic. The American has great self-reliance, 'a gude conceit o' himsel',' but, barring a certain flunkeyism in the wealthier classes, no respect or reverence for any thing above himself. I was discussing with an American gentleman the other day a grave philosophical question, when a sprightly lad, some fourteen years of age, who I am sure did not understand a word we said, broke in with 'I differ from you in opinion, Mr. de Bonneville.' I was silent of course. Your very boys hold themselves competent to dispute with your graybeards, and claim the right to hold and act from their own opinions without the least regard to wisdom, learning, age, position, or experience. You reverence nothing, and even your gallantry towards the fair sex is rather a prurient fancy than a genuine respect for the dignity of woman. To a stranger, a foreigner like myself, you seem absolutely deficient in reverence, and unable to appreciate true dignity. I hear, at your public meetings, striplings speaking with surprising self-confidence on grave political and financial questions of which they absolutely know nothing, save a few cant phrases. With you nothing is venerable, not even the mother of God, nay, not even God himself, and the only indication I can discover that your religious nature is not wholly obliterated, is the fact that some of you now and then do fear the devil, and are afraid of taking his name in vain."

"If that," interrupted Winslow, "were said by a countryman of mine, I should allow its truth, but it goes against my patriotism to hear it from a foreigner."

"Mr. Winslow has, after all, a slight feeling of nationality," interposed O Flanagan, "and is a little impatient when

he hears foreigners tell even the truth of his countrymen; let him pardon then the sensitiveness of my countrymen, when they hear foreigners saying not what is true, but what is false, of Ireland and the Irish."

"Let us have no more of that," interposed Father John. "Truth is truth, let who will speak it, and he who recoils from it is no true man. The shield has its reverse side. The writer in the *Civiltà Cattolica* has, possibly, not given the whole truth, and he may have given too favorable a picture of the American people; but he has raised a voice in favor of his countrymen, where few voices have been raised but in their disparagement. He has done well in presenting a picture of the bright side of the country, and in telling those things favorable to us, which are not usually told in the Catholic press of Europe. Catholic Europe has hardly yet learned to do us justice, and is very far from estimating us according to our real importance as a nation. It is only a few years since this same *Civiltà Cattolica* represented American society as a mixture of Indians, Negroes, and the descendants of European settlers; and the devout people of France and Italy still, very generally, when they hear talk of *Americans*, suppose the savage or Indian tribes are meant. They have not yet learned that there is a great and independent nation here, originally of European descent,—a civilized nation, with a polity, laws, institutions, and a national character of its own,—with a larger population than England, Scotland, and Ireland, and almost as large as the population of France or that of the empire of Austria, and in trade and commerce ranking as second only to Great Britain, and surpassing even her in her tonnage.

"Moreover, Catholic Europe has not been alive to the influence this American nation is likely in the future to exert on European thought and institutions, especially through England, and still more from its position on the Pacific, on Japan, China, and the whole of eastern Asia, and Oceanica. The two great conquests for the church now to make are Russia and this same American nation. Russia is virtually Catholic at heart, and though schismatical is not heretical. Nothing in her case is needed but her reconciliation with the chair of Peter. That reconciliation, if not opposed for political reasons by France and Austria, I regard as neither difficult nor distant. That reconciliation, once effected, secures the destruction of the Mahometan power, and the conversion of old Asia. The conversion of this American

nation secures this continent and its islands to the church, the faith and worship of Christopher Columbus, and Americus Vespuccius. To the Catholic, after the restoration of Russia to unity, there is no conquest to the faith so important as the conversion of the people of the United States. I am, therefore, pleased, that our friend at Rome has done what he could to call the attention of Catholics abroad to its importance."

"All that is very well," replied Winslow, "but I cannot understand how Rome can infer the feasibility of the conversion of the country from such movements as those of Brook Farm and Fruitlands, inspired by a socialistic, not a Christian spirit, and contemplating a heaven on earth, through gratification of the senses or passions, not a heaven hereafter through supernatural elevation of man to union with God."

"Every man," answered Father John, "has his own point of view, and his own idiosyncrasies. The movements our friend alleges are not in my view representative movements, and to me they have very little significance, for they were not indigenous, and did not spring spontaneously from the American mind and heart. All the movements of the sort amongst us have been produced by foreign speculations, or by foreigners coming here for the purpose of realizing their dreams. Even the Valley of the Cross movement in North Carolina was only an echo of the Puseyite movement in Great Britain. I never could attach to these things the importance attached to them by the author of the *Questions of the Soul.* They are important, however, in so far as they indicate that our people are not satisfied with the forms of Protestantism they now have."

"It seems to me," interposed Diefenbach, "that they are something more. They indicate a tendency on the part of the American people to get rid of shams, to dispense with cant, and to fall back on simple nature, and yield themselves to its pure instincts and lofty aspirations. Men cannot remain contented with pure nature, for it aspires to something more than itself; it tends instinctively to Catholicity. It is easier to convert a man from pure nature than it is from Calvinism. Hence I see a favorable sign in the very tendency of the American people to unbelief,—to pure nature."

"I cannot agree with Herr Diefenbach in that," remarked O'Flanagan, "and it seems to me a bit of a bull, to

suppose men are brought nearer the church by being removed further from her. It is no easy matter to make an impression upon a mind that has rejected all belief in the supernatural, and has succeeded in persuading itself, that there is and can be nothing on which to rely but nature alone. Men who have lost all belief in Christianity, and have fallen back on simple nature, usually seek their good from nature alone, that is, from the natural order, and become selfish and sensual. They devote themselves to temporal and sensible goods, and become deaf to all religious appeals, blind to all spiritual truth, and dead to all moral convictions. Let a nation lose all trace of supernatural life, the last remnant of its belief in a supernatural order, and it has lost all public and private virtue, and has and will acknowledge no God but the world, no good but sensible good. Instead of following pure instincts, and yielding to lofty aspirations, it becomes the slave of concupiscence, and bears as its fruits, covetousness, murder, contention, wrath, hatred, sensuality, and all manner of vice and crime. It follows the lower instincts, the senses, the corrupt desires, and becomes a Sodom or a Gomorrha."

"Mr. O'Flanagan is right in the main," replied Father John. "No man is brought nearer the church by being removed further from her, and a serious, earnest Protestant people are preferable to a purely infidel people. They are too, in my judgment, more easily converted. Sincere and earnest Protestants have always some elements of Catholic truth, and that truth forms a basis on which you can construct your argument. They *mean* to be Christians, and, if sincere, when convinced that to be Christians they must be Catholics, they will become Catholics. The chief obstacles we have to encounter in converting this country, do not arise from the Protestantism, but from the infidelity of our countrymen, or rather from the fact that with too many of them Protestantism is only another name for unbelief, or the rejection of all belief in revealed religion. We can now hardly treat Protestantism as a religion, even a false religion, and we are obliged, for the most part, to reason with Protestants as if they were downright infidels. But I look upon this as a disadvantage, not as an advantage."

"It strikes me," interposed De Bonneville, "that there is always hope of regaining a people that still retains some hold on Christian tradition, but that we may abandon in despair a people once christianized, that has completely

broken with that tradition. As long as a Protestant people means to be Christian, and retains a belief in the Trinity, the Incarnation, grace, and the sacraments, we have some hold on them, and can influence them by showing them that their Protestantism leads to infidelity, and the principle of their dissent from the church, if logically carried out, would require them to reject every thing distinctively Christian. But when they have avowedly shaken off all Christian belief, when they have consciously fallen back on nature alone, you can no longer influence them by proving that Protestantism leads to infidelity, or that to be Christians they must be Catholics, for they have no intention, no desire to be Christians. No doubt, large numbers of the French philosophers of the last century renounced their infidelity on their death-beds, and died in the communion of the church; but it must be remembered that they had been baptized in their infancy, and had been believers in their childhood, and had subsequently smothered rather than extinguished the faith they had received. No doubt, the author of *The Questions of the Soul*, as well as the author of *The Convert*, came to the church through a speculative rejection of revelation; but a careful analysis of this experience, as they have published it to the world, proves that they never wholly broke with Christian tradition, and never wholly lost the memory of their childhood's faith. They for a time saw nothing but nature on which to rely, but the grace of God never permitted them to rest there, and all unconsciously were they practically influenced by the brief and mutilated Christian instruction they had received."

"What Mr. de Bonneville ascribes to tradition and instruction, I should be disposed to ascribe to human nature or human reason itself," remarked Diefenbach. "Nature is too often underrated, and we too often overlook the fact that the human heart is naturally Christian, as says Tertullian. Nature left to herself aspires to the truth, aspires to God, and natural reason sees clearly the necessity of the supernatural. Hence it is that men cannot rest in purely natural religion. The free and full development of their reason of itself leads to the recognition of something higher, makes them long for supernatural guidance, and prepares them to receive and follow such guidance when given. God is himself in immediate relation with the soul, is himself the immediate light of reason, and hence he continually enlightens us interiorly, and conducts us to the truth."

"In the natural order, if you please," replied Father John; "but you forget that Christianity, though it presupposes the natural, is itself in the supernatural, and is in no sense indicated by the natural. Without natural reason, we could not be the recipients of revelation, but God makes his revelation to, though not through, natural reason. The light of his immediate presence constitutes reason and renders us rational creatures, but the light of God in revelation is his supernatural light, which illumines us immediately only in the beatific vision, and never in this life, for in this life we live by faith, not by sight. Mr. Diefenbach's doctrine is uncatholic, as well as unphilosophical, and makes no difference of order between the natural and the supernatural, and would imply that the supernatural is only a higher and fuller development of the natural."

"Tertullian, indeed, says," interposed Winslow, "that the human heart is naturally Christian, but he meant it only in what theologians call *sensus compositus*. Tertullian, as many of the early writers of the church, understood by nature, not pure nature, but nature as it exists prior to its elevation through the gift of faith received in baptism, prior to regeneration, or the birth of the soul into the supernatural order. But even prior to regeneration, nature actually exists in no man as pure nature, for it has never been wholly divested of the tradition of the revelation made to our first parents. From this tradition, however corrupted, mutilated, or travestied, all men have some indications of a supernatural order, some glimpses of a supernatural destiny, and wants and aspirations which are impossible to simple nature, entirely abandoned to its own lights."

"That is true," added Father John. "Strictly speaking, it is inexact to say that the human heart is naturally Christian, for whatever is distinctively Christian is above nature, though accordant with nature. Christianity accords with reason and satisfies our natural desire for good, but not therefore do we naturally desire it, or can we by our own natural reason attain to it. The supernatural must, in some degree or form, be revealed or be presented to reason, before the reason can conceive of its existence or its possibility. Nature alone, without revelation, is not equal to the conception of the supernatural; for to conceive the supernatural without revelation, nature would have to go out of its own order and enter the supernatural, and therefore would itself be supernatural in its power. If, then, you could obliterate

all traces of a supernatural revelation, divest a man wholly of all Christian tradition, and reduce him to pure nature, he would and could have no thought and no aspiration transcending the natural order. He might desire to know more than he does, he might have unsatisfied wants and desires, but never would he think of seeking their satisfaction in a supernatural order. These natural instincts and lofty aspirations appealed to in our arguments for Christianity may exist, but they are not purely natural, and they spring from reminiscences of the primitive revelation preserved in language, and which is retained in its purity, fulness, and integrity only in the speech of the church."

"It seems to me, also," remarked O'Flanagan, "that Mr. Diefenbach makes no allowance for the effects of the fall, and regards our nature morally and intellectually considered, as still in its original integrity, with its face turned towards the truth, and its primary and instinctive motions towards God. This I apprehend is not the case. By the fall reason lost its dominion over the flesh, and we find now that we more readily follow concupiscence than reason and conscience; virtue demands now always an effort, and restraint is always necessary to save ourselves from yielding to temptation and rushing into vice. It is the fact that our non-Catholic population are losing that portion of Catholic truth retained, though inconsistently, by the earlier forms of Protestantism, and are breaking almost entirely with primitive tradition, that renders their conversion in very large numbers well-nigh hopeless. The heathen in ancient or modern times, corrupt, mutilate, or travesty, but they never entirely lose the tradition of the supernatural. The Catholic missionary has not to convince them that there is a supernatural order; he has only to show them that it is found in the church, and the church only. So it is with what are called orthodox Protestants. But so is it not with the rationalists, with unbelievers. They not only reject the church, as founded on Peter, but even the tradition of the primitive revelation incorporated in some manner into every language and speech of men. They fall back on nature alone, and regard as an illusion every reminiscence of the primitive supernatural revelation which may now and then come up unbidden to their minds. How are you to reach them by argument? You cannot by natural reason alone, or from nature in its present state, prove the fact of the fall, and there is no logical process by which you can conclude the

supernatural from the natural. You can convict no man of logical inconsistency, who plants himself on nature, and resolves to live the life of nature alone."

"Hence by mere logic," interposed Father John, "you cannot reach the purely natural man, for pure nature is, and must be, as the work of God, consistent with itself. We can prove, but we cannot demonstrate, the fact of revelation to the man who falls back on pure nature. We can show that nature does not suffice for man in his present state, but we cannot show that nature does not suffice for nature, or natural reason for natural reason; for God might have created, had he so chosen, nature and reason as we now find them, without creating for man a supernatural order, or appointing him a supernatural destiny. The naturalist says he has done so; the Catholic says he has not. The question between the two is a question of fact, not a question of logic; and the Catholic can, in the nature of the case, prove his assertion only as any other matter of fact is proved, that is, by testimony. I mean, he can do it only in this manner in the case of the man who plants himself on nature alone. In the case of old-fashioned Protestants, Jews, Mahometans, and gentiles, it is different, for they accept reason and nature in the *sensus compositus*, and in some form confess the supernatural. In their case we have in the actual state of their reason, the premises of an argument for Catholicity; but in the case of those who have eliminated, as our unbelievers have done, all that is derived from tradition, and reduced it to pure natural reason, there is no basis for such an argument. It is therefore that, as a Catholic even, I regret to find the American people breaking away from the older and less unevangelical forms of Protestantism, and lapsing into pure rationalism, transcendentalism, socialism, or naturalism. It is not from those who thus break away we are to obtain accessions to our ranks. In my judgment, we should rather join with the less unchristian portion of the Protestant world in a warfare against these, than with these against those who still acknowledge the supernatural order."

"But our friend at Rome," added Diefenbach, "believes that man has a religious nature, and that when he finds that he cannot satisfy that nature in Protestantism, when he finds that his only alternative is Catholicity or no religion, he will become a Catholic. This is wherefore he

thinks that the dissatisfaction with Protestantism and the search after something better, manifested by the founders of Brook Farm and Fruitlands,—by the Mormons, Swedenborgians, and Spiritists, &c., are encouraging signs to the Catholic missionary."

"There may be something in that," replied Father John, "and I, for a considerable time, was disposed to take that view myself. But wider observation and experience do not confirm it. Our converts do not generally come to us from the ranks of those who have shaken off all religious belief, and have retained only their simple religious nature. In England and the United States the majority of converts are from the Anglican communion, and those who come to us that were not originally of that communion, generally come to us through it. Our true course, it seems to me, is the one the church has always appeared to approve, which has generally been pursued by our controversialists and missionaries, not that of seeking first to drive the misbelieving or heretical into complete apostasy, with a view of converting them afterwards, but that of recognizing and confirming the truth they still possess, and showing them that the complement, unity, and integrity of that truth can be found and held only in the Catholic Church."

"Father John, then, it seems," remarked O'Flanagan, "regards rationalism, transcendentalism, and downright unbelief as worse enemies to the church than simple heresy."

"Certainly," replied Father John, "but not therefore do I regard them as invincible, or even the conversion of their adherents as utterly hopeless. I regard the prevalence of rationalism, transcendentalism, socialism, scepticism, infidelity, among our countrymen, an unfavorable circumstance, and one which renders their conversion vastly more difficult, but not impossible. Our friend sees encouraging circumstances where I do not find them, but I as firmly believe that our religion is destined to prevail here as he does, and I have no sympathy with those who say Americans cannot be converted. I was lately dining with a party of American converts, among them was an ex-bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, an ex-priest and an ex-deacon of the same church, the latter of whom had been educated a Congregationalist,—one who had been a decided unbeliever, and another who had been through all the extremes of modern speculation and philosophism. Nearly all the phases of the

American mind were represented in our little party, from the highest form of Puseyism to the lowest form of infidelity, and yet we were all firm Catholics, meeting in the unity of faith, and the unity of love. The party was a practical answer to those who doubt the possibility of the conversion of the American people, for the majority of the party were real Yankees, New England born and New England bred. The grace of God that had reached and converted them, can reach and convert others. I sympathize with our friend's hopefulness, although I may not share all his views, or expect the conversion of the country from any direct efforts to effect it. It will come gradually, but in time it will come, from the increasing numbers and weight of the Catholic population, by the efforts of the venerable bishops and clergy to make the faithful here a model people, by the gradual diffusion of knowledge in respect to Catholicity and Catholic things, by the prayers and good example of the faithful, and by the grace of God silently operating upon the hearts of the people. Years will elapse before much progress is apparent, but nevertheless the work of conversion will go on; individual after individual will be gathered in, till at length the nation will find itself Catholic, and taking its rank among Catholic nations."

Conversation IV.

"Catholicity, remarked O'Flanagan, "hardly holds its own in this country, notwithstanding its apparent increase. The number of Catholics now in the country is not equal to the number of Catholics who have migrated hither, and their descendants. Our losses are greater than our gains by conversions."

"Our losses are great," replied Winslow, "but that is not what discourages me, for they are due to accidental and temporary causes, every day becoming less operative, as the numbers of the clergy, churches, school-houses, hospitals, and asylums increase. Neither am I one of those who despair of seeing the church prevail here; but I cannot persuade myself that any general conversion of the American people will take place till they moderate their democracy."

"Democracy," interposed De Bonneville, "is fatal to genuine loyalty, and a people destitute of loyalty are not easily converted to Catholicity. They have no tendency to

it, and necessarily find it repugnant to their habits and dispositions. Our friend at Rome, perhaps, is not mistaken in his hopes of the conversion of the country, but he seems to me mistaken in regarding its democracy as one of the circumstances favorable to it."

"Mr. Calhoun, the great South Carolina statesman, remarked to me one day," answered Father John, "that we made a great mistake in this country, when we substituted the word democracy for the word republican. Words are things, and from the habit of calling ourselves democrats we have come to embrace democratic notions. The American people in 1776 were republican, but not democratic, and the federal constitution was, in 1787, avowedly formed with a view to checking the tendency to democracy which had begun to manifest itself in several of the states. The government of the country was not originally, and is not now, purely democratic, because under it the people have no right to alter or amend the constitution, whether of state or Union, save by virtue of a constitutional provision, and in the way and manner the constitution provides. When the constitution is formed, and has gone into operation, the convention of the people which formed it is dissolved."

"But," asked Diefenbach, "are not the people sovereign? and does not the sovereignty inhere in them, and persist in them even under constitutional forms?"

"That," replied Father John, "is the democratic doctrine, but it is not the American doctrine, or was not when our civil and political institutions were adopted. The sovereignty inheres in the organism, and can be exercised only in accordance with its laws. The error of our politicians has been in overlooking this fact, and assuming that the sovereignty, after the constitution, persists in the people outside of the organism, and that their will, expressed any way, through or not through the organism, is supreme, and is to be regarded as the sovereign will. This doctrine came into vogue under General Jackson's administration, and is the fruitful source of lawlessness and disorder. I do not think this doctrine favorable to Catholicity any more than to good government, for it is essentially opposed to all law as law, and substitutes for the government of law, the dominion of arbitrary will. Pure democracy, like pure monarchy, is the government of mere will, and all government of mere will is a despotism under a monarchy, and anarchy

under a democracy. The radical difference between democracy and republicanism is that the latter places sovereignty in the organism, and subjects its exercise to law, while the former places it in the people outside of the organism, and leaves its exercise without legal restraint. Democracy is the absolutism of the people; republicanism is a government limited and subjected to a constitutional organism. Republicanism is freedom; democracy is incompatible with freedom. It either does not govern at all, or it governs arbitrarily. The worst tyranny France ever suffered was under the Jacobins, those pure democrats of the last century. The American institutions are not democratic, though the American people are becoming democrats, and giving their institutions a democratic interpretation, or altering them in a democratic sense. Hence our grave political danger."

"This danger," added Winslow, "our friend at Rome does not seem to be aware of, and hence he gives a wrong impression of the country."

"Perhaps," replied Father John, "he did not think it necessary to dwell on it; perhaps also he does not regard it as so threatening as it really is; perhaps he is more democratic in his own personal convictions or tendencies than we who are somewhat his seniors, and are no longer subject to the illusion of mere names; but, undoubtedly, the point he wished to impress upon the minds of his readers is that in this country there is as yet much real freedom, and full legal freedom for the church, which is, undoubtedly, not only a fact, but a fact favorable to the growth and expansion of Catholicity amongst us. He did well to dwell on this fact. The Catholic can well accept and defend as favorable even to his church our institutions, according to their original intent. What he has to guard against is, presenting them as favorable to the church in the sense it has now become the fashion to interpret them,—a fashion which makes them just what the dominant sentiment of the country for the time chooses. The danger the Catholics run here is the taking of that sentiment as the constitution, and following it out in our political action, instead of resisting it, and doing all in our power to bring the practical interpretation of our institutions back to their original republican meaning, Restore in practice the republican theory of our institutions,—I have no reference to the Republican party, so called,—and then the Catholic can heartily accept them,

and praise and defend them with all the patriotism and loyalty congenial to his heart."

"Till then," replied Winslow, "I do not see how Catholicity is to make much progress among the American people, and till it has made great progress and gained a controlling influence, I see not how we are to return practically to our republican theory."

"I see," rejoined Father John, "and admit the difficulty. I do not believe it an easy matter to convert a democratic people, and if their conversion depended on human efforts alone, I should despair of it. Pure democracy is, as M. de Bonneville holds, fatal to genuine loyalty. Loyalty can exist only under a government of law, embodied either in a constitutional organism or in the legitimate prince. Loyalty has been much weakened, and well-nigh destroyed, in Great Britain since the expulsion of the Stuarts and the accession of the Hanoverians. It is nearly dormant with us, and threatens ere long to sleep the sleep of death. Democracy cherishes a proud, conceited individualism, and at the same time a mean and cringing servility to popular opinion. Under a democracy, as our own experience proves, the individual forms an exaggerated estimate of himself, is in relation to other individuals self-sufficient, conceited, saying virtually to each one of them, 'I am as good as you, and a great deal better too,' while he is deplorably deficient in true independence of thought and action in face of the public. The thoroughpaced democrat, haughty and overbearing to his equal, is a timid slave before public opinion. He puts the people in the place of God, and takes whatever is popular to be lawful and right. He asks, Is it popular, will the people—which means his party—support it? If so, all right, go ahead! To stand well with the public, with one's party, or one's set, is the highest aim. As the questions are to be decided by votes, and votes are counted, not weighed, the appeal must be made to the many. Hence democracy has a natural tendency to reduce all virtue and all intelligence to a dead level. The mass of the people in our country are perhaps more intelligent, at least in political matters, than the lower classes in most European countries; our educated and cultivated classes are far below the corresponding classes in any European state. Indeed, our educated classes do not compare favorably with the educated classes of Mexico, and some of the South American states. There is little in our community to stimulate

exertions for the higher degrees of excellence. To rise too high is to rise out of reach and out of sight of the multitude; only inferior men, common-place men, can hope to secure the popular favor. No man of first-rate attainments or first order of abilities can hope to be elected president of the Union. Your Harrisons, Polks, Taylors, Pierces, Buchanans, carry it over your Clays, Calhouns, and Websters. The candidate is selected, not because he is fit, but because he is or is presumed to be available, and he is the more available the less the weight he carries. Look at the recent delegations in congress from Massachusetts and New York, or to their representatives in the state legislatures, and say if a high order of intelligence and public and private virtue are not a positive disqualification. High scholarship, profound, discriminating, original thought, are not and cannot be appreciated by the great mass of the people, and our authors to be popular must be superficial, commonplace, vapid, bombastic, or intense. What rises above the common level rises above the common intelligence. The reduction of all to the level of the mass, the self-sufficiency, and the obsequiousness to popular opinion, so manifest among us, are, no doubt, unfavorable to the conversion of our countrymen, because Catholicity requires true greatness, true independence and manliness of character, love for our equals, respect for our superiors, firmness of purpose, and loyalty to truth, to right, to justice.

"I see little in the American character as it has been developed under our democratic theory, to encourage my hopes as a Catholic. The tendency of the American people, with individual exceptions, is not towards the church, but from it. All this I concede, yet I do not despair. First, because I rely on God, and he will not withhold his grace; and, second, because I rely on the gradually increasing weight and influence of the Catholic population in the country, and the new and stronger elements they introduce to neutralize those I have alluded to."

"That last consideration is one which I expected Father John to overlook," remarked O'Flanagan, "for I did not suppose those who are making so much ado about converting the country, made any account of the some two or three millions of Catholics, of various nationalities, already settled here."

"I have nothing to do with their various nationalities," interrupted Father John. "When we are speaking of Cath-

olicity there is no question of nationalities. The Catholic religion is catholic, not national, and overrides, as occasion requires, all nationalities. In converting a country Providence adapts means to the end. Excepting the few Catholic settlers of Maryland, soon deprived of their Catholic freedom and subjected to Protestant intolerance,—almost as soon as the colony was organized,—the United States were originally settled by Protestants of the intensest kind, and nowhere was hostility to Catholicity more bitter or universal than among them. One of the grievances alleged by the colonies against the mother country was the liberty allowed in Canada to the French Catholics, to retain and practise their religion. When we became a nation, we recognized the principles of religious liberty indeed, not through the influence of Catholic France, as M. Henri de Courcy contends, nor through any good-will to Catholicity, nor yet through any love of religious liberty itself on the part of Protestants, but because no Protestant sect was strong enough to make itself a state establishment, and because Catholicity was looked upon at the time as virtually dead, and incapable for the future of making any conquests, or of manifesting any vitality. Moreover, at the time the leading men of the country had very little belief in any religion, and followed Voltaire and other unbelievers in advocating toleration, believing that by tolerating all religions, they could make an end of them. They held that no religion can long stand, or exert any influence, unless supported by the state, as a state establishment. Under these circumstances, with an intense hatred of Catholicity, fearing or disdaining to investigate its claims, caring little for any religion, and about entering upon a course of material prosperity perhaps unparalleled in the world's history, nothing but a miracle of divine grace could have called their attention to the Catholic religion, and gained them to the faith, unless a Catholic population should migrate hither and bring the faith with them. They would nowhere have tolerated or listened to the missionary. The church among them could not begin with the missionary, and it needed a foreign-born laity, zealous for the faith, to form the first congregations, and to erect the first churches. Except in a very few localities, the descendants of the original Catholic settlers were too few to sustain missionaries, and conversions numerous enough to do it in any locality could not be counted on. The foreign immigration invited here by that very material

prosperity which had become the god of the American people, thus became, in the providence of God, the means of giving us a Catholic population, and the church a firm footing on our soil.

"That this foreign immigration has been faultless, that it has had solely religious interests at heart, or that it has been a fair representation of the intelligence, respectability, and worth of the Catholic populations of Europe, no man pretends. It has been composed in great part of common laborers and servants, poor and illiterate; but this, strange as it may seem, has been an advantage, not only because they were the more likely to adhere to their faith in a hostile country, but because they were less likely to alarm Protestants as to the spread of Catholicity. Protestants would tolerate Catholicity in these humble classes, apparently without personal or social influence, when a much smaller immigration of the more intelligent and influential classes would have excited their unrelenting hostility. The church was looked upon simply as the church of poor, ignorant, and superstitious foreigners, and as these foreigners were very necessary to the development of our material prosperity, she was tolerated, and in some instances supported, for their sake. She grew up, so to speak, under the shadow of Protestant contempt, for while these classes were comparatively few, and strangers, nobody dreamed of their making conversions from the American population. The common opinion was that Catholicity could not live in our Protestant atmosphere, that the first, at furthest the second, generation born here, would be absorbed in the general non-Catholic population of the country. Through this foreign immigration it was believed the church could gain no permanent footing here, and must needs die out when the immigration should cease. It was not then worth one's while to persecute them, or to abridge their religious freedom. What to a superficial observer might have seemed in the outset a great disadvantage, and likely to strengthen the prejudices of the country against Catholicity, has proved to be the best, and, as far as we can judge, the only practicable means of introducing and establishing the church on a solid basis, as one of our institutions.

"These poor, illiterate laborers and servants adhered to their religion, they supported the clergy, they built churches, they provided for the celebration of the holy sacrifice. They became permanent settlers, citizens of the country,

married, prospered, brought out their fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, and, aided by European events and the continually increasing demand for labor by our works of internal improvement and the extension of our manufactures, trade, and commerce, they in a few years have swelled into a Catholic population that is counted by millions, growing in intelligence, in respectability, and influence, in proportion to the increase of their numbers. The Catholic body may be exposed to annoyances and vexations from the anti-Catholic spirit of the country, but it is now too large and too important to be overlooked, and too numerous to be banished or massacred. The material interests of the country cannot afford to sacrifice the Catholic population, and it cannot as yet dispense with foreign immigration. Catholics may almost be said to fill the lower strata of our society in all the free states, and they are every year rising and filling the middling ranks, while not a few have already reached the summit of our social hierarchy. The church has gained a footing, and is every day taking a more influential position in the country. The two thousand churches, the nearly two thousand priests, and a Catholic population of at least two millions and a half, afford a very respectable basis for missionary operations. It is through these, through their example, influence, and silent but effectual exertions, that prejudice is to be softened, hostility disarmed, and interest excited."

"But you forget, Father John," said Diefenbach, "that this Catholic body, large as it is, and zealous as it may be, is separated from the American community by difference of national origin, manners, and customs, and to some extent even of language. The church they support is still regarded as the church of a foreign body in the American community, and is not an exponent of any element of the American national life. Your Catholic body does not act on the American body, and you want, it seems to me, a larger infusion of the American element. Instead of relying on this foreign body, you should direct all your efforts to the conversion of Americans, who have the sentiment of American nationality, and thus americanize the church."

"Undoubtedly," replied Father John, "it is desirable that the Catholic body should be or become American, so far as to avoid all that is repugnant to a just American national sentiment; but I want the church americanized no more than I want her irishized, germanized, englishized, or

gallicized. The church always suffers from having imposed upon her the form of any nationality. Nationalism in religion is only another name for gentilism, or heathenism, and is in its essential nature anti-Catholic. There is no need of anxiety for the support of American nationality. It is abundantly able to take care of itself. In addressing foreign-born Catholics, it is always proper to advise them to be on their guard against unnecessarily offending the national sentiment, but for their sake, not for the sake of American nationality itself. The americanizing of the Catholic body does and will go on of itself, as rapidly as is desirable, and all we have to do with it is, to take care that they do not imbibe the notion that to americanize is necessarily to protestantize. The transition from one nationality to another is always a dangerous process, and all the americanization I insist on is, that our Catholic population shall feel and believe that a man may be a true American, and a good Catholic. In my own judgment, the americanization of the Catholic body goes on as rapidly as is compatible with the interests of religion, and perhaps even more rapidly than is desirable.

"It is a mistake to regard the Catholic body to-day as a foreign body in this country. It is not so. The great majority of them, if not American born, are American citizens. This country is the home of their interests, the home of their children, and the home of their affections. They are as much identified with the country and its interests as are non-Catholic Americans. Catholicity is now as much at home here as Episcopalianism, Presbyterianism, or Methodism. The Catholic body has here an American organization, and depends on no foreign state. It has its American sees, its provinces, its bishops, and holds its councils, subject to no foreign power or jurisdiction, except the spiritual jurisdiction of the pope, who as spiritual head of the church, by divine appointment, is no more a foreigner in the city of New York than he is in the city of Rome. The church is here in all her integrity, and here as elsewhere she must act as the church. Her first care is due to the faithful already here, and she cannot neglect them for the sake of engaging in direct efforts for evangelizing the non-Catholic population. The conversion of the country, it is evident to every one who knows the spirit and temper of the American people, can go on for the present, humanly speaking, only gradually, and as influenced by the presence of the

church here, and the example of devout Catholics. The first step is to provide amply for the spiritual wants of the existing Catholic population, and to bring them up to the level of their religion in their practice as well as in their faith.

"This is a country in which the laity must do more to promote the interests of religion than they are accustomed to do elsewhere. The American people, not yet evangelized, hate or despise Catholicity, regard it as hostile to their republicanism, as degrading to human nature, as a spiritual thraldom, as a debasing superstition, or as a worn out, dead, and buried institution. They are indisposed to examine its claims, to ascertain its doctrines, or to put themselves in communication with Catholics. The more lax of the Protestant sects are profoundly indifferent to the question, and neglect all Catholic publications; the more rigid exercise a strict vigilance over their members, and prohibit them from reading any thing in defence of Catholicity. The study of the Protestant ministers is to shut out the light from their people, to keep them in profound ignorance of our religion, and to perpetuate their unfounded prejudices against it. The non-Catholic people will neither hear nor read, or if they do either, it is not to learn what we really believe, but to catch something which they may present to our prejudice. These are obstacles that can be overcome only by personal intercourse, by personal acquaintance with Catholics, and by being forced to observe more closely their intelligence and virtue. It is only as our numbers and influence gradually increase, only as the fruits of Catholic life become more abundant and manifest, that these obstacles will give way, and the missionary be able to gain access to the non-Catholic mind. Hence it is that the laity have here a great responsibility, for they have here, each in his own sphere, a missionary work to perform, preparatory in some sense to that of the priest."

"It seems to me," remarked O'Flanagan, "that some of our converts in their zeal have talked too much about the conversion of the country. Catholics have never converted a country by saying they were going to do it. Too many proclamations are unwise, and tend rather to defeat than to accomplish one's purposes. God makes use of human instruments in converting a nation, but it is he after all, not the instruments, that converts it, if converted. It is never well to forget that all depends on his grace. There is no

surer method of failing than to place our dependence on human agency, or reliance on our own well-devised schemes. God has his own ways, and his ways are not our ways. He seems to take pleasure in bringing to naught our wisdom, and accomplishing his purposes by means that it never entered into the mind of man to devise. Who would have seen in the act of the legislature of New York authorizing the construction of the Erie and Champlain canals, a measure for the evangelization of the United States? Yet, in the providence of God it has been made to contribute powerfully to that end. It inaugurated a system of internal improvements which created a demand for labor that the country itself could not supply, and thus led the way for the migration hither of foreign labor, while this foreign labor could be supplied only by the Catholic populations abroad oppressed by Protestant governments. The introduction of the factory system by absorbing the surplus American female labor, and the abolition of negro slavery in all the northern states, opened a demand for maid-servants, which could be supplied only from Ireland or Catholic Germany, and no class has contributed more to the growth of our religion here than our Catholic servant girls. Indeed, our religion has been planted here, and has sprung up and flourished by means adopted without any direct efforts to that end. Man, in what he did, had other purposes, and Providence has made them contribute to his. The foreign immigration to whom we owe it, under God, that the church is here, did not migrate hither for the purpose of introducing and spreading Catholicity in a non-Catholic country. They were not even led by their religion to come hither. They came for worldly reasons, to improve their material condition, yet God so ordered it that they brought their religion with them, and retained it. These facts should induce us to do our duty in our own sphere, and leave it to Providence to convert the country in his own way."

"It is our duty," replied Father John, "to coöperate with Providence according to our means and ability. I feel no less interest in the conversion of the country than do they who say and write so much about it, but I see nothing at present to be done for it but to operate on, and with the Catholic population we already have, to save as far as possible our children from apostasy, and to do all we can to make all who profess to be Catholics worthy of the name. I see little that Rome can do to aid us, except to see that we have

good bishops, and that they maintain proper discipline and use their best efforts to rear up and sustain a body of zealous, faithful, and efficient priests, numerous enough to meet our wants. I see no need of enlightening Rome on the institutions of the country, on the nature of the heresies rife among us, or the prospects of Catholicity in the United States. In providing for the legitimate wants of the Catholic population as Catholics, Rome will provide for the wants of the country. Rome is prepared to sustain and encourage us in every legitimate effort for the promotion of Catholicity here, we can make. I like the things our friend at Rome has said in his articles, but I attach no great importance to them except as they tend to give the Italian people a juster view of our national character and institutions. I should have been better pleased if the excellent and patriotic writer had taken more pains to separate genuine American republicanism from the false liberalism of Italian, French, and German revolutionists, and entered a stronger protest against the wild radical spirit that is ruining his own country, and affording an excuse for absolutism in Europe. We Catholics are placed between two fires, and are obliged to present a double front. We have to defend ourselves on the one side against absolutism, and on the other against radicalism, and we are constantly in danger while opposing the one to be regarded as accepting or defending the other. The writer of the articles in question shows more sympathy than I feel with American democracy, but no more than I feel with American republicanism, or free constitutional government, in which the people have in some form an effective voice in the management of the national affairs. But let this pass. Every one who studies the Catholic population in this country, though he has to deplore some scandals, many losses both of children and adults, must admit that it is becoming every day stronger, better organized, more homogeneous, and more compact, increasing in intelligence, literature, science, weight, and influence. It is no longer in a condition to be despised or ignored. It forms a large and integral portion of the American people. It has its weight in both the world of business, and the world of politics. It is every day acquiring social influence, and thus forcing Catholicity upon the attention of non-Catholics. It forces individuals in all parts of the country to think about the church, to inquire into her claims, to learn what are her real doctrines, and thus disabuses them of many of their prejudices.

"The undeniable failure of Protestantism has also its influence with the more serious and better disposed portion of Protestants. There is a feeling in all Protestant sects, that Protestantism has not as yet fulfilled its promise, is not all that one asks of religion, and that man has wants it does not meet. There is a secret misgiving that it is not all that it professes to be. It cannot be denied that spiritual things are fostered less by a Protestant people than material things, and this excites reflection. It is seen, too, that the old church stands, that she has survived Luther and his associates, that she has survived the revolutionary horrors of the last century and the present, that she is making new conquests, and every day chronicles a new martyr, that she flourishes in free states even more than in despotic states, and can prosper when disconnected from the state, and deprived of all state patronage. Seek to disguise or explain the fact as they may, they are forced to admit that the church is living to-day, is as vigorous and perhaps even more powerful, has even a stronger hold on men's convictions and consciences than she had in the sixteenth century, when Luther, amid the shoutings of his pupils, burned the papal bull condemning his heresies. This wonderful tenacity of life, this ever-renewed youth and vigor of the old church, leads the thoughtful and earnest Protestant to reflect on his Protestantism, which extends itself only by colonization or the sword, and lives only a spasmodic life. At one time, under Peter I., Protestantism seemed likely to invade Russia, and gain a footing in the Greek schismatic world; but during the last thirty years the Russian church has resisted the Protestant tendencies which threatened its destruction, returned to orthodoxy, and become less indisposed to a reconciliation with Rome. What hope for Protestantism? what hope that it is to constitute the religious future of mankind?"

"There is in every Protestant community," added Diefenbach, "an interior doubt of the future of Protestantism. In Germany it has gone to seed; there is no life in its root, and its power is preserved far more as a political and social than as a religious institution."

"While in France," added De Bonneville, "Protestants have dwindled down to less than a million, to about eight hundred thousand souls. In Geneva, the Rome of the reformed, Catholicity has been reintroduced, another church was added the other day, and a very notable portion of the

population profess the old religion. It is true, Piedmont has given Protestants full liberty of worship, and they have erected a temple at Turin; but they make few proselytes, and are already divided, and fighting one another. Italians may become infidels, and reject all religion, but they will never become Protestants."

"These facts," continued Father John, "will impress themselves more and more on the minds of our Protestant countrymen, and dispose them more and more to listen to what we have to say for ourselves. Gradually their prejudices will soften, and they will learn somewhat of the Catholic system. Their vigilance will relax, they will begin to read Catholic books with an honest intention, one after another will be converted, till at length the horror of Catholicity will in a great measure be lost, and Catholics be recognized as standing on the footing of social equality, and placed in a position to exert their legitimate influence. The exterior obstacles to conversion will then be removed, and direct efforts to persuade the mass of non-Catholics to embrace willingly our holy faith may then be made with fair prospect of success. But till then our most practical and effective method of rendering the country Catholic will be to confine ourselves in our direct labors to our own population, to the work of giving them that high character for intelligence and piety, for wisdom and sobriety, for principle and manly conduct, which cannot fail to command the respect and win the confidence of all loyal hearts and good citizens."

Conversation V.

"It seems to me," remarked O'Flanagan, "that in Father John's theory there is a quiet assumption that the Catholic body in this country is wanting in intelligence and virtue, and that it must be elevated in a worldly point of view, before it can exert its proper influence on the non-Catholic mind and heart. I cannot help thinking that he is not only unjust to our existing Catholic population, but disposed to attach undue importance to worldly position and respectability, and to rely beyond measure on mere human agencies. The Catholic population of the United States have, undoubtedly, their faults, and faults which are the more marked because they are very different from those of the Puritan world; but they are at least equal in intelligence and virtue to any other class of American citizens. It is a

mistake to suppose that they are all poor, low, ignorant, vicious, without position or influence in the American community. It is not wealth, worldly position, or worldly respectability that renders Catholics especially influential in extending or sustaining religion. The poor have always been its firmest adherents, its most efficient missionaries, and its brightest ornaments. The rich, the noble, the great, the respectable, have always been the first to abandon the church, or to betray her to the mercy of her enemies. That Ireland is Catholic to-day is due, under God, almost exclusively to her poor and down-trodden peasantry, and to her clergy taken chiefly from their ranks. Elevate in the social scale the poor Catholic peasants who have migrated hither, give them the ambition and the opportunity to become wealthy, and to take an active and influential part in society and politics, and you only relax their hold on their faith, and cause them to lose in simplicity and fervor all they gain in worldly respectability. As soon as they find themselves able to associate on terms of equality with the upper classes of non-Catholic American society, they grow ashamed both of the land and the religion of their fathers, become liberal, as they call it, and suffer their children to imbibe the no-religion of the country. Exceptions there certainly are, but this is the rule, and I believe no small portion of the Catholic population of the Union will remain Catholic only so long as they remain in the humbler classes of society."

"The poor," added Winslow, "are the heirs of the kingdom, and one great excellence of our religion is, that it not merely pities the poor and flings them a few crumbs from the rich man's table, but it leads us to love and respect them. It places them not below but above the rich, and although it concedes that it is possible for the rich to be saved, it represents it as easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for them to enter into the kingdom of heaven. By the blessings it pronounces on the poor, by the honor it bestows on them, and the small account it makes of worldly wealth, greatness, and distinction, it lays the axe at the root of our more worldly passions and propensities. The poor and humble are under Catholicity our nobility, our aristocracy, if I may use the term. They are the special friends of our Lord. They are, under God, our firmest reliance, and it is through them, not through the rich and the great, that this country will be converted, if it is ever converted. God always chooses for carrying on his work the

instruments the world despises. The Stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner. The apostles were fishermen and publicans, the lowest and most degraded classes among the Jews. The Jews, of all people the most despised by the Romans, were chosen to be the first missionaries, and to form the first congregations in the Roman empire. The subjugated and contemned Gauls and Italians converted their proud and haughty barbarian conquerors. The Irish, impoverished and oppressed by the proud and overbearing Anglo-Saxon, are, we may believe, selected as the instruments for catholicizing England and the United States. God works not as men work, and he chooses to carry on his work precisely with those instruments human wisdom would reject."

"I see," interposed De Bonneville, "no good to come of discussions of this sort. It would be better to leave the question of converting the country to solve itself. I am a Catholic, but I leave the care of religion to the curé. I have no vocation to be a propagandist, and little sympathy with the proselyting spirit so strong in recent converts. I enjoy my faith and practise my religion for myself, without interfering with the faith and worship of my neighbor; to his own master each must stand or fall. I dislike religious controversy, and leave the conversion of heretics and infidels to our good missionaries. In France all religions are placed on a footing of perfect equality before the state, and we have no quarrel with our 'separated brethren,' who though separated are still our brethren. The only thing we labor to do is to moderate the zeal of the ultramontane party, to restrain the bigotry and intolerance of those hot-headed Catholics who are always insisting that theirs is the only way to heaven. I worship God according to the dictates of my own conscience, and leave others to worship him according to the dictates of theirs. Why should I disturb them? Why should I force my faith upon their unwilling attention, destroy their good faith, and thus peril their soul's salvation? They will not accept the Catholic faith even if presented to them, and it is better to leave them in their good faith, to be saved through invincible ignorance."

"Ignorance that is vincible," replied O'Flanagan, "is neither invincible nor inculpable, and no man is in a salvable state who has the disposition to reject the truth when presented. That there is invincible ignorance with regard to some things of secondary importance, and that invincible

ignorance excuses from sin in those matters whereof one is invincibly ignorant, I concede; but I have yet to learn that one is or can be saved by invincible ignorance. Ignorance, according to St. Augustine, in those who can know and will not, is itself sin; in those who cannot know it is the penalty of sin, and therefore is in neither an excuse, but in both just cause of damnation. Salvation lies in the supernatural order, and is not secured in the unsupernaturalized by the simple negative merit of not sinning. It is the reward of supernatural virtue, and is bestowed only on positive supernatural merit. If M. de Bonneville's doctrine about destroying the good faith of non-Catholics be true, our Lord must have committed a great mistake, when he sent forth his apostles and commanded them to go into all the earth and preach the Gospel to every creature. Our missionaries to non-Catholics, or to heathen nations, fall into a great error, and endanger the salvation of souls, by destroying good faith in error, teaching the truth, and dispelling ignorance. It is our friend, however, I apprehend, that is in error, and an error in excuse of which he can hardly plead invincible ignorance. The church in this world is and must be the church militant, and precisely because she is and must be propagandist, and therefore aggressive. Our Holy Father, Pius IX., has enjoined more than once upon the bishops of France and Italy to be careful to teach those confided to their care, the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation. If the Holy Father is to be credited—a matter which some of you in France deem it French to doubt—it is a matter of the last importance that all should be taught and thoroughly taught the Catholic faith. Zeal for the instruction and conversion of unbelievers and misbelievers is the natural fruit of Christian charity. Your polite academicians, your distinguished scientific and literary men, who are so complaisant to heretics and infidels, so shocked at religious earnestness, and so respectful to religious indifferentism, seem to me to have very little of the spirit of the Gospel, and to be in a fair way of being damned, if not for their want of faith, at least for their lack of charity. It is because the upper classes of society, those who are in possession of worldly wealth and distinction, are usually ready to fraternize with the cultivated heretics and infidels of the same social class, and to look with haughty indifference or contempt on the earnest and untiring efforts of Catholic zeal and charity to spread the faith and extend the empire of

Christ on the earth, that I turn from them, and place my dependence on the poor and simple, whom the world despises."

"The wealthy, cultivated Catholics in our own country," interposed Winslow, "are by no means the most earnest laborers for the spread of the faith, and the conversion of non-Catholics. They are very amiable, very polite, very hospitable, but they are so mixed up with non-Catholics in their business, in their amusements, their social relations, that under a propagandist point of view they are the least efficient part of our Catholic population. They are timid, always trembling lest they be compromised, or hear something that will displease their non-Catholic friends, or that will compel them either to give up their faith or to stand up manfully in its defence. They have a mortal horror of the bold, uncompromising Catholic publicist, who is in downright earnest, who believes the question is one of life and death, and with all the energy of his soul insists on Catholics being Catholics. They cannot endure him who insists on the Catholic faith in its integrity, who brings out in their full strength, without disguise or apology even, the unpopular dogmas of the church, and dares call those outside of her communion by their proper names. He is eccentric, imprudent, too severe, goes too far, and gives needless offence to our 'separated brethren,' and needless trouble to his own friends. They demand French politeness, and French euphuism, and turn pale when they are forced to acknowledge Catholicity presented in bold, fearless, energetic, and uncompromising tones. They want Catholicity emasculated, deprived of all virile force, rendered weak, effeminate, soft, sentimental, speaking only in a subdued and apologetic voice, conceding the superiority to heresy and infidelity, but begging to be excused because they make it a point of honor not to desert the religion of their fathers. Woe to the luckless wight, who in his simplicity dares assert the papal supremacy, and maintain, what Catholic faith obliges him to maintain, that out of the church no one can ever be saved. His very orthodoxy is more offensive to them than the heresy of their non-Catholic friends."

"In all Catholic countries," added Diefenbach, "you find a similar class, and more influential for evil than they are here. They have no *Catholic* public spirit. In their way they are often very pious, very devout; they make many

novenas, are seen in every procession, observe punctiliously all the precepts of the church touching fasts and abstinence; but they are imbecile and cowardly when called upon to take an active part in defence of their religion, or in the promotion of Catholic interests. Literature, science, the ruling political and social influences in France, with almost her entire population nominally Catholic, are notoriously and scandalously anti-Catholic. In Sardinia—where the whole body of the people, with a few individual exceptions, are Catholic, or profess to be Catholic, and are and will be nothing else—the Catholic electors want the spirit, the energy, the life to use the freedom the constitution gives them, to get possession of the government, and prevent it from being administered in a sense hostile to religion. In Belgium the Catholic majority permit the anti-Catholic minority to outvote them, and a Catholic minister of state, frightened by a few street brawls, throws up, in great trepidation, the seals of office, and suffers the administration to pass into the hands of the bitterest enemies of his church."

"But you forget," said De Bonneville, "that our Lord said the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light."

"I know," replied Diefenbach, "that he said so, and that it is so, but I do not know that he approved it. He commended the unjust steward for his worldly prudence; I do not recollect that he commended the children of light for their lack of prudence. What he said, he said to rebuke, not to commend them; for when he sent forth his disciples, he told them that he sent them forth as lambs among wolves, and they must be as wise as serpents and as simple as doves. I know no reason why Catholics should neglect the wisdom of the serpent any more than the simplicity of the dove."

"I will not deny," interrupted Father John, "that it is hard to restrain one's indignation at the weakness and timidity of Catholics in Europe, who in their contests with the revolutionists during the last seventy years or more, have failed to prove themselves in the stronger qualities of our nature, a match for their opponents. From Luther down, they have allowed themselves to be beaten, subdued, and enslaved by minorities. They seem not to have learned that there are times when active courage is as pleasing to God as passive courage; when it is as much the duty of the

Catholic to stand up and fight manfully for his religion as it is to kneel down and pray. But I attribute the timidity, cowardice, and shameful surrender of Catholic interests, which so frequently excite our indignation, to the fact that the people since Luther's time have been in leading strings, and have been accustomed to rely on authority to defend them and their religion, and have formed no habits of self-reliance. Whether rich or poor, learned or unlearned, they have never felt that the defence of Catholic rights and interests depends on them, or that they, as the laity, have any responsibility in the case. They have counted on the questions that came up being settled by negotiation between the ecclesiastical and civil authorities, and have taken no further trouble about them. They, therefore, have never acquired those habits of vigilance and self-help which we find so strong in the Catholics in the East, in Ireland, and, to a great extent, in the United States.

"The great body of the Catholic population have rarely been sufficiently instructed in their religion. I do not mean that the bishops and clergy have neglected to teach them the decalogue, the sacraments, and the precepts of the church; but they have not generally been taught with any thoroughness Christain faith and morals in their relation to the prevalent errors and heresies of the time. The laity need in our times a far more thorough instruction in the faith and its relations than they have ever hitherto received. They need, in addition to the usual instructions in Christian doctrine and morals, to be taught the bearings of faith on the peculiar errors and tendencies of the age, and especially to be made acquainted with those points of faith, and those decisions of the church, which condemn them and strengthen us to resist them. They need full instruction in relation to the supremacy of the spiritual order in face of the temporal, the essential papal constitution of the church, and the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, for these are three points on which Catholics in our day are strongly tempted to mutilate, conceal, or explain away Catholic truth. The whole body of the faithful need, also, to be instructed, that the day when they could rely on princes or civil governments to protect the faith, any further than its protection is involved in the protection of the rights of the citizen and the preservation of the peace, has gone by. There are no longer any Catholic states. The prince, as such, has thrown off the Christian law, and fallen back on the law of nature,

and holds by the same title as held the old pagan emperors of Rome. The church is almost everywhere virtually, if not formally, separated from the state, and has, and can have only, her own freedom and independence as a spiritual kingdom in regard to her own subjects. Catholic interests have now to be defended, sustained, or promoted, in their relations with the temporal order, by Catholics in their quality of citizens, not in their quality of Catholics, far less by the negotiations of the church, in her corporate capacity with the temporal sovereign. Hence, the people, the laity, as well as the clergy, need to know and comprehend these interests, so as to be able to act understandingly and efficiently in their behalf. Hence, also, the necessity of developing the active powers of their nature, and cultivating in them those high, manly qualities which will enable them to match their enemies with their own weapons and on their own ground. The interests of religion require in them the highest and strongest secular virtues, as well as excellence in the more distinctively Catholic virtues."

"With all deference to the practical wisdom and sagacity of the bishops and clergy, it seems to me," added Diefenbach, "that they have never fully comprehended or accepted the changes introduced by Luther and his reformation. Luther's movement only accidentally attacked the doctrines of the church. Its real character was the denial of the distinction between the clergy and the laity in the government of the church, and the definition of doctrines. It transferred the discussion of religious and theological questions from the narrow enclosure of the schools to the broad arena of the public, from scholars prepared by their studies to discuss them on their merits and in all their depth, to the uneducated, ignorant, and presumptuous multitude. It was no doubt a great evil to make on scientific questions the appeal from the scientific to the unscientific, but as it has been made, we cannot now withdraw it, and confine the discussion again to the schools and scholars. The evil has been done, and we must submit to it. We cannot help ourselves. The printing-press, the journals, and the common school system will perpetuate it, and render abortive any attempts we may make to restore the old mediæval order. The *disciplina arcani* is henceforth impracticable, and we must accept publicity as one of the conditions of our existence. Such being the fact, we can overcome the evil done by Luther's movement

only by thoroughly educating and instructing the laity. Indeed, it is remarkable how important a part Catholic laymen in late years have played in the defence of Catholic doctrines and Catholic interests. The first effective blow struck in literature against the infidelity and revolutionism of the last century was struck by laymen. The clergy could hardly gain a hearing till De Maistre, De Bonald, and Görres had spoken, and turned the current of public thought. At the present moment in Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States, some of the ablest and most effective defenders of Catholicity and Catholic interests are laymen. I find nothing gratifying to my Catholic feelings in the fact that it is so, but the fact, however we may deplore it, indicates clearly enough the conditions that must henceforth be complied with. The laity must be instructed, and rendered able to defend by their own knowledge and understanding, in subordination to the hierarchy assuredly, Catholic doctrines and Catholic interests when assailed. The reliance must now be placed on the intelligence of the many, not alone on the intelligence of the few. We cannot war successfully against the democratic spirit of modern society, and true wisdom requires us in some sense to accept it and to turn it to the advantage of religion. La Mennais had a glimpse of the truth, although he coupled the truth he saw and asserted with gross errors, which made it necessary for the church to condemn him.

"The fault I find with a portion of the clergy is that they either do not see the new order that has sprung up since Luther, and has been rapidly developed in the last century and the present, or they fancy that they can successfully resist it. But successfully resist it they cannot without a miraculous intervention of our Lord, on which we have no right to count. God in his providence has suffered the order to spring up, and it is not likely that he will intervene by a miracle to suppress that. The clergy, then, it seems to me, must accept it, and make the best of it.

"To make the best of it they must train the laity to understand the questions at issue, and to a feeling of deep responsibility in regard to them. They must educate the laity in a strong and masculine Catholicity, and instead of contenting themselves in making them parrots, they must study to make them thinking, reasoning men, to quicken

their understanding, to develop their reason, and bind them to their faith by intellectual conviction as well as by routine, or even grace divinely vouchsafed them. A larger amount of religious instruction must be given the laity, a higher and more liberal intellectual culture in relation to faith and morals must be given them, than has hitherto been deemed necessary. A more generous confidence must be placed in the common mind, and more reliance placed on individual reason and conscience. They must rely more on interior light and conviction, and less on mere exterior authority, than has for a long time been customary. Rationalism will never be suppressed by the suppression of reason, or the race of sciolists extinguished by neglecting real scientific culture."

"Individual reason and conscience," interposed Father John, "must be asserted in face of the civil authority, for that has no right to bind either; but for that very reason we must be all the more careful to assert the supremacy of the church over both. The independence of individual reason and conscience in face of the temporal prince is the principle of anarchy, and would lead to all manner of disorders, unless there were at the same time a full and practical recognition of the plenary authority of the church. But the authority of the church, unlike that of the state, is spiritual, not material or physical, and enlightens as well as commands. It does not suppress individual reason and conscience, it enlightens them, and directs them to the true and the good. Hence the more absolute the authority of the church over them, the more free they are; and the more truly enlightened they are, the more unreserved will be their submission to her authority. This shows that the church must always seek, and can never fear the intelligence of her children. The great enemy she has always and everywhere to combat is ignorance. She has not always, indeed but seldom, been able to give to her children the full and thorough instruction, now so necessary, for she has been frequently thwarted by a barbarism not to be removed in a single generation, and almost always by the temporal prince jealous of her influence, and afraid of the intelligence of his subjects. The defects in the education of the faithful hitherto given cannot be denied, but they are not chargeable to the church, though to a certain extent churchmen are answerable for them, inasmuch as they have, like Cardinal Wolsey, been more intent on

serving their king than on serving their God, and have been more ready to take their cue from the court, than from the vicar of Jesus Christ. As the line between Cæsar and Peter is more clearly drawn in our day, and as the incompetency of Cæsar in spirituals is more generally understood, and more frankly admitted even by Cæsar himself, the necessity and the practicability of a more full and adequate instruction of the great body of the laity in their religion, especially in its relations with the temporal order, must be more generally seen and admitted by those whose special duty it is to carry out the precepts and wishes even of the church of God. The press honestly conducted, under a proper sense of responsibility, by men who are above the petty ambitions and petty jealousies of little men, by men who are up to the level of their position, and equally free from a tendency to a false liberalism and from a slavish servility to routine, by men of generous culture, enlarged views, who understand their age and their religion, offers a medium for that sort of education and instruction of the people I contend for, far superior to any hitherto possessed by the Catholic world. Through it the faithful may be taught the philosophy of their religion, learn its place and office in this world, its rights in relation to the various speculations and tendencies of the age,—learn also true Catholic politics, and be stimulated and encouraged to the defense of Catholic interests. It cannot and ought not to supersede any of the old and established means and methods of instruction, for they have been instituted by our Lord himself, but it may be ancillary to them, as philosophy itself is ancillary to theology."

"But Father John," rejoined O'Flanagan, "is still insisting on human means, and appears to me to overlook the fact I have alleged, that the support and prosperity of religion do not depend on human agency. God founded the church, God takes care of her, and he uses as his instruments not rich men, wise men, noble men, or learned philosophers, but the poor and simple."

"God founded the church, and takes care that she shall never fail," replied Father John; "but the church, though his church, and informed and sustained by him, operates *more humano*. Conversion is the work of grace, and yet even by grace no man is converted against his own will. Man has his part to perform, and if he neglects or refuses

to perform his part the work will not be done. The doctrine of irresistible as of inamissible grace is a Calvinistic, not a Catholic, doctrine. The church represents the Incarnation, out of which she springs, and therefore requires the coöperation of the human, so that though there are two wills, the one human and the other divine, there shall be no discrepancy or contrariety, but perfect concord and union between them. The poor are the especial care of the church, but not the poor alone are called. She opens her communion to the rude, the simple, the unlearned, and lavishes upon them the treasures of supernatural grace; but she has a place and a use too for the learned. God calls the poor, the lowly, the simple; he calls also the learned, the philosophic, and the great. St. Paul was not deficient in the learning, the science, and the philosophy of his age. St. Justin Martyr was a learned Platonist, and St. Augustine stands at the head of all ancient and modern philosophers. All the great fathers were the great men of their age, men who in genius, in ability, learning, eloquence, science, were at the highest level of the human mind in their times, and who dares say, that they rendered and still render no service to religion? Is it of no moment to her to have had her Basils, her Gregories, her Chrysostoms, her Hilaries, her Ambroses, her Augustines, her Leos, her Damians, her Bernards, her Bonaventuras, her Alberts, her Thomases, her Scotts, her Vasquez, her Suarez, her Valentias, her Bossuets, her Fénelons? Was she not served by Leo I., Gregory I., Gregory VII., Innocent III., Boniface VIII., Julius II., and Sixtus Quintus, men of high attainments, lofty character, and eminent administrative ability, before whom the greatest of your temporal sovereigns seem dwarfed and insignificant?

"You tell me the poor are the last to give up their faith. It has been so in Ireland, it was so in France, in Belgium, but not so in England. The old nobility, the survivors of the wars of the Roses, the gentry, were the last to abandon the old church and accept the new Gospel at the bidding of the court. The middle classes, traders, artisans, the well-to-do burgesses, if there is any difference, have thus far in the history of religion been the most reluctant to receive and the most prompt to renounce the church. The church finds her best friends and her firmest supporters among the high who are satisfied with their worldly position, and the low who aspire to no higher worldly rank. The class be-

tween, mammon and place worshippers, are and always must be those who offer the greatest resistance to the church, and afford her the least consolation. In this class germinated the Protestant reformation, and it was by siding with them in those European countries where they were strongest that the sovereigns were able to cast off the authority of Rome and establish the Protestant Gospel.

"The serious obstacle to the conversion of this country is in the fact that they who in other countries are called the middle class, are here the great body of the people. Recent immigration has given us a Catholic lower class, but we have not yet a higher class. We have no nobility, and hardly a gentry. The mass of our people are the English middle class, and here, even more than in the mother country, mammon worshippers. An American metropolis is only an English provincial town. This constitutes not only the great obstacle to conversion—for people wedded to the world, bent on riches, or on political distinction, will not become Catholics, though they may be excellent Protestants, or still more excellent Nothingarians—but it also constitutes the chief difficulty in preserving our existing Catholic population faithful to the church. We lose adult Catholics through the influence of mammon. While our Catholics are poor, laborers and servant-girls, they are faithful, and most of them as good as the day is long, but when they begin to prosper in the world, they, or if not they, their children, fall in with the mammon worship of the country, and become no better than Protestants. This is a temptation against which our Catholic population have not as yet been sufficiently on their guard.

"The respectability on which I count is not the respectability which rests on wealth or place for its basis, but that which rests on intelligence and virtue. The non-Catholic community looks upon poverty as a crime and punishes it as such, and we can hardly hope to see them seeking any other respectability than that which rests on worldly wealth, or worldly success. But our Catholic population is not yet clean gone; it still has a conscience, a Christian sense, and is able to appreciate moral respectability, and to reverence worth though living in obscurity and clothed with rags. Through them the Christian standard of respectability may and will be erected in this country, and with the increase of their numbers, their intelligence, and their Christian virtues, they will have a greater power in protecting their children,

and a greater influence in checking mammon worship among non-Catholics, and in disposing them to listen with more reverence and docility to the teachings of the church."

Conversation VI.

"It strikes me," said De Bonneville, "as singular that Catholics are almost universally inclined in the United Kingdom to the Whig party, and in the United States to the Democratic, with neither of whom should I expect them to fraternize. The British Whigs are the modern representatives of the party that long persecuted the Catholics, and enacted in Great Britain and Ireland the oppressive and shameful penal laws against them. The Whig nobility is for the most part of comparatively modern origin, and consists chiefly of families that were enriched by the spoils of the church, and that owe their rank and influence to their devotion to the Protestant reformation. American democracy asserts the absolute sovereignty of the people, and asserts it against the church, as well as against monarchy or aristocracy. If analyzed, it will be found to exclude God from the state, and to be in fact only political atheism."

"It strikes me," replied Winslow, "as equally singular, that a Gallican, who defends the maxims of the French court from Philip the Fair to the Nephew of his Uncle, and accepts and admires the four articles adopted by the French clergy in 1682, should object to political atheism, or complain that God is excluded from the state."

"In religion," remarked O'Flanagan, "I am a papist, and I bow to the authority of the church; but in politics I am independent of all ecclesiastical control, and do not suffer my clergy, however much I may love and venerate them, to prescribe to me the political party I shall support. My religion has nothing to do with my politics."

"And yet," replied Diefenbach, "unless I have been misinformed, the clergy in Ireland are your political leaders, virtually chieftains of the clan as well as ministers at the altar; and by the authority of their sacred character as priests, attempt to direct your political action."

"In Ireland, the case is peculiar," replied O'Flanagan. "Through a variety of causes but too well known, the Irish people have been deprived of their legitimate temporal chiefs. The nobility are, for the most part, aliens to them in blood and in religion, and for a long time there has been

wanting a Catholic laity able and willing to look after their temporal interests. The upper classes of society have lacked sympathy with the Catholic peasantry, and the priests have been the only class who by their intelligence, their position, and their sympathies, could speak with any effect for the poor people. If they had been silent, all voices would have been mute, and no opposition could have been made to the non-Catholic and foreign oppressor. Yet even in Ireland the clergy take part in politics not for the sake of politics, but for the sake of religion. They do it in defence of religious liberty, or because the political interests of the people are intimately connected with their religious interests."

"Or rather, because they are intimately connected with the aspirations of nominally Catholic demagogues and office-seekers, who wish to use the Catholic religion as the means of giving themselves importance or power," suggested Diefenbach. "Mr. de Bonneville may find his difficulty solved in the fact that British Whigs have, in late years, been more liberal in their promises to British Catholics than British Tories, and have shown some willingness to give subordinate offices to Catholics."

"But, I see in that no real gain to religion," said De Bonneville. "No Catholic, either in the United Kingdom or in the United States, can be elected or appointed to any office in which he can really serve his religion, or to any office at all, unless he is a man who will sacrifice the interests of his religion to those of his political party. If really attached to his religion, and placing it first in his thoughts and affections, the Catholic is feared, distrusted; and such is the overwhelming non-Catholic force of the government in either country, that he is far less able to serve his religion, than would be a liberal Protestant in his place. I cannot see that religion has gained much in Ireland from having the Wises, the Shiels, the Keoghs, the O'Flaherties, the O'Farrels, the Fitzgeralds, and others in parliament or in office; and to me it is very doubtful whether religion stands as well with the Irish people as it did before O'Connell commenced his political agitation, and induced or forced the clergy to join him. The Irish youth, brought up in the midst of agitation for political objects, inflamed with vain worldly hopes and ambition, lose their simplicity of character, lose their religious sensibility, and suffer their faith to relax its hold on their minds and their hearts. The clergy, engrossed with efforts to effect political changes and amel-

iorations, necessarily, to some extent at least, neglect their spiritual functions, and leave their people uninstructed, to grow up in spiritual ignorance, exposed to the seductions of error, and an easy prey to the artful and the designing. The clergy themselves, trained up in the seclusion of the college and seminary, in as entire ignorance of the world as possible, unprepared to grapple with politics and politicians, open, candid, unsuspicious, become in the field of politics little else than the tools of the Dublin agitators, and retard instead of advancing the interests to which they devote themselves. Without intending or suspecting it, they play into the hands of the demagogues, and find as the result that they have aided in elevating men who only falsify their pledges and turn out a scandal to their religion. In this country, I am told your clergy generally supported Mr. Buchanan for president, and they apparently adhere to him, notwithstanding he has abandoned the policy to which he was understood to be pledged. They have given to the church here a political character, involved her in the party contests of the country, and enlisted the Catholic population on the side of slavery extension, to the great scandal of their European brethren."

"The clergy in Ireland, as elsewhere," remarked Winslow, "take that course which they judge wisest and best for religion, and it is not my province to censure them, even if they sometimes err. I am not their judge; they are my judges, not I theirs; I have never been in Ireland, and know little of her, except that she has held fast for ages the Catholic faith under every temptation to desert it, and that her faithful children are, in the hands of God, the chief agents in spreading and maintaining the Catholic religion in the English-speaking world. She has been for ages cruelly misgoverned and oppressed, and every Catholic, wherever born, or whatever language he speaks, does and must sympathize with her, and love and honor her. Her clergy have not always done all they would, but they have in general, I presume, done the best they could, and the best evidence of it is the love and veneration felt for them, even in spite of political agitation, by the mass of the Irish people.

"The part the clergy take in politics with us," proceeded Winslow, "has been greatly exaggerated. They may have, and they have the right to have, as well as any other class of citizens, their political opinions and preferences, but if

so, they have them as citizens, not as priests. As priests they teach their flocks to be loyal citizens, to vote honestly and conscientiously, according to their own convictions of the true interests of the country, but they do not tell them how or for whom they must vote. Catholics may have very generally voted with the Democratic party, but they have not done so by the dictation of their clergy, and any one who knows any thing of Catholic voters knows that the last thing they will submit to is clerical dictation in politics. They carry their independence in this respect even to an unjustifiable extreme. The clergy have not in this country involved the church in party politics, and given her a political character, and the only ground for assuming that they have is the false supposition of non-Catholics, *that Catholics never act except by the order and direction of their clergy.* No doubt there are Catholic laymen, journalists, politicians, demagogues, who labor to commit the church to a party, and to unite her interests with their own party interests; but these act against the views and wishes of the clergy, not by clerical dictation. In politics, adroit, shrewd, ambitious laymen lead the clergy, far more than the clergy lead them, and often embarrass them in their defence of religious interests, by their party action. The leaders of the Democratic party, no doubt, think they have a sort of prescriptive right to the support of Catholics, and the clergy are trammelled by the action of nominally Catholic partisans. The interest, as the aim, of the clergy is to keep religion independent of politics, and never to suffer the interests of the church to be involved in the conflicts of parties. They cannot always do this, because there are demagogues who will undertake to speak for them, and claim to have their countenance, when they are really acting against their wishes."

"Unhappily," said Diefenbach, "there are Catholic as well as non-Catholic demagogues, and the nature of the one is the same as the nature of the other. Catholic demagogues find their interests connected with those of party, and they conclude as theirs are, those of religion must be. These, misled by their own selfish ambition, suppose the interests of the church are secured when their own are advanced."

"There are, no doubt, Catholic laymen," continued Winslow, "who think the church cannot stand alone on her own foundation, and must fall if not propped up by

the secular power. These think she must always gain by an alliance with the political power, whether that power be the king or a party, and, therefore, in this country by being bound up with one or another of our political parties."

"Some indulgence," said Father John, "must be extended even to these, whether Whigs or Democrats, for in our English-speaking world, Catholics have so long been treated as aliens even in the land of their birth—have been so studiously excluded from all places of honor, trust, or emolument, whether civil or military, that it really is some gain to have Catholics, even though not of the very best sort, elected or appointed to office; for it tends to prove to the Catholic population that the days of exclusion and persecution are over."

"It certainly need excite no surprise," said Winslow, "that there should be amongst us men who conclude that the church is safe because they are inspectors of the customs, deputy postmasters in small country villages, or tide-waiters in ports of entry. They who for generations have been excluded, may well be pardoned for placing an exaggerated value on petty offices in the gift of the government. But whatever the Catholic laity may have done to have it understood that what is called 'the Catholic vote' must be given for the Whig party or the Democratic party, the clergy are not in any way responsible for it. Catholic citizens in the last presidential election very generally voted, I presume, for Mr. Buchanan, and without their votes he would not have been elected. But they voted for him not altogether from party or personal motives. They gave him their votes, because they believed him the Union candidate, and because his competitors were supported by parties held to be, the one anti-Catholic, and the other anti-Union. I myself, though no Democrat, either in a party or in a doctrinal sense, voted for him, and would do so again under the same circumstances, although he has turned out not a Union but a sectional president."

"I regard," said O'Flanagan, "this as a democratic country, and as a loyal citizen, I must support the Democratic party, and therefore its candidates. I voted in my quality of naturalized citizen, for Mr. Buchanan because he was the candidate of the Democratic party, and I adhere to him because he is the president of that

party. I make it a point of honor to be faithful to my party."

"I acknowledge," said Winslow, "no allegiance to party; Mr. O'Flanagan may, if he sees proper, support Mr. Buchanan's administration, but he should do so, because he approves its policy, not because he is bound in law or honor to adhere to his party."

"In a parliamentary state, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, there are and always will be parties," replied O'Flanagan; "and the government is and will be carried on by a party. The country is and can be served only by a party, and party can serve the country only on condition that it can count on the fidelity of its members."

"Must a man be faithful to his party alike whether right or wrong?" asked Diefenbach.

"No man can ever be bound to do wrong," answered O'Flanagan. "But a man should be always ready to sacrifice his private views and interests to the good of his party."

"But not his conscience or his principles," said Father John, "nor his honest convictions of what is the true policy for his country."

"The doctrine of party, more strictly adhered to by the Democratic than by any other party in the country," added Winslow, "I regard as unsound, immoral and dangerous. I have regretted to find Mr. Buchanan acting as the president of a party, and bringing the whole force of executive influence and of party machinery to bear on and to crush every member of his party who believes himself in honor and patriotism bound to depart from some of his measures. I have regretted to see him dismiss honorable gentlemen from office for not supporting his favorite candidates in the state or municipal elections. The president has no right to interfere in such elections, and to do it in the interests, not of patriotism but of party, is most injurious to political purity and independence. It is bringing into our elections a foreign element which has no business there. To attempt to keep men in or to whip them into the party traces through fear of losing or never gaining office, through fear of losing all political standing and influence, is incompatible with all political honesty and independence, and tends to nourish a spirit of baseness and servility. It is incompatible with the mainte-

nance of liberty. You cannot maintain a wise and just policy for any state with a race of selfish, timid, crouching slaves. It is men, high-minded, high-spirited, independent men, who will stand by their honest convictions, pursue what they hold to be just and honorable, in defiance of the smiles or frowns of parties, of the threats or cajoleries of presidents, kings, or kaisers, that are needed to maintain a free state. Men who feel that they are wedded body and soul to party, that in themselves they are ciphers, and can count only as aggregated to a party, are no better than broken reeds to lean upon, and are sure to fail you in the hour of trial. Parties are fallible, and it is only to an infallible authority a man can unreservedly surrender himself, without surrendering his freedom and manhood. The wise and honest man goes with party as far as party goes with him, but not one step further."

"If Mr. Winslow follows that maxim," said O'Flanagan, "he will gain the confidence neither of the people nor of party leaders, and may be sure of never being elected or appointed to any office or place in the commonwealth."

"I hope that I shall be able to live and serve my country and my God, notwithstanding," replied Winslow. "The office is for the man, not the man for the office. No man has any right to count on holding an office, big or little, at least in this country."

"That sounds very fine," said O'Flanagan, "but unhappily, the age and country we live in has very little sympathy with sentiments, however fine and chivalric, that cannot be converted into solid cash. Say what you will against fidelity or slavery to party, it remains always true, that in a republican state public affairs are and will be managed by party, and the citizen has little else to do than to choose and serve his party."

"Then," said De Bonneville, "your boasted republicanism merely transfers arbitrary and irresponsible power from the king to the dominant party. It changes the form, but retains the substance of oriental despotism."

"The tyranny of party," replied Father John, "is no doubt bad, very bad, but not so bad as the tyranny of a government that can support itself by the forms of law and the whole physical force of the state. Party ties are frequently strong, but any man with a firm and resolute will can break them, and without any serious difficulty, or

grave inconvenience. Bad as a democratic republic may be, it is chiefly bad from the defect, not the excess of power, and under any aspect it is less to be dreaded than absolute monarchy, with its *mouchards* and its *gens d'armes*. Parties are not desirable, but they are inevitable. There are in every state real differences of interest and opinion, and men, if not repressed by the strong arm of power, will group together according to the attraction of common opinions, and the affinity of common interests. They thus form parties, and parties which may have an honest and legitimate existence. These parties will enter into politics, and struggle each for power, to obtain the control and management of public affairs. Against this it is foolish to declaim. What, however, is wrong, and should never be tolerated, is the artificial organization of party, for the sake of party, or in the slang of the day, for the 'spoils.' I have nothing to say for or against the policy in general pursued by the American Democratic party. It may or may not be the wisest and best for the country, but to its doctrine of party, that party is always to be supported for its own sake, or because it is desirable that the affairs of the nation should be managed by a party, I do and must object. It is one of the loans we have made from the British oligarchy, and which we had been better off without. In England, since the revolution of 1688, affairs have for the most part been managed by party. There have been two parties, the Ins and the Outs. The Ins are the government and the Outs are the opposition. The one seems to be about as much a British institution as the other. 'Do you belong to her Majesty's government?' a Frenchman asked one day an English gentleman at Paris. 'No, I have the honor to belong to her Majesty's opposition.' The answer was neither a witticism nor an absurdity, but the simple statement of a fact. Her Majesty's opposition is not, however, an American institution. Parties, whether in the minority or majority, that oppose or defend an administration on purely party grounds, because it is or because it is not their administration, are simply factions. The president is and will be elected by a party, but he is elected not for a party, and is bound to conduct himself as the president of the nation, not of a party. When elected he belongs to the party opposing as much as to the party supporting his election. Both parties are integral portions of the political people

whose affairs he is called to administer, and he has no right to discriminate, for party purposes, between them."

"Hence," added Winslow, "the condemnation of the practice becoming almost general, that of the in-coming administration turning out of office or dismissing from their employments, all the adherents of the out-going administration, and filling their places with new men taken from the ranks of its partisans solely for party reasons. It introduces a selfish and sordid element into our elections, and substitutes love of office or place for love of country. It tends to render parties and elections venal. No changes should be made by the new administration except for public reasons, for the more prompt or more faithful discharge of the public service. None should be made for the purpose of rewarding noisy partisans or hungry and meagre expectants. A man is no more entitled to an office because he supported, than because he opposed, the election of the new administration. Office or governmental place is created for the public service, and is never to be given as a reward for party services, or taken away as a punishment for party delinquencies. The only consideration that should weigh with the electing or the appointing power is the public good, and the aim should always be to put the right man in the right place. For similar reasons should also be condemned that absurdest of all doctrines, called 'Rotation in Office,' a doctrine which one can hardly believe public opinion in any country could fall low enough to tolerate. It assumes that office is a favor, and therefore, in a democratic country all should share it by turns. Office, it assumes, is created for the office holder, and as monopolies are odious, and the rights of all are equal, each one should have his turn; but as all cannot hold office at one and the same time, as there cannot be offices enough for all, there must be rotation in office. After this, there is no absurdity that party leaders may not be regarded as capable of adopting, and even attempting to reduce to practice. No man should be appointed to an office unless competent to discharge its duties faithfully and acceptably, and as long as he does so discharge them, there can never be a good public reason for dismissing him and filling his place with another."

"The human mind," said Father John, "is naturally logical, and when it starts with a false principle it deduces and accepts for the moment any absurd consequence it involves. The Democratic party started with several false principles,

which it has been engaged in developing, and reducing to practice. The consequences of its doctrines of party and office are now becoming manifest in the factious character of all our parties, in the multiplication of noisy, brawling partisans, and the meagre and hungry aspirants, without number, in rendering our elections venal, our public men venal, and the administration of government venal, a series of mere *jobs*. Whether we look at the federal government, or the state government, or the municipal government, we see nothing but successful efforts for plundering the people, for fattening on the public treasury, corrupting public and private morals, and staving off every measure for the public good, or neutralizing its benefit by converting it into a private job. It is hard to conceive any thing more venal, corrupt, or corrupting than the municipal government of the city of New York, and yet the government of the state or of the Union is hardly better. The election or the appointment of any man to office or place, whether under the federal, the state, or the city government, is a presumption that he lacks either capacity or integrity, ability or public spirit."

"Things are, no doubt, bad enough," said O'Flanagan, "but not much worse than they have always been, and not quite so bad, I would fain hope, as Father John's strong language implies. Father John is not in his usual cheerful mood, and must be suffering from indigestion; no ray of light seems to pierce the darkness that surrounds him; but, the darkest period of the night is just before the break of day. When things are at worst they sometimes mend. I have very little confidence in Anglo-Saxons or in Anglo-Americans, who are seldom what they imagine themselves, and who have been, and are, the chief mammon worshippers of the world; but they have, notwithstanding, some good qualities, and some regard for the public good. We do not well to look only on the dark side of things. It is my rule to trust in Providence, and to make the best of the present. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. Why augment it by adding to it the evil of to-morrow? *Carpe diem*. It will be time enough to weep when the sorrow cometh."

"The prudent man," cited Winslow, "forseeth the evil and guardeth against it. Sorrow will come, for this is a world of sorrow, and He who redeemed it was a man of sorrows and burdened with grief; but this is no reason why we should not guard against increasing it by the additional sorrow of feeling that we have brought it upon ourselves by our own folly and wickedness."

"No man speaking under the influence of strong emotion," rejoined Father John, "should have his words taken *au pied de lettre*. Deep feeling always exaggerates, but the good sense of the hearer supplies usually the proper correction. Even the saints themselves use, in their holy zeal against the evil of their times, language which it will not do to take without some reserves. Things, in his time, did not, after all, go so bad as St. Peter Damian, for instance, represents. Men who have a high ideal are apt to regard as evil whatever falls below it. The noble soul counts nothing done while any thing remains to be done. My ideal for this republic is high, and I grieve whenever it fails to realize it. It is my home, it is, after my church, my mother, and I feel deeply whatever is not to its honor. Doubtless, all are not clean gone from the way; doubtless, there are more than ten just persons to be found in our modern Sodom; doubtless, there are more than seven thousand in our Israel, who have not bowed the knee to Baal, or burnt incense to Mammon; but, we are not what we might and should be. We may compare to advantage with the kingdoms and empires of the Old World, but no Christian, no patriot, can be satisfied with our present conduct and condition. I grieve to find even my Catholic brethren, who take part in political, municipal, and business affairs, hardly rising above, sometimes hardly to, the level of their non-Catholic fellow-citizens. I do not wholly despair of the republic. I hope in God, and, perhaps, have as firm a trust in Providence as my friend, Mr. O'Flanagan; but I see already the seeds of dissolution beginning to germinate in our youthful constitution, and I hope only with trembling. I know the nation that forgets God shall be turned into hell, and the nation that forgets virtue does forget God. Unless we return to God, cease to do evil, and learn to do well, there is room to fear that God will remember us in his judgments, not in his mercy."

Conversation VII.

"In our last meeting many good reasons," began De Bonneville, "were assigned why Catholics should not support the Democratic party, but I recollect no good reason that was assigned, why they should, or why they so uniformly do, support that party. Between Catholicity and democracy I can discover no natural affinity."

"I am," replied Winslow, "no democrat, and I do not think democracy, as I understand it, and as it is understood by the radical portion at least of the Democratic party, is compatible with Catholicity. But M. de Bonneville is mistaken in supposing that all Catholic citizens in the Union vote with the Democratic party; most of the Catholics of the older American stock in Maryland and Kentucky were Whigs while there was a Whig party. Archbishop Carroll's coachman voted, indeed, the Democratic ticket, but the archbishop himself voted with the Federalists. Catholics of a later migration have been divided, and in no election, state, national, or municipal, have they been found all on one side. There were Catholics who voted for General Scott, as well as Catholics who voted for General Pierce, and I have found several who say they voted for Colonel Fremont; yet it is probably true that the majority of the Catholic voters have, at least in the later elections, voted with the Democratic party; for such has been the state of parties that they must either do so or vote with the anti-slavery men against the Union, or with the Know-Nothings against religious liberty and the freedom of their church. The majority of naturalized citizens, whether of Irish or German birth, have no doubt, always inclined to the Democratic party, and been disposed to identify themselves with it; but to this they have been led by motives unconnected with Catholicity. In Europe we pass for a democratic republic, and indeed the mass of our own native-born citizens regard our institutions as democratic, and to be interpreted and applied in a democratic sense. Europeans migrating hither, whether from Ireland or Germany, suppose they are migrating to a democratic country, and very naturally conclude that, in order to be loyal citizens, they must be democrats. Nothing is more natural then, than that on settling here and becoming citizens, they should aggregate themselves to the Democratic party,—the party claiming to be democratic, and evidently truer to the democratic instinct than any other party in the country. They feel that they can be true, loyal, acceptable Americans only in doing so. The Irish Catholics, the most efficient and leading portion of the Catholic population in the Union, are, no doubt, attracted to the Democratic party, because they believe it to be the party of liberty; because it is the least stiff and rigid towards foreigners; and because it advocates a liberal policy towards foreign settlers,—makes fair and large

promises, and professes to be anti-English. The strongest passion in an Irishman's heart, after love for his church and for his native land, is hatred of England."

"The Democratic party," replied De Bonneville, "may be anti-English in its professions, and sometimes in its diplomacy; but in all else it is the most thoroughgoing English party I have been able to find in your country. It was Robert J Walker, a leading Democrat, secretary of the treasury under President Polk, Mr. Buchanan's late governor of Kansas, and a candidate in expectancy for the next presidency, I am told, who proposed, at least advocated, the Anglo-Saxon alliance, or the alliance offensive and defensive of England and America against the world,—an alliance which, if effected, would be simply auxiliary to the Protestant alliance, formed for revolutionizing every Catholic state, deposing the pope, destroying the church, and placing the effective government of the world in Exeter Hall, the Protestant Vatican. The Democratic party in its general policy usually, designedly or not, plays into the hands of England. The strength of that party lies in the southern or slaveholding states, and these states would dread nothing so much as a war with Great Britain, with whom, it is maliciously said, they would have remained united as colonies even to this day, had it not been for the bolder and more independent spirit of the northern states. A war with Great Britain would deprive them of the chief market for their cotton, rice, and tobacco, the products of their slave labor, and perhaps deprive them of their negro property itself. The railroad corporations and the mercantile classes would also dread such a war, for it would deprive them of their English trade and credit, and ruin their business. The Democratic party is the free-trade party, and free trade is precisely the policy which Great Britain, as the first commercial and manufacturing nation of the world, wishes your government to adopt, for it enables her to purchase of you the food and the raw material she needs for her industrial population, and to pay for them with the products of her industry. Her interest is to prevent the growth of American manufactures, and to confine you to the production of the raw material for her mills to work up, and to supplying, at a cheap rate, the food she needs for her operatives, and this is precisely the effect of the democratic policy of free trade. If the whole labor of the Union be directed to the produc-

tion of food, and the raw materials for manufacturers, it will produce a more abundant supply, and England would not only purchase them at a cheaper rate, but at the same time obtain a wider market for the products of her industry. Were the United States to adopt the protective system advocated by the late Mr. Henry Clay, and effectively protect and encourage their own manufactures, they would deal the commercial and industrial supremacy of England the severest blow it has ever received, and reduce the haughty Ocean Queen to a condition compatible with their own free development, and the peace and prosperity of the continental nations; and till they do so, they will never have really escaped from their old colonial dependence. The interest of the southern states, taken by themselves, may demand free trade, because they own and employ slaves and therefore unskilled labor, but the interests of the Union, as a whole, demand independence, which can never be attained by confining yourselves to the productions of unskilled labor to be exchanged for the productions of skilled labor. That is the policy of a semi-barbarous people, and never to be adopted by a people that aspires in the arts, refinement, and cultivation, to the first rank among civilized nations; as long as you continue it, you will be principally confined to the lowest grade of material civilization, and without moral weight among contemporary nations. The Democratic policy is dictated by the slaveholding and foreign commercial interests, and consists briefly in preferring unskilled to skilled labor, brute matter to cultivated intellect. That policy originated in the last century with men who defined man a 'digesting tube, open at both ends,' and ascribed his superiority over animals to the fact that his fore limbs terminate in hands, instead of hoofs or claws.'

"No doubt," continued De Bonneville, "you are a great people and have prospered; but, if you take into consideration the numerous and important advantages you have had, you have prospered less during the period of your national existence than any of the principal states of Europe. You have hardly kept up with the mother country, and Russia has far outstripped you in the race. You have prospered, as far as prospered you have, in spite of your government. What government in a country like yours can do to hinder the prosperity of a people, yours has done. Even your present prosperity has its limits, which, if you change not your policy, are by no means so distant as you imagine.

Already you find the continent too small for you, and have in some sections of the Union a surplus and dangerous population. You have despoiled the best part of your territory of its primitive forests, fearfully diminished the supply of timber and lumber, and with a reckless disregard to the wants of future generations, unmatched in the world's history. You are impoverishing your best lands, exhausting the fertility of your rich soils in producing rice, cotton, tobacco, grain, and provisions, to be exchanged for foreign luxuries, which destroy your simplicity of character, introduce habits of extravagance, corrupt your manners and morals, and are consumed without adding a cent to your capital, or productive capacity. Your trade, sustained by agricultural products, is a rich mine for England, which you work for her at the expense of your own land and labor. Irish Catholics, by emigrating from Ireland to this country, contribute far more to the prosperity of England than they could have done by remaining at home. Indeed, the United States is simply England's western farm or plantation, from which she derives in part the supplies for her household, and the Democratic party is her steward or intendant for its management. If hatred of England, and a desire to humble her pride and break up her supremacy, be a motive of political action with Catholics of Irish birth or descent, the Democratic party, it strikes me, is the last party in the country they should support."

"M. de Bonneville must be aware," replied O'Flanagan, "that however plausible his theory may appear, it is not universally accepted, and is denied by Adam Smith, and nearly all political economists."

"Adam Smith," rejoined De Bonneville, "defines the wealth of a nation to be the amount of its exchangeable produce, or the amount of its produce remaining over and above its wants for home consumption, without taking into the account the nature of the surplus, or of the articles for which it is exchanged; I make the wealth of a nation consist in its capital, and its capital in the productive capacity of its land, including the laboring population and all that goes to make up that capacity; hence the different conclusions at which we respectively arrive. If you take more from your land than you add to it, you diminish its productive capacity, and therefore the national wealth. Every agriculturist knows this, and it is proved by the pains they take to save, create, or import manures to restore their ex-

hausted soils. Hitherto you have sustained the constant drain on your land by your exportation of agricultural productions exchanged for the productions of foreign skilled labor, chiefly by opening new lands and bringing new virgin soil into cultivation; but this resource has its limit, extensive as your territory is, and must ultimately fail you. As long as this resource lasts, or remains near at hand, you may not be struck with the ruinous nature of your policy, or be led to reflect that you are exhausting, in luxurious and riotous living, the patrimony of future generations. You do not as yet reflect how much of your present prosperity is really a draft on the future. With your vast extent of territory, embracing almost every variety of climate, soil, and production, you might sustain in ease and comfort a far larger population than that of the Chinese empire, estimated at over four hundred millions of souls; yet with your present system you could not easily maintain a third of that number. You have not yet a population much over thirty millions, and you already in some sections find the means of obtaining a livelihood difficult, as is evinced by the constant stream of emigration from the older-settled states to the new states and territories. What would be your condition then, if the whole Union were as densely peopled as Massachusetts, Connecticut, or New York?"

"The grand error of the political economists," said Winslow, "is in laying down free trade as the true policy of all nations and at all times. Free trade is undoubtedly the true policy of England at present, for her territory is small, and her greatness depends on trade and industry. She does not and cannot produce from her own land the materials which are needed to supply her manufactures and her foreign trade. The chief value of her exports consists in the labor applied to raw materials imported from abroad. Her exports are chiefly products of her industry, not of her agriculture. She imports the raw material, and exports the manufactured article, and her trade adds more to her land than it takes from it; that is, by it more of the products of the soil, which by returning enriches it, are consumed at home, than she exports. Ireland, however, by the same system, is relatively impoverished, for her manufactures are comparatively few, her trade is limited, and the mass of her population are employed in agriculture, a large portion of the products of which is consumed not at home, but exported and consumed out of the kingdom. Hence the stern necessity which forces so

large a proportion of her sons and daughters to emigrate, although she could, under a different system, easily support a population twice as large as the highest number to which her population has as yet ever risen. This emigration weakens Ireland, regarded as a separate kingdom, but it enriches the empire, because the labor of those who emigrate is employed, directly or indirectly, in cultivating the yet unexhausted lands of the Union or of the British colonies, and more advantageously to British trade than it would or could be in Ireland."

"But in a country like yours," resumed De Bonneville, "free trade is the worst policy possible, especially since you have reached that state in which you can, with a little effort, make your industry suffice for yourselves. It keeps you dependent on foreign nations for the products of skilled labor, exhausts your capital to pay for foreign luxuries, which do and can yield no return of capital, and deprives you of the profits of industrial labor. You have little occasion to import the raw material, for you produce or may produce it for yourselves, and therefore may save to yourselves the profits of both industry and agriculture. Under free trade you apply your labor to agriculture, not to obtain the means of sustaining a larger population, but to obtain the means of carrying on a larger trade. The products of your agriculture go not to feed your people, and to increase your capital, but to support your commerce, and to purchase the products of foreign industry, which add nothing to your national wealth or strength, but really lessen both.

"Trade enriches a nation," concluded De Bonneville, "when its exports derive their chief value from labor and skill; it impoverishes a nation, when they derive their chief value from the land, for then it exhausts the land, enhances the price of living, and the country is able to sustain relatively only a smaller population. The gold taken from the mines of California, and exported to England or France, to pay for luxuries consumed, is simply so much extracted from the capital of the nation, and, under the economical point of view, thrown away. The exchange of the produce of the land for foreign luxuries necessarily diminishes, instead of adding to the national capital. You should, therefore, aim to supply your own markets with the manufactured article, and to restrict your foreign trade to the products of your industry, and the importation of such articles needed for your industry, as you do not or cannot

produce at home. That is, you should study to support your foreign exchanges with the products of industry, not, as now, with the products, the chief value of which is derived from the land, for then, in relation to foreign nations, you will live within your income, and not draw on your capital. In this way you will make your own industry profitable, add to your national capital, and have the means of sustaining a population of millions, where now you can sustain only thousands, as may be seen, even under the disadvantages of the present system of trade, by contrasting your free states with your slaveholding states. You do not seem as yet to have really escaped from your colonial dependence on the mother country; you follow her as a flock of sheep follow the bell-wether. When she adopted the protective policy, you adopted the protective policy; when she adopts free trade, you adopt free trade, and in either case without stopping a moment to inquire whether the same policy operates alike in the two countries, or whether the policy beneficial to the one may not be ruinous to the other. The mercantile interest and that of the owners of slave labor are no doubt identical with the interest of England and demand free trade, but they are at war with the true interest and glory of the American people as an independent nation and a first-class civilized power. The mercantile interest depends more on the slaveholding interest than on any other one interest in the country, and the slaveholding interest is dependent almost entirely on free trade, especially with Great Britain. Here is your grand difficulty. The antagonism between these interests on the one hand, and those of the American nation, regarded as a whole, on the other, is so deep, so radical, that I see not how you can easily reconcile it. It seems to me the United States must either fail to take their proper rank in the scale of nations, and gradually lapse into a semi-barbaric state, or else the slave interest must be gradually suppressed, and finally extinguished. I see no other alternative, unless the slaveholding states secede or be driven from the Union, and form a slaveholding and planting republic by themselves, and such is the conclusion to which your ablest and most sharp-sighted statesmen, especially of the South, are rapidly coming. This much is evident, the slave interest, as long as it exists, must dictate the policy of the Union or be ruined. It must govern, or be not at all, and the non-slaveholding states will not submit much longer to its govern-

ment, for they have adverse interests, and feel that they are strong enough to have their own way."

"The fact of antagonism between the two sections of the Union," said O'Flanagan, "cannot be denied, and if it continues, and grows as it has done for the last few years, it must, of course, cause a dissolution of the Union. But it is rather an antagonism of sentiment than of interest, and with reasonable concessions on each side to the prejudices of the other would cease to exist. Even on M. de Bonneville's own principles, there is no reason why the slaveholding interest should be singled out as an especial object of attack. The farming interest seeks a foreign market as well as the planting interest. Wheat, Indian corn, beef, pork, wool, butter, and cheese are produced with a view to foreign trade, no less than cotton, rice, and tobacco. Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin are as dependent on free trade as South Carolina, Alabama, or Mississippi. The agricultural interest of free labor is then identical with the agricultural interest of slave labor."

"The antagonism of sentiment, Mr. O'Flanagan admits," remarked Diefenbach, "originates in the real and radical antagonism of interest between the North and the South. You have adopted two mutually hostile systems, neither of which can develop itself without displacing the other. The free labor system will not tolerate the slave system, and the slave labor system cannot tolerate the free labor system. They can co-exist in a state only by the subjection of the one to the other. This, I take it, is the simple naked fact. Either the one system or the other must be in the ascendency, and dictate the policy of the government, or your Union is no real union, and you are, whatever your pretences, two distinct and hostile peoples. You are now in the crisis of the struggle between these two antagonistic systems. Hitherto you have proceeded in comparative harmony, for ever since the election of Mr. Jefferson the slave system has for the most part of the time been suffered to govern the country. It has done so, as Mr. Hammond, the senator from South Carolina, boasted in his place in the senate, for the last sixty years. But the interest of free labor, so depressed in all the slave states, where it dares not even complain, seems now resolved on asserting its independence and its supremacy. Mr. Seward has well said that it makes no difference whether you regard the action of congress on the Kansas imbroglio as the last

defeat or as the first victory of the free state party; no new slave state can be admitted into the Union. Free labor, it seems to me, is destined to no more defeats. What then will the slave interest do? Submit it cannot, for it must rule the government, or be ruined. Slavery is so interwoven with the habits and manners, the whole social and private life of the South, that emancipation is out of the question, and, moreover, is not at present desirable for the mass of the slaves themselves; and under a government that consults the interests of free labor alone, slavery becomes ruinous to the masters. The contest for ascendency has come, and the battle cannot any longer be evaded by declamations, either against the abolitionists of the North, or the so-called 'Fire Eaters' of the South. These extremists, as you call them, are extremists only because they better represent the real tendencies of their respective parties than the moderate, *via-media*, or so-called Union men. I see no alternative but a secession of the slave states from the Union. They are separated already from the Union in feeling, in interest, and in policy, and a union against these cannot much longer be maintained even in appearance."

"The dissolution of the Union is an event," remarked Father John, "that I have never allowed myself to contemplate even as possible. I know no right that a state has in or out of the constitution to secede, for it cannot secede without a breach of faith,—certainly not, unless it has the formal consent of the other states, parties to the Union. That consent will never be obtained. Only the weaker and defeated party will ever dream of seceding, and being the weaker, it will not be suffered by the stronger to secede. Threats of secession may be thrown out to stay the encroachments, or assumed encroachments, of the ruling interest, but I do not think there is a state in the Union that would not shrink from the difficulties of carrying them into effect. There are only about three hundred and fifty thousand owners of slave property in the Union, at least such is the statement made; and it is certain, that but a small minority of the inhabitants of the slave states are really owners of slaves. The non-slaveholding population of the slaveholding states have even less interest than the free population of the North in sustaining slavery. The slaveholders constitute an aristocracy, a very respectable aristocracy, if you will,—high-spirited, generous, hospitable,

and who are loved the more the better they are known, but still an aristocracy, which crushes the hopes and aspirations of the poor laboring white population of the slave states. This free white population has really no sympathy with slavery, for it reduces them to a condition below that of the free peasantry in any of the states of Europe. These, when assured of the support and sympathy of the free states, will hardly vote or fight for secession, when secession has for its object the maintenance of slavery, which crushes them; and it is possible that every seceding state would find a powerful enemy in its own bosom. Secession cannot be effected peaceably, and I do not believe it can be by force, or against the force that would inevitably be brought to bear against it, especially as the army and navy would remain under the command of the federal government. I regret that threats of secession should be thrown out, or hopes of it indulged, but as yet I do not regard it as probable, hardly as possible.

"Then," proceeded Father John, "I do not agree with my friends as to the relative weakness of the slave system. The slave states furnish not only the best market for a portion of our importations, but also the best market for our domestic manufactures, and thus greatly soften the hostility even of northern industry. Their productions supply the larger portion of the exchange for imported luxuries consumed to a far greater extent in the free than in the slave states. The free trade policy of the government has, as Mr. O'Flanagan has suggested, turned the attention of the great farming states of the centre and the West to producing for a foreign market, and identified their interests, for the present at least, with the interests of the slaveholding states. All your railroads, canals, or artificial means of communication, are constructed with a view to foreign as well as home trade, and are designed to connect the seaboard with the interior. Slavery is directly or indirectly interwoven with the interests of the whole country, and its abolition would derange the business and social relations of the free states hardly less than of the slave states themselves. Boston, New York, and Philadelphia are hardly, if any, less interested in sustaining slavery than Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, or New Orleans. The ruling classes in the free states, however much they may for political reasons favor free-soilism, as it is called, are really interested in sustaining slavery, and will support no legislative measure seriously hostile to it. I think, therefore, that the slave

system is in no immediate danger, that it is quite able to protect itself, and that the free labor system is very far as yet from its first victory, or its last defeat.

"The South," Father John went on, "is less deeply imbued with the spirit of trade than the North; but the slave system which it supports is a most important element in the mercantile system which now governs the world. That mercantile system is the worst system that has ever prevailed in human affairs. It installs Mammon in the place of God, and puts trade in the place of religion; and is more degrading, more brutalizing, more fatal to morality, to the virtue, the integrity, the well-being of the people, than any system of ancient or modern gentile superstition and idolatry. It lives and thrives, only, by materializing the present, and discounting the future; and the reason why its fatal tendencies are not detected is, that it obscures, like all false systems, the intellect, blunts the moral sense, and degrades the soul to its own level. But that system governs the governments, and they cannot subject it to their power. It is too strong to be broken up by any possible governmental policy or measure. Governments can do nothing against it, and even the pontifical government itself has been forced to yield in some measure to its influence; and nine-tenths of the things which modern liberals, even of the moderate school, denounce as evils or abuses in the governments of old Europe, are regarded as evils, only because they are not in harmony with the interests of the mercantile system, which has supplanted the Catholic system introduced under Charlemagne. The system can be weakened, and ultimately broken up, only as was the old system of Græco-Roman idolatry and superstition against which Peter erected his chair; that is, by recalling men to the fact that this world is not their home, that their destiny is not in this life, and that their supreme good is not found in the goods of the natural order. Religion, operating on the hearts of individuals, detaching them from the world, elevating their affections to the invisible and the eternal, and fixing them on the heavenly and the spiritual, not government, is the agent that must work out the changes, and introduce the ameliorations, my friends so ardently and so justly desire. A protective tariff would, to some extent, affect unfavorably the trade of England with this country, but it would neither annihilate nor shake her mercantile supremacy. With a large part of Europe bound in the meshes of her

system, with South America, the East, all central and southern Asia, all Canada, and Oceanica, to say nothing of Africa, open to her trade, she can bear without any great damage a serious falling off in her trade with us. If the American system of 1824 had been persevered in, it would have done something to prevent the wonderful developments and expansion of British commerce; but it is now too late for its revival to produce a perceptible effect.

"The revival of the protective system," continued Father John, "would give a new spring to our manufactures, and promote the interests of our industrial, as distinguished from our agricultural, labor. It would do something to render us less dependent on foreign industry; but it would, at the same time, lessen the power of foreign nations to consume our agricultural products, and thus render them less dependent on us. It would, for a time, sacrifice what is with us the stronger interest to the weaker, and that, too, without building up for us a system of real home or domestic industry. Under an economical point of view, the factories of Lowell, Providence, or Pittsburg, are no more domestic in relation to the Carolinian, Georgian, or Alabamian, than those of Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, or Glasgow. The so-called American system might aid and encourage what the French call *la grande industrie*, but what we want is the small industry, which may be taken home, and carried on in the bosom of the family. But that is hopeless till there comes a crash, a catastrophe more terrible than that of the fall of western Rome before the advancing hordes of northern barbarians. The protective tariff might help to emancipate us from the remains of our colonial bondage, but it would only serve to rivet still firmer the chains of the mercantile and credit system. But our speculations are idle. The American people will not revive it, or if they should by a spasmodic effort reënact it, they would not steadily sustain it. The agricultural, mercantile, and railroad interests, are too strong for that of industry, even when backed by the strong anti-slavery sentiment of the free states.

"The great evils," added Father John in conclusion, "of modern society are too deep, and too wide-spread, to be reached by political and economical devices and arrangements. The whole head is sick, and the whole heart is faint. The endeavor to restore society to health and soundness by governmental action, will only make matters worse, as is proved by the example of the United Kingdom and the

United States. In fact, the evils complained of originated in the triumph of the political system over the religious. It became inevitable, when the *politiques*, the politicians who opposed alike the victory of the *Ligue* and of the Huguenots, succeeded in placing Henry of Navarre on the throne of France as Henry IV. Then was inaugurated the system of independent politics—a system which tolerates all religions and submits to none, and governs the world with sole regard to human and temporal interests—a system which excludes religion from the state, subordinates the moral and spiritual interests of mankind to the political, or treats them with haughty disdain, or a profound indifference. In this system of independent politics, which has become nearly universal, and is the boast of the modern world, is the source of those evils, which prey upon the heart of every contemporary civilized nation. They originate in the very attempt to exclude God from the state, and to secure the progress and well-being of man and society, by political and legislative action. They lie in the very heart of the age, in the prevalent political atheism, in the universal carnal Judaism, which renews every day the crucifixion of our Lord. Till you lay the axe at the root of that evil, revive faith in the heart of man, and cure his neglect or contempt of religious duty and the retributions of another life, you have no remedy, no hope."

"Father John has, I see," said O'Flanagan, "no confidence in politics, and takes very nearly the same ground, which a few months ago he rebuked Mr. Winslow and myself for taking."

"I have not," replied Father John, "and never have had any confidence in politics divorced from true religion, and operating alone. When warmed and fecundated by their union with religion, and acting in obedience and subordination to the natural and the revealed law of God, I confide much in them. I advocate the liberal side in politics, because it is only by so doing that I can guard against the subjection of religion to Cæsar; but I advocate the submission of politics to religion, to save politics from running into atheism, anarchy, and rendering society impracticable."

"After all," rejoined O'Flanagan, "speculations on the topics that have come up, on political economy, free trade, and protective tariffs, have very little to do with explaining why the majority of my Catholic countrymen, naturalized in the United States, usually support the Democratic party."

"It is not necessary to seek an explanation of that fact," replied Father John. "The Democratic party, as to its doctrines, is of European rather than of American, of continental rather than of English, origin, and is the counterpart of the absolute monarchy which prevailed in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Nearly all the political people of the United States are of European origin or descent; but some emigrated from Europe at an earlier and others at a later day. As a general rule, the more recent arrivals brought with them the democratic or Jacobinical doctrines which were in fashion in Europe throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century, and these, whom we may call neo-Americans, constituted the main body of the Democratic party. Nothing was more natural than that the immigrants in our own day should associate themselves with this party, with whom they, in their capacity of citizens of foreign birth, the more readily sympathize. Add to this that the political and social doctrines, put in vogue by the French revolution, are still held and deeply cherished in the bosom of those classes of the European population that emigrate. Catholic Ireland sympathizes with the continent far more than with England, and in its political and social doctrines is chiefly influenced by France. Being in a state of chronic rebellion against the government, and suffering innumerable wrongs, it has, like the continental liberals, looked to democracy as the source of deliverance and regeneration. The lay-leaders of the national party are liberals, and being obliged to draw their force from the people, are at least virtually democrats. The Irish popular mind has been turned to democratic ideas and hopes before leaving home; the Irish have felt, they as well as others, the workings of the spirit of the age; and on coming here, they find their natural association with the Democratic party. They are not led to the support of that party, either by their clergy or their religion, but by their political sentiments and tendencies. That they entertain notions and do many things incompatible with a true understanding of their religion, it were foolish to deny; but they do not see the incompatibility, and with few exceptions, intend to subordinate their politics to their religion, not their religion to their politics. Make them see that a certain doctrine or policy is opposed to their Catholicity, and the great body of them will abandon it, for they have, even in these times, a political conscience. After all, I see not that they owe any

apology for supporting the Democratic party, which is probably as little objectionable as any party in the country. What I wish is that Catholics, as Catholics, should stand aloof from all parties, and hold themselves free as citizens to vote for such candidates as they prefer. What I ask of them is to study not to commit their religion or their church to any party, Whig or Democrat. Catholic citizens, as others, may be partisans, but the church is not and cannot be a partisan, and they must beware of attempting to make her so, and of doing or saying any thing that will embarrass the freedom and independence of her clergy in relation to the interests of religion. I do not want the Democratic or any other party to feel that it has a special right to count on the votes of Catholics."

Conversation VIII.

"Mr. O'Flanagan," remarked Diefenbach, "observed the other evening that his religion had nothing to do with his politics. I understood him to mean that his politics are independent of his religion, and that in the political order he may hold or do any thing he pleases, whether it does or does not accord with the doctrine and precepts of his church. I have heard many Catholics, even some earnest, practical Catholics, say the same; but I always presume that they speak without really meaning what they say."

"In this instance, at least," replied O'Flanagan, "I mean what I say. My political opinions and conduct are my own, dictated by my own sense of justice and expediency, not by my church or my clergy, whose functions are purely spiritual, and who have no authority in the temporal order."

"There were," rejoined Diefenbach, "in the time of Leo X., certain pretended philosophers who took it into their heads to assert, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, though theologically true, is philosophically false. The pope condemned them, and asserted that nothing can be true in philosophy that is false in theology, or true in theology that is false in philosophy. One truth cannot contradict another; philosophy does not include Catholic theology, but Catholic theology includes philosophy; nature does not include grace, but grace includes nature; the natural virtues do not include the supernatural, but the supernatural include the natural. So politics

do not include religion, but religion includes politics. To fail in political morality is to fail in religion itself, for the basis of all specific political morality is the precept, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; and if a man love not his brother, that is, his neighbor, whom he hath seen, how shall he love God whom he hath not seen?' If there be a moral right in politics, then, though a man's politics may have nothing to do with his religion, yet his religion, as his supreme law of conscience, has something, and indeed much, to do with his politics. Mr. O'Flanagan will allow me to say with all respect, that he would have spoken more like a good Catholic, as he no doubt is, if he had said his religion is independent of his politics, and gives the law to them, instead of receiving it from them."

"There are," answered O'Flanagan, "two orders, the spiritual and the temporal, each independent and supreme in its own order. In the spiritual order the authority of the church is supreme; in the temporal order the supreme authority is vested in the state; and in that order, I am free to do whatever the state permits, or does not prohibit. As a citizen of a democratic state, I share the political sovereignty, and have in my political opinions and actions all the freedom and independence which belongs to that sovereignty."

"In so far as the civil order is concerned, I concede it," said Winslow, "but the question is not there. The civil order cannot call a man to an account for what it permits, but a man may nevertheless be accountable in the spiritual order for things done in the temporal. Mr. O'Flanagan says well, that there are two orders, each independent and supreme in its own order, but it does not follow from this that one order may not be dependent in relation to another and a superior order. The temporal order is inferior to the spiritual order, and is on all sides bounded by it. This is so not by positive ordination, but in the very nature of things, and even God himself cannot make it otherwise. This is the point which, it seems to me, some Catholics overlook. *Brownson's Review*, in controverting the opinion that free negroes, citizens of a particular state, are not citizens of the United States, delivered by the chief justice in the Dred Scott case, says: 'We regret that in giving the opinion of the court the learned judge did not recollect what he is taught by his religion, namely, the unity of the race, that all men by the natural law are equal, that negroes

are men, and therefore, as to their rights, must be regarded as standing on the same footing with white men, where there is no positive or municipal law that degrades them.' To this a Catholic journalist replies, with apparently general approbation, 'that the reviewer would do well to remember that the chief justice occupies his seat to administer the law according to the constitution of the United States, not to execute the ordinances and decrees of the Council of Trent.' That reply, if it means any thing, means that a Catholic judge is not bound in his official character by his religion. Nobody is silly enough to pretend that a chief justice of the United States has it for his official duty to execute the ordinances and decrees of the Council of Trent; but the question raised is, whether a Catholic judge can administer judicially the civil law or sit under a civil constitution that brings him into conflict with the ordinances and decrees, the doctrine and discipline of his church?"

"It is not certain that the objection of the reviewer is well founded," rejoined O'Flanagan, "and it may be, that the opinion of the court is compatible with our religion. The Catholic journals argued well against the reviewer, that Chief Justice Taney, brought up a Catholic from his infancy, should be presumed to know and to respect his religion as well and as much as a recent convert, notorious for the eccentricity of his opinions, and the grievous errors of all sorts into which he has fallen in the course of his life."

"That was well argued on Protestant principles," replied Diefenbach, "but very badly argued on Catholic principles. Protestantism is based on the opinion of men, but Catholicity reposes on the word of God, and Catholics have an infallible method of determining what that word is, without drawing invidious comparisons between individuals, whether eminent or not. Neither Chief Justice Taney nor the editor of *Brownson's Review* is an authority in Catholic doctrine, and if the question arises, which of them represents that doctrine truly, the appeal must be to a standard independent of them both. Judge Taney is, no doubt, an eminent jurist, but it does not follow from that fact that he is an eminent theologian. There have been many able jurists who could not be accepted as authority in Catholic doctrine, such as Ulpian and Papinian, Domat, Mansfield, Blackstone, Marshall, Kent, and Story. A man may be eminent in one line without being eminent in every line. Count Boniface was no doubt superior as a military

man to St. Augustine, but probably several degrees below him as a theologian. A man may have been a Catholic from his infancy up, without being a father or a doctor of the church, and I have never heard that Chief Justice Taney has distinguished himself by his theological attainments or proficiency. The principle assumed by the journals is invidious, and opposed to that freedom of thought and criticism which our religion allows. It would invest eminent jurists or civilians, who may have devoted no special study to theology, with papal prerogatives and immunities with regard to all humbler or less eminent individuals. It is an ungenerous and an unmanly attempt to silence every modest man by an appeal to the *argumentum ad verecundiam*,—an argument seldom resorted to when other arguments can be had."

"I raise no question," said Winslow, "between the chief justice and the reviewer. I do not censure or defend either. The question I raise is, as to the justice of the reply the Catholic journalist gave to the reviewer, which was, as I understand it, that a Catholic judge is not bound in his official character to consult the teachings of his religion, and may administer the civil law although it conflicts with the doctrine and precepts of his church. If we accept the principle of that reply, a Christian might have officiated as judge under Nero, Decius, or Diocletian, and doomed his fellow-Christians for being Christians to the amphitheatre, or to any of the various forms of torture and death authorized by the laws of the empire; or a Catholic might have sat on the bench under Elizabeth, and sentenced the priests of his church to be tortured, hung, drawn, and quartered for daring to perform the proper offices of their priesthood. That may be so, and it may be that it is because I am only a convert, and too green as a Catholic to see its lawfulness, but as at present informed I cannot admit it. It strikes me that no Catholic can hold an office that requires him to act against his religion; and if the constitution and laws of the Union really do require the judge to go against his religion, the least he can do is to resign his seat, for under a constitution and laws that really do that no Catholic can hold office."

"The case made by the reviewer can be disposed of without raising the question as to the mutual relation of the two powers," said De Bonneville.

"But not the case made by the Catholic journalist in his flippant reply to the reviewer," replied Diefenbach.

"The chief justice is an officer of the civil, not of the ecclesiastical court, and his duty is to declare and apply the civil law, the law of his own court, as he finds it," replied O'Flanagan.

"The law by which priests were hung in England under Elizabeth, was a civil, and not an ecclesiastical law," replied Diefenbach. "Technically they were not sentenced and executed for performing their priestly functions, but for treason, because the civil law made the performance of those functions treason against the crown. Treason is a civil offence, and punishable in all states by the civil authority. The judge, therefore, in sentencing the priest sentences him directly for a civil offence, and only indirectly for performing the offices of his church. Could a Catholic judge plead that at the bar of conscience, in justification of his having, in fact, sentenced the priests of his church to be hung, drawn, and quartered, for doing that which by the law of God is no offence, but for them a right and a duty?"

"The judge holds under the civil law, and his duty is to interpret it and apply it faithfully to the case before the court," rejoined O'Flanagan. "If the law is unjust, the legislative, not the judicial authority, is responsible."

"I am not prepared to say as much as that," answered De Bonneville. "The judge is bound to take into consideration the justice of the law, and to interpret it in accordance with natural right, so far as he can without violence to the text. The reviewer did not complain of the chief justice that he did not follow the Council of Trent *against* the constitution, but that he did not remember, in interpreting the language, or more properly the silence, of the constitution touching negro citizenship, what his religion teaches him, and what as a Catholic he holds and must hold, namely, that negroes are men, that all men are equal before the law of nature, and therefore as men, negroes and whites stand on the same footing of equality. The legal presumption, then, must be in favor of equality, and therefore in favor of negro citizenship. If negroes are men, and all men are equal as men, then free negroes and whites are equal as citizens, unless the contrary is expressly ordained by the constitution. Free negroes, citizens of a particular state, are citizens of the United States, unless expressly excluded by the text of the constitution itself. Had the chief justice remembered the great doctrine of the unity of the race and the equality of all men before the law of nature, which

the constitution left him free to do, and which his religion required him to do, he would have seen that the presumptions in the case were in favor of equality, and therefore, that he must decide in favor of negro citizenship, because, as every one knows, there is, as a matter of fact, nothing in the letter of the constitution against it."

"The court," replied O'Flanagan, "does not make, and has no power to make the constitution; it only declares what it is, according to the true intent and meaning of the sovereign will that ordains it. It has nothing to do with speculations on the unity or diversity of the race, with the abstract law of nature, or the abstruse and subtile distinctions of scholastic theology. It looks solely to the intent and meaning of the sovereign people in forming the constitution. The legal method of ascertaining this meaning is to consult what was the sentiment of the civilized world at the time when the constitution was made, of the convention that drew it up, and of the people who ratified it. This sentiment touching the negro race at the time did not treat negroes as the equals of the whites; it branded them as an inferior race, and regarded them not as men, but as merchandise that might be bought and sold in the market as any other species of merchandise. It is preposterous to suppose that the white race entertaining this sentiment could for a moment think of placing persons of the negro race on a footing of equality with themselves, or of conferring on them the rights of citizens under the new government they were forming. The presumption then is against negro citizenship, and the rule is to interpret the constitution against it as far as it can be without violence to the text. So at least reasons the chief justice, and what lawyer will say that his reasoning is not true legal reasoning?"

"The facts," said Winslow, "are not precisely as the court assumes. The sounder sentiment of the civilized world at the time did not deny, and in fact it had never denied, negroes to be men, sprung alike with the white race from Adam and Eve. With a Catholic judge the sentiment of the Catholic Church must count for something in determining the sentiment of the civilized world, and that sentiment had always treated negroes as men, having under the law of nature and the law of grace equal rights. The popes as early as 1482 had positively forbidden, under pain of excommunication, the reduction of negroes born free to

slavery, and also the purchasing of those who were thus reduced. Practically negro slaves were bought and sold in the market, but public opinion, if it tolerated, never sanctioned it, and certainly never allowed *free* negroes to be so bought and sold. It condemned, in this country, as early as 1787, and in fact as early as 1776, the African slave trade, though that trade still continues, for there are always found in every age and in every country individuals who will brave public opinion and even religion itself in pursuit of gain. The colonies themselves, as is well known, had at an early day protested against the introduction of negro slaves, and the constitution bears on its face ample evidence that public opinion condemned both the slave trade and negro slavery, and that the convention that drew it up would have abolished both, if they could have done so without defeating the union of the several states under a single government, which was the principal end they had in view. The constitution studiously avoids all recognition of slavery in terms, and nowhere marks the slightest distinction between free negroes and free white men. If it refers to negro slaves at all, it refers to them as 'persons held to service,' or as 'other persons,' or simply 'persons imported,' never as negroes, and in denominating them *persons*, it declares them to be human beings, men, and therefore that, under the law of nature, they stand on a footing of perfect equality with men of the white race."

"The court," added Diefenbach, "was out in its law as well as in its facts. It assumes that in order to determine the true intent and meaning of the constitution, it suffices to ascertain the true intent and meaning of the people in ordaining it. But the constitution is not all conventional, and only a part, and that the least essential part, originates in the will of the people. The state, civil government, is instituted and exists for the purpose of maintaining justice, and repressing or redressing injustice; for, Cousin, the eminent French philosopher, well asserts, the state is founded on the idea of the just, and has for its mission the realization of justice in society. All acts against justice are acts against the very purpose and end of the state and therefore unconstitutional, and null and void from the beginning. St. Augustine, and all ethical authorities, ancient or modern, maintain that laws against natural justice, are violences rather than laws, and without force; and even Blackstone concedes that acts contrary to the law

of nature are null and void. The law of nature, natural justice, is anterior to the convention, anterior to civil society, and is the fundamental law of the civil constitution, against which the convention or the political power has no right, no authority. It is integral in the constitution of the state, always presupposed, and is what may properly be called the non-conventional part of the constitution. The prince, that is, in a popular state, the convention, is restricted in his powers by it, and whatever he attempts against it is unconstitutional and void, without the slightest legal force, since it is against the fundamental and inviolable law of the state, which binds alike the sovereign and the subject. In determining the law, in deciding the question of its constitutionality, the supreme court must consult this non-conventional part of the constitution, even more than the conventional part. The law of nature limits the power of the sovereign. Neither the legislature nor the convention can perform any valid act against natural justice, and therefore the court which has cognizance of constitutional questions will and must treat not only every legislative enactment, but every provision, article, or clause of the conventional constitution itself, that contradicts that justice, as *non avenu*."

"The supreme court, therefore," added Winslow, "can never, whatever the text of the written constitution, declare any thing to be constitutional, and therefore law, that contravenes natural justice. It is not true, then, that the court has no power to go behind even the written or conventional constitution, and to inquire whether the law does or does not violate the law of nature, for the law of nature being the fundamental law of the state, that from which the state derives its being and the convention all its powers, is as much before the court or within its cognizance as the conventional constitution itself. The supreme court of every state for the state, the supreme court of the United States for the Union, is the supreme civil tribunal for settling the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the legislative acts which come before it. It entertains the plea to the constitutionality, and will declare every legislative act or so much thereof unconstitutional and void as it judges to be forbidden or not authorized by the constitution. But no act is or can be constitutional that contradicts the natural law, because that law is an essential element of the constitution, is itself the fundamental constitution of every state,

by the very fact that the state is a state, not a mob or a despotism."

"The court," explained Father John, "judges of the justice of the law, that is, whether it is or is not forbidden by the natural law, but it does not judge of the policy or impolicy, expediency or inexpediency of the law, for that belongs primarily to the political, and secondarily, to the legislative power."

"The judges," rejoined O Flanagan, "are civil officers, created by civil society, and hold their office from the prince, or, as we say in this country, from the people. They are subordinate to the sovereign, and are bound to ascertain, declare, and apply to the case before them the will of the sovereign people, as expressed by them in the constitution and the laws made in accordance therewith. They may judge whether the legislative enactment under which the case before them is brought, does or does not conform to that will so expressed, but they cannot go behind that will itself, or judge the acts of the convention, under pretext of judging whether the law is constitutional or not. The highest conceivable civil tribunal is the convention or the people themselves, and their judgment in convention, of what is or is not in accordance with the law of nature, is supreme and final for the civil court. It would be absurd to pretend that the judges have authority to sit in judgment on the will that creates them, and to set aside as void the very act from which they derive all their power."

"If the maxim of the old Roman jurist, *Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem*, be accepted, Mr. O'Flanagan is certainly right," replied Diefenbach. "His principle is unquestionably that adopted by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, and by the leaders of the Democratic party, since the time of General Jackson, who introduced and sanctioned the doctrine that each department of the government interprets the constitution for itself. The courts are created by the convention or the people, and the judges are directly or indirectly appointed by them, and officiate in their name; but the courts are created courts of justice, and the judges are elected or appointed to administer justice, and, therefore, derive their power from the people only so far as the justice they are to administer is created by the people and dependent on their will. They are judges of the law; they decide sovereignly in the civil order what is the law, as

well as apply the law to the particular case before them. The will of the people or the convention is law within the limits of the natural or the moral law, but is null and void as unjust, as a violence, the moment it passes beyond those limits. Whether their will does or does not pass beyond those limits, is not a political or a legislative, but a judicial question and its decision belongs not to the convention, the supreme political power, nor to the legislature, but to the supreme judiciary. This is implied in that division of the powers of government into separate departments, so essential in the judgment of the fathers of the American republic to the existence and maintenance of freedom. The supreme judiciary is not merely a branch of the executive department, nor are the judges elected or appointed simply to carry out the will of the sovereign, whether the sovereign be the king or emperor, the nobility, or the people in convention, but to restrain even that will itself within the limits of the moral or natural law. Mr. O'Flanagan's reasoning is at war with rational liberty; it involves the principle of civil despotism, makes the people absolute sovereign, and assumes that justice and injustice, right and wrong, are simply conventional."

"But, I have simply stated the democratic principle, which I understand to be adopted as law by the American people," replied O'Flanagan; "I am not responsible for that principle."

"The democratic principle, as understood by European democrats, Jacobins, red-republicans, and revolutionists, who only transfer the absolute power of the state from the monarch to the convention or the people," replied Father John, "Mr. O'Flanagan indeed adopts or states, but not the democratic principle as it has been hitherto understood by the great body of the American people. In the sense of that principle, the American government, whether state or federal, is not, and was never intended to be democratic, for it was intended by its framers to be, in principle and in practice, a free government, a government compatible with the maintenance of justice, and the natural rights of man."

"When the political, legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government," remarked Diefenbach, "are united in the same hands there may be despotism, but there is no state, no recognition, at least no guaranty, of freedom, no protection of natural rights. The glory of the American

government is not in its democratic features, but in its wise and just division of the powers of government into distinct departments, a division, which has its reason in the very nature of government. With you the powers of government are distributed into four departments, the political, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The political power is the convention; the legislative power is vested in the legislative assemblies, subject in some instances to a conditional veto by the chief executive officer; the executive power for the Union is vested in the president; in the several states in the governor alone, or in the governor and council; the judicial power is vested in the supreme court. The executive executes the law as declared and applied by the judiciary, and can execute it only as so declared and applied. The legislative power may enact any law it pleases, authorized by the constitution, or in the state governments, not forbidden by it. The political power or convention may authorize or forbid, through the constitution, what it pleases, not in contravention of natural justice, or what in this country is called the natural rights of man. The judiciary decides whether the political as well as the legislative power transcends the limits of natural justice, and declares void the acts of either, when it judges that it does."

"Therefore," added Father John, "the judicial is the more important department of government, as being that which restrains arbitrary and unjust power, and protects the freedom, the rights of the subject or citizen. The judiciary protects the rights of the citizen in face of the political sovereign as well as in face of the legislature, the executive, or his fellow-citizens or subjects. The office of judge is, therefore, the most essential, the most vital, and the most dignified in the state. So long as the judiciary remains incorrupt and independent, so long as it firmly insists on its rights and fearlessly performs its duties, though there may be political blunders, though there may be many impolitic laws, and many foolish legislative enactments, there can be no gross oppression, for substantial justice will be affirmed and injustice repressed. It is deeply to be deplored, that the high dignity and vital importance of the judiciary have, in a measure, been lost sight of in late years by the public, in consequence of the tendency, insanely encouraged, to exalt unduly the political power. The gravest dangers threaten us in consequence of the unwearied efforts on the part of political leaders and demagogues to render the polit-

ical power absolute. The judge has come to be looked upon as a mere executive officer, whose official duty is simply to declare and apply to the case before the court the will of the political power, or the sovereign people; and he is regarded, even by honest and intelligent men, as transcending his powers, as abusing his office, if he attempts by his decisions to confine the will or pleasure of the political power within the limits of justice. There have been for several years strong and even successful movements throughout nearly all the states of the Union to subject the judges immediately to the political power, to bring them immediately under the influence of public opinion; and the judges themselves, as they lose their independent position, are beginning to lose sight of their high and solemn functions, and to regard it as their duty simply to give effect to public sentiment, which is, practically, the popular opinion, prejudice, or caprice of the time and place. It was avowedly to render the judges immediately responsible to popular opinion, that the radicals, who have inflicted so many irreparable evils upon our American community, demanded and have introduced into most of the states the constitutional clauses, which render the judges elective by popular suffrage, elective for a brief term of years, and reëligible. These changes destroy the independence of the judiciary, and reintroduce the terrible evil from which our English ancestors struggled so hard to free themselves, and which was one of the causes of the American revolution itself—that of making the judges dependent on the good will of the sovereign, and the mere instruments of his pleasure. They have worked an almost entire revolution in the judiciary, and prepared our republic to become a popular or a democratic absolutism, in which the people, that is, party, that is, again, the demagogues, govern, without any legal or practical restraint on their irresponsible will."

"The chief justice of the United States," remarked Winslow, "though bred in a good school, seems to have been led to adopt the maxims of the Roman, rather than of the English law; and has sought rather to give effect to the will of the political power, than to strengthen the defences of individual rights. In deserting the old Federal party, he seems to have gone over to political absolutism, the real character of which is concealed from his vision, because it presents itself to him under the popular name of democracy. If we adopt the principle of the radical democracy, and

pronounce the political power absolute, no fault can be found with the opinion of the chief justice in the Dred Scott case, save so far as it is founded on the misapprehension of the facts in the case. But that principle, which I believe to be the real, pure democratic principle, and therefore the reason why I cannot be a democrat, is the principle of absolutism, of cæsarism, just as much as it would be if the political power was vested in one man, instead of being as with us vested in the people, or the convention. It makes the arbitrary will of the people supreme, and therefore, right and wrong, conventional. With us the people are the state, and this doctrine makes the state absolute, free to do whatever it pleases. It makes the popular will, which in practice is simply popular opinion, the supreme law of the land, with no higher law to which that will is itself bound to conform."

"So it comes out at last, that we must accept Mr. Seward's doctrine of the higher law," exclaimed O'Flanagan—"a doctrine which has excited a burst of indignation from one end of the Union to the other, and which is incompatible with the very existence of government."

"No man who denies the higher law," replied Father John, "has or can have the right to open his mouth in favor of liberty, whether civil or religious. There is, if there be any truth in reason or revelation, a higher law than the will of the people, or the convention. Mr. Seward did not err, but uttered a great truth, when he boldly proclaimed it in his place in the senate. It is the only basis of liberty, whether civil or religious. The error of Mr. Seward was not in proclaiming the higher law, but in making each individual his own judge of what it enjoins, and in tacitly implying that the constitution of the United States requires one to do things against it. The constitution requires nothing of any one incompatible with the higher law, whether the natural law or the revealed law, and not the individual, but, in the civil order, the supreme court is the tribunal for interpreting, declaring, and applying it. The great danger to liberty in our country, it cannot be too often repeated, is from the tendency to assert the absolute supremacy of the state, and in not recognizing the fact, that no will or ordinance even of the people in convention assembled, and ratified by a popular vote, is or can be law, or be rightly treated as law by the courts, if it contravenes the law of justice. The existence and well-being of society

depend on the wise and prompt administration of justice, which is anterior to the convention, and is its law. This justice is that higher law, which is created by no human convention or legislation, but is enacted by God himself, as the transcript of his own eternal law. The tribunal for determining this law is not, as Mr. Seward would leave us to infer, the individual for himself, but the supreme judiciary. So understood, it involves nothing anarchical, or restrictive of the just freedom and authority of the political power."

"But the supreme court is not infallible, and may err in its decision, as it is contended Chief Justice Taney actually has done, in deciding in the Dred Scott case, against negro citizenship," rejoined O'Flanagan. "What security have we, then, that the courts will maintain justice, or that they will not make unjust decisions? If they do make unjust decisions, what is the remedy? If the decisions of the court bind both the individual and the political power, what right will any one have to reclaim against them, or to demand their reversal?"

"The difficulty is theoretical rather than practical," answered Father John. "In practice, the courts, if pure and independent, will seldom err as to natural justice. Their decisions, furthermore, bind only in the temporal order, and one is obliged to obey them only in his civil capacity, and is, consequently, free to criticise the decision, if he see cause to do so. Even the error of the court in the Dred Scott case, if err it did, was not in relation to the points actually before it for adjudication; and the criticisms which I should allow myself, are not on its decisions, but its *obiter dicta*. I think the opinion wrong that denies negro citizenship, because I hold that the presumption under our system is in favor of equal rights, and negroes are citizens, the same as others, if not expressly excluded. But I do not think the presumption is in favor of negro suffrage, for suffrage is not a natural, but a conventional right, and can never be presumed. The right to vote in elections is a trust positively conferred, and must be strictly construed."

"The supreme court is the supreme tribunal in the civil order, but the civil order is not itself supreme," added Diefenbach; "and the supreme court is itself bound to take the law of justice, as expounded by the supreme tribunal of the supreme or spiritual order, which enlightens conscience in regard to absolute justice, and interprets supremely for it the law of God. The supreme court after all, is a civil

court, and within the civil order. It is a branch of the civil government, and its decisions, though civilly, are not absolutely infallible, unless on the moral and spiritual relations of the case it borrows its light from the spiritual order, or the court which is instituted, not by man, but by God himself, to interpret, declare, and apply the higher law for conscience. This is wherefore political atheism is necessarily hostile to true liberty, as not recognizing, and not being able to declare infallibly the law of natural justice, which is the basis and sanction of all human law. This shows, also, wherefore Catholics cannot mean what they say, when they assert that their religion has nothing to do with their politics, as Mr. O'Flanagan is so fond of saying."

"Undoubtedly," replied Father John, "the spiritual order is superior to the temporal, and thus the church interprets the natural law for the state, and not the state for the church. But this she does by her ordinary teaching, not ordinarily by formal judicial decisions,—by informing the mind and conscience of the judges and rulers, as men and citizens. However, in a state that holds under the natural law, as with us, and is not by its constitution a Catholic state under special Catholic obligations, natural justice suffices for the courts, and as that is in the natural order, the civil judges are competent to decide any questions arising under it, at least, with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes. For myself, I should be satisfied with the civil courts, when properly constituted, and suffered to be independent, as sufficient to maintain justice in all civil causes. The faults of their decisions do not arise from their ignorance of natural justice, or their inability to make just decisions, so much as from their dependence on the political power, and failure to assert their rights and prerogatives. The world has not subsisted six thousand years, and two thousand years under the Christian dispensation, without the natural law being known, the law which is incorporated into the very reason and nature of man. Practically, at any rate, the higher law may be safely asserted, if it is asserted and followed only as declared and applied by the supreme court,—safely followed, whether in relation to liberty or in relation to power."

Conversation IX.

"I am at loss," remarked De Bonneville, "to understand why the Catholics of this country so generally oppose the common schools, established and supported by the public. These schools seem to me to be founded on sound principles, and for the most part to be very well conducted."

"They are either godless schools, or sectarian schools," replied O'Flanagan; "corrupt and corrupting; and under their influence the American people, as several Catholic publicists have well asserted, are becoming a nation of unbelievers and swindlers."

"That irreligion, vice, and crime are on the increase among the American people," said Diefenbach, "is an undeniable fact; but perhaps it would be more reasonable to attribute it to your growing wealth and luxury, to the sweepings of European prisons and poor houses annually cast upon your shores, and to the swarms of anarchists, revolutionists, rebels, traitors, infidels, rogues, cheats, swindlers, forgers, thieves, robbers, burglars, murderers, assassins, who flock hither to carry on their trade or to escape the justice of the Old World, than to your common schools. If you will make your country a refuge for the depraved, ignorant, and criminal population of old Europe, you must expect a decrease of religion, and an increase of vice and crime."

"We undoubtedly suffer from the immigration of the class to which Mr. Diefenbach alludes," remarked Winslow. "The immigration of the honest and industrious Catholic peasantry, laborers, and mechanics, of Germany and Ireland, is of great service to us; but with the immigration of the other class, we could very well dispense, for the home-manufacture is quite sufficient for all reasonable demands. Without attributing the increase of vice and crime to the public schools, I yet think it is chiefly owing to the want of schools in which our children can receive a proper moral and religious education. The common schools do not answer the principal purpose of education, the moral and religious training of the young. All education, divorced from religion and morality, is hurtful. These schools, when conducted according to the law creating them, are godless, and in practice they are, for the most part, sectarian."

"Therefore," added O'Flanagan, "when not godless, they are devilish; for all sectarianism, I take it, is from the devil. No education at all is better than either. The example of my own countrymen proves it. The rascally usurping Saxons, in their hatred of the Catholic religion and the Celtic race, took from us our churches, broke up our institutions of learning, prohibited, under the severest penalties, the reëstablishment of Catholic schools, and forbid the Catholic parent to teach his own children even letters. They compelled us, to a fearful extent, to choose between education and religion. We chose religion with ignorance and poverty, rather than heresy with wealth and knowledge. We could only teach our children their prayers and their catechism. Taught this much, however illiterate or poor, they clung to their faith, maintained their integrity and the honor of their religion and their country, and there is not in the whole world a people to compare with them in wit, faith, piety, morality, and solid worth."

"The *Catholic* Irish people," added Winslow. "Too much in our age, and especially in our country, is made of the mere secular education of what are very improperly called 'the masses.' You cannot, do the best you can, give a thorough education to all the children of the land, and the smattering of learning acquired in common schools, is often worse than nothing. Better not know how to read at all, than to read only a lying newspaper, or a yellow-covered romance.

> A little learning is a dangerous thing,
> Drink deep or taste not the Pierian spring;
> There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
> But drinking largely sobers us again.

Thus sang one of England's Catholic poets. The life, intelligence, and rank of a nation depend on the thorough education, the high culture and mental discipline of its natural aristocracy, not on the simple ability of the many to read, write, and cipher. The national schools in Ireland are producing a great change in the Irish people, but I have not learned that it is a change in favor of religion and morality. Educate the few as much as you please, but for the many it suffices that they be taught their prayers and their catechism."

"There can be no question," remarked Diefenbach, "among Catholics, with regard to the absolute necessity of

moral and religious education. It is so important, so necessary, that Almighty God has appointed, set apart, and consecrated by a special sacrament a class of teachers to look after it. But I should like to be informed how much more moral and religious education those of your children receive, who run at large in the streets, who are kept at work, or begging, by their parents, than those receive who attend the public schools."

"In your country," said De Bonneville, "where you have no state religion, where you have a multitude of conflicting sects, and where the state recognizes the equal rights of them all, and its obligation to respect equally the conscience of all its citizens, it is impossible to establish a system of public schools, in which moral and religious instruction shall be a part of the education given. The state must confine itself to secular education, and such very general moral and religious principles as everybody accepts."

"Therefore," said Winslow, "I would have no system of public schools, and would leave education to parents, to the church, and to each sect for itself."

"Where authority, either civil or ecclesiastical, does not intervene," replied Diefenbach, "comparatively few parents will take the trouble to provide for the education of their children. In England and the United States, laws have been needed to force parents to let their children be educated, by prohibiting them from employing them under a certain age in the factories, and without a certain amount of schooling. In most continental nations it has been found necessary to make it compulsory on parents to send their children to school. The church looks after the moral and religious education of children, and establishes, according to her means, schools to meet the wants of the *spiritual* society; but she does not hold it to be her business, and she has never undertaken, to provide for and to give secular education to all the children of the land, in any age or nation. It is her right and her duty to look after the moral and religious character of the education given in public and in private schools, and she has supreme authority in respect to the moral and religious elements of all education given to her children, whether given by the state or by individuals; but to purely secular education, I suppose, she holds only the relation she holds to any and every other secular matter. As for the sects, I own I do not wish to

see them each educating for itself, even their own children. Sectarianism is one of the greatest curses than can light upon a nation, and I am not willing to support a rule that would tend to perpetuate it. It was a great victory won for Catholicity in this country, when the common schools were wrested from sectarian control, and placed under that of the state, and when common school education was secularized, and forbidden by law to be sectarian. If the American people had insisted that religion should continue to be taught in the common schools, Calvinism, in some form, would have remained virtually, if not formally, the state religion in nearly every state in the Union, and Catholicity could never have gained a foothold, or Catholics a legal *status* in this republic. More than any other class of the community, have Catholics gained by that very feature in the common school system, against which, with their Old World prejudices on the subject, they are waging a relentless war. In an old Catholic country the secularization of education opens the door to infidelity; in a non-Catholic country like this, it favors religion by breaking down sectarianism and the bigotry and intolerance of the community."

"That may all be very true," replied O'Flanagan, "and Catholics do not generally object to purely secular schools for non-Catholics; but such schools will not suffice for us. We want for our children no education separated from religion and morality. Even if the common schools were, as they are not, free from sectarianism, they would not be acceptable to us, because we insist on uniting moral and religious training with secular instruction."

"That cannot be done in any system of public schools, practicable in a country like yours," interposed De Bonneville; "Catholics are a feeble minority in the Union, and there is no state in the Union which will consent to make the Catholic religion the religion of its schools. If any religion is carried into your public schools it will be Protestantism in some or all of its forms. It is, in my judgment, more for the interest of Catholicity that sectarianism should be excluded from the public schools, though the Catholic religion is not introduced, than it is that they should be made nurseries of Protestant bigotry and sectarian intolerance. It seems to me, that Catholics may very well be content with the public schools, though these schools do not favor their religion, if, at the same time, they exert no influence against it."

"I am well aware," replied O'Flanagan, "that it is impossible in a country like this, for the state to establish a system of education satisfactory to Catholics, and, therefore, I am opposed to state schools. I would carry the voluntary principle into education, as we have carried it into religion."

"And leave the bulk of your children to grow up without attending any school," threw in Diefenbach.

"I would much prefer no education to a sectarian education, or a secular education without religion," replied O'Flanagan.

"If you could have a no-education," answered Diefenbach. "But your children do not and will not grow up without education of some sort. If they have not that of the schools, they will have that of the streets."

"But," remarked Winslow, "though we send not our children to the public schools, we may send them to schools of our own. We have already numerous Catholic schools, and we may establish more."

"But not enough, nor half enough for all your children," remarked De Bonneville. "You have not the teachers nor the means for that. In Boston, about one-half of the children of school age are children of Catholic parents; and the city of Boston expends annually on her public schools, for ordinary expenses, three hundred and thirty-three thousand dollars. Where are the Catholics of that city to obtain the half of that sum annually, together with a million of dollars outlay for the erection of school houses and fixtures? In the city of New York, there are Catholic schools for about one Catholic child in six or seven, who is of proper school age. Now, what are you to do with five-sixths or six sevenths of your children unprovided for? In neither Boston nor New York have you the means to provide a proper education for all your children. In neither city, as yet, have you half church room or half priests enough for your Catholic population. The church must precede the schoolhouse, the priest the schoolmaster, and you must provide for the sacraments before providing for education. With a church without revenues, and a Catholic population for the most part made up of the poorer classes of old Europe, with the best intentions in the world, you cannot provide for the common school education of more than a sixth of your children, unless you avail yourselves of the public schools. What do you propose for these five-sixths whom you leave out of your own schools?"

"It is not necessary," replied Winslow, "that all the children of the land should be educated in secular learning. I do not find that they have been so in the most Catholic ages and nations of the world."

"But are these children who attend neither Catholic schools nor the public schools, who receive no secular education, any better trained in their religion," asked Diefenbach, "than those who do attend the public schools? If you take your children from the public schools where you have not and cannot have Catholic schools for them, you must leave them to learn not religion and morality, but all manner of mischief. How much better off under a moral and religious point of view are your children who run at large in the streets, associate with the vilest and most criminal portion of the depraved population of modern cities, are initiated, before a dozen years of age, into every vice and crime known to that population, and who grow up to be food for your brothels, your houses of correction, city penitentiaries, state prisons, and the gallows,—how much better off, even under a Catholic point of view, are these than they who attend the public schools, and in them acquire, at least, habits of order and study, and the rudiments of a solid secular education? It is singular that people cannot understand that there is a very influential, but a very undesirable education acquired by children who attend no school, in the streets, and from association with the vile and worthless, the vicious and the criminal. I am almost scandalized at the indifference, the improvidence, and utter neglect of their children by large numbers even of Catholic parents—at the multitudes of children lost every year to the church and to society, when a little foresight, a little care, a little zeal, a little earnestness, a little well-directed effort, might easily save them to both."

"Mr. Diefenbach is unable to forego any opportunity of giving vent to his anti-Celtic spite," said O'Flanagan. "The Irish are not the only disorderly people in our cities, and Catholics do not furnish the whole of our vicious and criminal population. There is more sin, more hardened depravity, more deliberate malice, in a score of your well-dressed, wealthy, prim, long-faced, canting Anglo-Saxon Yankees than in the whole Celtic population in the country."

"Mr. O'Flanagan," returned Diefenbach, "notwithstanding his clamorous protestations, must have a very

mean opinion of his countrymen, or of his brother Celts, or he would be far less ready to apply my remarks specially to them. I said nothing of Celts, or of Irishmen. I spoke of Catholics; and there are, I believe, even in this country, persons not Irish, who are Catholics, and very sorry Catholics too. Mr. O'Flanagan is, if he will permit me to say so, very unjust to his countrymen. He takes up the cudgel in their defence where there is no occasion, and does them a serious injury by his over-suspiciousness and sensitiveness. In the Catholic world, I take it for granted, there is no disposition to overlook or deny their claims or their just merits. The Catholic world is not ignorant of their Catholic worth and services,—is not ignorant of the firmness with which the Irish have held fast to the faith, and the sacrifices, as a people, they have made for conscience. It loves and honors them, and holds them inferior to no Catholic people on the earth. It sympathizes with them, and defends them, and no Catholic but feels an insult or injury to them is an insult or injury to himself. Mr. O'Flanagan must permit me to say that he would serve his countrymen better, if he would learn to respect them more, and not cherish so ungenerous a distrust of them. I am very far from asserting or conceding that Catholics, whether of Irish or of any other national origin, furnish the whole vicious and criminal population of the cities and towns of the Union, but I fear I must admit that they furnish, at least, their full quota,—I say not of the most really criminal and sinful, but of those the administration of justice practically treats as such. Certainly, the "Dead Rabbits" are not greater sinners than the "Plug Uglies;" our poor boys who are sent to Blackwell's Island, or to Sing Sing, are not worse than hundreds of the sons of respectable non-Catholic families, who are regarded as very good boys; and the Catholic who is arraigned for beating his wife in a drunken row, for knocking down a policeman, or stabbing one of the opposing faction in an affray, is less really depraved than many a pious evangelical banker, railway president, cashier, or director, member of the legislature, or representative, or senator in congress. Our vicious and criminal population are rarely as depraved as they seem, and when studied closely will be found to retain many noble qualities and generous sentiments wanting in the corresponding class of non-Catholics. Their offences are the result of thoughtlessness, animal spirits, love of fun, love of adventure, or of

sudden passion, excited perhaps by strong drink, far oftener than of deliberate malice. Yet with all the drawbacks and allowances we can make, the broad fact stares us in the face, that we contribute our full proportion, if not more than our full proportion, in the cities and large towns, to the corrupt and vicious population of the country, and a proportion, I fear, annually increasing instead of diminishing. This is a fact well known to non-Catholics, who do not fail to make the most of it against our religion. No doubt non-Catholics regard our faults and defects in a too unfavorable light, and draw from them inferences wholly unwarranted, simply because these faults and defects are not precisely their own; but it is possible, on the other hand, that we ourselves pass them over too lightly, because we have long been accustomed to them. There can be scarcely a graver injury to Catholicity in this country than to let our children run at large, and receive their only education in dens of drunkenness, and haunts of vice and crime. I am sure, the injury thus done would more than overbalance any that could be done by the sectarianism of the public schools."

"Therefore," interposed Father John, "where we have not and cannot have *good* schools of our own, I think the best thing we can do is to send our children to the public schools. To mere secular education itself I do not attach the importance attached to it by our age and country; but still I do attach to it some value. Catholics, in our times, if deprived of it, labor under a serious disadvantage, and are crushed down by a sense of their inferiority. We do not live in the middle ages, when the people were simple believers and docile to authority, when scholars wrote and published only for scholars, and the people left the thinking to their chiefs. The author now addresses the public at large, and has the multitude for his judges. The people are no longer unquestioning believers; they have ceased to be docile, are puffed up with a vain sense of their own wisdom and importance, and can no longer be taught or governed as children. The change may be regretted, may be for the worse, but it has taken place, and whether we like it or dislike it, we must adapt ourselves to the new state of things it has introduced. We cannot now rely on the simple faith and docility of the people. We can govern or direct them even in the way of salvation only through their convictions, and therefore it becomes all-important to

cultivate their intelligence, and to enable them to have enlightened convictions. Our appeal must now be made to intelligence, and to the intelligence not of the the few, but of the many. Our greatest obstacle is in the ignorance of the people. We find even Catholics who are so ignorant, so utterly destitute of mental culture and discipline, that the priest is almost unable to make them understand the simplest duties of their state; who are too little cultivated, we may almost say, to be taught the simplest rudiments of natural morality, to say nothing of the principles and dogmas of revealed religion. These too are not unfrequently parents, whose duty it is to bring up their children in the faith and piety of the church. Others there are, less ignorant than these indeed, and having all the education and culture they would need in an old Catholic community, who yet are too ignorant, too little cultivated to perceive the dangers to which they and their children are exposed, or to understand even the refutation of the errors and heresies which surround them. This ignorance may not be fatal to the salvation of the soul, but it is incompatible with the public interests of Catholicity in a country like ours, and the greatest hindrance and discouragement to the pastor. Any means, not morally wrong, of overcoming it, it seems to me, may be lawfully adopted. Where we have and are able to have no other means than the public schools, I see not why the public schools should not be used."

"But these schools," repeated O'Flanagan, "are corrupt and corrupting."

"So say some Catholics who have no acquaintance with them, and judge them from a preconceived theory, or from the testimony of incompetent and untrustworthy witnesses, not from actual observation. The public schools are not all I could wish them; they are not always all they might and should be. The teachers are but too often incompetent, immoral, indolent, bigoted, and disposed to make the school an engine for the perversion of the faith of the Catholic child. But all *Catholic* schoolmasters are not immaculate, and instances have been known of the scholars chasing their drunken master through the streets of a populous city. No system is to be judged by its occasional abuses, and no system of schools is to be condemned because there happens to be now and then an incompetent or immoral schoolmaster. Where the law organizing our public schools is fairly com-

plied with, it is wrong to denounce them as corrupt and corrupting. They surely are not all that Catholics want, but no child, Catholic or non-Catholic, is likely to be corrupted by attending them," replied Father John.

"But," insisted O'Flanagan, "they are wrong in principle. They are state schools, and the state has no more right to be an educator than it has to be a director of conscience. The child belongs to the parent, not to the state, and education is a spiritual, not a secular function."

"That," answered Father John, "opens a question which Mr. Diefenbach has already settled. The early Christians availed themselves of the imperial schools, supported from the imperial treasury, and they counted the closing of those schools to them by Julian the Apostate, as the cruellest persecution they had undergone. St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and others, the sons of saints, went to study their philosophy in the pagan school of Athens. The state has no competency in spirituals, and must leave what concerns religion and morality to the parent or the spiritual authority; but it is its right and its duty to provide the means of a solid secular education for all its children, because the public safety, the public good, which it is bound to consult, demands it, and there is no other power in society that can do it. If the means are not, in some form, provided by the state, they will not and cannot be provided at all. The rich may provide for the education of their children at their own expense, but the poor cannot. As a fact, where education is left to the voluntary principle, the majority of children remain uneducated, and are left to fester, generation after generation, in deplorable ignorance."

"All education," said Winslow, "should be moral and religious, and as the church is the only competent authority in religion and morality, the church is the only rightful educator."

"All tailoring, shoemaking, hatting, blacksmithing," replied Father John, "should be moral and religious, and therefore the church must make our coats, our shoes, our hats, our hoes and axes; nay, must take the management of every department of secular life; and we must have priests and religious orders and confraternities to do our sowing and reaping, our washing and cooking—to be our housekeepers and chambermaids, and our wet and dry nurses. Education, in the respect that it is purely secular,

is no more the business of the church than any other secular matter. The church teaches religion, and has plenary authority from God in education as in every thing else over all that touches the spiritual order, the rights, duties, or interests of religion. The simple teaching of reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, history, book-keeping by double or single entry, is purely a secular affair, and as much within the province of the secular authority as the construction of roads and bridges, or providing for the national defence. The church has no more to do with the one than with the other. She has never acknowledged herself bound to establish a system of secular education for seculars, and in no age or country has she founded a system of secular education for all the children of the land. She establishes, according to her means, schools and seminaries to meet the wants of the spiritual society, for training up and properly preparing candidates for her own offices, in which she teaches all the branches of secular learning and science which she judges under the circumstances to be necessary or useful; but there her obligation stops. If she finds the children taught to read, she puts into their hands the catechism and a manual of prayers; if she finds them unable to read, she does not begin by first teaching them reading, but she instructs them orally, and requires them from oral repetition to get by heart their prayers and catechism. To assume that the secular education of seculars is her business, which she and she alone is authorized to impart, is only assuming in other words that in every age and nation she has failed in her duty, and therefore cannot be the church of God."

"The child, I repeat," said O'Flanagan, "belongs to the parent, not to the state, and therefore, the parent, not the state, is the legitimate educator."

"The parent has the right," answered Father John, "before the state, to choose the school and the religion in which he will have his child educated; but he has not the right to say his child shall not be educated at all, for the public good requires all to be educated, to some extent at least. The assertion that the child belongs to the parent and not to the state, is not true, without some important reserves. The child belongs in part to society, in which he is born and is to live; in part to the church into which he is born by baptism. Both society and the church have claims on the child, which the parent has no right to resist.

The parent has no right to bring up his child a thief, a robber, a murderer, or a vagabond, or to hinder him from being taught the true religion, and approaching the sacraments of penance and the eucharist, as often as the church judges proper. The dominion of the parent over the child is far from being absolute, and is shared with him by society and the church. On this point some of our Catholic publicists have forgotten the Christian and lapsed into the old Græco-Roman order of thought, and have laid down principles as unsound as they are ill-timed. Even a good cause is injured by being defended on unsound principles."

"The state," said De Bonneville, "is bound to defend society, and may summon to its aid all the forces society possesses. If it may defend, it may foresee the danger and guard against it. If, in its wisdom, it judges the secular education of all its children necessary, it has the right—reserving to the spiritual authority, represented before the law by the parent, all its rights—to provide for that education at the public expense, and to make it compulsory. So far the child belongs to society, represented by the state. The country, we will say, is in danger, the enemy is on its frontiers, an invasion is imminent, the child and every adult, if able to bear arms, and needed in the emergency, may be called out by the civil power, and sent to meet the invader, to fight, to slay, or be slain. I abominate the doctrine of Lycurgus, Plato, and modern socialists and red-republicans, that the child belongs exclusively to society, and the state may take him as soon as born and train him up as it pleases. The state has no right to train up my child, or to require me to train him up, or to expose him to be trained up, in a religion which is not mine and which I abhor. So far as the state is concerned, the religion of the parent is the religion of the child, till the child is old enough to choose a religion for himself."

"And therefore," added Father John, "the state is bound to keep its public schools free from sectarianism, or in other words, such as shall not interfere with the religion in which the parent chooses to bring up his child. I do not object to the principle on which our common school system is founded, nor do I reject the common schools because they do not teach my religion, though I regret the divisions of the community which make it necessary to exclude Catholic instruction, in order to avoid a greater evil. The fault I

find with them, is not that they are not Catholic, but that, in violation of the law creating them, they too often are sectarian, and teach things repugnant to my religion. Perhaps it would be better to have religious instruction given in the public schools than to reserve it for catechetical schools; but in our country, a system in which that can be done in a manner satisfactory to Catholics I regard as impracticable, and I go no further than to insist on having excluded all that is repugnant to the Catholic conscience. In those countries where the voluntary principle in regard to religion is not adopted, where the state does not leave religion to itself, and where the population is collected in towns and villages, a division of the public schools according to religion is practicable, and is very extensively adopted. An illustrious American bishop, in *Brownson's Quarterly Review* for last January, urges the adoption of the same system in this country. But it could be adopted here only in the towns and villages, and even there only partially, owing to the fact that our Catholic families are not all congregated in the same quarter, and are too dispersed. The fundamental constitution of the American state, moreover, leaves religion to the voluntary principle, and with us the state can lawfully impose no tax for the direct or indirect support of any religion, whether Catholic or Protestant. The religious education of children can no more be provided for at the public expense, than the maintenance and support of religious worship. We could not, therefore, introduce the system legally without a fundamental change in the constitution, and giving it in principle the right to establish a state religion,—a change which Catholics would be the last to advocate, for it would be a change from which in the actual state of things they would be the principal sufferers. Then, again, however desirable the system might be, the American people cannot, while non-Catholic, be persuaded to introduce it. The Catholic himself will not willingly consent to be taxed to support sectarian schools, and the non-Catholic majority will by no means consent to be taxed to support Catholic schools, even for the children of Catholics. With all deference to the opinion of others who are far better qualified to judge than myself, I confess I see nothing practicable for us but to insist on the rigid exclusion from the public schools of every thing simply repugnant to the Catholic conscience."

"And suffer our Catholic children to be trained up without any moral or religious instruction," said O'Flanagan.

"That by no means follows," replied Father John. "There runs through nearly all the reasoning I have heard on the subject the assumption, that, if our children are not taught their religion in the common school, they will not be taught it at all. This assumption is unfounded. After the common school, there still remain the family, the church, and the Sunday-school. In these children may be taught their religion, and let the common school be what it may, it is in these that are found the chief influences that form the moral and religious character of the child. No doubt at present, to a fearful extent, home education counts for less than it should, since a large portion of Catholic parents in this country lack the ability, if not the disposition, to give their children a proper religious education. Having never themselves received any thing like a home education, they do not think of giving, nor are they able to give a home education to their children. They devolve the whole care on the overworked priest, and sometimes bring him their child and tell him, if he does not take care of it, they will hand it over to the Protestants to be brought up in the Protestant religion. It is little that can be done with these parents, for their habits are fixed, and they cannot be expected to do much for the moral and religious education of their children; but the church and Sunday-school remain, and with these much may be done."

"It seems to me," said Diefenbach, "that the gathering of our children into the public schools, where they acquire habits of order and study, would rather aid the church and Sunday-school than hinder them."

"It would do so," said Father John, "if these public schools were really free from sectarianism; but, unhappily, this is far from being the case. I willingly believe the sectarianism is not universal, and is less than sometimes represented. I have, too, more confidence than some of my friends in the ability of our children to resist its ill effects, even where it is worst. But in too many places the public schools violate the letter and the spirit of the law establishing them. The reading and text books used, even when no complaint is to be made of the teachers, are saturated with a sectarian spirit, and filled with allusions and remarks insulting to the Catholic religion. All Catholic books are in most instances carefully excluded from the school libraries, purchased at the public expense, on the ground that they are sectarian; and yet, in many instances these libraries are

half filled with the most false, rabid, and calumnious anti-Catholic books that can be found. The Protestant public seem to make it a point of honor that the Protestant version of the Bible shall be read in them. Though I do not think much harm accrues to the Catholic child from this, yet the book Protestants call the Bible is as much a sectarian book as Dowling's History of the Popes, and a just construction of the law excludes it. It is not a true and correct version of the Holy Scriptures, as all learned Protestants themselves know and admit. Save in the large cities and towns, where Catholics are numerous and have votes, little fairness or justice is done to the Catholic child, especially if the child of foreign-born parents. The children of the laboring Irish suffer a great deal. They are treated with great harshness and ridicule in the same school where children of wealthy or educated American Catholics are treated with all the tenderness and consideration shown to the children of non-Catholic parents. The children of what are called the low Irish, in consequence of their peculiar habits and manners, and the strong national prejudices against the class to which they belong, rather than in consequence of being Catholics, find themselves in an inferior position in the public schools, and are exposed to numerous vexations and annoyances. These things, when we consider this class of our children are numerous, and those for whom we should feel the most solicitude, and when we further consider the inability of a large portion of their parents—poor in a strange land, exiles, and ignorant themselves—to give them a proper home education, we cannot but feel obliged to adopt the policy wherever practicable, wherever we are able, of establishing schools of our own. These things compel us, even where we cannot establish superior schools of our own, to tolerate rather than fully approve the public schools. In this I think I find myself fully sustained by the American hierarchy, who have recommended the formation, wherever practicable, of Catholic schools."

"But, unhappily," said Diefenbach, "those of your Catholic schools which have come under my observation, are for the most part far inferior to your public schools, and rather fitted to keep your Catholic population a foreign colony in the country, oppressed by a sense of inferiority, than to make them an integral portion of the American people, animated by an independent spirit, and feeling themselves standing in all respects on a footing of equality with their non-Catholic fellow-citizens."

"The bishops and clergy," answered Father John, "look to the spiritual wants of the Catholic people, and it is only in the interests of religion that they concern themselves with the education of children. They look, as they should look, first of all to Catholic schools, as a protection to the faith and piety of their children. The secular elevation and acclimatization, so to speak, of the Catholic body is, and ought to be, with them only a subordinate consideration. The social position of the Catholic body is in itself of comparatively small importance, for he gains nothing who gains the whole world, but loses his soul, and he loses nothing, though he loses all secular goods, who saves his soul. If men have faith and piety, and are friends of God, whether they are princes and nobles, or mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, freemen or slaves, is of little moment. The bishops and clergy must also work with such materials, and use such means as are at their disposal, and with such materials and means as they have at their disposal, it is impossible for them to place our Catholic schools, regarded as secular schools generally on a par with the public schools supported by the resources of the state. Certainly, our Catholic schools are not of a high order, and I am aware of none, save under the religious point of view, that can begin to compete with the public schools of New York or Boston."

"It seems to me," said Diefenbach, "that the public schools are to be preferred, even in a religious point of view, to Catholic schools, which are altogether inferior, under the charge, as many of your schools are, of incompetent teachers, from whom the children can learn little, and that little only imperfectly—teachers, whose manners and influence can do little to elevate and refine them. These schools, under the charge of half-educated and half-paid teachers, who, in some instances, can hardly speak the language of the school, and have hardly a sentiment in common with the order of civilization under which their pupils are to live, are not precisely what you want in a country like this. The mass of your Catholic population, however honest, industrious, and faithful, are from the lower classes of the Catholic population of various European countries, illiterate peasants, laborers, servants, mechanics, and small trades people. They very soon after their arrival become naturalized, and invested with political and social rights and duties to which they were total strangers

in the land of their birth. Their children enter into the body of American citizens, and require an education, a mental cultivation and discipline their parents rarely received. Now, it seems to me that the interests of religion itself, as well as the interests of society, are opposed to their growing up with a sense of inferiority, which they are sure to do, if sent to inferior Catholic schools, and deprived by the religion of their parents of the advantages of the superior public schools, attended by non-Catholic children. Teachers from the Old World, where the distinction of ranks still obtains, who never have thought of giving to all ranks and classes a common education, or that for the poorer class of Catholics here any other education than is given to the peasantry and lower classes of Europe is necessary, will do as little for you religiously as socially. You will have, perhaps, even more difficulty in preserving to the faith the children educated in such schools as they will keep, than those educated in the public schools of the country. You must accept, not by shouting democracy and running into the radical and filibustering extravagances of too many Americans, the political and social order established in this country, and educate your children to be Catholics in harmony with it, and not to be Catholics only in opposition to or in spite of it. If you train your children to be the lower class in monarchical and aristocratic Europe, you do not train them for this country, unless you intend to revolutionize it; you create an antagonism between them and the society in which they are to live, and place the whole force of that society, in their minds, against their religion, and thus do more on the one hand to tempt them from their religion than you do on the other to attach them to it."

"It is not possible," said De Bonneville, "for you to establish Catholic schools supported by yourselves out of your limited means, that shall successfully compete with the common schools supported by a public tax or by public funds, and at the same time build your churches and provide for the services of religion. The funds are not in your hands. You cannot build first-class schoolhouses for all your children, or afford to pay the salaries which will command the services of first-class teachers. In most places the pastor is poor, and struggling with debt, and if he attempts to establish a first-class school, he involves himself still deeper in debt, is still more embarrassed to find the ways and means

of meeting his expenses. He becomes so harassed, distracted, and worn out with his temporal affairs that he has hardly time, strength, or courage to devote himself to the spiritual welfare and progress of his charge. Except in a very few places, the establishment and maintenance of a free school impose upon the clergyman a burden too great to be borne, and under which, after a few years of struggle, he does and must break down, unless sustained by supernatural agency."

"It is only fair," said Father John, "to presume that those of our bishops who insist so earnestly on the establishment of parochial schools have taken all the objections and difficulties suggested by Mr. Diefenbach and Mr. de Bonneville into consideration, and that stronger reasons in their minds overrule them, and induce them to decide in favor of parochial schools wherever they are able to establish them. But I do not understand them to require the clergy to establish schools where they are impracticable, or where the pastor and people are unable to do it without great inconvenience, or where they cannot establish a school every way equal to the public schools. In my own view of the matter, I think the public schools, sectarian as they frequently are, preferable to very poor parochial schools, under the charge of wholly incompetent teachers, and dragging out a painful, lingering, half-dying existence. I consider the church has made it obligatory on us to establish schools, as far as we are able, in which our children will not be exposed to the loss of their faith, or the corruption of their morals; but I do not regard as such schools, though called Catholic, those in which the children in study and behavior are not brought up to the common average of the public schools of the country."

Conversation X.

"If," said O'Flanagan, "we are to accept Father John's view of the public schools, expressed a few evenings since, and send our children to them where we have not and cannot have schools of our own every way equal to them, this advantage will result, that our venerable bishops and priests will have more leisure and means to devote to the elevation of our colleges, academies, and seminaries. The education of the whole mass of the children in common schools, may be a necessity of modern times, especially in a democratic country,

but it can never, however thorough, suffice for the wants of the church or of society. The first want of the church is a numerous and well-educated clergy. The fields are always white for the harvest, but the laborers are always too few. The establishment and support of a *petit-séminaire* in every diocese is a desideratum, and would do far more for the interests of religion than the multiplication to any extent possible of simple parochial schools."

"The evil of modern society," added Winslow, "is an exaggerated democracy, which looks at the mass and neglects the individual collects a body of privates and neglects to provide them with proper officers. Education may be much more diffused in modern society, than it was in antiquity or in the middle ages, but the higher and more thorough education of the few is relatively more neglected, and inferior in the cultivation and discipline of the mind, and in the formation of character. Especially is this the case in our own country, where what is called liberal education, that is, the education of freemen, *liberi* or *generosi*, in contradistinction from the education of the servile, or menial classes, is below what it is in any other civilized country We cut but a sorry figure in this respect beside Italy, France, Germany, England, Spain, or even distracted Mexico. The speeches of the members of our congress cannot compare, under the point of view of scholarship, mental discipline, and intellectual culture, with the speeches of the members of the British parliament, and even the Mexican diplomatic and state papers show a more thorough training than for the most part do our own. In the whole range of our presidential messages, from Washington to Buchanan inclusive, we can find no one to compare favorably with the first message of Louis Napoleon to the French national assembly. We have plenty of privates, but we lack officers, leaders, who can organize them into an army, and lead them to victory. Officers are more important than men, the architect than the mechanic who works after his plan, the artist than the artisan, the leader than the followers. 'Give me the man,' said Napoleon Bonaparte, 'I can find men enough anywhere.' Say what we will of democracy, and shout equality till our throats are sore, the people have and must have leaders, and it is of far more moment what the leaders than what the followers are. This principle which is true of the population of the country in general, is equally true of the Catholic population in particular. Gather all

your children into common schools, and give them what is called a good common school education; if you stop there, you have private soldiers, but no marshals, generals, colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants,—an unorganized mass, not an army, a mob, not a state. You want officers, you want leaders, men qualified to organize and direct what without them is inorganic and lifeless. You want first the clergy, for the religious wants are primary. Ample provision, first of all, needs to be made for a numerous and thoroughly educated clergy, who should stand at the head of society in learning and intelligence as well as in wisdom and virtue. But the people need leaders in secular as well as in spiritual affairs. They want their lawyers, their surgeons and physicians, their statesmen, men who can lead them, defend their rights, and vindicate their interests in every department of public and social life. After the seminary, or school for training and preparing the spiritual chiefs of the people, the next most important thing is the college and university for training and preparing their lay or temporal chiefs."

"The college and university are the more necessary to the Catholic population of this country," remarked De Bonneville, "because, if worst comes to worst, you can use the public schools; and it seems to me that the college and university do not receive the attention their importance demands, and the attention given to your colleges is given to them rather as *petits-séminaires*, or as feeders to your ecclesiastical seminaries and religious orders, than as schools for the education of the lay chiefs of the Catholic society. They seem to me, to a great extent, to fail in both objects. With all submission to authority, I think your bishops would better accomplish their object, the obtaining of candidates for the seminary, if they confined their exertions mainly to establishing, instead of colleges chiefly for the education of seculars, little seminaries, as feeders of the theological seminary. They would find more vocations, and more speedily supply the want of priests, which is now almost everywhere so deeply felt. I think their best plan would be to confine their direct efforts to supplying the wants of the spiritual society, and leave the college and university, save in what regards religion and morality, to the secular society. We have all agreed that the church is not bound to provide or to give a secular education to seculars, and therefore she is not bound to train up the lay chiefs

of society. She provides for the spiritual society, and secular society ought to provide for its own wants. No doubt there have been times and places in which, if the church had not volunteered to provide for those wants, no provision would have been made for them."

"The point," said Father John, "is a delicate one, and we must never forget that the spiritual order is supreme over the temporal; or that in all things the temporal is subordinate and should be subservient to the spiritual. The church is not bound to give secular education to seculars, and therefore is not bound to found colleges and universities any more than she is bound to furnish common schools for them; but it is her right and her duty to see that when founded, by whomsoever founded, they work in subordination and subserviency to the spiritual interests of which she is the divinely appointed guardian. With this reserve, I agree with Mr. de Bonneville, and would separate the two classes of schools, placing the seminary, little and great, exclusively under the control of the church, while I placed the control of colleges and the university, in all save spirituals, under the control of the secular society; or, if under the control of priests and religious, under their control as the agents of the secular society, not of the ecclesiastical. The primary object of the college and the university, save the faculty of theology, should be to meet the secular wants of secular society, whether the professors are priests, religious, or seculars. This seems to have been the view of F. G. in *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, in his able essays on Public Instruction, though he may not have brought out his meaning with as much clearness and distinctness as the case demanded. What he really objects to on this score, is the attempt to combine the seminary for the training of young Levites with the college for seculars. He considers the two classes of institutions should be kept distinct and separate; that while those having an ecclesiastical and spiritual end, should be placed under the exclusive control and management of the spiritual society, those intended to provide for secular wants only, should be placed under the control and management of secular society, in subordination and subserviency, of course, to the paramount interests of religion, as should be all temporal or secular action. He complains of our colleges, that they are neither seminaries, nor colleges proper. The bishops and clergy in the beginning founded and sustained them with a view of obtaining

candidates for the priesthood, hoping at the same time to meet in them the desire of Catholic parents to give their sons a good secular education. But aiming to fulfil the double purpose, they really fulfil neither. This objection is not true, to the extent supposed, of all our colleges. In very few cases,—I recollect now but two,—is the seminary proper combined with the secular college, and a beginning is made in the work of separating the little seminary from the college, and will probably before long be completed in most of our dioceses."

"I do not quite agree with Father John" remarked De Bonneville, "when he says the spiritual is *supreme* over the temporal, for that seems to me to imply a jurisdiction I do not concede it; but that the spiritual is *superior* to the temporal, therefore spiritual interests must take precedence of temporal interests, I myself hold. With this reserve, I accept Father John's statement. It distinguishes things which are distinct in their nature and in their immediate end. The college is properly a secular institution."

"I see," interrupted O'Flanagan, "that the whole aim of my friends is to withdraw all but religious education from the church, and to give it to the secular order. I protest as a Catholic, a citizen, and a man, against this. Society even is never safe when this separation is allowed. The church has the supreme control of education, and the entire training of the rising generation."

"In so far as the interests of religion and morality are concerned, I grant it," said De Bonneville; "but not in so far as it is secular, any more than she has of other secular matters, as we have already agreed."

"But," rejoined O'Flanagan, "she can never secure the interests of religion and morality, unless she has charge of the whole of education, the entire instruction, training, and moulding of the young. To give to seculars the control of secular education, will end only in secularizing religion and morality, and excluding the spiritual order itself from society."

"There is something in Mr. O'Flanagan's remarks," said Father John, "and if they err at all, it is on the safe side. But we have discussed that question in a previous conversation, and it is for us no longer an open question. The church is a spiritual kingdom, set up on the earth for spiritual purposes. She does not absorb the temporal kingdom, or secular society. Her authority over the temporal order

is spiritual, not temporal; and therefore, is authority to govern it only in its relation to spirituals. Such being the fact, secular society not being absorbed or superseded, but left in its autonomy, it must have, in subordinance to the spiritual authority in regard to spiritual interests and ends, full authority in all secular matters, and, therefore, the control and management of education in so far as education is purely secular. F. G. is therefore right, and would withdraw nothing from the church which she claims as her right · he would only relieve her of a burden secular society has no right to ask her to bear, and would simply compel secular society to bear its own burdens, and to perform its own duties."

"But did not the Holy See condemn the queen's colleges in Ireland because they were purely secular colleges, under the control of the state, not of the church?" asked O'Flanagan.

"Not at all" replied Father John. "Those colleges were not censured because they were founded, supported, and managed by the civil power, but because they did not permit proper safeguards for religion to be introduced. They were judged to be improper for Catholic youth, because they would expose their faith and morals to perversion. If the church could have had in them full control of whatever relates to spirituals, to the faith and morals of her children, we have no reason to suppose the Holy See would have censured them. In the secular colleges I am disposed to recommend, I suppose the church to have plenary authority in all that touches spirituals, and to see that neither in text book, nor lecture any thing be advanced repugnant to, or not in accordance with, the purity, integrity, and interests of the Catholic religion. They cannot then be liable to the censure inflicted on the queen's colleges in Ireland. Moreover, when I speak of secular society in connection with them, I mean our Catholic secular society, not the general secular society of the country."

"I suppose you would have the colleges lay institutions, with a lay government, faculty, and professors," remarked Winslow, "for this, as I gather it, is the view of F. G."

"F. G. would have the college a secular, not an ecclesiastical institution," replied Father John, "but I do not understand him to object to the government being in the hands of priests, or to clergymen constituting the faculty or professorial staff. It might be worthy of consideration,

looking to the great want of priests for the mission, and the difficulty educated Catholics, not priests or religious, find in obtaining in the Catholic community of this country a congenial employment, whether more laymen, not candidates for the priesthood, might not be advantageously employed. This would be almost a boon to them, and would, at the same time, release a large number of priests to be employed on the mission. Something in this direction, I see with pleasure, is commenced in Mount St. Mary's College, near Cincinnati—a young institution indeed, but promising, if I am not much mistaken, to take a high rank, and to be a noble monument to the zeal and practical wisdom of the illustrious prelate to whom it is indebted for its existence. It is for the interest of Catholicity in this country, to open as many avenues as possible for our educated young men, who have no vocation to the priesthood or to the religious orders, and for educated gentlemen who come to us from the non-Catholic world, who lose their means of temporal support by their conversion, and yet in consequence of being married, as well as for other reasons, cannot take orders in the church. Too little provision has hitherto been made or thought of for either of these classes. Our Catholic population has been singularly forgetful of the wisdom, not to say duty, of providing employment, according to their ability, for their own educated young men, and especially of aiding their professional young men in the commencement of their career. I can conceive nothing more disheartening than the position of a young Catholic lawyer or physician, for instance. He has been educated, we will suppose, in a Catholic college, and has formed few Protestant acquaintances, and acquired no status out of the Catholic community; he studies his profession, and opens his office; but Protestants will not employ him, because they do not know him and have formed no relations with him, because he has not yet acquired a reputation, and because he is a Catholic, and they have no interest in pushing him forward; and Catholics do not come to his aid, often simply because he is a Catholic, and therefore, in their judgment, cannot serve them as well as a non-Catholic. Let him succeed, and prove that he is able to live without them, then they will be proud of him, and give him their business. But till then, he can't be much, for he is a Catholic, and Catholics for this world are, of course, inferior to non-Catholics. I know very few instances in which a young

Catholic professional man has succeeded without compromising his religion, and living, whatever his faith, very much like a non-Catholic. Hence it is, we lose so many of our young men, who with a little consideration in the outset, a little patronage of Catholics, which would cost them nothing, might have grown up pillars and ornaments of our Catholic society. The Catholic community shows, in this respect, great lack of prudent foresight and just regard for Catholic interests. Nevertheless, I ask for no change as to the *personnel* of our colleges, and I do not object, nor does F. G. object, to the professors being priests or monks, and as a Jesuit, I certainly am not likely to propose the exclusion of my own order from the business of education, in which they have won so much glory, and which is one of the principal ends of their Institute."

"But even to render your colleges secular, in the sense Father John contends, would not meet the wants of Catholic secular society," remarked Diefenbach. "Their separation from the *petit-séminaire*, would not elevate their character or render them more effective to their end, if the government and faculty remained unchanged. The great fault to be found with them, is that the education they give is too superficial and too confined. They do not turn out their young men brave soldiers, well disciplined, and fully armed and equipped for the battle of life, qualified to be the lay chiefs and leaders of your Catholic lay society. The non-Catholic colleges cannot compare with similar institutions in Europe, and they hardly prepare their graduates to enter an English or German university. Your Catholic colleges do not rise in secular education to the common average of non-Catholic colleges of the country. You have no colleges that can compare with Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Columbia, and several others I might mention. Yet the wants and interests of the Catholic body in the Union, require you to give to your young men not only a religious, but also a secular education, superior to any given in non-Catholic colleges. You have your own body to elevate, and the country to conquer, and you can effect either only by proving yourselves at every point, in learning, literature, science, and intelligence, the real chiefs of the country, who have the real moral and intellectual superiority that entitles them to the leadership.

"Your Catholic population," continued Diefenbach, "are chiefly from countries where Catholics have been in an

inferior position, and crushed down to the dust by the superincumbent might of successful heresy. They have been bound with chains of iron which have eaten into their flesh, even into their souls, and the scars remain, and in some cases the wounds are as yet unhealed. They have a sense of inferiority, and hardly persuade themselves that they are relieved of the chains worn for so many years, and that they are in very deed freemen, and stand on a footing of equality in society with their whilom oppressors. They are afraid it is all an illusion, and that they with the next breath will see it dissolve. The consequence is that you take too low views of your position and means, and fail even to aim at the influences within your reach. 'Only let us live in peace and quiet,' you say, 'without having our goods confiscated or our throats cut, and we shall be grateful.' You forget that you belong to a living religion, which has the right to be aggressive, that its divine Founder said he came to send not peace, but the sword rather, that you must be propagandists, or not be true to the spirit of your church, which aims to bring the whole world within her pale, and to induce them in spirit and in truth to worship her Lord. It seems to me that both your people and even your collegiate faculties pitch your standard too low, and do not venture even to aim at the superiority which you should use all lawful means to acquire. You should feel that your freedom is a reality, and use it, and as men who must account to God for their stewardship."

"Nothing can satisfy Herr Diefenbach," remarked O'Flanagan. "He declaims against all that Catholics think, do, or say, and now he gets off a diatribe against the whole Catholic population of this country. Wonder, if he ever heard of that charity which thinketh no ill, or of that wisdom which is meek, gentle, and not puffed up? Not one word of sympathy has he for those who have maintained their faith amid every trial and the sacrifice of every thing else, nor one word of encouragement for those who are doing all in their power for the Catholic cause."

"Mr. O'Flanagan is quite mistaken," replied Diefenbach, "and suspects fault-finding where none is intended or can be justly inferred. I state a fact, and its cause,—a fact from which Catholics suffer; yet I blame not them, I blame only those who have oppressed and persecuted them. Owing to the habits generated by the position in which they have for generations been held by triumphant and intolerant heresy,

they have lost their free spirit and manly courage, and can even here hardly feel that their freedom is not an illusion. They are afraid to act with the high hopes and courage of men who have never been in bondage, or oppressed by an heretical government."

"Mr. Diefenbach may explain as he will, but the Catholic instinct detects in him the old Teutonic pride, his contempt for the meek, resigned, passive virtues of the true Christian," added O'Flanagan. "He prefers the pride and stoicism of the old Græco-Roman heroes and statesmen to the humility and patience of the Christian saint, the greatness and nobility of nature to the greatness and nobility of grace."

"In that, I think, Mr. O'Flanagan is right," said Winslow. "In all the remarks I hear from those Catholics who talk of elevating socially the Catholic body, and call upon them to be bold, energetic, manly, I feel there is more of the gentile than of the Christian spirit. In that courage which comes from nature, in that merely human pride, ambition, wisdom, energy, expressed by the word *manly*, the world outside is and always must be superior, for it was precisely to break down the spirit that generates and sustains it, that our Lord gave us his religion. Read the blessings pronounced in his sermon on the Mount, and you cannot fail to perceive that the Christian spirit is in bold contrast to the spirit Mr. Diefenbach and others would have us possess. 'Blessed are the poor in spirit.' 'Blessed are the meek.' 'Blessed are the pure in heart.' 'Blessed are the peacemakers,' &c. The root of every Christian virtue is humility, not merely a natural, but a supernatural humility, the offspring of grace not nature, and the whole aim of Christian morals is to substitute for the nobility of nature the nobility of grace. Always to the men of the world the Christian will appear tame, spiritless, passive, insensible to insults and injuries, inviting indignities, and glorying in being trampled on, and treated as of no account. Hence in the history of Catholic states you find the best Catholics are seldom at the head of affairs, and the men who control the policy of the government, whether churchmen or laics, are men who abound more in the gentile than in the Christian virtues."

"Mr. Winslow," replied Father John, "retains, I fear, a little of the old Calvinistic leaven of his ancestors. I find nothing in Mr. Diefenbach's remarks that savors of Græco-

Roman gentilism, and I know no reason why Catholics should not be as bold, as firm, as independent, as manly, nay, as aspiring in laboring for the interests of the church as statesmen are in laboring to advance the state or their own personal ambition. Humility is never incompatible with greatness of mind, and a servile, timid, crouching spirit is never an evidence of grace. Without me, said our Lord, ye can do nothing. In the Christian order all begins and ends in grace. But it is a mistake, if nothing worse, to say that our Lord seeks in his religion to substitute the nobility of grace for the nobility of nature. We should say rather, he seeks to elevate the nobility of nature to the nobility of grace, for in no respect whatever does grace supersede nature, or become a substitute for nature. It is certain that Catholics in the English speaking world have been so long held in an inferior position, have so long been deprived of their freedom, been so long cowed down by their haughty non-Catholic masters, who have ruled them with a rod of iron, so long been forced to practise their religion by stealth, in opposition to the civil law, that they can hardly believe that their present apparent freedom is real, and it seems almost unnatural to them. It is not strange, then, that oppressed by their memories they should not rise either in their hopes or in their conceptions to the level of their position. They are timid, where the interests of their religion are concerned, and are too ready to purchase the freedom to worship according to the dictates of their Catholic conscience, at the expense of their dignity as men and their rights as citizens."

"Your great defect," said Diefenbach, "is your humble deference to non-Catholic public opinion. That opinion brands Catholics as inferior to non-Catholics, and, unhappily, the bulk of your Catholic population, however they may protest in words against it, really believe it, and, for the most part, act accordingly. This is one great secret, whether they are conscious of it or not, of their neglect of their own educated young men, and their preference of Protestants, wherever talent, learning, energy, influence, is needed. The Swiss Sonderbund had the weakness to place a non-Catholic at the head of their army in 1847, and gained—a defeat by it. In almost every country, and in none more than in this, they are crushed down by this sense of inferiority, which is generated by this false non-Catholic public opinion. There is no justice in it. Morally, intel-

lectually, and physically, Catholics are far superior, wherever they dare be, to non-Catholics. It is only the Catholic religion that gives to nature fair-play, and enables her to display herself in all her strength. What I want is to see them shake off this deference to non-Catholic public opinion, to rise above this sense of inferiority, and to assume in their feelings as well as in their words, their rightful position as freemen, as God's noblemen on earth. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. Dare be yourselves, and take your rule of conduct from your own divine religion, and face, in the strength of your faith and the grace of God, boldly the enemies of your church, and show them, by proving your intrinsic superiority, that all their charges against you are false and calumnious. To do this you must rely in great measure on your colleges and academies."

"But this submission to non-Catholic public opinion, this partial adoption of the Protestant estimate of the Catholic body," added Father John, "is a great obstacle to making our colleges and academies what they should be. No matter how able and zealous are our professors, how just their views of what education should be, or how admirable are the methods they adopt for giving it, they cannot give it unless they are educating in and for a community that feels the necessity of such education, and will sustain them in giving it. I will not undertake to defend in all respects our colleges for young men and academies for young women as they are now organized and conducted. They do not meet our needs, though they fully come up to the ideas of the great majority of parents, who send their children to them. Their results do not satisfy me. Our conventual schools for girls are too superficial, run over a great number of studies, but teach nothing thoroughly, unless a few light and showy accomplishments. They seem to forget that girls have intellect, and that intellect in wives and mothers is not a superfluity. I reverence the moral and religious worth of the good sisters, who with so much patience, gentleness, and assiduity, devote themselves to the ungrateful task of education, but I wish they would take higher views of female education, do more to develop the understanding of their pupils, and place less stress on mere external accomplishments. I have no patience with your 'strong-minded' women, but I have great respect for the female mind, and I measure the civilization of a country by the cultivation and intelligence of its women. There are

branches in which I do not expect them to equal men, but there is no reason in the world why the young ladies who graduate from our conventual schools, should not, with the modesty, reserve, and the lighter accomplishments always indispensable, come forth thinking, reasoning beings, and prepared to give to the society into which they enter, a high moral and intellectual tone, at least be able to do something besides simper, sing, gossip, and dance. Women, as well as men, have rational souls, and should receive a rational education, and be qualified to take their part in any rational conversation that may be started. 'I never read *Brownson's Review*,' is a very common remark with our so-called educated Catholic young ladies; 'it is too deep for me.' That is all nonsense; any young lady as well as young gentleman who has been properly taught, been accustomed to think, will easily understand it, if she chooses, at least with the exception of now and then an article. The difficulty is not in the *Review*, it is in the fact our young ladies have not been educated to take an interest in grave intellectual subjects, and in this respect are by no means as well educated as the better class of non-Catholic ladies. Young ladies should be taught to think and to reason as well as to love. The same fault runs through all our colleges for young men, or I should say, our colleges for boys. We have none for young men. They may go over ground enough, but they do not quicken the intellect of their pupils—do not accustom them to think, and to assimilate and make part of themselves what they read or are taught by their professor."

"This fault," said Diefenbach, "I think, pertains to your professors and teachers as well as to your Catholic population. They are too much under the influence of the public opinion of Catholic conservatism in the Old World. Under all European society smoulders a revolutionary spirit, and more especially in the Catholic states, liable every day to break out in a flame, and consume both the throne and the altar. Catholics live in a constant fear of a social or political outbreak, more especially in Italy and France. They very generally adopt the policy of repression, and repression in regard to thought, as well as to outward acts. Of the wisdom or unwisdom of that policy I will not now speak, for it has been fully discussed in this club. But that fear propagates itself in this country, and that policy is carried into your colleges, and all the more readily from the fact

that a large portion of your body, recently arrived in the country, are infected to a greater or less extent by the same revolutionary spirit against which that policy is adopted. Hence your professors and teachers have more or less fear of stimulating thought in their pupils, and in forming them to habits of self-reliance, and free and spontaneous action. They think they must repress as well as encourage, and therefore confine themselves chiefly to loading the memory, without stimulating real intellectual activity."

"Undoubtedly there is something in that," said Father John; "and I for myself think it would be better in our schools, colleges, and academies, to look more to our own country, and less to the Old World, so different from ours, and from which we want nothing but the Catholic religion. Still I do not admit the chief difficulty is in that. I do not believe, as a general thing, our professors and teachers are absolutely afraid of stimulating and cultivating the intellect, or of making their pupils thinking and reasoning men and women. They are Catholics, and must hold their religion to be catholic, embracing all truth, and therefore having nothing to fear from thought or intelligence. Some improvements, however, in the internal organization of our colleges, as demanded by F. G., I think might be advantageously adopted. The pupils are received too young, and the preparatory school is not usually separated from the college. The government and discipline adapted to boys eight or nine years of age cannot be adapted to youths of eighteen or nineteen. Our colleges now for the most part combine, or attempt to combine, the grammar school and the college proper, and the members of both are under the same prefects, and subjected to the same government and discipline. Boys need to be governed as boys, but the students in a college ought to be governed as young gentlemen, and the appeal should be to their sense of honor, propriety, and justice. Those who are deaf to such appeals should not be flogged, but expelled."

"I think," said Diefenbach, "there is another objection. You combine not only the grammar school and college, but also the college and university. In fact, hitherto, you have had only one grade of schools; you should have four; the common school, divided into primary and secondary, your high school or academy, your college, and the university. To a great extent you may and must for the present use the public schools established by the state, and the education

given in these will suffice, with the religious instruction which they may receive elsewhere, for the great majority of your children. The other three grades you must establish and support yourselves. The high school is to be the feeder of the college, and this might be a private school, opened by a private person, a competent layman, in the case of boys, and by an educated and competent Catholic lady, who must do something to support herself, when it is for girls, and intended to feed the conventual school for young ladies. Leaving, by the way, the female branch, the college receives from the high school those whom their parents wish to advance further, in case they have the requisite qualification, and carries them on to the baccalaureate. From the college to the university pass such as wish or are able to obtain a complete liberal education. The college and university courses should be each at least four years. Such is substantially the English and German system, which I prefer to the French and American."

"That is no doubt what we want, and what in due time we shall have," answered Father John; "but as yet we cannot introduce so complete a system. We are not able to sustain two universities, and the Catholic body, if we are to have but one, will divide on the question of its locality. The people in the eastern states will never send their sons to a university situated west of the Alleghanies. They will send them to Ireland, or to continental Europe sooner. For the present, I fear, we must stop with the college, which, if all its capabilities are developed, will answer our purpose very well. There will be very little difficulty in adapting the college to the wants of the country on the part of the college itself, or on the part of the bishops, who are their patrons, or the religious or others who conduct them. The only serious difficulty is on the part of parents, who will not or cannot keep their children at the institution long enough to receive the education it is prepared to give. The separation of the high school from the college, although it might and probably would reduce our colleges in number, or deprive several of them of their name of colleges, would to a great extent remedy this evil, for only those parents who were able to carry them through would send their sons to the college. The others would stop at the common school or at the high school. The changes and modifications I suggest may be easily adopted without any violent revolution in our educational system, and without

essentially altering the college as at present understood and conducted; and if so, I think all reasonable objections to our colleges would be removed, and the college fulfil, as perfectly as any human institution can, its purpose."

"I am glad to find," remarked O'Flanagan, "that, after all, Father John is not disposed to carry his innovations to the extreme I feared."

"Never take counsel of your fears," replied Father John, "and always hear a man's whole thought before you fly in a rage at him. I wish the Catholic public in our country to take higher views of what a collegiate education should be; I wish them to insist on a higher standard being reached, and to sustain the college in reaching it. We have, I believe, the men every way qualified to educate to the full extent demanded, and we already have colleges that have all the requisite machinery and force to do it. Give them the youths, and let them have them long enough to carry them through the prescribed course, and I think there will be little cause for complaint."

"Though I cannot agree to tolerate the common schools as far as Father John seems disposed to do," said Winslow, "I can agree with him in his views of collegiate education. But he ought in justice to say that things are already taking the turn he wishes, and the plan he suggests has already been begun to be acted upon. We can safely leave the whole question to the proper authorities, and to the force of circumstances."

"I am aware," said Father John, "that the changes and modifications I contend for have been commenced, and are approved very generally by the intelligent Catholics, whether clergymen or laymen, who have much studied the subject. In several of the colleges under the control of the Society of Jesus, the preparatory school is partially separated from the college proper, and in them all the college is separated from the seminary. The heads of colleges and professors in general, even when they see not clearly what improvements can be made, feel that our colleges, as they have hitherto been, do not produce the desired results. For my part, I think we have too many colleges, and not enough of schools of an intermediate grade between the primary school and the college. The college is the worst possible school for those who are not intended to go through the entire course. The boys are sent to college quite too young —in some instances, before they have been sent to school—

and they are little more than boys when they graduate. The effects of this are bad. Our colleges, as now managed, take the boy at a tender age, watch over him with a maternal solicitude, provide him with all the helps religion can give, use all the means and appliances that can be devised to make him love and preserve his faith, cram him with religious instruction, refresh his religious sensibilities by retreats and reiterated exhortations, place the confessional always before him, and a director at his elbow, till he reaches the age when the passions begin to unfold, and he commences the dangerous period of transition from the boy to the man. And then, when he needs more than ever the spiritual aids and counsels he has been accustomed to, they send him out into society, weak, ignorant, without any habits of self-reliance, self-government, or self-help, exposed to all its seductions and temptations, so much the more to be dreaded, as they all have for him the charm of novelty, and leave him, wholly unprepared, to battle with the world, the flesh, and the devil, as best he may. The majority, I believe, succumb, as we might expect, in the struggle. Something would be done to remedy this evil, by separating more decidedly the preparatory school from the college, and receiving students in the college at a more advanced age."

"That would do something," said Diefenbach, "but the system of government and discipline of your colleges, I think, is not, and can never be adapted to a free state. The nursing system is carried too far, and the student is kept constantly in leading-strings, never suffered, hardly even in his sports, to think and act for himself. The maxim of the college is, Every thing for the boys, nothing by the boys. All this is very good, if your boys are to be trained up to be monks or to live in a society organized on the maxim, Every thing for the people, nothing by the people. But it will not do in the training of seculars who are to live in a republican, not to say, a democratic state. Your American society is founded on the maxim, Help thyself. What is wanted, first of all, in the government and discipline of the college, is a system that shall form as early as possible the child to self-help, self-reliance, and self-government. You fail precisely because you educate for the monastery or for a society organized on principles which American society repudiates. You overdo, you do all for the boy, and suffer him to do nothing for himself, and keep him ignorant where his only safety is in knowledge, and weak and dependent on others,

precisely where he needs to be strong and able to help himself. The college should image on a small scale the society in which the boys are to live and play their part as men, and therefore, in this country it should be, not a despotism or a monarchy, where the governor is every thing, and the governed are nothing; but a miniature republic, in which, save in religious instruction, and in the hours of study and recitation, the boys govern themselves, where from the first they begin to act the part they are to act in real life. Your system may be admirable in other countries constituted differently from this, but it will not answer here, where the boy sucks in republicanism with his mother's milk. The failure of the non-Catholic colleges of the country, for fail they do, is owing to the adoption of a similar system, a system which makes the maintenance of the college authority the great thing to which, if need be, all else must be sacrificed. Your system does not, and cannot fit young men to take their proper rank and exert their proper influence in American society; for it breaks down the sense of independence, too often destroys the frankness and ingenuousness of the boy, and renders him shy, artful, false, deceitful, and hypocritical—in one word, what Protestants express by the word jesuitical."

"The first lesson to be taught the child is submission, and his first virtue is obedience," said Winslow; "and it is only in proportion as you can enforce this lesson and obtain this virtue that you can organize society on a Catholic basis. In my view there is an innate antagonism between American society and the Catholic religion, and if you educate for the one you cannot educate for the other."

"So say, in principle, the Know-Nothings," said Diefenbach. "Why then does Mr. Winslow find fault with non-Catholic Americans for opposing Catholicity, on the ground that it is anti-American? No matter what lessons you teach in your colleges, a people whose chiefs are trained under your present system of government and discipline, can never be a free, self-governing people, as we may learn from the example of the French people, who have, notwithstanding their intelligence, failed in every attempt at republicanism. They cannot govern themselves, and must have a master, and the more absolute, the more they love him. There is no need of words or speculation about the matter. But I deny the fact of the alleged antagonism. That there is antagonism between the system of government and disci-

pline of your colleges or the habits formed under it, and the political and social order of this country, I not only concede but assert. Yet I dare maintain that that system, which has grown up in other times and in other countries, and may have been wise and just when and where it originated, is no part of the Catholic religion, and is not only distinguishable, but separable from it. There is, Catholics have asserted it over and over again, nothing in the constitution of the American political and social order repugnant to Catholicity, and an American priest of high standing has maintained at Rome in *La Civiltà Cattolica*, that it is even favorable to Catholicity. I have never heard from bishop or priest, whether native born or foreign born, whether Irish or French, German or Italian, that Catholicity can prevail here only by revolutionizing the existing political and social order, and introducing the cæsarism which obtains in France, Naples, Austria, and Russia. You need, in order to have this a purely Catholic country, to change nothing but the religion of the American people."

"Mr. Diefenbach is right," said Father John, "and I agree with him in his view of the organization of our colleges in regard to government and discipline. The system adopted was good in its time and place, and well adapted to the state of society for which it was intended. That it needs essential modifications to adapt it to the principles and wants of our American society, I think can reasonably be doubted by no one. But we must give our colleges time, and not complain of them for not having introduced at once an entirely new system, of which the president and professors could know nothing. They naturally introduced the system with which they were acquainted, and under which they had themselves been trained. All men are more or less the creatures of routine, and evils we have long been familiar with, we are apt to regard either as not evils at all, or as inevitable, and to which we must reconcile ourselves. The Catholic trained under the existing system, and ignorant of any other, cannot be aware of its deficiencies. Our colleges had need to learn many things from experience, and I have seen in them, except, perhaps, in here and there an individual, no unwillingness to profit by experience. Many changes have already been introduced, others are contemplated, and in due time all that can reasonably be asked, no doubt, will be adopted, if the public opinion of the Catholic body can be brought to sustain them. What

I insist on is, that the defects of our colleges as they are, be they greater or be they less, shall not be ascribed exclusively to the college faculty or authorities. Parents must co-operate with the college, and sustain it in its efforts at improvement. Unhappily too many of our Catholic parents never think of any thing of the sort. To many of them a college is a college, partaking of the infallibility of the church; and the best thing they can do for their sons is to send them to college, though it be only for a year."

"Father John must not be too hard upon Catholic parents," said Diefenbach; "the majority of these parents are from countries where Catholic colleges could hardly breathe, and are no judges of what they should be."

"All that is very true," replied Father John, "but colleges can never run far in advance, in secular knowledge and training, of the intelligence and habits of the community for which they educate. It is little a college, however organized, can do with a mass of boys, sons of ignorant, sometimes vicious parents, who are acquainted with all the vice and crime of our large cities, and have never received any proper training at home. With such boys it would not be easy to form the students of a college into a miniature republic, and leave them to govern themselves. The error of F. G.'s articles, if error they have, is in laying the faults they point out too exclusively to the manner in which the college is organized and conducted. With such a Catholic public as we have had in this country, I see not clearly how we could have had colleges much different from or superior to those we have."

"F. G.," said Winslow, "deserves censure, even supposing his views correct, for having published his articles. Our schools and colleges are a family affair, and we should settle our disputes respecting them without calling in the public to listen."

"I think not so," replied Father John. "In what relates to ecclesiastical schools, or ecclesiastical administration, whether in great or little matters, public discussion is out of place, and the publicist can take no part in it. But I distinguish between colleges for seculars and the church, and between the authority of college faculties in seculars, and the authority of bishops and pastors in spirituals. I have profound reverence for the general of my order, but I distinguish between him and the pope, and I can well believe that, residing as he does at Rome, with no personal

knowledge of this country, he may know very little of what sort of education is needed here, or of the system of college government and discipline best fitted to train our boys to live and take their part in our society. The secular education of seculars is a secular function, whether performed by laymen or by ecclesiastics. In all secular matters, in a country like ours, public opinion has the right to interpose, and it is all-important that it be enlightened and sound. F. G. has provoked discussion on the subject, and in so doing has done the Catholic public good service. Discussion will tend to form a sound public opinion in the body of the laity, and will enlighten the colleges themselves as to what is demanded of them, and both hasten and facilitate the changes they must see are necessary to meet the just expectations of the Catholic public. The hush-up policy Mr. Winslow recommends, comports neither with our age nor our country, and would tend to retard rather than to advance the interests of religion among us. There is with non-Catholics a very general persuasion that we are not frank, open, candid, honest—that we trim, and practise concealment. We must, at almost any risk, labor to remove this false persuasion, and gain public confidence in our honesty and truthfulness. We have to look out for the interests of religion in our own country, not in France and Italy, and to deal with sharp-witted, yet bold and manly Yankees, not with French and Italian infidels, diplomatists, statesmen, and politicians. Astuteness, craft, and diplomacy will not serve our turn, even if we were disposed to use them. Publicity is the order of the day in this country, and I confess I can see no harm in publicly discussing what, after all, is a public question, and must be solved by the public. We live in a free country, not under a despotism, where free speech is a right, not where the press is gagged and a *mouchard* is at our elbow to listen to every word we say, and report it to the *préfet de police*, or the minister of the interior. We speak openly and above board what we think and what we mean, and despise Italian astuteness and French diplomacy, the fruits of despotism and tyranny. I wish Catholics to have a sound public opinion on secular education for seculars, and to understand that they are under no obligation to yield unquestioning submission to college authorities, because the college is governed and conducted by spiritual persons. Spiritual persons filling secular offices have the authority of seculars filling the same office, neither more nor less. The

pope as temporal prince has no more authority over me than has the emperor of Austria. I owe him obedience only as pope, only when he commands me as the vicar of Jesus Christ on earth. My pastor, my bishop, or the rector of a college, has no authority by virtue of his spiritual character to exact of me what I am not bound to yield even to the vicegerent of God, and visible head of my church. The college for seculars, I maintain, is a secular, not an ecclesiastical institution, and as a secular institution I have a perfect right to discuss its merits and demerits. Yet I hold myself bound to be just to it, and to treat our colleges fairly, and with respect. It is true, their results, thus far, do not satisfy me, but I believe their faculties are disposed to improve them, and will improve them as fast as they are able, and as fast as a just prudence permits. I trust, too, that I may say as much of our conventual schools for young ladies."

Conversation XI.

"Even men of real ability and finished education," observed Winslow, "are not always logically consistent. It is, in fact, seldom that you find a man who will carry out his principles to their last consequences, or who will abide by the same principles on all questions. The same man who complained of you yesterday for asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, complains of you to-day for asserting the authority of the state in matters purely secular. You may find any number of men who accept in general thesis principles which they deny the moment you give them a particular application, or who will assert in the particular application a principle which they will deny in general thesis. There are very respectable men, not unfamiliar with theological studies, who, when you are speaking of the mutual relations of church and state, and show yourself disposed to assert the rights of the spiritual, and to defend the prerogatives of Peter, will maintain that the spiritual and secular are two mutually independent orders, neither having any authority over the other, and each the judge of its own rights and powers, but who will, nevertheless, accuse you of being false to your faith and duty, if, for instance, you maintain that what is purely secular in the education of seculars, is the business of secular society. So, too, men who really believe in God, and do not hesitate to call him our first cause and our final cause, will shrink with a sort of

horror from the word theocracy, which really designates only the government of God, or a government which holds from him, makes his law the supreme law of the land, and governs under and in accordance with it."

"Yet," said Diefenbach, "theocracy, if understood according to the etymology of the word, is the only possible legitimate government. God alone hath dominion, and his dominion is absolute and universal. He is the creator of all things; all existences distinguishable from himself are entirely and exclusively the work of his hands, and therefore, are his, and he is their proprietor or owner, since the thing made necessarily belongs to the maker. Hence the apostle tells us, *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, which is both sound philosophy and good theology."

"Mr. Diefenbach founds, I perceive," said De Bonneville, "God's right to govern on his ownership, and his ownership on the fact of creation. His right to govern, then, rests on his creative act, not on his own eternal being and intrinsic justice, goodness, love. Does not this place his dominion in his omnipotence, and consecrate the principle, that might makes right?"

"I think not," replied Diefenbach; "God is most simple being and most pure act, and no real distinction between his being and his attributes, or between one of his attributes and another, is admissible. In him, might and right, power and justice, will and reason are identical, and creation is as much the act of his intrinsic justice, goodness, love, as of his omnipotence."

"But, suppose, if it be allowable," said O'Connor, who, on Mr. O'Flanagan's return to Ireland, had been elected to his place in Our Club, "that God was not what he is, or that his nature were the reverse of what we know it to be, would he then, although our Creator, have the right to govern us."

"The supposition is not allowable," rejoined Diefenbach, "because God is necessary being, and therefore necessarily what he is; and also, because being and good, in the real order, are identical. Considered in themselves, the supreme good and the supreme being are indistinguishable, and are distinguishable at all only in relation to our faculties. Regarded specially as the object of the intellect, being is called the true, and as the special object of the will, it is called the good, but the true and the good are one in being. All good is in being, and all evil in non-being, or lack of being,

Even Satan, in so far as he partakes of being, or is a creature of God, is good, not evil; that is, he is physically good, and only morally evil. We must be on our guard against Manicheism. There are not, and cannot be, two original and eternal principles of things, one good and one evil. There is, and can be, no positive principle of evil. Every principle must be real; if real, being; if being, good, and good cannot be the principle of evil. If the principle be not being, it is merely an abstraction, and abstractions are nullities. God being supreme and perfect being, being in its plenitude, is necessarily the supreme and perfect good, the good itself, and in itself. Only being can create, for what is not, cannot act."

"The transcendentalists, even the Hegelians, who assert the identity of being and not-being,—*das Sein und das Nichtsein*, — will hardly concede that," interrupted O'Connor, "for they tell us that *being* is in *doing*, and that by doing we may enlarge and fill up our being. On this assumption is founded the modern doctrine of progress, which teaches that man may attain to the infinite, realize infinite possibilities, and make himself God."

"Speculations of that sort," said Winslow, "were not uncommon a few years since in France, Germany, and the United States, the three leading speculative nations of the modern world, but they are out of fashion now, and seldom gain admittance into good society. What is not, cannot act, and nothing cannot make itself something. We act, because through the creative act of God, we partake of being, and the limit of our participation in being is the limit of our activity. Only infinite being can have infinite activity, or create from nothing. The Creator, then, is and cannot but be good."

"If being and good are identical, and there is no original principle of evil," asked De Bonneville, "how can we assert that the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, is eternal, and founded in the very nature of things?"

"Evil, wrong, injustice, vice," answered Winslow, "are not things. They have no physical existence, and therefore require no original or eternal principle. They are predicable only of creatures, and the distinction between them and good is not a distinction between two principles, but a distinction between being and no-being, between principle and its denial, between the presence of principle and its

absence. It is called eternal, because the being or principle they deny, or of which they are the absence or privation, is eternal."

"There is and can be," added Diefenbach, "no positive evil. Evil has and can have no physical existence. If we suppose it to exist physically, we must suppose that it exists either as created existence, or as uncreated being. We can suppose neither. If uncreated being it is real, necessary, self-existing being, therefore not evil but good. If created, then being must have created it; but all being is good, and good cannot create evil. The only possible evil is moral evil, and that is not a positive existence, but simply a misuse or abuse of his faculties by a created moral agent."

"We are led into difficulties on this subject," said Father John, "by our want of a philosophy that accords with our theology or the truth of things. The popular philosophy is a miserable sensism, which either denies the intelligible, or confounds it with the sensible, and identifies good with sensible pleasure, and evil with sensible pain. Whether the pleasure be or be not the effect of good, whether the pain be or be not the effect of evil, it is certain, the pleasure is not the good, and the pain is not the evil itself. The only possible evil is sin, and sin is not a creature, but simply a deliberate transgression of the law of God, or deviation from the line of rectitude by a free moral agent."

"To ask if God be good," said Diefenbach, "after having conceded that he exists, is absurd, not only because no distinction between good and being is possible, but also because we have no criterion, standard, or measure of good, except God himself. To ask if God be good, is simply to ask if God be God, or if he is what he is. When we say of any particular thing, it is good, we pronounce a judgment, and every judgment is by virtue of some rule or standard of judgment."

"That rule or standard," replied De Bonneville, "is our intelligence, or our reason."

"Yet reason," rejoined Diefenbach, "must itself have some principle of moral judgment, or no moral judgment is possible."

"That principle," interposed O'Connor, "is the idea of good, of the good itself, a constituent element of reason, and one of our absolute and necessary ideas. What conforms to that idea we judge to be good, and what repugns it, we judge to be evil, bad, or not good."

"But that idea of good, or of the good itself, what is that?" asked Diefenbach.

"The question seems to me quite unnecessary," answered De Bonneville. "We cannot go back of our ideas, and all we can do is to show that they are inherent in reason as its constituent elements. We all know that we have the idea of good, and what conforms to it we judge to be good, and what conforms not to it we judge to be evil."

"Nevertheless," insisted Winslow, "the validity of the judgment depends on the validity of the idea. If the idea be invalid, the judgment is worthless. We must, then, determine the validity of the idea, the soundness of the principle of our moral judgments, or have no scientific basis either for our morals or our politics. We must understand by idea of good, the good itself, an objective representative of good to the mind, distinguishable from good as the representative from the represented; or in fine, the simple mental perception or subjective judgment itself. If we say the last, we take ourselves as the standard, and good and evil will be simply what each one judges them to be. If we take the second sense, and understand by idea, with the peripatetics, not the objective reality itself, but a certain intelligible species or immaterial copy, image, or representation of it, we must determine, whether the idea really represents any thing existing *a parte rei*, and if it does, whether it represents it truly and adequately, two things which the interminable disputes of philosophers on the point prove to be forever beyond the power of reason. Nothing remains for us, but to understand by the idea of good, the good itself as intuitively present by its own affirmation of itself in reason, as the very principle of our moral life. That is, we must understand that the ideal is the real, as Plato long ago taught."

"M. Cousin, whose view Mr. O'Connor seems to favor," said Diefenbach, "makes our absolute and necessary ideas, —the idea of the true, the idea of the good, and the idea of the fair,—inherent in what he calls the impersonal reason, or reason operating independently of our personality or will; but unhappily, on the one hand, he makes this same impersonal reason, substantially our faculty of intelligence, which has a pantheistic tendency, and on the other distinguishes it from God or real and necessary being, which tends to nihilism. He is very obscure on this impersonal reason, and I am not able to determine always his precise

meaning. Reason operating spontaneously he calls divine; operating reflectively he calls it human. Yet whether operating spontaneously or reflectively, it is one and the same reason. Is it the reason of God or the reason of man? Is the reason of both one and the same being? The latter would seem to be his doctrine. He asserts, and it is a great point, reason as objective, but he distinguishes even this objective reason from the divine being, and makes it representative of reality, rather than the reality itself. He calls reason operating spontaneously divine, the *Λόγος*, the Word of God, and yet shrinks from calling it God, as does Rosmini from so calling the idea of being into which he resolves all our necessary and absolute ideas. But absolute and necessary ideas, if not God, if not real and necessary being, are mere abstractions, and therefore nothing; for the necessary is not and cannot be creature, since creature is always contingent. If real and necessary, they must be being, and therefore God himself, the only being. The *Λόγος*, the Word, *Verbum Dei*, is a distinction *in* God, not *from* God, for the Word *is* God. Reason then, when distinguished from our faculty of intelligence, which depends on it, is not something between necessary being and contingent existence, but is real and necessary being, or God himself, as Fénelon maintains, and therefore the idea of good must be the good itself."

"The ideal," interposed Father John, "is the intelligible, and the intelligible is God himself affirming himself, and in the act of affirming himself creating and illumining our intelligence; and he is at once the Creator, the immediate object, and the light of our reason. The idea of good, which is the principle of our moral judgments, is God affirming himself to us as the good itself. God, then, is himself the principle, the rule, standard, or measure of our moral judgment. When we judge this or that particular thing is or is not good, he is the term of comparison. We may properly judge whether this or that conception of God be true or false in the same way, but to ask whether God himself be good or not is absurd; for we can, in order to answer the question, compare him only with himself."

"We have not," added Diefenbach, "two distinct ideas, one of God, and another of good, between which we can institute a comparison, or which we can judge the one by the other. The two ideas in the real order are one and the same. God as being is identically God as good, for in God

there is no distinction between essence and being, and none between being and attribute, or between one attribute and another."

"Therefore," said Winslow, "nothing is gained by the attempt to found the sovereignty of God on his intrinsic justice, goodness, love, distinguished from his omnipotence, or creative power. Goodness, justice, love, so distinguished, give the law according to which the sovereign power must be exercised, if you will, but they do not give dominion itself. If, *per impossibile*, some other power had created us, we might still love and revere God, for what he is in and of himself, but he would have no right to command us as a sovereign, for in that case we should not be *his* creatures, but another's."

"If then, the devil had created us, we should have been bound to obey the devil," concluded De Bonneville.

"Give the devil his due, is a maxim one often hears repeated," replied Father John. "If the devil were an independent being and were really our creator, we should be his, and bound to obey his commands. But the supposition is absurd. The devil could create us only on the supposition that he is not himself created, that he is real and necessary being; and if real and necessary being, he cannot be evil but must be good, and hence not the devil but God. The devil is a creature, the creature of God, and therefore, like any other creature, belongs to God in all he is, and in all he can do. Whatever the power he may have he has received it from God, and owes it to him. God owns him, owns his power, and therefore all that by that power can be brought forth, as he who owns the parents owns the offspring, as we believe is asserted by the laws of every civilized state."

"M. de Bonneville," said Winslow, "is a French royalist, in exile for his loyalty, and he, I presume, holds that he is bound to obey his legitimate prince, precisely because it is his prince who commands. The same command, however just and good, issued by another, would not be a command for him. How then is it that he fails to perceive that the obligation to obey God does not depend on what is commanded, but on the fact that he who commands it is his sovereign. It is not precisely because what is commanded is just and good that God's commands are obligatory, but because they are the commands of him who has the right to command."

"God's commands bind our consciences because they are just and good," said O'Connor.

"Rather," replied Winslow, "they are just and good because they are his commands. I love the law of God, I delight in it, because it is just and good; I obey it because it is the command of my sovereign."

"The dispute arises," said Diefenbach, "from not distinguishing between the real sovereign and his deputy or representative, between him who is sovereign in his own right, and him who is sovereign only by commission. God is sovereign in his own right, and we owe him unconditional obedience; we can make no inquiry into the intrinsic nature of his commands, before obeying; we can only inquire what is commanded, and whether it is really He who commands. The real sovereign is not and never can be a tyrant, for *tyrant*, by the very force of the word, means a usurper, one who commands without the right to command. Every tyrannical act is a usurpation of power, and an unjust command is tyrannical, because no one has legitimate authority to command injustice. Human sovereigns, even the most legitimate, are only delegated sovereigns, and possess no sovereignty in their own right. Into their orders we may inquire, for they have no authority beyond their commission, and that commission never authorizes them to command what is intrinsically unjust. But when we know the command is from God, to inquire if it be just or not, is not only irreverent, but absurd, for it is simply asking if the command of God be the command of God."

"But that, though it may give us rights in face of the delegate or human representative of power, gives us none before God," said O'Connor. "The law of justice is universal, and God himself is no more exempt from it than the meanest of his creatures. He has no more right to do injustice than I have; I have then before him the right of justice."

"The law of justice," said Diefenbach, "is universal, not because it is distinct from God, above him, or anterior to him, but because it is God himself. He is bound by it only in the sense that he is bound by his own being, or the perfection of his own nature. He can apply the law to his creatures, or create existences that shall come under it, but he cannot alter it, because he cannot alter or annihilate himself, or his own real and necessary being. God is, and is necessarily what he is. He only is, and whatever is dis-

tinguishable from him is not being, but existence, created by him, and having its being in his being, 'for in him we live and move and have our being.' Abstractions are nullities, and an abstract law is simply no law at all. The law of justice must be real, then being, and if being, God. Hence St. Augustine identifies it with the eternal reason or will of God. The nature of things, the contrary of which cannot be done, is not something distinct from God, and subjecting him, but is precisely his own eternal and immutable nature. The nature of things is what it is, because he is what he is, and cannot make himself other than he is. To say such or such a thing is impossible in the nature of things, is simply to say that it is repugnant to the nature of God, and what he, from the perfection of his nature, cannot do. God cannot be subject to any law but that of his own being. He cannot be placed under obligation; we then can have no rights before him, and no rights at all except from him, and under him, for rights on the one side are obligations on the other."

But by placing the law in the very being of God," said De Bonneville, "in his eternal and immutable being, Mr. Diefenbach returns to my doctrine, which he denied, that the right of God to command is in his essence, and not in his creative act."

"By no means," answered Father John, "for the creative act is a free, voluntary act of God, and not a necessity of his being. That he should have dominion over his creatures in case he creates, is the law of his own being; but that he has dominion over *me*, rests on the fact that he has made me, and I am his; by virtue the principle, the thing made belongs to the maker. That the thing made belongs to the maker, is implied in being; but that God has made me, and I therefore belong to him, depends on his act, because that act is on his part a free act. If you ask why has God dominion over me, I answer, because he has made me, and the thing made belongs to the maker. If you ask why the thing made belongs to the maker, I answer, because the thing made is the maker, *mediante* the act of making. God is eternal being, self-existent, independent, and therefore belongs only to himself. His acts are his acts, proceed from his being, are vitally joined to it, and subsist only in it. The creature subsists in the creative act alone, and by it is vitally joined, as the act itself, to the creator, and therefore pertains to his being as the effect to the cause, and is nothing save in the cause."

"All existences," added Diefenbach, "proceed from God, and have their being in his being,—the truth pantheism sees and asserts. The only being they have is his being, and they are only in him. He then is their being. But not immediately, for that is the error of pantheism. Then mediately, and then they have their being in his being, *mediante* his creative act, which not only produces them from nothing, but sustains or keeps them existences. God is universally, efficaciously, creatively present, creating them every instant from nothing, the truth deism denies. There is nothing between the eternal being of God and existences but his creative act, and nothing but his creative act between them and nothing, and hence they are really his being, *mediante* his creative act, and through that act vitally joined to it."

"But to avoid another error of pantheism," said Winslow, "we must understand that the creative act which creates existences and unites them to God as his acts, creates them not as modes or affections of his being, but as activities or second causes, able in the order of second causes to imitate or copy his creative act. He is immanent or present in his act, but as first cause, creating second causes. So great is his creative energy that it makes its effects, themselves, a sort of creators in their own order, in relation to their own effects or phenomena."

"Hence," said Diefenbach, "the ground of moral and political obligation. The creatures of God are created activities, and man and those above him are created free activities, free agents, and capable, though in a feeble sense, of imitating his free activity as first cause. But as they are made such only by his creative act, they owe even this free activity to him, and are bound to render it to him freely and voluntarily. As he owns our voluntary activity, he has the right to its product. Through his creative act he becomes the law to us, our sovereign, and we his subjects. As our law he is our final cause, as by his creative act he is our first cause. As we proceed from him by his free, voluntary act as first cause, so we must return to him as our final cause by our own free, voluntary act, or obedience. He is our first and our final cause, our first beginning and last end. Hence we have and can have no rights before him; rights, I mean, which we can plead against him; we have before him only duties, and what we call our rights before him are only the excess of his goodness, the rewards he freely offers us."

"The only right man has before God," said Father John, "or can pretend to have, is, that since he has willed us to be free agents, he must have us free agents as long as he wills us to exist, and govern us accordingly. But this, in reality, is his right, not ours; for it is simply the right in him to be what he is, and not to contradict his own essential nature. Being created activities, free moral agents, we have rights in regard to one another, but only duties before God."

"As we are bound to obey God because he is the law or our final cause," said Winslow, "and as he is our final cause only by virtue of the fact that he is our first cause or creator, his dominion is, and must be, founded on his creative act, and we are his, and bound to serve him, because he is our creator, and therefore our final cause. His right to govern us, is in the fact that he has created us, and owns us. In obeying him, we are giving him only what we owe him, only discharging the debt strictly his due."

"In this we see," said Father John, "that both atheism and pantheism deny all moral conceptions, for denying the creator they can assert no sovereign, and, unable to assert a sovereign, they can assert no law, no justice, therefore no rights on the one hand, or duties on the other. We see, also, here, the real atheism of those—and they are many—who scorn to serve God from a sense of duty, or because commanded, but profess to be willing to serve him from love. They deny that they owe a debt to God, which they are bound in strict justice to pay him, but are willing to make him, from their boundless generosity, a donation to the same or even a greater amount. This sort of *love*, so attractive to our superficial, immoral, unbelieving, sentimental age, is no service of God at all, because it contains no act of obedience, no recognition of the divine dominion or sovereignty, of his right to us and to all we can do. In it there is no acknowledgment of his proprietorship, and it implies no act of submission to him as the law or final cause of the will. It is the invention of a heart capable of feeling indeed, but too proud to acknowledge its dependence, too proud to own a superior—a master—even though that master is its maker. Certainly, we are commanded to love God with all our heart, mind, soul, and strength, but not with a sentimental love that excludes, but with the rational love that includes, the sense of justice, of stern duty. We love and adore God for what he is in him-

self; we give him thanks for what he has done for us, both in creation and redemption; we hope in him and confide in his promises, as our supreme good, but we obey him because he is our sovereign lord and master. Not to obey him because he is our sovereign lord, and we are his by his right of property, is not to obey him at all, and we only follow our own sentiments and impulses, and obey ourselves. It is to deny his relation to us as our beginning and end, and to set ourselves up in his place. The morality, based on sentiment, impulse, or interest, is no real morality at all, and is, in the last analysis, only self-love, or the adoration of self. We are moral, only in so far as we act in obedience to the will of our sovereign, and in acting, acknowledge his right or authority to do with us as he pleases—to command us what he chooses."

"Hence," said Winslow, "they who do even the things commanded by the law, if they do them not because the law ordains them, fail to honor the lawgiver. In order to give God his due, we must keep the commandments because they are *his* commandments, so that in the act of keeping them, there shall be an acknowledgment of his dominion, and of our subjection to him. We must in it perform an act of real, downright submission, and make a full and unreserved confession of the truth that we are his, and not our own. It is this, not the thing commanded, that makes obedience so humiliating or so distasteful to our pride. It is far pleasanter to be generous than it is to be just, and sacrifice is less humiliating than obedience. In obedience, we deny ourselves. In generosity, in sacrifice, except sacrifices made for the sake of God, we assert ourselves. We may be generous from pride, we can be obedient only from humility. The English and Americans, the so-called Anglo-Saxon family, are generous, and are inferior to no people on earth, in nobility of sentiment, and manliness of character; but they are deficient in humility, lack that true loyalty of heart which loves and obeys the law because it is the law. They will submit to no authority, because it is authority. They are proud, and claim to be their own lords and masters. They can brook no superior, and what they do they will do because it is their pleasure, because it comports with their own self-respect and personal dignity."

"Mr. Winslow is too sweeping in his expressions," said Father John. "Those traits of character, when confined to

our purely human relations, the relations of man with man, and of man with society, are not unreasonable, and up to a certain point, are even commendable. They give to the individual a personal dignity and manly bearing; they found free governments, favor republican institutions, and provide safeguards for individual freedom and independence. They cease to be commendable, and become sinful only when transferred to the relations of man with his maker. As God's dominion is founded on his creative act, through which, if we may so speak, he becomes our final cause, as he is in his eternal essence his own final cause in creating, he is the end or supreme law of all our free, voluntary activity. As his dominion is universal and absolute, since he is sole first cause as sole final cause, it excludes all other dominion and denies all dominion of man over man, and of society in its own right over individuals. No creature has an inherent right over another. What we call the rights of man and of society are really the rights of God. I have no rights before him, and owe him the most absolute and unreserved submission, but as the necessary converse of this I do and can owe submission to no one else. Before him I can make no assertion of self, for I have no self independent of him, but before others, before all creatures, I have the perfect right of self-assertion. No creature can bind me by his own authority, and the debt I must pay to my neighbor, I owe not to him, but to God, and I must pay it to him only because such is the will of God, my sovereign. The obedience, the submission is in all cases due to God alone, and where his law does not exact it, I owe no obedience at all. Theocracy, then, frees us from all authority but that of God, and while it exacts entire submission of man to his maker, it asserts his entire freedom and independence in all his relations with his fellow-men, both individually and socially. No individual, no king, no emperor, no aristocracy, no democracy has any power to bind me, save as the delegate, vicar, or representative of God, appointed and commissioned by him, and even then, only within the terms of the commission. Theocracy is, therefore, the basis and the only basis of all true or desirable liberty."

Conversation XII.

"If the dominion belongs to God, and his dominion is absolute, universal, and exclusive," remarked O'Connor, "every government except his is a usurpation, and founded in robbery and violence. Theocratic government, then, must be the only rightful, legitimate, or just government. But how can we assert this without denying the great political doctrine of the modern world, namely, the sovereignty of the people, and therefore the legitimacy of the political institutions of this country, which are professedly founded on that doctrine. The sovereignty of the people, as explained by the most accredited organs of the Democratic party, asserts that the people or a majority of them, are in their own native might and right the sovereign. So wrote Mr. O'Sullivan some years since in the *Democratic Review*, and this appears to be alike the doctrine of the American Democrats and of the European Liberals. Mazzini and his followers speak of the people not only as people-king or king-people, as Virgil called the Romans, but also as PEOPLE-GOD, and go so far as to claim for them the absolute and exclusive authority even in matters of religion,—dogma, discipline, and worship. Can it be pretended that this doctrine is compatible with theocracy, or the absolute dominion of God, founded on his creative act?"

"Certainly not," replied Winslow, "and therefore I regard democracy as only another name for pantheism or atheism; 'an illuminated hell,' as Fisher Ames called it."

"It certainly, wherever it has had sway, has justified the strong expression of that most eloquent and enlightened of American orators," said De Bonneville. "Its very essence is to make war on the throne and the altar. I cordially endorse all that can be said against democracy, and am the last man in the world to assert that blasphemy, the sovereignty of the people."

"The sovereignty of the people, *in the sense alleged*," remarked Diefenbach, no Christian, and indeed no philosopher, till his brain is addled, can assert. It is atheism and blasphemy. But God, having created man with an active nature, as a cause in the order of second causes, can delegate to him authority, and can, if he chooses, delegate the political power to the people collectively as well as to the king or the nobility, and if you only understand that the

people hold their power as a trust from God, there is no more blasphemy or atheism in calling the people than in calling the king or nobility sovereign."

"I am," said Father John, "no democrat in the popular sense of the word, but I see no incompatibility between theocracy and the real principles or constitution of the American state. The assertion of theocracy does not exclude human governments, in the sense of delegated or divinely commissioned governments, any more than the power given to an agent denies or excludes the power of the principal. The sovereignty of the people, when asserted against the sovereignty of God, is atheism, pantheism, blasphemy; but when asserted only against the sovereignty of the king or the nobility, as it was by those who first asserted it, and also by the fathers of the American republic, it is nothing that may not be rightfully asserted and defended. It then means simply that the political power delegated by the divine sovereign vests in the people or the body of the nation, and that kings and nobilities hold from and are accountable to the nation. It identifies the state and the nation, denies that the king is the state, and regards him simply as the first magistrate of the nation, and justiciable by it. If he abuses his office, perverts it to base and selfish ends, enslaves and oppresses the people, the nation, on this supposition, has the right to depose and punish him, as the English nation did Charles I. and the French nation did Louis XVI."

"I do not," said De Bonneville, "accept the doctrine that kings hold from the people and are justiciable by them, for I hold with Louis XIV. that the king is the state, not simply its first magistrate, and I could not explain the consecration of our ancient French kings with holy oil, if I did not. But it is not theocracy in that it asserts the dominion of God and that all power is derived from him—for that every Christian does and must hold—but theocracy in that it vests the sovereignty, in temporals as well as in spirituals, in the priesthood, who claim to be the exclusive oracles of God, and to have the divine sanction for whatever they command, that the world has very generally agreed to regard with horror, and to repulse as a tyranny which crushes at once both soul and body."

"It would seem then," said Winslow, "that it is hierocracy rather than theocracy, that is so odious to the world. But the priestly government is held to be odious, because it

professes to govern in the name of God, who only hath dominion. So the odium, after all, really attaches to theocracy. In point of fact, priestly governments are regarded as odious, because they assert the divine dominion, and the sacredness of power, thus making obedience a matter of conscience, and because they aim to govern in reference to spiritual and eternal rather than in reference to mere sensible and temporal good,—the very things which should make them loved and respected! But God is sovereign, and may delegate power to whom he pleases; and if he chooses to delegate it to the priesthood and thus establish a hierocracy, what right have you or I to object? Has he not the right to do what he will with his own?"

"There is no doubt," said O'Connor, "that as a matter of fact, the world very generally holds sacerdotal governments in temporal affairs to be the worst governments possible. The world, appealing to the ancient priesthoods of Egypt, Syria, Assyria, Phœnicia, Gaul and Brittany, Mexico at the time of its discovery by the Spaniards, and to modern India, Thibet, Tartary, and Japan, in justification alleges that these governments are opposed to social well-being and national prosperity, that they oppose the progress of science and the diffusion of intelligence, keep the people in ignorance and wedded to routine, repress all free thought, and all original development of genius, debase and besot the people with superstition, and enervate their very souls by an all-pervading, vigilant, and inexorable despotism."

"Those were or are heathen priesthoods," answered Winslow, "and it is not lawful to conclude from them what are or must be the influences of the true Christian hierarchy. Yet even in the nations mentioned, I do not find the priesthood, unless for brief moments, the only governing power. Always, at least since Nemrod, the mighty hunter before the Lord, I find the prince or civil power by the side of the priesthood, and not unfrequently usurping its functions."

"Not only so," said Father John, "but the most really flourishing periods of the so-called sacerdotal nations of antiquity, were precisely those in which the power and influence of those priesthoods were the greatest. In every age and nation the priesthood is the depositary of its highest wisdom, its most sacred traditions, and its purest morality. In all ages and nations priests have been the civilizers of the race, and the representatives of intelligence and moral

power. Even in Protestant nations the preachers are above the average of the people, and represent for them intelligence and moral power, and so far the divine. The moral, intellectual, and material degradation of the people in ancient sacerdotal nations did not originate in the fact, nor were they prevented from being remedied by the fact, that the sacerdocy governed. The priests of Egypt, and of the old mystic East, low as they fell, degraded as they became, preserved better than any other class the primitive wisdom, or tradition of the primitive revelation made to our first parents, and it was from them that Greece received the elements of her civilization, and Plato drew those parts of his philosophy which have made him called even by some Christians the *divine* Plato. However numerous and lamentable their short-comings or their positive errors, the gentile priesthoods kept alive in the hearts of men the religious sentiment, and asserted always the supremacy of moral and intellectual power against brute force, represented by the warrior caste. Certainly they had false, horribly false, conceptions of God and the divine government, but they, nevertheless, asserted the Divinity and the obligation of moral and religious service. Certainly superstition mingled in all their religion and worship, but superstition bears witness to true religion, and is less debasing and brutalizing than atheism. The pagan Greek or Roman was far above the atheistical Chinese."

"The ancient gentile priesthood, I think," said Diefenbach, "had their origin in good rather than in evil. God has established for the human race two powers, the priestly and the kingly. In the beginning these powers were not detached the one from the other, but were both united in the person of the patriarch or *pater-familias*, the *patrician* of early Roman history, who was both priest and king for his own family, household, or *gens*. This order, the patriarchal, was the original or earliest form of government, and is that from which all other forms have been developed. It was in the early ages of the world universal, and we find traces of it among all nations ancient and modern, especially in the *gentes* of the Romans, the *hordes* of Tartary, the *septs* of Ireland, the *clans* of Scotland, the *tribes* of the American Indians, and in the *village* of the Hindus and Russians. In this order originally, as I have said, the two powers were united, but in the time of Nemrod, as I read the Biblical records, the kingly power detached itself from the priestly,

and erected itself into a separate power. Nemrod would build cities, found a mighty empire, and reign alone as absolute lord and master. The priesthood still remained in the *pater-familias*, till gradually it became confined to certain priestly families, who in process of time became priestly corporations, and in some nations a priestly caste. The separation was not sought or effected by the priestly power, but by the kingly, and the union continued in the Biblical patriarchs till the establishment of the Levitical priesthood, and the consecration of Aaron. With the gentiles, that is, the people who broke from the patriarchal order and apostatized from the patriarchal religion, the separation took place at a much earlier date, and by violence, not as in the Levitical priesthood, by divine authority and arrangement. But even in these apostate nations the gentile priesthoods were in some sense, the continuation, though in a heterodox line, of the primitive and true priesthood, which God had originally established among men. They succeeded, in some sort, to the patriarchal priesthood, and represented for the gentiles the ideal or the divine element in human life and affairs. They did not all at once lose the primitive doctrine, or even their original character, and all the great states of antiquity were, most likely, founded while they were comparatively pure. They became corrupt and corrupted doctrine and worship only by degrees, and all the historical records bearing on the case go to prove that while they remained comparatively pure their power was greatest, and precisely while their power was greatest their respective nations were the most moral, laid the foundations of their grandeur, and made their most rapid strides in civilization. To the superficial observer these nations may seem to have become more resplendent as the influence of the priesthood declined, and as the lay power became more and more predominant; but it is only with a phosphorescent splendor, indicative of their increasing rottenness. The decadence of a nation dates from the decadence of the power and influence of its priesthood. The heroic ages of Greece and Rome are the ages when the sacerdotal order exerted the most influence, and the nation was most careful to observe the worship of the Gods. The philosophers came afterwards and undermined the belief in the popular religion, taught the people to speculate, to doubt, and to ridicule the popular worship, and Greece fell before the invader and ceased to be an independent nation. Rome, founded by a

colony not yet become idolaters, became gradually corrupt, and the power and influence of her priesthood declined, the piety of her people, so renowned during her ages of progress, disappeared, and the mistress of the world entered upon her long agony under her Cæsars. The decline of the influence of Protestant ministers in this country is visibly attended by an increase of luxury, crime, immorality, and corruption, in which we already nearly rival pagan Rome or Babylon, and the speedy fall or ruin of our young republic might be safely predicted, did we not see transplanted here, taking root, and springing up with a fresh and vigorous growth, the true Catholic priesthood, in living union with its chief."

"The corruptions of the ancient priesthoods did not originate wholly in the priesthoods themselves, for the detaching of the kingly from the priestly functions, the first great act of gentile apostasy, was not their act, but the act of the Nemrods," said Winslow, "and their corruption which followed, was owing not to their power, but to their relative weakness before the growing power of the lay sovereign. The arts they are said to have practised, the frauds they committed, and the tricks they resorted to, originated not in their possession of power, but in efforts to retain their constantly declining influence in face of the lay authority, which labored to subject them to itself, and to make them the instruments of its ambition, as Napoleon I. sought to subject and use the papacy. Wherever they retained their independence of the lay power, the gentile priests were, even in the worst of times, the *pars sanior* of the nation, and the least unfitted to be the depositary of power; and in no instance I can find, in ancient or modern times, has the nation gained in real strength, virtue, or true glory by the passage of power from true or false priests to the lay chiefs of society."

"This view of the ancient gentile priesthoods, that they had their origin in the legitimate priesthoood established by God himself, and that they became more and more corrupt as time went on, is not in accordance with the doctrine held by the scholors of France and Germany," remarked De Bonneville. "These scholars suppose the lowest point in the gentile religions was their starting point, and that they were gradually purified, enlightened, and elevated by the natural progress of the human mind, till they rose to the sublime conceptions of Hebrew and Christian monotheism."

"That is because they suppose darkness is older than

light, and error older than truth," replied Father John; "and because they wish to be able to destroy the authority of Christianity, by making it appear that it has been attained to in the natural religious progress of the human mind. They assume, against all history and all philosophy, that the earliest religion of the human race was the lowest and most disgusting form of fetichism. They take the juggler or medicine-man of the North American savages, as the incipient priest, instead of taking him as the degenerate priest. The medicine-man of the savages is the last faint reminiscence of the priest, not the germ from which the priest is developed. The savage is not the primitive state, but the deteriorated state of the human race, the lowest state to which the race ever falls. The gentile priesthoods in their origin and early stages were comparatively pure and enlightened. They started with the patriarchal religion, as the patrimony of the human race, but, like imprudent heirs, they gradually squandered or lost it in their wild and reckless speculations."

"That patrimony," said Winslow, "included not only natural reason, but also the primitive revelation made to our first parents in the garden, which contained, in substance, St. Thomas tells us, the whole revelation which God has made to man."

"There has never been," added Diefenbach, "but one revelation from God to man. We must not suppose that God made no revelation to man till about two thousand years ago, or that he made a revelation only to the little Jewish people enclosed within the narrow limits of Palestine. He made his revelation in the beginning, to our first parents, and in making it to them, he made it to the whole human race. The ancient patriarch and the modern Catholic belong to one and the same religion; as believed the one so believes the other. Faith never varies. The patriarchs believed in Christ as we believe in Christ, only they believed in him as to come, and we in him as having come."

"The present tendency in a certain class of scholars," said Father John, "to deny the supernatural origin of Christianity, is a reaction against an untenable hypothesis, originally started, I believe, by Philo, the Jew, and revived and generally held by the learned of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The mediæval scholastics knew doctrine, faith, theology, and philosophy as well as we, if not better; but they knew less of history, and therefore

made little account of the coincidences of doctrine and worship in remote gentile nations with Christianity. In the latter part of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after our missionaries had visited India, China, and Japan, and explored the regions of the New World, the subject attracted more attention, and the learned, overlooking or not duly considering the primitive revelation made to mankind, and it not occurring to them that it might, in a broken and corrupt form, be transmitted in the gentile world through an independent, though heterodox line, agreed very generally to regard whatever they found in the gentile religion coincident with Christianity, and not derivable from natural reason, as borrowed from the Jewish scriptures, or learned from intercourse with the Jewish people. The hypothesis was too narrow to meet the exigencies of the case, and moreover was not sustainable by history. There is scarcely a dogma, a moral precept, or a usage common to the Jews and Christians, or regarded even as peculiarly Christian, that cannot be found in some form, pure, corrupted, mutilated, or travestied, in gentile religions, older than the Hebrew Scriptures, though not older than the Hebrew traditions, and which were the religions of nations, who we cannot reasonably suppose had any intercourse with the Jews,—an isolated, agricultural, and pastoral people. The learned of the last century and the first part of the present, seeing this and taking it for granted that the heathen had no revelation, or reminiscences of a revelation, asserted a contrary hypothesis, made Christians the borrowers, and brought these very coincidences to prove that Christianity is not a revealed religion, but the natural production of the human mind."

"The error on both sides," said Diefenbach, "is in assuming that the gentiles had only the simple light of natural reason, and that the Mosaic law was, what it was not, a revelation of dogmatic and moral truth. The dogmatic and moral truth presupposed, implied, or prefigured in the Mosaic law, was simply the dogmatic and moral truth held by the patriarchs, and contained in the revelation made to our first parents. Even our Lord himself did not come to reveal new truth, truth before unrevealed, or to make a new revelation of dogmatic and moral truth. He came to fulfil the promises made to the patriarchs, and to do those things without which the faith of the patriarchs would have been vain and illusory; for their faith pointed forward, as ours

points back, to the incarnation of the Word, or second person of the Trinity, to the atonement, the redemption of the human race, through the life, passion, death, and resurrection of the God-man, 'the Word made flesh.' No doubt the faith was rendered more explicit by the preaching of our Lord and his apostles than it was before. New provisions for the preservation, administration, and application of the truth were instituted; but the matter of faith was not extended, no really new dogma or new moral precept was added. Strike out, as Unitarians do, the incarnation, and what depends on it, or grows out of it, and you make the mission of our Lord at best only the work of an ordinary reformer, who labors to recall men to the practice of truths and virtues, which they have obscured, neglected, or forgotten. His mission is significant only when regarded as fulfilling the faith, or doing those things which are promised in faith."

"The Christian revelation, as distinguished from the doing of the things by the Word, on which the redemption of the race and the elevation of human nature to be the nature of God, depend," added Father John, "was made to our first parents, and a worship was instituted for them, on their expulsion from the garden, in accordance with that revelation, and adapted to their state. This revelation the father was commissioned and commanded to teach his children, and of this worship he was instituted the priest for his own family or household. This order, the patriarchal order, prevailed with the whole human race before the deluge, and even after the deluge with the faithful patriarchs, till the institution of the Levitical priesthood. It prevailed everywhere till the apostasy of the gentiles. After the building of the Tower of Babel, the confusion of tongues, and consequent loss of unity of speech and unity of communion, there took place a schism in the human race, and the gentiles or schismatics then dispersed into separate nations, as we see Protestants formed into separate and often mutually hostile sects. From that time there have been two lines, the one orthodox, the other heterodox, through which the primitive revelation and worship have been transmitted. Through the orthodox line, the faithful patriarchs, the synagogue, and the church, they have been transmitted in their unity and simplicity, their purity and integrity; in the heterodox line, that of the gentile priesthoods and the sects, ancient and modern,

they have been also transmitted, but in an impure, corrupt, broken, mutilated, and sometimes in a travestied form. Nevertheless the heterodox line has always transmitted something of the true religion. There is not a dogma or precept of the Catholic Church, some traces of which, either as denied or asserted, as pure or perverted, cannot be found in some one or all of the Protestant sects. The gentiles, the Protestants of the old world, took their point of departure in the primitive tradition which had been transmitted to them through father and son from Adam. All their dogmas, precepts, superstitions, rites, ceremonies, even those evidently demoniacal, are reminiscences, corruptions, perversions, imitations, or travesties of the true faith and worship. They did not borrow directly from the Hebrew Scriptures, or from the Hebrew people, but drew from the same original tradition, corrupted with them by the loss of unity of speech at Babel. The ancestors of the ancient gentiles, as the ancestors of the Hebrews, were orthodox believers and worshippers, as the ancestors, and not very remote ancestors, of modern Protestants were orthodox Catholics, and lived and died in the communion of the church. Among the gentiles the priests succeeded to the priestly functions of the patriarchs, and were the depositaries of the primitive religion as it was retained in gentilism, and though heterodox in the beginning, and growing more and more hetorodox as time went on, they really did represent religion, as far as it was represented at all, in the gentile world, as Protestant preachers represent it among Protestant nations, and would represent it far more truly if they were less under lay influence, and more independent of the civil government and their congregations. I do not think it a misfortune that the gentile priesthoods had power, but I do think it a grievous misfortune that the gentile nations had not the true and divinely protected and assisted priesthood. I do not think Protestant nations suffer from the power and influence of their preachers, but they suffer from not having true, legitimate, orthodox priests, to feed them with pure doctrine, and to offer up the true sacrifice for them."

"There are," said Diefenbach, "true priesthoods and false priesthoods, and nobody can expect the false to equal the true. The human mind cannot act without the ideal, that is, God, who is the apodictic element of all human thought, and of all human life. Men in the reflective order

may or may not reproduce their intuitions truly, but they always reproduce them in some sort. Hence, they have always some conception of the divine in human affairs, some sort of a *credo*, some sort of religion, which is for them the supreme law—a law that binds *in foro conscientiæ* as well as *in foro exteriori*. The priesthood is the representative of this law, that is, the divine in human life. Since all authority is from God, and he only hath dominion, or the right to govern, it follows that whatever governing power he delegates to man is a trust vested in the priesthood. It does not, of course, legitimately vest in a false priesthood, as became the gentile priesthoods, but for those nations who have no true legitimate priests, these false priests are the least illegitimate depositaries of power they have. Their right is good as against all other claimants, and yields necessarily only before the right of the true priesthood. Representing the divine, though imperfectly and untruly, they yet represent it for their nations, and for these nations to rebel against them, save at the command of the true priesthood, would in their minds, consciences, and in the practical moral effects, be, to rebel against God, and to refuse all acknowledgment of the divine government. To reject a false religion, for none at all, is atheism, and atheism is worse than heresy or superstition. The government of false or heretical priests will be false in the face of the true priests of God, but relatively to that of the laity, who are equally removed from the truth, it will be legitimate and good."

Conversation XIII.

"I hope," said De Bonneville, "that I have due reverence for the ministers of religion, and I would never countenance the adherents even of a false religion, in treating their ministers with disrespect. The minister of religion, even when the religion is heterodox, has for me something sacred, and I would never treat even a Protestant minister as if he were the same as a Protestant layman. But I look upon the orthodox clergy, or my own church, as having received authority only in spirituals, and I hold the interests of religion are best promoted when the clergy let secular matters alone, and confine themselves to their own spiritual functions."

"If we accept the principle that all authority in morals and politics as well as in religion comes from God,

who, through his creative act, is the law to all his creatures," said O'Connor, "I see not how we can make any valid distinction between authority in spirituals and authority in seculars. If the clergy represent the ideal element of thought, I see not how we can say their authority does not extend alike to all departments of life, to seculars, as well as to spirituals."

"The question," replied De Bonneville, "is not one of reasoning, but one of authority. Our Lord says, 'My kingdom is not of this world,' and therefore 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.'"

"That the clergy, in union with the sovereign pontiff, their chief, are a spiritual society, and possess only spiritual authority, or have only spiritual functions, is, I suppose," said Winslow, "agreed on all hands. The real question is not whether the spiritual authority has secular authority or not, but whether the spiritual authority itself, by its own nature, subordinates the secular authority. The government, in both spirituals and seculars, belongs to God, who only hath dominion. The spiritual society is instituted as his minister in the government of human affairs. It represents the spiritual law, and the spiritual law is the supreme law, from which all so-called human laws derive their force. The spiritual society, then, is not merely the superior of secular society in dignity or rank, but its superior in authority, as the creator is superior to the creature. All authority belongs to God; all dominion is his; the spiritual society represents on earth his supreme dominion; therefore, secular princes must hold from God through the spiritual society, or the church, and be amenable to that society, and justiciable by it. The texts M. de Bonneville cites do not sustain him. When our Lord says, 'his kingdom is not of this world,' he does not mean that he has not authority over this world, for he says, 'all power in heaven and in earth is given unto me,' but that his kingdom is not *of* this world, not derived from it, or not founded on its principles and maxims, in the old sense of the word *of*, which is the sign of the genitive, answering to the Latin *de*, and the Greek ἐκ, the preposition used in the original. The other text spoken by our Lord, in answer to a captious question put to him by the Jews, does not affirm that Cæsar owns any thing or has any right. It was the Jews, not our Lord, that said, the image and superscription on the tribute money are

Cæsar's. Our Lord simply replies, if Cæsar's, as you say, then render to Cæsar what is Cæsar's, and render unto God the things that are God's. He does not answer the question, 'Is it lawful to pay tribute to Cæsar?' put by the Jews to entrap him, but merely asserts the general principle, that we must give to every one his due. That he did not acknowledge Cæsar's right to the tribute, at least from the priesthood, is evident, from his telling Peter to pay it, not as an act of justice, but as expedient, in order scandal."

"But conceding all authority is from God," asked O'Connor, "why may not God have made the spiritual society supreme in spirituals, and the state or secular society in seculars? Both would then hold from him, and be compatible with the assertion of his exclusive dominion."

"God can do," answered Winslow, "whatever is not incompatible with his own eternal being,—any thing but deny or annihilate himself. But he can found no order in which the spiritual is not supreme in authority, because he is himself the spiritual in itself, and as the dominion is his alone, the supreme authority is and must necessarily be spiritual. He cannot make the division of authority contended for, because the spiritual representing him, the distinction between it and the secular must copy or imitate in the order of second causes his creative act. The sovereign Lord is one and indivisible, and as his authority is by its own nature spiritual, the spiritual which represents him must include all the authority he delegates, and by its own nature extend to all creatures in all their acts, words, and deeds. It, if it represents the divine authority at all, must then represent it in its universality and exclusiveness, and stand to the secular as representing the relation of creator and creature."

"But even that," rejoined O'Connor, "concedes a radical distinction between the spiritual and the secular, for the distinction between creator and creature is radical. If then God can delegate power at all to a creature, why not to the secular society as well as to the spiritual, since the secular society is no less his creature than the spiritual society."

"Secular society is the creature of God indeed," replied Winslow, "but his creature *mediante* the spiritual society, and therefore he can delegate power to it only through the medium of that society. All power is spiritual, and the secular holds from God through the spiritual."

"That denies all original secular power," said De Bonneville, "and makes the secular the mere creature of the spiritual. It supposes the prince does not receive his authority immediately from God, but receives it from God only through the medium of the pope,—the theory of Gregory VII. and Boniface VIII., but which the Christian world has rejected."

"Which temporal princes and their lawyers and courtiers have rejected, M. de Bonneville should say," replied Winslow. "But if the two great popes named asserted it, they asserted it not as a theory of their own, but as the law of Christ, whose vicar they were, and to oppose it is to oppose Christ himself. The pope is the highest authority for declaring what is or is not the divine order."

"But the church herself," replied O'Connor, "has always recognized two societies and two distinct powers. Pope Gelasius asserts it in writing to the Emperor Anastasius, and admonishes that prince that as the spiritual does not encroach on the rights of the secular power, the secular must not encroach on the rights of the spiritual power. In all her relations with temporal princes, the church has recognized a distinct secular authority, independent in its own province, and all she has ever claimed has been her own freedom and independence in spirituals."

"The church," rejoined Diefenbach, "has always recognized the two powers, I grant, but never as two mutually independent powers. In the letter of St. Gelasius referred to, the pope represents the spiritual as having to answer to God for the secular, which could not be if the spiritual had not power over it, for where there is no power there is no responsibility. There are two orders, and the one is not absorbed in the other; but the secular depends on the spiritual, and is sustained by it, not as a power in relation to the spiritual, but as a power in relation to the secular, as the creature, created a second cause, is a power in relation to its own acts."

"That is all very true," interposed Father John, "if we take care to distinguish properly between natural society and the church. The church certainly recognizes two societies, but the distinction between them is not precisely the distinction between the spiritual and the secular. The original order, as was seen in our last conversation, was the patriarchal, which vested all authority in the father of the family, who was at once priest and king. This order was

propagated or perpetuated by natural generation, and therefore is called natural society, and its law the law of nature. The Jewish priesthood, type of the Christian, was restricted to an elect people indeed, but as it was perpetuated by natural generation, did not lift even that people out of the order of natural society. The Christian priesthood is catholic, instituted for all men and nations, but the society it founds is propagated by grace, not by natural generation, and therefore is called supernatural society. The patriarchal society included the whole human race, and was commensurate with natural society; the Jewish included only a single nation, but was commensurate with natural society within the limits of that nation. The supernatural or Christian society, as perpetuated by grace, includes only those who are born of grace by baptism, and is commensurate only with the baptized, or regenerated humanity. The supernatural does not destroy, abridge, or annul, the natural. The church therefore leaves natural society standing, in full possession of all its original rights under the patriarch. All authority comes from God through the spiritual, but not necessarily through the church or supernatural society. Princes may hold from God under the law of natural society, and though they would not hold from the church, they would still hold from the spiritual."

"But though the supernatural," objected Diefenbach, "does not abrogate the natural, it includes it. The law of the patriarchal or natural society included not merely the dictates of natural reason, but also the primitive revelation containing in substance the whole Christian revelation; it is therefore substantially the law of the supernatural society and not radically or really distinguishable from it. The church succeeds to the patriarchs, and has authority in both societies, and therefore the same authority over princes holding from God through natural society as over those holding from him through supernatural society."

"According to the law under which the prince holds, and in relation to princes who belong alike to both societies, conceded," replied Father John. "In natural society as in the supernatural the dominion belongs to the spiritual, however the spiritual may be constituted, or by whomsoever it may be represented. But the Christian society, or the society that is perpetuated by the election of grace, does not create or found natural society, but presupposes it, and fully recognizes its existence and rights. Natural society holds

its rights and powers from God, but not through the medium of supernatural society, which only recognizes and confirms them. The prince then, who by the constitution of the state, holds from God only through natural society, holds only under the law of that society, and is officially bound by it alone. The church, then, even though he is in her communion, can judge him in his principality only by that law, and if not in her communion cannot judge him at all, or exert any authority over him."

"The church since the coming of our Lord," said Winslow, "represents on earth the ideal, the divine, and therefore the divine government or authority in all human life, public and private. As the legal successor of the synagogue and the patriarchs, she has all the authority of the Jewish high-priest, and of the father of a family, prior to the separation of the priestly and kingly functions; for that separation was made by violence, and without the divine approval. The church is one and indivisible, and therefore must have the same authority in both societies, and in all orders. True, the supernatural does not destroy or annul the natural, but since the church succeeds to all the authority of natural society, she must have full authority under both laws, and therefore the same power over princes who hold under the law of natural society that she has over princes who hold from the law of the supernatural society. The supernatural society may have more, but cannot have less power than had natural society."

"Mr. Winslow, in his zeal to magnify the authority of the church, forgets," remarked O'Connor, "the doctrine we have established, that dominion is founded in the creative act. God's dominion rests on his creative act, as first cause; the dominion of the delegate or representative must then rest on the creative act of that delegate or representative as second cause, and thus really copy or represent the divine dominion. As grace does not create nature, but presupposes it, the supernatural society cannot ever represent the divine dominion over the natural, and can only recognize and confirm its rights and powers. In regard to what pertains to the natural, she, as succeeding to the synagogue and the patriarchs, may judge it indeed, but only by the law of natural society."

"Mr. Winslow's doctrine," objected De Bonneville, "absorbs in the church, not only the rights and powers of the prince, but all the rights and powers of the father, and gives to her the whole management of all public and private life."

"I concede willingly," said O'Connor, "the plenary authority of the church in all that pertains to religion, or to the interests of religion, and she, not I, is the judge of what does or does not pertain to religion, and what is or is not for or against the interests of religion. If she tells me such or such a school is dangerous to religion, and *therefore*, I must not send my child to it, or if she says, my religious duty requires me to send my child to such or such another school, I hold myself bound to obey her. She interprets and defines my rights as a father, but does not create them, and can neither abrogate nor abridge them. But when and where only temporal interests, by her own judgment, are concerned, I may take the advice of my pastor, but I do not recognize his authority to command me. So in all the affairs of private and domestic life. The church defines what is or is not secularity, but within the limits of what she defines to be secular, I am bound only by the law of natural society. It is the theocracy that denies all natural liberty, that intermeddles with one's whole life, tells authoritatively to what professions or callings, irrespective of religious considerations, we shall breed our children, when we may buy or sell, what we shall eat or drink, when we shall lie down, or when we shall get up, that has become so odious to mankind. It was theocracy in this odious sense that Calvin established in Geneva, and that the Puritans in England, Scotland, and the early New England colonies attempted to establish. If you wish to destroy the remaining influence of the clergy, and render religion universally odious, you cannot do better than to insist on a system by which Calvinists and Jansenists have plunged a large part of Europe into pure naturalism."

"I have nothing to do with consequences, if what I assert be true," replied Winslow. "Truth is not mine; I can neither make it nor unmake it. If God has given his church the full powers I allege, neither you nor I can make it otherwise. All truth is good, fair, and amiable, and if men find it not so, the fault is in them, not in it."

"Mr. Winslow, I perceive," said Father John, "has not as yet cast out all the leaven of the Pharisees, and retains some traces of his Puritan birth and breeding. He has not yet learned, it seems to me, to appreciate the theological maxim, *gratia supponit naturam*. If grace supposes nature, supernatural society, founded by grace, supposes natural society, and can annul, alter, or abridge none of its orig-

inal rights. The plenary authority of the spiritual I assert without qualification or reserve, whether in supernatural or in natural society, but the church, presupposing natural society, recognizes it as co-existing with the supernatural in Catholic or Christian society. She governs the natural in the bosom of the supernatural, indeed, but by the laws of the natural, and denies that grace releases us from a single one of the duties imposed, or revokes or abridges a single one of the rights conceded by that law. She can, then, deny none of the rights or powers of princes holding from God through natural society."

"Otherwise," said O'Connor, "we should be obliged to deny all legitimate government outside of the Catholic society, to maintain that all legitimate authority is conferred by grace, and thus fall into the heresy of Wicliff and his followers. We should be obliged to maintain that infidels, or non-Christians, cannot have lawful government, and that every infidel prince is a usurper, without right, whom no one is bound to obey, and whom every one is free to resist as he pleases. This the church does not and cannot concede, for she has condemned the error of Wicliff as a heresy. St. Paul writing under an infidel government, under Nero, the pagan emperor of Rome, at the same time that he says, *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, adds, *quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinatæ sunt. Itaque qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit.* Thus plainly teaching not only that infidel princes may have legitimate authority for his unbelieving, but even for his Catholic subjects. The government of this country holds from God through natural society alone, and no Catholic doubts or can doubt that he is bound in conscience to obey it, precisely as he would be were it a professedly Catholic government."

"Infidel governments are legitimate," said Winslow, "because the church legitimates them."

"The church can legitimate them," answered Father John, "only for their Catholic subjects; whence, then, derive they their legitimacy for their infidel subjects?"

"Nobody, not even the most inveterate Papist," said O'Connor, "maintains that all princes hold from God through the church, or denies that princes may, and that some do, hold legitimately from him, through natural society."

"But the church includes both societies," answered Winslow, "and has jurisdiction under both laws, and therefore,

may take cognizance of offences against the one as well as offences against the other."

"In the case of those who are members of both societies, I concede," said Father John, "but not in the case of those who are members of natural society only. The church takes cognizance of offences against either law, but she judges only those persons who are in her communion, or are joined to regenerated humanity by baptism. She can take cognizance of public as well as private offences, of the offences of the prince as well as of the subject; but as her authority extends only to regenerated humanity, her jurisdiction is necessarily restricted to Catholic princes, and in the case of infidel princes to their Catholic subjects. The infidel prince, neither as a prince nor as a man, is within her jurisdiction. He holds under the law of natural society, and within the limits of that law he is the legitimate prince for all his subjects, Catholic or non-Catholic, not because the church legitimates him, but because, as the church teaches her children, admission into the supernatural society, or aggregation to regenerated humanity, absolves from no duty or obligation imposed, and abrogates no right or power conceded by the law of natural society, as I have just said. Antinomianism is a heresy. If the infidel prince transcends his legitimate powers, and ordains what is contrary to the law of God, natural or supernatural, the church forbids her children in the matters thus ordained to obey him, and she would do the same were the prince a Catholic, for we must obey God rather than man."

"Princes and nations, outside of Catholic society," said O'Connor, "are in precisely the condition of the gentiles before the coming of our Lord. The law of grace changes nothing in the condition of individuals or nations till they come under it by the new birth, the birth of grace, which introduces them into supernatural society."

"But God commands all men and nations to hear the church," said Winslow, "and none of them has his permission to remain out of her communion. The law does not cease to bind because men refuse to obey it, or the court lose its jurisdiction because the criminal refuses to acknowledge it."

"Yet it does not follow," said Father John, "that our Lord has given his church authority to judge those who are without, or to punish all offences against his law. We know he has not given her authority to compel any one to

come into her communion or to be baptized, because he has willed that the reception of the faith should be a voluntary act. She has no authority over those without, and has only the right of self-defence against them, and to compel them, not to come into her communion, but to leave her free to fulfil her apostolic mission."

"But as the natural survives the supernatural, and subsists in all its rights and powers, as well as duties and obligations, under it," said De Bonneville, "natural society in Catholic society must hold to the supernatural the same relation that it holds to it outside of Catholic society. Since natural society is represented by the state, princes, even when Catholics, hold independently of the church, and can, in respect to their principality, in no case be accountable to her, or justiciable by her."

"It only follows that those princes who hold under the natural law, can be judged only by that law," said Diefenbach. "The fallacy is in assuming that the state represents the whole natural society; it represents the kingly, not the priestly functions of the patriarch, and therefore represents the secularity, not the spirituality of natural society."

"Princes," said O'Connor, "who hold from God through natural society alone, even though personally Catholic, are not justiciable by the church as princes, but only as Christians. She may judge and punish them as Christians, but she cannot deprive them of their principality, for she has not conferred it."

"Say she does not, not that she cannot," said Father John, "for it is more becoming in us to leave her to define her own powers, than it is to undertake to define them for her. I have found in her history no instance in which she has ever deprived a prince who, by the constitution of his state, holds from God through natural society, and not through the supernatural society. But I am not prepared to say she cannot deprive even such a prince. With regard to princes who hold from God through the church, and who by the constitution of their states and their own coronation oaths, are bound to profess, protect, and defend the Catholic religion, there can be no question. They hold under the law of supernatural society, and the pope as the supreme justiciary in that society, may undoubtedly deprive them for cause, as he has done more than once. The prince, though he hold under the law of natural

society, holds from God through the spiritual, and as the church, for all Christians, represents the spiritual element of natural society originally represented by the patriarchs, and as the prince may forfeit his right to reign under the natural law as well as under the supernatural, I do not see very clearly, since she has jurisdiction under both laws, why she has not the right to declare for the faithful the forfeiture, if it has been incurred, under the one law as well as under the other. But her uniform practice throughout her history inclines me to believe that she does not interpret her powers as extending to the deprivation of the prince who, by the constitution of his state, holds only under the law of natural society."

"However that may be," said O'Connor, "if the supernatural recognizes and confirms the natural, the state in the bosom of the Catholic society, must have all the rights and powers, as well as all the duties and obligations it has in natural society."

"Therefore," said Father John, "theocracy does not introduce the intermeddling and vexatious system of Calvinism, and one which makes religion a burden too great to be borne. I have indeed only duties before God, for I am his creature, and belong to him in all I am, in all I have, and in all I can do. But this absolute dominion of God is my absolute freedom. None but God, or one really commissioned by him to declare his will and represent his authority, can bind me to obedience. I obey the church, only because in obeying her, I am obeying him; I obey the state when it commands me nothing repugnant to the law of God, because it is his minister; but no man, of his own right, can bind me, or lay me under the moral obligation of obedience. It has pleased God to institute two societies, the one natural and the other supernatural; in both societies the spiritual, that which represents the Creator, is supreme. He has delegated to the spiritual—in regenerated humanity, to the church, and therefore to the supreme pontiff, who possesses the ecclesiastical power in its plentitude, and is, under God, the source from which all authority in the church proceeds, all power that he does not reserve to himself; but to the spiritual in neither society does he delegate all his power. Our obligation to obey the delegate is limited by the power delegated, and this limitation of the power delegated is the basis and measure of our liberty, which is not freedom from the authority of God, but freedom from the authority of

his representative. In being elevated by grace to supernatural society, we retain all the rights and powers we possess in natural society, and this is what we call our natural liberty, which the church does not abridge, but recognizes and confirms; she declares it sacred, defends it, and suffers no one without her disapprobation to infringe it. In the supernatural society, the father, the prince, the citizen, or subject has all the rights and duties he has in natural society, only he must take both as she, the supreme teacher and judge, defines them."

"In the Catholic society," said O'Connor, "the family and the state are, in their own order, as free as in natural society, only neither interprets the law under which it holds for itself. Each must take the law as infallibly declared by the supreme pontiff, chief of the supernatural society, and head of the church, sole representative of the spiritual in regenerated humanity. Within the limits of the law so declared, the father may educate his children where and how he judges best, and the prince may govern his subjects as seems to him good. The church defines the secular, tells us what is or is not secular, but within the secularity, as she defines it, she leaves the father and the prince, the family and the state, to their own wisdom and prudence."

"The rule for our guidance in both public and private, social and domestic life," said Father John, "is that there are no rights against God, or even against his representative. I have no will that I may set up against the church, nor has the state any rights that are valid against the spiritual authority. But from this it by no means follows that there is no will, no judgment, no autonomy but hers. She defines the secular order, and the secular order has no rights against her, but this is not saying there is no secular order, or that the secular, in face of the secular, has no rights, no powers. What really are the rights of the father, the family, the school, the state, the secular society, are simply what God has willed they should have, and these the church, as his faithful spouse, must recognize, confirm, and with all her power protect and defend when assailed."

"But I do not see," remarked De Bonneville, "that Father John's doctrine is much more liberal than Mr. Winslow's. Neither will allow the church can ever be in the wrong, or recognize in the state any independency in face

divine, the revelation of God, but the traditions of Catholics are affected by the mediums through which they have been transmitted, and unhappily bear the taint of the civil despotism which has so long prevailed and still prevails in Catholic nations. But while we are bound to receive Catholic tradition, we are under no obligation to receive or to defend the traditions of Catholics any further than they are accordant with the teachings of the church. Individuals in the church may, no doubt, misunderstand and misuse the theocratic principle, but after all, true theocracy is the only government suitable to a free man, for it is the only government which enables him with truth to say, 'I bow or bend my knee to God alone.'"

Conversation XIV.

"We departed," said Winslow, "from the original design of Our Club, in permitting our conversations to be reported and published. We thus converted it from a private club for the mutual pleasure and improvement of its members, into a sort of public debating society, in which it will hardly do for one to throw out a remark or offer an opinion which he is not prepared to do battle for, as for an article of faith. We lose our freedom and unreserve, and can no longer talk at our ease."

"The public," added O'Connor, "will not understand conversations in which each speaker says simply and frankly what he thinks for the moment, and which are designed to stimulate thought and mature opinion, not to express thoughts and opinions already matured. Our purpose is to examine rather than to settle questions; and if each one of us is careful to say only what he really thinks, we none of us feel that we are bound either to ourselves or to others to stand by what we here say, but are as free to think otherwise as if we had not said it."

"No man," added Diefenbach, "has the right to dogmatize anywhere or on any subject. Only the church has that right; and even she can establish as a dogma, only what Almighty God has revealed to her. That she authoritatively declares or defines; and whatever she declares or defines to have been divinely revealed and committed to her is of faith, and must be accepted and believed, without questioning, by all Catholics. In matters of faith there are and can be no differences of opinion. Faith is true, is certain, and

must be taken as so much ascertained truth, and used as the mathematician uses his axioms or the geometrician his definitions. But the definitions of the church do not cover the whole field of human thought or speculation, for faith was not given to supersede reason or to restrict its sphere. Under faith we have all the reason and all the scope for its exercise we could have were faith not given. Reason in its own sphere, according to its own laws, is always equal to itself, its own coefficient, and as free in the Catholic as in the non-Catholic. All the difference between the Catholic and the non-Catholic in regard to reason is, that the Catholic does not attempt to do by reason what reason cannot do, and asserts its insufficiency in relation to matters which are above its power, while the non-Catholic asserts that reason is sufficient for all that man needs to know or believe, and thus undertakes to do by reason what reason cannot accomplish, or to eliminate from his belief whatever transcends the scope of reason. In the broad field not covered by faith, we Catholics hold that reason is free and our only authority, and that freedom of opinion is not only allowable, but desirable, since in that field, and that only, progress is possible, and no progress is possible without freedom."

"But unhappily," said O'Connor, "even all Catholics do not always properly appreciate that freedom, and we find not a few among them who seek to transfer to matters of opinion, the rule that governs us in matters of faith. As faith is fixed and unalterable, they would have even opinions fixed and unalterable ; and as they receive their faith from tradition, they would receive their opinions from tradition, and neither suffer themselves nor others to depart from the opinions any more than from the faith of our predecessors. These fall into routine, suffer their minds to run in grooves, and look with distrust upon every one who is really a thinking and living man. The world outside the church takes advantage of this, and charges their lack of mental activity and energy to their faith, and thus enlists no small portion of the active progressive intelligence of the age or country on the side of our enemies. The club permitted its own conversations to be reported and published with the hope that their freedom and occasional boldness might force the minds of those who should read them out of their lethargic state, and exert an influence in compelling the Catholic public to think freely and independently on the questions raised. The club did not presume

to tell the public what it must think, or what it ought to think; its end was gained if it only induced it to think at all."

"But that was an end we might have known the public would misconceive," interposed De Bonneville. "The public was not likely to suppose that we were laboring only to render it a thinking public, and not to induce it to accept and swear by our conclusions."

"It was no matter whether it misconceived our purpose or not," replied O'Connor; "we were sure to gain our end, if we only induced it to examine the questions we raised, though it should do so only to condemn the opinions we advanced."

"The public," rejoined De Bonneville, "wants conclusions, not processes, to see opinions already formed, and hear them asserted as fixed and unalterable, not to be amused or perplexed with the process of forming them. The people are averse to the labor of forming their own opinions, and wish always to be saved the labor of making up their own minds. If you aim simply to quicken their mental activity, to force them to look at all sides of a question, they will either meet you with their mental inertia, or abuse you for holding unsound opinions, because holding opinions they are unfamiliar with, or different from those put forth by their ordinary leaders. If you escape with your labor for your pains you may think yourself fortunate. However orthodox you may be in your faith, however submissive you may be to authority in all things where authority claims the right to decide for you, to command, or to direct you, you will be regarded as an innovator, as a restless, turbulent spirit, against whom all good Catholics should be on their guard. In the bosom of Our Club, when what we say is to go no further, we may speak freely, and even crudely, without harm, and with mutual profit; but to suppose we can do so with any advantage before the public, Catholic or non-Catholic, is to prove that we know very little of mankind. The public will not tolerate or profit by free speaking. Catholics will tolerate the freedom we exercise in this club less than others, not because it is incompatible with any thing in Catholicity, but because they are less accustomed to it, because they are more in earnest, because they attach more importance to opinions publicly expressed, and because they fear the habit of free speaking and free inquiry on matters even not of faith, may, by an easy and not

unnatural transition, be extended to the discussion of matters of faith. The private judgment asserted by Protestants is to be avoided, for it reduces faith itself to mere private opinion; but it is not every one who can distinguish between that private judgment, and the free, untrammelled use of reason the club practises. Private judgment in matters of faith, as asserted by Protestants, is a misuse of reason, and really the most unreasonable thing in the world; but only men of disciplined minds, possessing more than ordinary analytical powers, can discriminate between it and the free use of reason in matters not of faith, or in the understanding of the various articles of faith in their relations to one another and to our natural faculties. Hence there is always danger that the habit of free thought and free expression may injure faith, and end with the mass of the people in rationalism. The Catholic aversion to free inquiry is therefore not unreasonable."

"The people," added Winslow, "do not and cannot be made to understand what is unfamiliar to them. They do not and will not think for themselves. There is not one man in a thousand who does or can be made to think freely, and form opinions for himself, even in the sphere of opinions. Men must receive their opinions cut and dried, and labelled. They hold the tradition of opinions hardly less sacred and obligatory than the tradition of faith. Their minds not only run in grooves, but can run nowhere else. The power of free original thought is the rarest thing on earth; ages on ages roll away without any one appearing to make a new application of long and well-known principles. The art of printing was known and practised when men first stamped coins, and yet it was not till the middle of the fifteenth century of our era, that the well-known art was applied to the printing of books by means of movable types. A slight step in advance would lead to a most important application of universally received scientific principles, and yet centuries elapse before any one appears to take it. Do not, then, think to make all men thinkers, or that you can by any means at your command force them out of routine."

"What is still worse," said De Bonneville, "they who never think freely and independently themselves, can never appreciate free and independent thought in others,—never really thinking themselves, they take it for granted that nobody else ever thinks. They measure all minds by their own. It never enters their heads that a speaker or writer

can have any meaning which lies too deep for their comprehension, and the more really original and profound he is, the more shallow and commonplace he appears to them. A worthy priest some time since published a book entitled *The Atheism of Brownson*, in which he concludes Brownson makes God a mere scenic personage or theatrical personation, because he says 'God is *actus purissimus*, most pure act.'"

"That is bad enough," said Diefenbach, "but a recent writer in a Catholic journal, criticising our conversations on theocracy, represents Father John, who states the doctrines of Our Club, so far as doctrines it has, as maintaining that under the new or Christian dispensation the prince or the state holds from God through the church or supernatural society."

"The precise doctrine I denied," said Father John, "and did my best to refute. Such an opinion was broached in the club, but it was refuted, and we all finally agreed, that unless otherwise ordained by the constitution of his state, the prince holds from God through natural society. We all agreed that infidels may have, and in fact do have, legitimate government, and that Catholic subjects of a non-Christian prince, are bound to obey him in like manner, and to the same extent, that they are bound to obey a Catholic prince. It was conceded that the government of this country holds from God through natural society, and yet that it is a legitimate government, and that we as Catholics owe it the same allegiance we should in case it held from God through the supernatural society."

"But it was maintained by some of us," said Winslow, "that all governments ought to be Catholic governments, and hold from God through the church."

"Very true," replied Father John; "but whether so or not, we all agreed that the church has no power to force any government to become Catholic and hold through the supernatural society, against its will. To the question raised the club gave a *transeat*. In the middle ages the greater part of the governments of Europe held by their own constitution and the coronation oaths of the sovereigns from God, in some sense, through the church; but there are none that so hold now, and we maintained that it is not necessary that a government should so hold in order to hold from God and be a legitimate government. Whether the change is for the better or the worse we did not even inquire, for it has taken place, and must be submitted to whether we like it or not."

"But did not Father John assert the right of the church to judge the prince and deprive him of his principality for cause?" asked De Bonneville.

"When the prince holds from God through the church, yes; when he holds from God through natural society, no," replied Father John. "I simply refused in the latter case to say she has *not* the right, for she is the judge of her own rights and powers, and I am not aware that she has ever decided whether she has or has not the right. But I maintained that she never has deprived, and never does deprive, the prince who holds through natural society. In the case of such princes, if in her communion, she judges the sin, but not the fief or principality, as Innocent III. says in a letter to Philip Augustus. I went no further, except to give it as my opinion, based on the uniform practice of the church, that she does *not* interpret her powers so as to make them extend to the deprivation of a prince, even though a Catholic, who holds under the law of natural society alone. It would seem the clever journalist failed entirely to understand the drift of the conversations he criticised, or to read the plain English placed before his eyes."

"Almost as gross a mistake was made," said De Bonneville, "by some persons as to the views of Our Club in regard to education, especially in regard to common schools. We were understood to advocate the public schools, and to discourage the establishment of parochial schools for our Catholic children. Great indignation was expressed at the alleged feeble manner in which Mr. Winslow and Mr. O'Flanagan opposed the public school system, and defended that of separate Catholic schools."

"Great injustice, then, has been done those gentlemen," said Father John, "and I should like to see their critics defend their side of the question better than it was done by them. They said all that has been said by the ablest of our Catholic journals; and if they failed, it was not for lack of ability, but because the ground on which the public schools are usually opposed and separate Catholic schools defended, is untenable. The club did not pretend that the public schools, as they are managed, can meet the views and wants of Catholics with regard to education; and with the acquiescence of all its members I stated expressly that considering the manner in which the schools are in many places perverted to sectarian purposes, the impossibility of giving positive religious instruction in them, and the fact,—owing

to various causes,—that a large proportion of our children will receive no religious instruction at all unless they receive it in the school room, it is necessary, wherever we have the ability, to establish separate schools of our own. I am not aware that the authorities of the church have gone any further. It is true, I did not condemn the system of public schools as established in the majority of the states of the Union; I only condemned its management. That system I believe is in itself just and equitable, and the best system ever devised. The evils that flow from it are not inherent in it, and result solely from the fact that the community is a mixed community of Catholics and non-Catholics. If the community were all Catholic, the public schools would be all we could desire. As this country is one of these days to become Catholic, I think it poor policy to condemn the system, and to labor to pull down to-day what it may cost us much labor and expense to rebuild to-morrow. The early Christians established some famous catechetical schools of their own, but they also used the schools founded by the pagan emperors, and the colleges of the whole civilized world are even to-day modelled after the schools of the pagan Roman empire. Why shall we seek to destroy what we are to inherit? Wait a little while, and the educational and all the other institutions of this noble country, will peaceably pass into the hands of an enlightened and virtuous Catholic population.

"Furthermore," continued Father John, "I do not like decrying what I must use. To a great extent Catholic parents must, for the present at least, send their children to the public schools, or do worse, for we have not established, and for a long time to come cannot establish, a sufficient number of suitable schools of our own for all our children. Why then shall we destroy the good faith of Catholic parents and children by teaching the parents that it is un-Catholic for them to send, and the children that it is un-Catholic for them to go, to the public schools? I am far from believing that the public schools are as bad as some of our zealous friends represent them; and I know constant efforts are made to guard against the immorality which in some instances has threatened to invade them. Should we not do more good by bringing our wisdom and virtue to aid in improving them, than by standing off and denouncing them? After all, these non-Catholic Americans are our countrymen, our brethren, with whom we do and must live,

and whose temporal lot is inseparably bound up with ours. Catholics and non-Catholics are all alike Americans; and as men, as neighbors, and as citizens, have the same wants and the same interests. A policy of complete isolation is as impracticable as it is undesirable; and nothing would tend more to give us the confidence of our fellow-citizens, and to diminish the petty annoyances and vexations to which as Catholics we are subject, than to show that we really do feel ourselves an integral portion of the American people, identified with the country, and anxious to improve and preserve its institutions. Let us establish and support, wherever we can, such schools for our children as our pastors recommend or require, but let us refrain from denouncing or making war on the public school system, which is evil only because not in the proper hands. This, if I understand it, is the view taken in a recent lecture on education, by the illustrious archbishop of New York."

"But these misapprehensions and misrepresentations of our reported conversations," concluded Winslow, "prove that the policy some neo-Catholics insist on of bringing all things into the arena of public discussion, and of endeavoring to induce all men to think freely and independently for themselves, is a very unsound and a very dangerous policy. The people at large can never have any thing but a blind faith, or any better reason for believing than that so they have been taught. They must have and will have leaders, and the only real question is who shall lead them,—pastors divinely appointed and assisted, or self-appointed teachers, —prophets who run without being sent. What we want is docility, reverence for authority, not freedom or independence of thought, wild speculation, the agitation of theories which settle nothing and unsettle every thing. Men who like myself have been brought up among your free and independent thinkers are unable to respect them. All in our religion rests on authority; and if we would enter into the kingdom of heaven, we must become as little children, and believe and obey because the father bids."

"But our precise difficulty," replied Diefenbach, "is that the respect for authority, the child-like docility, Mr. Winslow demands this age and this country have not. Men though childish are not child-like. They have the ignorance, the petulance, the changeful humors, and the impatience, but not the candor, the docility, the simplicity, and the trustingness of the child. They are puffed up with a vain

conceit of themselves, and speak with contempt of the 'Governor.' Authority they regard as an impertinence. They demand a reason without being able either to give or to receive a reason. They are filled with the spirit of unbelief, even when not actual unbelievers; and our Lord cannot do many mighty works among them, on account of their unbelief. These are the men we have to deal with; it is this proud, impatient, head-strong, supercilious, doubting, cavilling, rebellious spirit, that we have to exorcise; and how are we to do it? Tell men to be docile, respect authority, believe and do as they are bid, or they will never enter into the kingdom of heaven? What care they for that, since they really believe neither in heaven nor hell, neither in God nor the devil?"

"You see in that the sad effects," said Winslow, "of your common schools, and your insane efforts to educate the people. Universal education is the maddest dream of this maddest age and country. The mass of the people cannot be educated so as to be able to think or judge for themselves, and the modern system educates them only just enough to render them vain, proud, captious, indocile, rebellious. It all comes from attempting to do what Providence never designed should be done. The pastors, the chiefs, the leaders of the people, should be well and thoroughly educated, but we should never undertake to educate the people beyond their prayers and catechism. We do them an immense injury when we attempt more—when we make them feel that it is a degradation to be led, and that they must aspire to lead themselves. We then place before them the primal temptation, presented by Satan to our first parents, 'Your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,' that is, knowing them as God knows them, without being taught them by the law or command of a superior."

"There is truth in what Mr. Winslow says," added O'Connor, "and the evils we deplore result from the attempt to follow the satanic spirit, or from yielding to the satanic temptation. The education of the people, since they can at best be only half educated, is, no doubt, a great source of evil. It generates this very rebellious spirit we complain of; and till we can exorcise that spirit, we can do little for the religious amelioration of society, or individuals even."

"Whether ignorance be really the mother of devotion, or

whether an ignorant and besotted people, who can hardly discern their right hand from their left, are more likely to be docile and submissive to legitimate authority than an educated and enlightened people, we need not inquire," replied Diefenbach, "for the attempt at universal education has been made; and the people in most civilized countries have been to school, and a return to that blessed Eden of ignorance which Mr. Winslow regrets is no longer possible. We have been driven forth into the world to gain our bread by the sweat of our faces, and the cherubim with flaming sword guards the gates of the garden against all return. We can effect nothing by fighting against the inevitable. We have adopted the policy of educating the people, and we cannot now abandon it; we must do the best we can with it, and henceforth rely on intelligence, imperfect as it may be, instead of the ignorance some seem to deplore."

"I am not so certain of that," said De Bonneville. "It may not be impossible to return to the state of things which it is thought we have not done wisely in deserting. Not a few of our friends in Europe have good hopes of being able by education to undo the ill effects of education, or of making education itself the means of restoring lost ignorance. It would do no good to wage open war against the education of the people, and to suppress forcibly the schools established and supported for them, It is better to take possession of these schools, and use them against all education that quickens the mind, stimulates thought, or trains children to exercise freely their own faculties. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is as easy to teach ignorance as it is to teach knowledge; and it is not difficult, if you have the control of the schools, and are so minded, to make education the means of stifling thought, and enervating the mind. Let an absolute government establish a rigid censorship of the press, and prohibit free speech, and all public discussion; let it prevent all movements of intelligence by its omnipresent police, or punish with fine and imprisonment every manifestation of mental activity, not devoted to the support of power, or the purely material order, and suppress the expression of every aspiration after freedom or manly independence; let the clergy join with the government, uphold it in its war on intelligence, and second it with all their spiritual power and influence, and then let both unite in training the rising generation in accordance with the principles and wishes of the government, and you will have the ages of

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ignorance restored, and the people as docile and as little disposed to think or act for themselves as they were before the modern attempts to educate them. It is not education that needs to be opposed, but the education that induces thought, and quickens the spirit of freedom and independence. I am a Bourbonist, and do not like to see Louis Napoleon Bonaparte sitting on the throne of St. Louis; but I am charmed with his policy, which subjects to his authority both the church and the school, and uses both as the means of extinguishing all dangerous intelligence, and exorcising the revolutionary spirit which has so long possessed the French people. His uncle complained that the pope left him only men's bodies to govern; he means to govern both their bodies and their souls. If his holiness protests, he has an army in Rome, just reinforced, to snap him up and whip him out of the papal states, and clap him into a French prison; and if the French people grow restive, he can with his matchless police and his army of five hundred thousand of the finest troops in the world, very speedily reduce them to order. His Imperial and Royal Majesty of Austria understands and practises the same policy with equal skill, and with more than equal success."

"But we should bear in mind," said Diefenbach, "that

'The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft a-gley.'

The policy of the European *oscuranti* is very fine, but its success is more than doubtful. The clergy, from their chief downward, are, no doubt, opposed to the false notions of liberty now rife in the populations of Europe, and willingly throw their influence on the side of order; but they know that order is threatened as much by despotism as by revolutionism, and, save in a moment of panic, very few of them will knowingly consent to aid the monarchs in moulding the people to be the peaceable victims of despotic rule. The clergy, too, are and always have been on the side of intelligence, real, genuine, not sham intelligence, and must be duped before they coöperate with the political power in suppressing it. It is only up to a certain point that absolute governments can count on the coöperation of the clergy, and if they wish to go beyond, they will find them with all their moral and spiritual influence against them."

"Then," added Father John, "the sovereigns overrate

their own power as well as that of education, or rather they err in supposing they can ever get that complete control over education demanded by their policy. They may control the schools and the lessons taught in them, but it is the least part of the education which moulds and determines character that is acquired in the school room. Society educates, and do what we may, will educate her children, and give them her own opinions, aspirations, convictions, aims, and tendencies. You can never effect any radical change in the character and tendency of society by beginning with the children, for it is always the adult generation that educates the rising generation, and in educating forms it to its own image. The man is father to the child, not as Wordsworth sings—

'The child is father of the man.'

The generation that in the sixteenth century made the Protestant reformation, and the generation that in the eighteenth century made the infidel revolution in France, had been educated in Catholic schools, under the pious care of the clergy or teachers approved by them. The Italian carbonari, the Mazzinians, all young Italy, so hostile to the pope and the whole Catholic religion, are all graduates of Catholic schools. It is with the adult generation you must begin your reform, as it is through the adult generation only that the seeds of doubt, unbelief, irreligion, rebellion, are sown. While the adult generation remains what it is, bent on liberty, and animated by the revolutionary spirit, however the outward manifestation of its thoughts and aspirations may be suppressed, you can never, without a miracle, train up your children and youth to be contented under the *régime* of despotism and ignorance. By no power in church or state can you render the character of the new generation essentially different from its predecessor. You must begin with the parents, and change the character of the adult generation, and that you can never do by fines and imprisonment, by penal statutes, or armed force. Bayonets are impotent against the impassible spirit of man."

"The adult generation is already convinced," interposed Winslow, "that it has been following a false light, and aiming at the impracticable, and even the undesirable."

"I doubt if such is the case to any great extent," replied Father John. "There has been a reaction against the revolutionism of 1848, but it is more the effect of panic or de-

spair than of conviction. There is not a throne on the continent of Europe that can safely trust for its support to the convictions and affections of the people, or that is not upheld by armed soldiery. Every continental government depends for its support on its army not only against foreign aggression, but also against its own subjects,—a remarkable fact, as far as my reading goes, unknown in the previous history of the world. The governments of Europe are or tend to be centralized despotisms, while the great body of the European populations are virtually republican, in favor either of a republic such as ours is conceived to be, or of a constitutional monarchy like that of Great Britain. There is no harmony between the governments and their subjects, and there can be none without such political changes as accord with the wishes of the majority of the people. You may declaim against the wickedness and danger of secret societies as much as you please, but they have their origin in the dissatisfaction of the people with the political order which obtains, and their determination at the first opportunity to effect a change. Even Russia is covered all over with secret societies, and we need not be surprised to witness before long strange movements in that vast empire, which has the misfortune of being rotten before being ripe."

"Undoubtedly," said O'Connor, "the dominant sentiment of the populations of Europe is in favor of what we call self-government, or the government of the nation by itself. It is therefore opposed to foreign domination on the one hand, and to cæsarism on the other. It is alike in favor of national independence and of republican freedom. Thus we see the same uneasiness in Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Italy, and France. Ireland regards herself as a nation, and struggles for a national government; Hungary would recover her independence, and Italy would drive out the Austrians, and resume her nationality and her autonomy. Against the just aspirations of these nations, the despotisms of Europe are leagued together, and the people everywhere see that political liberty and the relief of the oppressed nationalities do and must go together, and that they constitute one and the same cause. The Irish in Ireland, in England, and in this country, no doubt have sympathized with Napoleon III., but only because they have trusted that he would humble the pride of England, and become the liberator of Ireland from foreign domination."

"Drowning men," replied Diefenbach, "catch at straws,

and are excusable for so doing. His Imperial Majesty will never interfere to liberate Ireland from English rule, unless it be to annex her to his own dominions, and to make her a province to be ruled or misruled by some debauched prince of the imperial family. The hope of the Irish in him is vain, for he is more likely to become, as his uncle became, the prisoner of Great Britain than the humbler of British pride. Even if not so, how could Ireland content herself with being a province of France, since her principal happiness is in having a good grievance, and in declaiming lustily against the government? Of all the people on the face of the earth, the Irish are the least fitted by habit or temperament to sit down contentedly under the cæsarism which now reigns in France. The mingling of the cause of oppressed nationalities with that of political and civil liberty, is one of the chief obstacles to the settlement of European society on some permanent basis. Most of these nationalities are hopelessly lost, or too much weakened, or too much torn by intestine divisions, to be able to sustain themselves as independent nations. Irish patriotism sighs for independent Ireland, governing herself, and rivalling her old enemy, but it can only sigh for it. Ireland is really an integral part of the British empire, and it is only as such that she can subsist. As such she can develop her resources, and command the respect and admiration of the world. She is not subject to England, but is one of the great constituent elements of the British state, and of British glory. Let her be separated from the British crown and parliament, and set up a government of her own, whether republican or monarchical, she would be torn by intestine factions, by rival claimants, and be unable to carry on the ordinary business of government. Her true interest is to submit with the best grace she can to the connection she already has with the British empire, to labor to become reconciled to it, and to derive from it all the advantages it is capable of affording, as has been done by her sister kingdom of Scotland. Italy looks with some hope to Louis Napoleon to liberate her from Austrian rule and preponderance, but with no better reason. Italy is, after all, a geographical expression, not a nation, and is incapable under any possible domestic power of being moulded into a nation. A united Italy could recover and maintain its independence, whether assailed by France or Austria; but there is and can be no united Italy. Drive out the Austrians, and Lombardy and Venice become sepa-

rate states; Tuscany will unite neither with Lombardy nor with Piedmont. The South of Italy and the North will not act together, and the old divisions, and the old wars of city with city, and principality with principality, would soon revive and devastate the Peninsula. Free any of the oppressed nationalities of which you speak, the old causes which reduced them under the dominion of their neighbors would revive,—for though suppressed they are not extinct,—and soon reduce them under a foreign domination again,—would make them again a prey to foreign powers, and much impoverished and demoralized, they would soon be once more where they are now. Why seek to accomplish impossibilities? For myself I do not feel much sympathy with oppressed nationalities, unless the oppression touches the rights of man, and takes away that freedom of the individual without which man is no longer man. Let the struggle be for substantial freedom, a reasonable and just freedom, to be gained by honest means, and it must sooner or later prove successful. I do not sympathize with the European revolutionists, but I do sympathize with the cause of freedom, of self-government against cæsarism, and for that cause my voice shall ever be raised."

Conversation XV.

"We might sympathize with the cause of European liberals," remarked Winslow, "if it were really the cause of freedom. But the so-called liberals are struggling for absolute democracy, and absolute democracy is as hostile to true freedom as is absolute monarchy. It simply puts the people in the place of the king, and renders the rule of an ill-informed, thick-headed, capricious, and irresponsible majority, changing with each election, absolute, and irresistible. Under it there is no uniform policy of government. One legislature enacts laws, and the next repeals them. Laws, too, when they would restrain, become a dead letter. Nobody regards a law that is in his way; and no court or jury can be found to enforce an unpopular law, or a law highly displeasing to a numerous and influential class of electors."

"Your experiment of popular government, just in proportion as it becomes democratic, fails everywhere in the Union," said De Bonneville. "The order and prosperity you have hitherto enjoyed are, so far as government is concerned, due to the principles, laws, and institutions you in-

herited from England, not to the additions or alterations you yourselves have made. As the spirit of democracy acquires strength, as it pervades your society, and moulds your constitutions, laws, and institutions to suit itself, you lose the advantages of government, grow corrupt, and cease to have honest men enough left to look after the rogues; corruption eats into the very heart of your community, and such a thing as political honesty can hardly be found amongst you. Your whole government, state and federal, is a job, and the public interest is everywhere sacrificed to private speculation."

"I am," said Father John, "as all my friends are well aware, no democrat, either in a party or any other sense. I concede the terrible corruption that is creeping into all our political parties, and the shameful profligacy of the men we intrust with the management of our public affairs; but I am not prepared to admit that we are, even in these respects, unrivalled by the despotic states of the Old World. The members of the various Spanish, French, and Russian administrations are much belied, if they are not more than a match for our public men in jobbing. With all the evils which flow from the excesses of liberty, and I have no wish to extenuate them, we suffer far less than they who are exposed to the excesses of power. It is no small advantage even to be able to publish criticisms on ourselves, and to point out and publicly denounce the misdeeds of government without being arraigned before the police and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. Thought is an important function of man, and the free expression of one's honest convictions is one of the strongest necessities of a rational nature. The worst of all tyrannies is that which strikes at free thought and free speech. The body is not the whole of man, and you have done little even though you have provided for its comfort, if you have stifled thought, imposed silence on intellect, and extinguished the soul. I care little for the tyranny which touches the body, if it leave the soul free, thought and speech unfettered. We may war against red-republicanism as warmly as we please, but we should take care that, in doing so, we be not found fighting for cæsarism."

"Between red-republicanism and cæsarism," said O'Connor, "there is a third party, alike free from the despotism of the king and that of the mob. I call this party republican, and distinguish its doctrine from both monarchi-

cal and democratic absolutism. It defends what is called representative, constitutional, or parliamentary government. It advocates self-government, that is, the government, through its estates or its representatives, of the nation by itself, sometimes with a king as in Great Britain, sometimes without a king as in the United States. A very considerable portion of the European liberals belong to this party, and seek to restrain without abolishing government. They are not opposed to a limited monarchy, they war not on dynasties, and seek not to bring kings or Cæsars to the block. They only seek to restrict power within just limits, and to secure to the nation in some form a preponderating voice in the management of public affairs. With these I confess I sympathize."

"So do I," added Father John; "and my complaint of a portion of our Catholic friends in Europe is that they do not recognize the importance of this party, that they war against it, and seek to discredit every man who adheres to it. This, as I often repeat, is the ground of my quarrel with M. Louis Veuillot, the able editor of the *Univers*. M. Veuillot, who carries with him a portion of the French episcopacy and a large part of the rural clergy of France, and who in this country, where few read him, is regarded as a sort of lay pope, was, while it was popular, attached to this party, but now wages a fierce war against it. He joins the winning side, and now aims studiously to combine the defence of the highest-toned Catholic doctrines and practices with unceasing opposition to parliamentary government, and especially to the men, if Catholics, who regret its loss in France, and would gladly see it restored. He thus gives a false direction to the public thought of the Catholics who confide in his guidance, and does more injury to the cause of religion than the vilest Voltairian journalist in Europe. I blame him not for giving to the actual government of his country a loyal support, but I do blame him for endeavoring to enlist Catholicity on the side of cæsarism, and doing all in his power to place the church in a false position before the world. I blame him for endeavoring to use the sound papal doctrine he asserts with even unnecessary ostentation against the Gallicanism of the old French court, to protect the political cæsarism he seems determined shall be fastened on all Catholic states. The high papal prerogatives he seems to recognize were asserted and used by the popes themselves only in defence of the laws, of popular and national rights,

against the invasion and usurpations of Cæsar, never in his support. They are compatible with liberty, and are in a proper state of society among its most efficient safeguards, as no one knows better than the emperor of the French, who has absolutely refused to repeal the infamous organic laws annexed by his uncle on his sole authority to the concordat of 1801, and declared in force the edict of Louis XIV., revoked even by that monarch himself, commanding all professors in colleges and seminaries to hold and to teach the four articles of the French clergy in 1682. I blame Louis Veuillot, who occupies an important position as editor of the first Catholic journal in Europe, for laboring constantly and with all his might to prevent the establishment of any check on power, and to leave the friends of religion and society no alternative between cæsarism and red-republicanism."

"The policy of the emperor of the French evidently is," said Diefenbach, "to break down and utterly annihilate the constitutional or parliamentary party, and to leave the friends of order and religion no alternative between supporting cæsarism and joining the ranks of the red-republicans. He appears to think that when driven to this alternative they will rally under his drapeau, as they did after his famous *coup d' état.* Sure of their support, he appears to trust that, by means of his army and his admirable police, and by coquetting with the red-republicans, leading them now to hope that he will make war on the Austrians in Italy, or use his troops in Rome, there, it is understood, against the consent and the will of the pope, to destroy the autonomy of the papal government, under pretence of reforming the administration of the papal states, he will be able to sustain his power and establish the Napoleonic dynasty on the throne of France, and perhaps also on the thrones of the Italian and Spanish peninsulas. The fault of Louis Veuillot and the Catholics he leads or represents is, that they have aided him in this policy, labored to render perpetual the dictatorship he usurped in his *coup d' état*, instead of laboring to put an end to it at the earliest practicable moment, to make the emperor assume the character of a constitutional prince, and to secure adequate guaranties of the rights of the nation and of the citizen. I complain, not of the church in France, but of some half a dozen French prelates, who, counselled perhaps by their fears, took the occasion when the press was gagged and no voice could be raised to contradict them, to

desert the cause they had previously defended, to pronounce undeserved eulogiums on the prince-president, and to invite him in the name of religion to revive the empire, and re-establish the Napoleonic dynasty. I complain of them because they thus compromised their brethren, who could not oppose them without endangering their heads, or provoking the vengeance of power on the church in France, and because they place the whole French episcopacy in a false position before the world, and make it, apparently, responsible for the base surrender of the rights of the church and of the nation to the arbitrary will of the new Cæsar, who had proved himself no friend to either. They have done all that they could do to link the cause of Catholicity with that of cæsarism, and to give the lie to all of us who, in constitutional states, have to combat the standing objection, that Catholicity is unfavorable to political and civil liberty, and naturally sympathizes with despotism."

"The evil," added O'Connor, "is far more serious than our narrow-minded and short-sighted publicists suspect. They have confirmed, as far as the bishops and clergy of a single nation can confirm, the standing charge of the enemies of the church, that her existence in a state is incompatible with its political and civil liberty, and that her real sympathies are with cæsarism,—a fact which the American Know-Nothings will be sure to remember, and to make the most of against us. By breaking down and annihilating the constitutional party, they have left in Europe only cæsarists and red-republicans, with no mediator between them. They have thrown the church on the side of Cæsar, and stirred up the wrath of the insurgent democracy against her even more than against him. They have deprived the church of the vantage ground she held in 1848. Then she was understood to be on the side of liberty, and opposed to the despotism of the government. When the revolution in France proclaimed the republic, nearly all the French bishops and clergy hastened to declare their adhesion to it, and to avow themselves in favor of freedom. The republic confided in their good faith, refrained from attacking the rights of the church, and men who all their lives had warred against her, vied with one another in rendering her homage, and in protecting her liberty. Indeed the revolution, in freeing the people, freed her from the thraldom in which the temporal sovereigns for centuries had held her, and she moved and spoke with a freedom she had not enjoyed before since the great western schism,

nay, since the time of Philip the Fair. But she has lost all she had gained by the liberal policy with which our present glorious chief pontiff inaugurated his pontificate, and which for twenty years had been advocated by Catholic bishops, clergy, and intelligent laymen throughout the world, except in Austria, where obscurantism is at home. In the new red-republican revolution, which seems likely, sooner or later, to break out, she will hold a far different position and be regarded with far other sentiments. The bishops and clergy may again declare their adhesion to the republic, but the triumphant democracy will no longer trust them. It will respond to their overtures, We cannot trust you. You would desert us on the first opportunity, as you did in 1852, and applaud the usurper who would mow us down in the streets, or send us by thousands to die of pestilence in the swamps of Guiana. You have no sympathies with us; you detest us, and love only Cæsar. Cæsar you chose, Cæsar you have served, go, and share the fate of Cæsar."

"But the *coup d'état* by which the republic was overthrown, and the empire was virtually reëstablished," Winslow contended, "was a necessary step to save religion and society from the threatened attacks of socialism, and even liberal Catholics in Europe and America generally approved it."

"After Louis Napoleon, by a bold stroke of policy, dissolved the legislative assembly, arrested and imprisoned its prominent members, and usurped the entire power of the state, they," replied Diefenbach, "without approving what had been done, very generally believed that the best thing left for them in the circumstances in which it placed them, was to accept it, and to legitimate the power the president had grasped, as it would be better that he should exercise it by a legal than an illegal title. But the *coup d'état* left them really no choice in the matter, for the president had usurped the power, and could not be made to relinquish it. Yet there never was any necessity for that *coup d'état* itself, except what was created by the president and the Bonapartists themselves, in order to have an opportunity of reviving the empire and reëstablishing the Napoleonic dynasty. The danger from the socialists had been defeated. True, Kossuth, the champion of oppressed nationalities, had formed an alliance with Mazzini, the leader of young Italy, and the pantheistic democracy; but their combined movement could effect nothing serious, for the necessary 'ma-

terial aid' was not forthcoming, and the party of order were everywhere victorious, well organized, and on the alert against them. The republic itself had defeated the socialists and broken their power, as early as June, 1848, without aid from Louis Napoleon, and the revolution had known how to set bounds to itself. It is a fact that should not be forgotten, that throughout Europe the victory for order had been fought and won under republican or liberal auspices. The French republic put down the triumvirate of Rome, and restored the Holy Father to his temporal throne; Austria proclaimed a liberal, virtually a republican constitution for her motley empire, and under its prestige triumphed over her enemies in Hungary and Italy; Prussia was liberal till the socialists were used up, and it was not till the cause of order had been everywhere successfully vindicated, and a decided reaction in the public mind against socialism and red-republicanism had taken place, that cæsarism dared leave its hiding place, and not till after liberalism had proved its ability to put down anarchy and protect religion and society, did Louis Napoleon attempt his *coup d' état*, or the movement to reëstablish cæsarism, under pretence of sustaining order and religion, fairly commence. Cæsar was terribly alarmed at the danger after it was over, at anarchy after the republic had suppressed it. There never was the danger pretended, and there was not the slightest necessity, in order to save religion and society, of the *coup d'état*, or of the surrender of both to the fostering care of a despot."

"It seems never to have occurred to our good friends," said O'Connor, "that to surrender religion and society to Cæsar is really to abandon both, or, unless men have become slaves in their souls, is really to sow the seeds of a new and fiercer revolution against them. It would not be easy to conceive the evils that would follow a new and successful revolution against the governments of Europe."

"There can be again no such revolution," said Winslow, "if Catholics are only loyal in the support of power, and therefore, I side heartily with the *Univers* and its friends. The church is free in fact now in both Austria and France, and she can, wherever free, grapple successfully with the revolutionary spirit, and exorcise it, as every other evil spirit.'

"The church can nowhere grapple successfully with the revolutionary spirit, if she appears as the ally of despotism,

or not as free to war against cæsarism as against revolutionism," replied O'Connor. "This is a point our friends do not sufficiently consider. The European populations, especially in the Catholic states, are deeply imbued with the sentiment of liberty. That sentiment, as they hold it, may not be pure or truly enlightened, but, such as it is, it rules them, and is with them a fixed idea. In that sentiment, too, is an element of truth and goodness which consecrates it to their minds, and gives it its terrible power over them. Let the church be really or apparently placed in opposition to that sentiment without discriminating, accepting, and defending what is true and good in it, and she at once becomes powerless over those who are under its domination, and instead of exorcising the revolutionary spirit that possesses them, or winning them back to her embrace, will drive them further from her, and render them still more hostile both to her and to all legitimate authority. The church, to be able to control them, must be free not only to preach submission to them, but to recognize their rights and the duties of power; therefore, while she upholds just authority, to defend true liberty, and this she is not free to do either in France or Austria. She can be free to do it only in a free state, under a constitutional government which recognizes and protects free thought and free speech in the citizen. The church is free either in France or Austria only so long as she offers no opposition to cæsarism."

"I wish our Catholics, who have eyes only for the past, and who can never understand their own age and their present duties, would tell me," said Diefenbach, "why it is in Italy, France, indeed in every Catholic state, we find the young, active, living intelligence of the age almost exclusively anti-papal, nay, anti-Christian. The fact is undeniable. It is very easy to ascribe it to diabolical pride and wickedness, or to trace its remote cause to the prevarication of Adam and the corruption of human nature, but something more specific than that is needed as an answer. Children born of Catholic parents, in a Catholic country, and educated from infancy in Catholic schools, do not, as they grow up, as their intelligence unfolds, and their views expand, lose their affection for the church, and become her sworn enemies without at least some pretext, and I will say, never without some blame on the part of Catholics themselves, never unless the policy they are led to believe is approved by the church, outrages their sense of justice, or

their sense of the rights and dignity of men, and the progress of society. Explain or disguise it as we will, it grows out of the fact that the church is believed to be hostile to the sentiment of liberty, and pledged to the cause of despotism, which is simply a social death; that they who are looked upon as Catholic leaders, are obscurantists, with no sympathy with the down-trodden millions, and anxious only to uphold arbitrary or oppressive power. They hear everywhere these movements in favor of liberty denounced, but seldom hear power rebuked for its excesses or abuses. A man full of generous sentiments, with no thought of doing or saying any thing uncatholic or disloyal, sees the sufferings of the people, sympathizes with them, and says simply that he thinks the government might be better administered —that there might be a more beneficent exercise of power, and a wider scope allowed to the activity of the citizen. His words are reported, and from that moment he is, a marked man, placed under the surveillance of the police, thrust into a dungeon, or banished from the realm. This was the offence, and the only offence, of the Abbate Gioberti, for which he was exiled from Piedmont, to which he was permitted to return only when that kingdom resolved to become a constitutional state. When a man is thus treated by a professedly Catholic government, supported and applauded by the clergy, who hold it up as a model government, and its sovereign as a model prince, what wonder that he commits the mistake of supposing the church is irrevocably wedded to despotism, and is more intent on upholding power, than meliorating the condition of the people—more devoted to authority than to justice—and that he includes her in the wrath he feels, and justly feels, against the government that wrongs him, and abuses its most sacred trusts?"

"But we must be just," said O'Connor. "The church is not implicated in such transactions. There are old fogies amongst Catholics as well as amongst non-Catholics—men who are steeped to their eyes in cæsarism, and who would make war on the church herself were she to favor a liberal and just policy. We saw it in the beginning of the pontificate of Pius IX. There was a class of Catholics in every country, that opposed and labored in all ways they could to thwart the liberal policy he inaugurated. He attempted to cut the church loose from the chains with which the despotism of the courts had bound her, to assert her freedom

and independence of the sovereigns, and to enlist all the generous sympathies of the European populations in favor once more of religion. But he everywhere encountered the *oscuranti:* everywhere they opposed him; and it is said, I know not how truly, that the prelates of Austria, inspired not unlikely by the court, admonished him in a formal letter, that if he persevered in the policy he had inaugurated, the church in Austria would withdraw from his obedience. The opposition from Catholics, playing into the hands of the Mazzinians, defeated his generous intentions, and he is now held to keep the peace by the armies of France and Austria, who occupy his states under the pretence of protecting him against the disaffection of his temporal subjects, whose just demands he was not and is not now permitted to satisfy."

"I know very well the church is not implicated in the war upon the just rights of individuals and nations," replied Diefenbach. "I am, I trust, a Catholic, and God forbid that I should do or say any thing to cast the slightest shade of suspicion upon the church of God, the representative of his kingdom on earth. But I do know and say that Catholics—and Catholics in influential positions—are implicated, are even foremost in supporting cæsarism. Nobody can deny that the more influential Catholic statesmen in southern and central Europe, under pretence of maintaining order, uphold Cæsar in his war upon thought and speech, and oppose with all their might the introduction of liberal institutions. Have we not read long wearisome essays in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, published at Rome, against modern representative government? Do we not read the daily diatribes of the Paris *Univers* against the men who remember the tribune, regret the loss of free institutions, and wish their reëstablishment—men of unimpeachable Catholicity, unimpeachable loyalty, men who defended the cause of Catholic freedom in the French parliament, with masculine eloquence, to which the world listened with admiration and conviction, when Louis Veuillot was spouting infidelity or writing obscene novels? Have we not all seen the first Catholic orator and statesman of the age, of whom any age or nation might be proud, traduced for his devotion to civil and religious liberty, prosecuted and sentenced by a police court to fine and imprisonment for daring to express his admiration of the parliamentary government of Great Britain, and his regret at the loss of a similar government in his own

country? Have we not found every Catholic journal in free, enlightened America, except those written in the German language, denouncing him, and with only a single exception, if I recollect aright, that of the *New York Freeman's Journal*, defending the government of the new Cæsar, and grossly abusing the only Catholic in America who has had the courage or manliness to protest publicly against the outrage committed, in the person of the noble Count Montalembert, on free thought, on free speech, on just liberty, on historical truth, and on manly intelligence? These facts do not to the Catholic implicate the church, I very well know; but they do implicate her in the minds of non-Catholics, who are not in the habit of drawing nice distinctions between the action of Catholics and the action of the church. The Catholic press in this country, in its treatment of M. Montalembert, has shown what its professions of attachment to liberty and of loyalty to American institutions are worth. The majority of Catholic journals are published with the approbation of the ordinary, and they furnish a fruitful text to American Know-Nothings, which may one day be handled against Catholics in a way that will not be advantageous to our cause in this country. How can these journals expect to combat successfully the Know-Nothings, when they take pains to confirm their objections? It is well to think before speaking, and to look before taking a leap. As far as it is in the power of your Catholic press to commit the church to the cause of cæsarism it has done it, and confirmed the standing charge against our religion, that it is incompatible with republican institutions, with civil and religious liberty, and is the grand support of despotism."

"But Mr. Diefenbach makes too much of the slips of the American Catholic press," said Father John. "That press, for the most part, has very little character and less influence. Even the enemies of the church seldom take it as an index to the real sentiments of the Catholic body, and rather ignore than consult it. The Catholics of this country, from causes not necessary to mention, have, almost to a man, a great hatred of England, and a strong attachment to France. M. Montalembert has not lost his Catholic position among them by his attachment to self-government, but by having outraged their deep-seated prejudices in praising England, and in intimating that her government is better than that of his own country. American Catholics have no

special attachment to Louis Napoleon, but they have been in the habit of maintaining, as necessary to the defence of their religion, the superiority of every thing in Catholic states, and they suppose the French bishops and clergy are the best judges of what is most favorable to religion in France. Finding, or supposing they find, them all but unanimous in supporting the imperial government, they very naturally conclude that any one who is not satisfied with it, is under the influence of some worthless political theory, and to be regarded only as a disappointed politician, or a political agitator. The whole matter in their view pertains to the political order, and Catholics as such have no occasion to trouble their heads about it. That this is the view generally taken by our Catholic journals is unquestionable, that it is the true view I by no means concede. The prosecution of Montalembert by the imperial government, is in my view a gross outrage upon liberty, and should excite the indignation of every Catholic throughout the world, because *that liberty which it was attempted to strike down in him, is in our times and the present constitution of society the indispensable condition of that freedom and independence which every intelligent Catholic demands for his church.* The experience of every Catholic in America ought to teach him that the freedom of the church cannot now be maintained on the ground that it is *her* right, for no government can acknowledge it to be *her* right, without acknowledging her to be the church of God, and that no government in our times will do, or be permitted to do. The freedom of the church can now be maintained only as the right of the citizen, included in his right to choose, profess, and propagate his own religion. This is the view taken by M. Montalembert, and that was defended with so much energy and brilliancy for twenty years by what was called the Catholic party in France, adhered to by nearly all, if not all, the Catholic bishops of the American Union. The state now professes no religion, it professes none even in France and Austria, and therefore can recognize and protect the freedom of no religion as such. Consequently where the citizen has no rights recognized and protected by the political constitution of the state, as is the case under cæsarism, the church has and can have no freedom, no recognition and protection of her rights. Louis Veuillot and those who oppose Montalambert and his friends overlook this fact, and wish the state to recognize the rights of the church as

hers, that is, to make the state profess the Catholic religion, and exclude or at least only tolerate other religions. This, even if desirable, is henceforth, I take it, absolutely impracticable. The state has ceased to be Catholic, and public opinion throughout the world refuses to permit it to profess any religion, and demands that it recognize all as equal before the state. Any one who knows the age and its fixed ideas, knows that it is idle to struggle against this demand. France and Austria, Sardinia and Belgium, have yielded to it, and so far as the state is concerned, we must make up our minds to leave error as free as truth, heresy as free as orthodoxy. Citizens must settle their religious controversies among themselves, without calling in the aid of the civil power. This is the American system, which all nations will be forced to accept. The state here does not recognize the Catholic Church as such; it simply recognizes and protects my rights as an American citizen. But in my rights as a citizen is included my right of conscience, my right before the state to choose, profess, and propagate by moral means my religion, whatever that religion may be, provided it is not *contra bonos mores*. This right, being my right as a citizen, the state must recognize and protect. In the exercise of this right I choose the Catholic religion, the Catholic Church, and therefore the state must recognize and protect the Catholic Church, and defend her freedom in relation to all who are or who wish to become Catholics, against all external violence, not because she is the Catholic Church, but because she is the choice of free citizens. This suffices, for it in fact leaves the church wholly free and independent of the state. It is just and equitable, for it only asks the Catholic to respect in others, who may differ from him, that freedom before the state which he asks them to respect in him. But it is easy to see that on this ground the church can have no guaranty for her freedom and independence except in a free state, which asserts and maintains the equality of rights, and an equality of rights which the state does not grant, which are anterior to the state, and which the state must recognize and respect. The citizen having no rights under cæsarism, or none that he can defend, for cæsarism denies all rights which do not emanate from Cæsar, the church can have none, nor means of defending the rights God gives her. Hence the question involved in M. Montalembert's prosecution does interest us Catholics, for it is fundamentally the question of religious freedom,

and of the right to profess, defend, and maintain the Catholic religion. The age is not wrong in always coupling civil and religious liberty together. They are inseparable, and they have the same basis and conditions. Deny religious liberty, and you can no longer assert civil liberty, because to deny it is to deny a civil right, which is tyranny. Deny civil liberty and you cannot assert the freedom of religion before the state, for then you deny all right before the state. We must then support civil or political liberty as the condition of supporting religious liberty, and religious liberty as the condition of supporting civil or political liberty. England and the United States have both discovered this; the United States have fully conformed to it, and England finds herself forced to conform nearer and nearer to it, and will find herself forced ere long to conform wholly to it, and give up her church establishment."

Conversation XVI.

"My friends seem to me," said Winslow, "to take a very false view of Catholic Europe, and of the sentiments of leading European Catholics. In fact, they seem to me to have derived their views from the anti-Catholic press of England. There is no doubt that the better part of European Catholics, including the majority of the bishops and clergy, rally to the support of the governments,—not because they are in favor of cæsarism or opposed to genuine liberty, but because the revolutionary party, the so-called liberals, are alike the enemies of religion and society. There is no formal alliance between the church and the governments, but the church sustains the sovereigns simply because their cause and hers happen to be, just now, one and the same. The church wants for herself social order, and social order demands stable and efficient authority. Shaken as European society has been by a century of revolutions, broken loose from all its old moorings, afloat on a tempestuous sea, the sport of every revolutionary wind that blows, its first want is order, and till authority is reëstablished, and able to protect itself and command the respect of the people, there can be no order, no social melioration, no advancement of religion even."

"The revolutionists," added De Bonneville, "are not, as they would have us believe, the friends of liberty; they are not moved by a sincere and earnest desire to get rid of bad

governments, and to redress real grievances under which the people no doubt suffer. Their real motive is the possession of power for themselves, and freedom from all restraint, religious and political. None of the Catholic governments are really tyrannical or oppressive, and the only real complaint the English press brings against any of them is, after being stripped of its verbiage, that they are not disposed to remain quiet while the conspirators cut their throats, or that they treat as criminals those lawless spirits, whatever their rank, education, or refinement, who conspire and lead others to conspire against them. They commit the sin, unpardonable in this age, of holding treason to be a crime, and of regarding as treason the overt attempt to assassinate a sovereign, or to overthrow the legal government of a country. I know nothing worse to be said against either the emperor of Austria or the king of the Two Sicilies, called, in the slang of the day, King Bomba. No sovereign can justly be blamed for regarding himself as a sovereign, and acting as a sovereign must act, unless he abdicates his power, or for endeavoring to preserve the authority with which he is clothed by the constitution of his realm."

"The revolutionary party," resumed Winslow, "have no excuse, no pretext even for seeking to overthrow the government in any Catholic state. I will not say that no revolution is ever justifiable; I will not say that, when rulers abuse their powers, oppress their people, and there is no other means of redress, the people may not, appealing to God for the purity of their motives and the justice of their cause, take up arms and liberate themselves by force from their oppressors. So the popes have always taught, and they have more than once deposed the prince who oppressed his subjects. But a revolution for the sake of carrying out a theory, or in obedience to some political crotchet, the only pretexts for a revolution the European liberals can allege,—is never allowable. The revolutionists have no excuse, for they have no real grievance to redress, except that the church does not choose to surrender her rights at their bidding, and the governments will not suffer themselves to be overthrown. In Italy the party pretend to be national, and attack the pope, because they regard the papacy as in the way of Italian unity, of driving out the Austrians, and regaining for the peninsula the primacy among the nations she held in former times. It is pagan Rome, pagan Italy they want to reëstablish, and as they cannot do that with

the pope, they cry, Down with the pope. Elsewhere and everywhere they attack religion itself, and the whole order of civilization that has grown up under the fostering care of the church. They war especially against the church, because they have sense enough to perceive that without her Christianity ceases to be a religion, and becomes merely an idea, a philosophy, a morality, a sentiment, or an opinion. I cannot understand how any Catholic can see any thing good in them, or make the slightest concession to appease them."

"I should be sorry to be thought capable of disputing the general truth of what Mr. Winslow and M. de Bonneville allege," replied Father John. "I am opposed alike to the cæsarists and to the revolutionists. Both parties are wrong, though each has an element of truth which we should disengage, accept, and defend. Precisely what I complain of is that our friends in Europe do not do this, and have suffered a false issue to be made before the public. The true issue is not between cæsarism and red-republicanism. Cæsarism, in so far as it simply supports order against anarchy, is right, and red-republicanism, in so far as it opposes tyranny, demands liberty, or free scope for the normal activity of our faculties, is also right; but the cæsarists, in that they deny free scope for our rightful activity, suppress intelligence, and make the prince the fountain of all right and all law, are wrong; and the red-republicans, in that they war against just authority, and demand freedom from all restraint, or in that they seek to substitute the despotism of society for that of the prince, are also wrong. Between the two parties it is hard to say which a wise and good man should prefer. The victory of the red-republicans would be attended with unheard-of violence,—would drench the land with its best blood, and people heaven with martyrs; but their first fury spent, the natural sentiments of humanity and the instinct of order and justice, common to all men, might, unless cæsarism stepped in to thwart them, force them to reorganize society, and to provide, better or worse, for the protection of the rights of life, property, and conscience. The triumph of cæsarism would be less violent, but it would be a slow lingering disease, enervating society, depriving the individual of his natural energy, and rendering the people tame, servile, and helpless. Under it society would stagnate and rot."

"Both parties," added Diefenbach, "are virtually pagan. The red-republicans would revive cæsarism under the form

of democracy, and the cæsarists under the form of imperialism. Both are equally enamored of classical antiquity, and inveterately hostile to the civilization introduced by the German conquerors of the Roman empire, and developed and matured under the fostering care of the church. The attempt to resuscitate imperial Rome was made by the Hohenstaufen emperors of Germany, aided by the lawyers and Ghibellines of Italy. Frederic I., commonly called Frederick Barbarossa, regarded himself as the successor of Augustus, and spoke of Crassus and Antony as the generals of his predecessors. Misled by his pride and ambition, but still more by the jurisconsults romanized by the study of the Theodosian and Justinian codes, he claimed to be the absolute sovereign of the whole earth; or, as one of his lawyers told him, 'on earth what God is in heaven;' the source whence emanates all authority, all right, all law. With these lofty pretensions he demanded submission from the pope, bishops, princes, dukes, free cities, and all orders in church and state. He did what he could to romanize Germany, and invaded Italy, made war on her free cities, her independent principalities, and for twenty-five years devastated that rich and beautiful country with fire and sword. But the time had not come for the complete triumph of Roman imperialism. Pope Alexander III., at the head of the Lombard League armed in defence of the German order betrayed by the kaiser, defeated him, and as a penance compelled him to join the crusade, and lead his army against the Saracens in the East, where he perished before reaching Palestine. But neither the doctrine nor the attempt was abandoned by his successors. The doctrine found always subtle defenders in the crown lawyers, and had a celebrated advocate in the poet Dante, in his *Monarchia*, if not in his *Divina Commedia*, and the attempt always found soldiers in the Ghibellines of Italy.

"The struggle between the popes and emperors in the middle ages," continued Diefenbach, "is, for those who understand it, a struggle between the German monarchy introduced by the German conquerors of Rome and sustained by the popes and the imperial Roman monarchy, revived in western Europe by the study of the Roman law, and sustained by the German kaisers, who desired to inherit the empire of the Roman Cæsars, and to hold it by the same title. The German monarchy that sprung up after the conquest, and which culminated in Karl der Grosse, or Char-

lemagne, a Frank, and therefore a true German, was a monarchy compatible with freedom. It left nations, principalities, and cities their autonomy, their local independence, laws, manners, and customs, and the church her freedom and independence as the representative of the kingdom of God on earth. The popes had cherished it, lavished on it their protection, and they defended it as long as they were able, as that which best comports with the freedom of the church, the rights of nations, and the well-being of the people. But shaken under the immediate successors of Charlemagne, chiefly remarkable for their imbecility and their vices, by the growth and consolidation of feudalism, and by national animosities and national ambitions, it finally fell before the continued advances of Roman imperialism, what I call cæsarism, which has triumphed on nearly the whole continent of Europe. Germanism has been able to preserve itself in comparative purity and vigor only in the British race, in Great Britain and her colonies, and this great republic. Charles V., Philip II., and Philip V. very nearly extinguished it in the Spanish and Italian peninsulas; Louis XI., Henry IV., and Louis XIV. struck it down in France, and the Protestant reformation put an end to it in Germany and Scandinavia; Ivan IV. and Peter the Great wiped out all traces of it from Russia. The Plantagenets, the Tudors and the Stuarts carried on a fierce war against it for centuries in England, but without complete success, because in England the civil or Roman law, the Theodosian and Justinian codes, had never become the law of the land, and the people had the good sense to preserve their own common law, derived from the customs of their German ancestors, and developed and perfected under Catholic influences. The English are, as to race, a mixed people, with a large infusion, no doubt, of Celtic blood; but their institutions, their laws, their civil customs and usages, their monarchy, their civilization, are of Germanic origin, and pertain to the Germanic order, not to the Græco-Roman, which the Germans had vanquished. It is to this fact, not to difference of race or blood,—which counts for nothing, since God has made of one blood all the nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth,—that we must ascribe that invincible energy, that enterprising, robust life, which we remark in the British and American people, and which is so superior to that of the latinized races. Although unhappily separated from Catholic unity, the British race, using the

term in its largest sense, represents to-day, far better than any other people on the globe, the Germanic order of civilization, that took the place of the Roman after the conquest of the empire. Their superiority is in the fact that they are less romanized, less latinized, and remain more German than any of the continental families—than even the Germans themselves. The struggle between cæsarists and red-republicans, two branches of the same family, both hatched from the spawn of pagan Rome, is one in which humanity can take no serious interest. The real issue is between the two orders of civilization, the German and the Roman, as it has been ever since the eleventh century. The revival of pagan Rome, whether under the imperial or the democratic form, will prove impotent to restore European society, and save the continental nations from the doom which threatens them. A new Germanic invasion and conquest is demanded, not this time by armed soldiery, but by the old Germanic spirit, the principles and institutions introduced by the conquerors of the Roman empire, and accepted and developed by the Roman pontiffs, and which to-day are best preserved and represented by the British race."

"Whether the British and American civilization is of Germanic or Celtic origin," said O'Connor, "I will not undertake to decide. Most of my Celtic countrymen have decided for themselves that whatever is good is Celtic, and whatever is evil is Germanic or Gothic, which is learnedly proved to his own satisfaction, I presume, by the amiable author of a recent work on the Goths and Celts. I am an Irishman, and believe that Ireland was a civilized state when England was barbarian, and that Irish scholars and Irish missionaries may claim an honorable share in the work of recivilizing Europe after the downfall of the western empire. Yet I agree that the British and American civilization is the living progressive civilization of our days, and that the British and American people,—to a great extent Celtic however,—are the really leading people of the modern world. Their order of civilization rejects cæsarism whether under the democratic or the monarchical form, and combines, better than any other the world has any knowledge of, the liberty of the citizen with the stability and efficiency of power. Its grand defect is in the fact that the people who have the working of it reject even more strenuously papal than pagan Rome. Let the British and American people return to Catholic unity, let them have

Catholicity to purify their manners and ennoble their sentiments, and their civilization would triumph over every people and tribe, and become the universal civilization of the race."

"Therefore," said Father John, "while as Catholics we labor with all our power to restore these nations to Catholic unity, we must resist every attempt to weaken their order of civilization, or to substitute for it the civilization of pagan Rome, whether under a republican or an imperial form. The red-republicans are as hostile to it as are the cæsarists; and the attempts we see made to introduce both into England and this country the theories of continental democrats on the one hand and of continental imperialists on the other, threaten its very existence. The Germanic order of civilization, which is the boast of the British race, is opposed alike by continental democracy and continental monarchy, and the error of our Catholic friends, trained under continental influences and brought up in continental ideas and habits, is that they incline either to the one or to the other, and war against what, for distinction's sake, I call the British system, either from the point of view of democracy or from the point of view of imperialism. This is wherefore they are so ill able to appreciate the position of that illustrious champion of civil and religious liberty, Count de Montalembert; why they are so ready to sneer at him, and to take sides with the emperor against him. They do not see that the noble count has studied history to a far better purpose than they have; that he makes himself the advocate, against pagan Rome, of that Germanic constitution of society, which remains in vigor only in England and her colonies, and in the United States, and which is the only constitution of society that affords any tolerable guaranty of political and religious freedom. England is heretical, and Catholics are not willing to praise even her civil constitution, though it dates from Catholic times; she has in past times persecuted Catholics, and outrageously oppressed Catholic Ireland, whence the majority of American Catholics have emigrated; and their feelings are naturally hostile to her. Hence whoever attempts to recommend her political and civil system as superior to and even more in accordance with the real wants of Catholicity than that which obtains in Catholic states themselves, can hardly fail to be regarded as false to his Catholic brethren, and even to his church. He is looked

upon as making fatal concessions to the enemy, concessions which imply what Englishmen maintain, that a higher order of civilization obtains in non-Catholic than in Catholic states. Even *Brownson's Review* has fallen more than once into the common mistake, and attempted to prove what really is not provable, the superiority of the continental civilization over the English and American. No doubt the Catholic populations of Europe are better off than the Protestant population of England or the United States, but that is because they have the true faith, not because they have a better or more desirable civilization. Catholicity softens the asperities of despotism and neutralizes many of the worst effects of a bad civilization, by its sublime charities and its rich spiritual consolations."

"But if people are Catholic," interposed Winslow, "it matters little what is the civil order that obtains. Leave us the church, it is all the Catholic needs. She will regenerate a vicious civilization, or create a new civilization adapted to her wants."

"That," replied O'Connor, "is a sentiment one does not like to combat, because it is hard to do so without appearing to underrate the power and efficacy of the church, and because it is a very common sentiment among Catholics of all countries and ages. But it nevertheless is a false and dangerous sentiment, though seemingly pious. The church is divine, but she works through human agencies, in accordance with human free will. She cannot give men faith or virtue against their will, nor change the morals or manners, far less the laws and institutions, of a people without their concurrence. She converted the Roman people and inspired them with that heroic spirit which led them with joy to martyrdom; but she did not and could not regenerate the Græco-Roman civilization, or save the Roman empire from destruction. She did not herself create a new civilization, when the old was demolished by the conquest, for the elements of the new civilization that took its place were brought in by the German conquerors. These conquerors, who were barbarians to the refined, lettered, disciplined, but weak, effeminate, and corrupt Romans, had before the invasion and conquest an original civilization of their own, rude and undeveloped, no doubt, but in many respects more in harmony with the purity and freedom of Catholicity than the Græco-Roman under the emperors, pagan or Christian. It is a mistake to suppose that civilization was destroyed by

the barbarian conquest. An old and effete form of civilization, with its despotism and cynicism, was exchanged for a new, fresh, and vigorous civilization, adapted to the future of the world."

"The church," added Diefenbach, "gained more than she lost by the exchange. The Germanic conquest gave her a new people and a fresh field for her operations, and the most glorious period I find in her history is that from the sixth to the tenth century, when the western world was Germanic, and pagan Rome survived only in the cæsarism of the Byzantine empire. She did not create from absolute barbarism that new civilization, but she took it under her protection, fostered, developed, and matured it. This is all that she can do in any case, for civilization lies in the natural order. Her special work is not that of civilization, which is properly the work of natural society. She aids indirectly civilization by the virtues she fosters, the lofty principles she inculcates, the noble sentiments she inspires, and the purity of life and manners she insists upon as indispensable to eternal salvation; but she always works and does the best she can with the civilization she finds. She sends out missionaries to evangelize the nations and to teach them, whether civilized or uncivilized, the faith as she has received it. These missionaries are civilized men, and they aid civilization. But the only civilization they can carry with them is that to which they are accustomed, and under which they have been trained. They nowhere create a new civilization; they take that of the country to which they are sent or introduce that under which they have been born and bred. Thus the Catholic missionaries and colonists from France and Spain in the sixteenth century brought to the New World the civilization of their respective countries, which was no longer German, but had become Roman, and hence the difficulty French and Spanish colonies have, when cut loose from the mother country, in establishing and maintaining the *régime* of freedom. The English missionaries and colonists who founded the colony of Maryland, although Catholics, brought with them the German civilization then in vigor in England, consequently the elements of a free state; and no state in the Union at the time of American independence was more thoroughly imbued with the principles of liberty, or better prepared to take her rank as a free commonwealth. After the revival of the civil law on the continent and the extended study of the Theodosian

and Justinian codes, ecclesiastics born or educated on the continent labored to introduce that law into England, and would have done so, very innocently, and destroyed English liberties, as Ximenes did the Spanish, if they had not been resisted by the sturdy German spirit of the nation.

"Nor is the church always able," continued Diefenbach, "to resist the tendencies of ideas, and to preserve against all opposition the order of civilization she approves and finds most consonant to her free spirit and her independent action. The civilization most to her mind was undeniably the Germanic, represented by Charlemagne on the continent, and by Alfred in England. That civilization was not founded on a strictly logical theory, and had no craving for a systematic unity. It could tolerate exceptions and anomalies, and suffer institutions resting on a basis independent of the will of the sovereign. It limited the power of the monarchy by personal rights, national rights, municipal rights, corporations, *Volks-rechten* and local customs, laws, and usages. It therefore saw and could see no inconsistency in leaving the church free and independent in her own sphere, with the power of enacting and enforcing canons on all matters coming by her own divine constitution within her jurisdiction, and which should be respected and observed as laws in their order by the state, the monarch,—by all manner of persons, whatever their rank, dignity, position, office, or state of life. There was nothing in this not in perfect accordance with the ideas and the daily practice of that noble old Germanic civilization brought from the original seat of the Germanic race in upper Asia. But the church has not been able to preserve it. Hardly was it established and brought to some perfection, before it began to be assailed. It did not satisfy the need of strict systematic unity, of logical consistency throughout, felt by the Roman and Byzantine lawyers, and as soon as these lawyers began to have influence in the courts of sovereigns, the war against it commenced. It lacked the unity, the consistency, and the simplicity of cæsarism. The kaisers deserted Charlemagne for Diocletian, waged a fierce war on it, in which, though occasionally defeated, they have been upon the whole successful. The popes struggled to maintain it, and for three hundred years after the war commenced retained it in more or less vigor; but under Boniface VIII., when the grandson of St. Louis brought to the aid of cæsarism the power of France, with the mass of her bishops and clergy, they were

forced to succumb. Driven, under the successor of Boniface, by the turbulent Ghibelline nobles from Rome, into seventy years of Babylonish captivity at Avignon, on the heels of which followed the great western schism which destroyed their prestige, and stripped them of their political power, the popes were no longer in a condition to renew the struggle, and were forced to leave the victory with the Græco-Roman order, which continued to advance daily, till the proper German monarchy was nearly annihilated on the continent, and the church was placed again as under imperial Rome at the mercy of Cæsar."

"This result was helped on," added O'Connor, "by the *renaissance*, or the new impulse given to the study of pagan literature by the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the dispersion through the western world of the Greek scholars who had been trained under Byzantine cæsarism. The renaissance and the dispersion of these scholars gave fresh vigor and popularity to the pagan views of government and society in western Europe, and revived, especially in Italy, the manners and vices of the worst days of the pagan empire. Florence under the Medici was almost a pagan city, and even the city of Rome herself did not escape the contagion. Hearts were corrupted, minds were perverted, and Catholics in all the higher ranks could be found, who, aside from simple dogma, were far more pagan than Christian. On the heels again of the renaissance followed the Protestant revolt, and the war of the German princes against the papacy. The faithful in Italy and France being paganized in their manners and ideas, and beginning to be romanized in their institutions, and abandoned and opposed by the only princes who could have aided them to preserve some remains of the Germanic civilization and resist the complete resuscitation of the pagan empire, the popes must obviously no longer continue a struggle which could not be successful, and might have lost all the continental nations to the faith. They were forced to abandon and did abandon the useless struggle, and the Roman civilization won the victory over and drove back the German civilization from nearly the whole of the continent that had been subjected to the Roman Cæsars. The Protestant revolt was a treachery, not to the Roman civilization, as some have supposed, but to the German. Its abandonment of the German conquest of Rome, and the surrender of Germany herself, whom the Roman arms had never been able to conquer, instead of

preserving, as the honest German people were made to believe, the old Germanic order, secured the triumph to Roman cæsarism, for even revolted Germany had adopted and retained the Roman law, revived and introduced by the treacherous German kaisers."

"In other words," said Father John, "through the infidelity of the German kaisers, and the revolt of the German princes, the vanquished Roman civilization recovered its power, and conquered its conqueror. The movement of the German princes in the sixteenth century, what we call the Protestant reformation, directed as it was against the emperor, who regarded himself as the heir of imperial Rome, and the pope, who had virtually ceased to struggle against Græco-Romanism, save in dogma and the interior life, might seem to have been a movement for the defence of the old Germanic civilization, and I have no doubt that it was so in the minds of many honest Germans who supported it, and that in this fact we are to seek its remarkable vigor and persistence. But in its effect it was not so, for the princes who headed it were themselves imbued with the Roman system, and used the national sentiment which they appealed to, only to facilitate the establishment of cæsarism in their respective states or principalities. The movement tended to resist the triumph of the Roman order, and to preserve the Germanic system only in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and England, and in those countries only because in them the people had never lost their power, and had never had their autonomy destroyed by the German kaiser, or the Gallic monarch. If the German princes had remained true to the Germanic civilization, and steadfast in their support of the pope against the emperor, pagan Rome could never have triumphed in the civil and political order. The pope and the Guelph princes and nobles, after the accession of the Hohenstaufen, were the real defenders of the Germanic order of civilization, and the German kaiser, with his Ghibelline princes and nobles, was then the defender of the Roman, and the party that sought to recover for vanquished Rome once more the power exercised by her Cæsars. Luther and his party, in the sixteenth century, if they had been wise,—for the religious question was only a pretext, as it is now,—would in order to effect their purpose—which I take it, was the restoration of Germanism—have rallied all that remained of the Germanic world around the pope, against the cæsarism that oppressed him and

them, and liberated him from the thraldom of resuscitated pagan Rome. It was not yet too late in Luther's time to have done it; for though warred against and everywhere weakened, Germanic ideas and institutions, till obliterated by the revolution of 1789, and the Emperor Napoleon, were not wholly extinct in any country in Europe; and even in Italy, France, and Spain, all traces of them have not disappeared. The diet still survived in Germany, the states-general in France, the comuneros in Spain, and the commons in England. But placing the pope and emperor in the same category, and warring upon the papacy as if it, instead of being the victim, was the supporter of Cæsar, they consummated a schism in European society, which still remains, and which has operated most disastrously for the Germanic civilization, as well as for the nations abandoning or adhering to the Catholic religion."

"Although it is idle to expect the restoration of European society from the latinized nations," said Diefenbach, "we can hardly expect it from the nations that retain a portion of the Germanic civilization, so long as they remain separated from Catholic unity; yet it must be admitted that the old Germanic system, which Europe and the church demand, exists in more force in the non-Catholic than in the Catholic nations. Austria, though in part German by blood, is more Roman in her civil and political ideas than Würtemberg, Hanover, or even Prussia, for she claims to be the heir of the Holy Roman Empire of the Hohenstaufen. Her present emperor is an able sovereign—liberal, enlightened—and a sincere friend to the church, to which he is willing to concede more liberty in his dominions than the prelates of his empire are willing to exercise; but after all, as a means of consolidating and strengthening the cæsarism he inherits, not as a means of restoring the monarchy of Charlemagne. He is a Constantine, or a Theodosius, if you will, but still a Roman, not a Frank or German emperor. I even respect the emperor of the French as a man, but he is no real successor of Charlemagne, and is Gallo-Roman rather than Frank, and sustains the Roman, not the Frank empire. He is the rival of the Austrian, and would transfer imperial Rome to Paris, as Francis Joseph would retain it at Vienna. The reëstablishment and consolidation of the Roman, not the German, monarchy is the common object of both, and Italy is the prize the one seeks to retain, and the other to win; nothing is really gained for society, let which will

prove the victor. Of the two the Austrian is the better Catholic, and more liberal in his concessions to the church. The French emperor retains the church under stringent laws, which he can instruct his police to enforce against her, when he pleases; but as a grace, he permits her a tolerable share of practical liberty; yet her practical freedom has no guaranty, no security, but the personal will or disposition of the sovereign. The other Catholic states need not be named; they must follow in the wake of either France or Austria, both of whom proceed on the Roman system, recognizing really no rights in the citizen or subject, except as grants from the sovereign, revocable at will, and though personally favorable to religion, holding her legally in the position she was held in under Nero or Diocletian. Civil and religious liberty are both incompatible with the imperial system, which these two great states maintain, and which now governs nearly all Catholic Europe."

"This is wherefore I complain of the support given to that system by leading European Catholic influences," said Father John. "We know how that system is regarded by our illustrious chief pontiff, for the first measures of his pontificate were a solemn protest against it, and a glorious effort to get rid of it. He failed in his generous efforts through the opposition he encountered from Catholics and liberals, and having protested, he submits to the evils he cannot redress. But because he remains silent, we must not suppose that he has changed his views, condemned the policy he gloriously inaugurated, or reconciled himself to imperial despotism, whether exercised from Paris or Vienna. We know his mind, and we know that in laboring by lawful and Christian means to restore and consolidate as far as may be in our day, and in the altered circumstances of the world, what we have called the Germanic order of society, we are not likely to incur his displeasure. What I would impress upon Catholics everywhere is, that they volunteer no aid to the old order of pagan Rome, whether in the form of democratic or imperial absolutism, and that, as far as they can without revolutionism, they labor to strengthen and help on the true Germanic cause, which, though defeated, is not yet beyond hope of recovery, and cannot be so long as Great Britain and her colonies and the United States retain the vigor of their constitutions, and exert their influence against absolutism. No people in the world are more deeply interested in maintaining the British and American

or Germanic system than Catholics, even though for the present the system is mainly sustained by non-Catholics. Nothing prevents the restoration of England and America to Catholic unity, for each feels deeply the need of that unity, but the cæsarism of the Catholic continental states, and the regrettable fact that in modern times the Catholic mind is to a fearful extent wedded to the old Roman order of civilization, and hostile to the German. The very nickname, *Romanism*, given to Catholicity, proves what is the nature of the hostility it encounters among English and American Protestants. Everybody knows that, save with a few old fogies, the opposition to the church is civil and political, not theological, and that the papacy is opposed only because it is assumed, though falsely assumed, that it is allied or indentified with Roman cæsarism. Say what we will, interpret it as we may, draw from it what inferences we choose, the fact is that the non-united nations retain more of the old Germanic order of civilization than the united nations, and heresy is strengthened by its union with that civilization, while orthodoxy is weakened by its forced and unnatural union with the old Roman order, which after all is not a living but a dead civilization that ought to have been buried with Augustulus. This is an unnatural state of things. The living expansive civilization is linked with heresy, which is a dead body; and Catholicity, which alone has life in the spiritual order, is linked in the natural order to the dead body of the old Roman world. In each case it is the living tied to the dead. In the non-Catholic nations the Germanic civilization for this reason can expand only in the material order, and be energetic and powerful only in producing, exchanging, or accumulating the goods of this life; in Catholic nations, Catholicity is deprived of her legitimate political and social sphere of action, and is forced to confine herself to the interior man, and to weep over social miseries which she cannot relieve, and which she can do little even to console. The problem of the age is to separate the living from the dead; to gather the living to the living, and the dead to the dead. 'Let the dead bury their dead.' No Catholic doubts or can doubt that it is better to be a Catholic under cæsarism than a Protestant even under Germanism, or the Catholic subject of the king of Naples than a Protestant citizen of the United States. But if the people of Holland, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States were really Catholic, who doubts that their condition

would be far preferable to the condition of the people in the most favored Catholic nation?" *

Conversation XVII.

"Both Mr. Diefenbach and Father John," remarked Winslow, "appear to me to take a low, inadequate, and narrow, as well as a very inexact view of the elements that have warred against each other in modern history. I have an instinctive distrust of all explanations of history by means of any special theory. The antagonism of races, nations, institutions, civilizations, no doubt, counts for much, but it by no means explains all the great events of history.

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* The reporter has sent us three additional Conversations of Our Club on this same subject, the really most important social question of the day. We shall publish them in our next *Review;* at least, we hope to do so. The three conversations we now publish leave the discussion incomplete, and hardly do full justice to the side espoused by Messrs. Winslow and De Bonneville. Further developments and explanations of the theory broached as to the two civilizations may be required by those to whom that theory is new, and who are not very familiar with the details of European history since the downfall of the western Roman empire. The history of Europe from the beginning of the sixth to the end of the tenth century, has been but superficially studied, and the real character of the Frankish empire founded by Charlemagne is but imperfectly understood, and very imperfectly appreciated by our popular historians. We know something of feudalism, but very little of the political and civil order, save in Gaul under the Merovingians, that intervened between its establishment and the German conquest of the empire. Light, however, begins to dawn on those dark ages, and it now appears that most of our historians have confounded the progress of civilization in modern times with the progress made in resuscitating and reëstablishing in the Christian world the civilization of pagan Rome, or the progress of the vanquished in subduing their vanquishers, as conquered Greece subdued with her language and civilization her Roman conquerors. That in the war between the empire and the church in the middle ages, the German kaisers struggled to revive the Roman and the popes to sustain the German order, is now pretty well known, and gives to those wars a significance little suspected by such writers as Robertson, Hume, Hallam, or even Lingard. The superiority in a Christian point of view claimed by Diefenbach and Father John, and conceded by O'Connor, of the German civilization to the Græco-Roman, will probably be contested; and the opinion enunciated that the British race in Great Britain, the United States, and the British colonies, represent the system of civilization the most consonant to Catholicity, and the only real, living, progressive civilization of the age, will most likely shock many received ideas, and call forth no little opposition from those who think it Catholic to abuse every thing English or American. But the theories broached have their adherents among men whose learning is respectable, and whose Catholicity cannot be impeached. They are worth considering, even if they should turn out to be unsound or exaggerated.

Men and nations act from a great variety of motives, from mixed motives, and not seldom from contradictory motives. They act, too, from passion, sentiment, caprice, illusion, and even delusion, as well as from reason; and it is idle to think of reducing their history to a science, and of finding a logical connection and consistency in all its events. I do not believe that all history from Julius Cæsar to Francis Joseph and Louis Napoleon can be resolved into a struggle between Rome and Germany for the empire of the world. In the struggles of nations and civilizations the church counts for something, and the great struggle, that which has dominated all lesser struggles, has been between her and the powers of this world,—a struggle between the city of God and the city of the world, between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness. The world has been created for the glory of the Word, and all in it is ordered in reference to the glory of God manifest in the flesh, or the Word incarnate, whose representative on earth is the church, his bride, whom he loves, and hath purchased with his own blood. It is only when we rise to the high standpoint of Catholic faith and theology, from which St. Augustine wrote his *De Civitate Dei*, the eloquent Bossuet his *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, and the profound Schlegel his *Philosophy of History*, that we can seize the master elements that have been at work, and give to history its real scientific explanation."

"That is very true," answered Diefenbach, "when we seek to explain history from the point of view of the Creator, or from the point of view of the origin and destiny of man. God in creating the world has a purpose which he is everywhere and at all times fulfilling, and that purpose we can know only from Catholic faith and theology; but the creation in its own order copies or imitates the Creator. Natural society is not absorbed or annihilated by the introduction of supernatural society. It survives and continues to operate as second cause by its natural laws to its natural end. This end, which is by no means the final end of man, is really the end of natural society as natural society after as before the introduction of supernatural society. It lies wholly in the natural order, and is attained to, even under Christianity, by natural laws, and by the use of natural means; these means, these laws, and this end are the subject-matter of what is beginning to be called social science, and are as susceptible of scientific statement and exposition

as the subject-matter of any other science in the natural order."

"Our age," interposed O'Connor, "if steeped, on the one hand, in the Pelagian heresy, is, on the other, profoundly Jansenistic. The essence of Jansenism is in the suppression of nature to make way for the assertion of grace. In the matter of conversion, it denies all place to free will, and asserts the *gratia victrix*, or irresistible grace; in philosophy, it asserts traditionalism, builds science on faith, and allows nothing to natural reason; and in history, it sees nothing but Providence, and explains nothing by the free activity of man. Hence that pantheistic fatalism which marks so many of the historical productions of modern France and Germany."

"The age," added Diefenbach, "very generally denies or misinterprets the great mystery of the Incarnation, into which the whole Christian order is resolvable, and in which is the type of the relation of the human and the divine in the supernatural order, of the natural and supernatural, reason and faith, nature and grace. Some deny the Incarnation outright, allow no relation between God and man but the relation of cause and effect, and fall into pure naturalism; some absorb the divine nature in the human and fall into Pelagianism; others absorb the human in the divine and fall into Jansenism, substantially Calvinism, in theology, and pantheism, when not Manicheism, in philosophy. Jansenism is the error of pious minds inadequately instructed, or misinstructed. A little attention to the definitions of the church touching the Incarnation, against the Nestorians, Eutychians, the monophysites, and the monothelites, would guard the student against both Pelagianism and Jansenism. In the Incarnation the divine assumes the human, not the human the divine, and while divine nature and human nature are united in the unity of the divine person of the Word, and each is literally and truly the nature of God, they remain forever two distinct natures, without intermixture or confusion, without any conversion of either into the other; so that the human remains as distinctly human nature, and the divine as distinctly divine nature, after as before the fact of the Incarnation."

"The church is, in some sense," added O'Connor, "the continuation or representation on earth of the Incarnation, and each individual Christian, or living member of Christ's body is in some sort a miniature representation of the

church. He unites in himself both the human and the divine elements, not, of course, as in our Lord himself, in a hypostatic union, but in a union having its principle in that, and faintly imitating or copying it. The divine element in the Christian is the indwelling Holy Ghost, or what we call grace; but this divine element infused into our nature no more transforms nature itself, than the Incarnation of the Word transforms the humanity assumed. The infusion of grace elevates the act of our nature to the supernatural order, but it no more makes our nature itself supernatural than its assumption by the Word makes it divine nature. The human nature assumed became the nature of God, but the *human*, not the *divine*, nature of God. The assumption leaves it true and distinctively human nature; so grace leaves nature in its natural integrity, with all its natural powers and faculties, with its natural will and understanding, to operate according to their own natural laws to their own natural ends. While therefore, as against the unbelieving world, we must assert grace, we must, as against even a portion of the believing world, assert nature and defend the natural order."

"Hence the delicate position in which we are placed," remarked Father John. "If we apply ourselves to the assertion and vindication of nature, we strengthen the hands of those who deny or underrate the supernatural; if we apply ourselves to the assertion and vindication of the supernatural, we strengthen the hands of those who deny or underrate nature. So we can hardly open our mouths on the subject without favoring in effect either Pelagianism or Jansenism. Mr. Winslow, brought up a rationalist and recently converted, is the more afraid of losing the supernatural, and Mr. Diefenbach, brought up a Catholic, but familiar with the ravages of Jansenism, is the more afraid of losing the natural, because he is well aware that without the natural there can be no supernatural. It seems hard to the devout mind, anxious to abnegate self and exalt the glory of grace, to be told that it must beware of making grace exclusive, and that it must be careful to recognize the existence, the rights, and the activity of nature. It seems like an attempt to check devotion, and to rob God of his glory,—like limiting the divine by the human. The most subtle and dangerous error we have ever had to deal with is the Jansenistic, which, under a somewhat different form,

is as rife now as it was in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and the first half of the eighteenth."

"One extreme," said O'Connor, "begets another. The exaggeration of grace at the expense of nature, begets the exaggeration of nature at the expense of grace. Rationalism is the reaction of common sense against the scepticism of Pascal and Huet, who demolish reason in order to make way for revelation; traditionalism is the reaction of faith against rationalism; Jansenism is a reaction against Pelagianism, and naturalism is a reaction against Jansenism. The church always opposes to the insurgent error the truth that condemns it, but all who undertake to defend that truth, or to oppose that error, do not observe her moderation. She in her definitions stops always with the simple condemnation of the error, without ever striking against the truth its adherents may mingle with it. But the controversialists, intent only on combating the error, fortified, as they think, by the definitions of the church, rush in their zeal beyond her condemnation, and extend the definition, virtually if not formally, so as to make it condemn not only the error, but even the truth which has led the advocate of the error to embrace and defend it. This gives him a show of right; and as between him and them leaves him not wholly in the wrong. The great work now is to defend the natural order, natural reason and will, and natural society itself, not against the church, not against the supernatural, which is the error of the rationalists, but against that false and exaggerated supernaturalism which condemns them as totally depraved, and seeks to suppress them, or to absorb them in the supernatural."

"Very true," replied Father John; "but we must, while asserting and vindicating the natural, be on our guard against favoring a false and exaggerated naturalism. We must fix it clearly in our minds that nature, in and of itself, is totally impotent in the supernatural order, and therefore, in relation to our final destiny, since that destiny is purely supernatural. 'Without me,' said our Lord, 'ye can do nothing;' that is, without grace we can do nothing towards meriting or obtaining eternal life. He who should cultivate all his natural faculties, and exercise them all in their normal order, or who should keep the whole law of nature, though he would be less deserving of punishment indeed, would have no more claim to eternal life, to eternal beatitude, than he who breaks every precept in the deca-

logue, because that life, that beatitude, is the reward, not of works done from nature alone, but of works done in and from grace as their principle. Grace is always gratuitous, and can never be merited by any purely natural work whatever. We must fix it also in our minds that the church is a supernatural kingdom, supernaturally founded, supernaturally supported, for a supernatural end, the true and only final end of man in the present decree of Providence, and that by no possibility can she be resolved into natural society, or natural society be elevated to her level, substituted for her, or be made to perform her work, or the smallest conceivable part of her work. Having done this, and keeping it always in view, we are in no danger of exaggerating nature, of unduly exalting man's natural faculties, or the rights, powers, and duties of natural society."

"All that I accept," said Winslow; "I wish neither to convert nature into grace nor grace into nature. What I protest against is keeping grace and nature so distinct, that grace cannot elevate nature. Justifying grace is an infused habit, and if infused, it is infused into nature, coalesces with it, supernaturalizes it, and gives it a supernatural power or facility of acting, so that nature with it can do what without it infinitely exceeds its power. I am not willing to say that nature supernaturalized acts as simple nature, or that the church, the medium of grace, has no hand in civilizing natural society, and giving it a higher and nobler character than it could derive from nature alone. All civilization, we have agreed, is of sacerdotal origin. Priests have always been the civilizers of the race."

"Grace, that is, justifying grace, is an infused habit indeed," said Father John, "and it gives us the ability to do what without it would infinitely exceed our power; yet the ability it gives is not an ability in the natural order, or in relation to natural society, but in the supernatural, and in relation to the supernatural end of man. It is, if you will, the complement, or the perfection of nature; but in relation to the supernatural, not in relation to the natural. It enables a man to make a hat or a shoe from a supernatural motive, and to acquire thereby a supernatural merit; but it does not teach him how to make, or give him the ability and skill to make either, or either better than he otherwise might. Certainly grace illuminates the understanding and inspires the will, but only in relation to things that pertain to the supernatural *order*, the supernatural destiny of man, or

the order of supernatural merit. God may by a miracle, no doubt, endow individuals with knowledge, wisdom, skill, strength, or ability for natural ends, which they have not naturally; but grace, as an infused habit, gives ability only in relation to supernatural ends. Civilization is of sacerdotal, but not necessarily, therefore, of sacramental origin. Priests are the civilizers of the race, for civilization lies in the substitution of the dominion of reason for the domination of passion, and priests are always the representatives of reason as against passion, of intelligence and moral power as against brute force. Yet elevate civilization as you will, you can never elevate it to the supernatural order; perfect it as you may, it will still lie in the order of nature, and depend on the natural knowledge, wisdom, and virtues of the race. Civilization can never be converted into Christianity, nor substituted for it; natural society can never be transformed into supernatural society; and the most we can ever expect of civilization is that it shall accord with the church as reason accords with faith. The church does not administer the sacraments to the state, or baptize civilization. Civilization always remains, and must remain in the natural order, and depend on the natural virtues, however much grace may contribute, as a matter of fact, to sustain those virtues."

"Yet," said Winslow, "grace elevates the natural virtues to supernatural virtues, and a man in a state of grace, making a hat or a shoe for the love of God, acquires a supernatural merit."

"Undoubtedly," replied Father John. "Every act we perform has a supernatural value, and gives us, through the merits of our Lord, a title to heaven, if done in grace and from supernatural motives; but this effects the merit of the action in the supernatural order, not the ability or skill of the workman in the natural order. All the natural virtues, private as well as social, may in this way be made supernatural virtues, and meritorious of everlasting life. The church, instituted for the supernatural end of man, and having for her mission the glory of God in the salvation of souls, labors constantly to induce us—not to neglect the natural virtues, for without them there are, and can be no supernatural virtues, but—to perform them from supernatural motives, so as to enable us, in performing them, to merit eternal life. This is her great care and solicitude, 'for what doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world

and lose his own soul,' or miss the supernatural reward? Yet what we must not forget is, that the grace does not add to the natural ability to perform the natural virtues as natural virtues; it only adds the ability to perform them from supernatural motives, to render them at the same time supernatural virtues, meriting, through the merits of Christ who gives us the grace, eternal beatitude. Our ability in the natural order, in reference to natural motives and ends, is precisely the same with or without infused grace. A man cannot without infused grace acquire supernatural merit in making a hat or a shoe, but he may without that grace make as good a hat or shoe as with it, and merit his natural reward for making it."

"Yet," interposed O'Connor, "the church, by enabling us to perform the social and private virtues from supernatural motives, and promising us a supernatural reward makes us more diligent, more earnest and persevering in performing them, and thus renders an important service even to natural society, and exerts an incalculable influence in advancing true civilization. She thus adds to the natural motive the supernatural, and to the hope of a natural the hope of a supernatural reward, an eternal reward to one that can be enjoyed only in this life. The natural motives are in most men too weak to secure the natural virtues, as all experience proves, and we need the hope of a higher than a natural reward to keep us from neglecting or violating them. The church by adding the supernatural motive, through grace, strengthens the resolution, confirms the purpose, and gives energy and perseverance to the will in well-doing. Man will do more for the love of God than he will for the love of man, the love of natural society, or the love of civilization; more, when a firm believer, for an eternal supernatural reward, than for a temporal natural reward. In this sense grace may be said to aid nature in obtaining natural ends, by enabling us to obtain them for an ulterior supernatural end, and the words of our Lord are verified—'Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.' We are struck with astonishment at the vast service rendered by the clergy, secular and regular, to civilization in the barbarous ages, that is, from the conquest of the western empire to the establishment of feudalism in the eleventh century. There is no period in history when the progress of civilization has been greater, or has overcome greater obstacles; yet the

progress of civilization was rarely the direct end the clergy proposed to themselves. The direct object of their love was not natural society, but the church, or God manifest in the flesh. The direct end of their labors was not an earthly reward, but the crown of eternal life. They were animated by the love of God, by divine charity, and they looked only to the heavenly reward, the salvation of their own souls and the souls committed to their charge. Yet they abounded in all the natural virtues, and devoted themselves, for God's sake, to solacing the evils of their times, to the founding of schools, hospitals, institutions for the relief of the poor, the suffering, and the captive; to the amelioration of manners, the organization of the state, the improvement of legislation, the promotion of learning, art, and science, and thus lifted the human race up from the depth to which it had fallen, and placed it on the high road to a civilization in harmony with the Gospel."

"And because they did so, and because without them that progress could not have been made," said Winslow, "we say, and say truly, modern civilization is the work of the Catholic Church, and as her work, it is rightly called *Catholic* civilization."

"It is the work of the church," replied Father John, "in the sense that it has in a great measure resulted from her labors for the glory of her Lord in the salvation of souls, but not her work in the sense that it was the end she had in view, and for which she labored. She advanced natural society in laboring for the supernatural. She had the same mission then as now, and worked to the same end and in the same way that she now works. Yet we must distinguish in modern civilization that which was developed and matured under her fostering care during the period from the beginning of the sixth century to the end of the tenth, from that which has been retained from Græco-Roman civilization, or which has been since resuscitated, and is now generally meant by the term *civilization*."

"The church also aids civilization in a less indirect way," added Diefenbach, "by laboring always to secure her own freedom and independence. The church is indeed a spiritual kingdom, and established solely with reference to the glory of God in the salvation of souls; but she is a spiritual kingdom set up on the earth, and though operating for eternity alone, neverthless operates in space and time. It is necessary to the successful prosecution of her divine mis-

sion on the earth that she be free to act in all her integrity according to her own divine constitution and laws. Although she has received no authority to impose her faith and discipline by force on unbelievers, she has, as inherent, in her essential constitution, like any other kingdom that legitimately exists, the right of self-defence, and therefore, when necessary, to employ force if she has it at her command, to repel violence, and to protect her own freedom and independence. In asserting and defending her own freedom and independence as the church of God she necessarily asserts and defends religious liberty, the freedom of conscience, without which there is and can be no civil or political liberty, no government of law and therefore no civilization. The church, under the Germanic system, had to deal with rude manners, violent passions, and lawless and headstrong individuals; but she was recognized by the civil and political order as an institution independent of the state, resting on a basis of her own, and deriving her rights and powers from God through her own spiritual constitution, not through the concessions, charters, or edicts of temporal government. The state did not originate her freedom and independence, or even establish her as the religion of the land; it recognized her freedom, her independence, her authority as the church of God, and its own obligation to obey her as such, and to protect and defend her in all her divine rights and powers from all external violence. She was a free, independent corporation in the Germanic society, and held as other corporations by a title anterior and superior to the state. To attack her liberty was to attack the whole constitution of the Germanic society, and the liberties of all corporations, all institutions, all distinct and independent bodies, cities, towns, principalities, dukedoms, or counties, and with them the liberties of the people. Hence in defending herself as she did against the German kaisers, who sought to revive imperial Rome, she necessarily became the defender of political and civil liberty, and the grand supporter of the necessary conditions of all genuine civilization."

"Just as in defending her own freedom and independence in this country," added Father John, "she must necessarily defend the freedom and independence, or the rights of the citizen, what we call the rights of man. Under the Germanic system the church was free as an institution, or as a body not created, but recognized and protected by the state, or

supreme temporal power. That was then the condition of all freedom. The people then were free as bodies, corporations, guilds, or estates, not as isolated individuals. This feature of the Germanic system is not retained in our American system; we have reversed it, and now defend the rights of corporations and institutions as the rights of the citizen, the individual, the man. The church is not known as a corporation or institution to our constitution and laws, and is free and entitled to freedom and protection under them only as a citizen, that is to say, only in the right of the citizen or the man to freedom and protection. That this is a change for the better or the worse may or may not be true. On that point men may honestly differ, but it certainly has introduced a better condition than that in which the church existed in imperial Rome, even after the emperors became Christian, and far better than that she is now in under France or Austria. Whether for the better or for the worse, the change has been effected, is a *fait accompli*, and we must accept it. We can now defend the freedom of the church before the civil tribunals only in defending it as the right of the citizen, and therefore only in defending the freedom of conscience of the individual, and all the rights our system acknowledges the citizen holds, not from civil society, but anterior to it, from his own manhood, or from God as the common Father of all. Catholics here must defend the peculiar American liberty as the very condition of defending before the law the freedom and independence of the church as a spiritual kingdom or the kingdom of God, for here we can defend the rights of God only as the rights of man."

"And that," answered O'Connor, "is a full answer to those non-Catholic Americans who are, or affect to be, afraid that the church, if she prevailed here, would require her children to destroy the American republic, and introduce a despotic civil rule. It is not to be supposed that the church is bent on suicide, or that she can require or permit her children to destroy the only basis and safeguard of her own freedom that she has or can have in the Union, and to establish despotism, her worst enemy, of which Catholics would be the first victims. Individual Catholics, trained under a system where their religion is used to adorn the court, to swell the pomp of royalty, and is allowed the chief place in processions and the post of honor on gala days, may not much relish our republican simplicity, and may even

regret the lack of court patronage; from old habits they may think there is a natural association between the throne and the altar; but this belongs to them as Europeans, not as Catholics, and the church herself knows that she has had comparatively little to suffer from the people, and that her worst enemies have always been despotic princes, especially when they claim to be her friends and protectors. The interests of the church are here united with the interests of the citizen, and the rights of each are, in relation to the civil order, so intimately connected, that you cannot assert and defend the rights of the one without asserting and defending the rights of the other. There can be no clashing here between the Catholic as such, and the non-Catholic American, on the subject of liberty, or between the believer and the unbeliever. The unbeliever defends our civil order from natural motives, from love of natural society and natural justice, if you will; the believer does it from the same motives, and also for the sake of defending the freedom and independence of his church."

Conversation XVIII.

"I do not blame Mr. Diefenbach for his high estimate of the Germanic system," said De Bonneville; "but he should not forget that the Germans, when they first came in contact with the Romans, were an uncivilized people, barbarians, very much like your North American Indians, to whom the learned and judicious Guizot compares them. What little civilization they had at the epoch of the conquest they had derived from imperial Rome, in whose armies they had served from the time of Julius Cæsar, and from the efforts the Romans had made for two hundred and fifty years to civilize those who remained in their native forests. In conquering the empire they did not, with all deference to Father John, introduce a new order of civilization, but broke up the existing order, and planted barbarism on its ruins. The struggle from the Christian era down has, if you will, been a struggle between Rome and Germany, but it has been at the same time a struggle between civilization and barbarism. Before the conquest Rome sought to impose civilization on the Germans. Since the conquest the struggle has been to preserve the wrecks of the old civilized world, or such portions of it as had been retained by the church and the Roman populations of Gaul

and Italy; or on the one hand to restore and advance civilization broken down by the German conquest, and on the other to preserve and spread Germanic barbarism. In this work of reconstituting a civilized Europe the church has undoubtedly taken the lead, through her popes, her clergy, and her religious and military orders. To no one man is more to be attributed than to St. Benedict, a Roman nobleman, and the legislator of the monastic orders of the West. The great centres of revived civilization have been not only recently admitted into the civilized family in Germany, but in the so-called Latin nations, where the conquest had been the least complete, and the most of the ancient order had been retained. They have been in Italy, southern Gaul, and Spain. These nations retained a large Roman population, much of the language, the manners, the customs, the literature, and the institutions of the Roman world, and have been, as all the world knows, the leading nations in recivilizing Europe."

"Mr. de Bonneville should not forget, when speaking of the recivilization of Europe, my native country," said O'Connor. "Ireland had escaped both the Roman and the Germanic conquests, and in the sixth and seventh centuries stood at the head of the civilized world. It was her scholars and her pious and heroic missionaries that restored religion and learning in Gaul, and even in Italy, and no one, when he names St. Benedict, should forget to name St. Columbanus, St. Gall, and the colonies of monks they led with them, or which followed them from Ireland, where young men from England and all parts of the continent flocked to receive their education in the celebrated Irish schools, and to share the generous hospitality of the Irish people."

"I neither forget nor wish to underrate the services of the Irish monks in the sixth and seventh centuries to the Gallo-Roman population of the continent," answered De Bonneville. "An Irish monk founded, I believe, the monastery of Luxeuil in France, St. Gall in Switzerland, and Bobbio in Italy, but the influence of the Irish missionaries was very slight on the Germanic population, and they entirely failed in their efforts to introduce Christianity into Germany itself. The apostle of Germany was, I believe, the Anglo-Saxon Winifred, whose name the pope changed to that of Boniface. But be this as it may, the learning that was cultivated in Ireland during the centuries named,

and which the Irish monks and scholars carried with them to the continent, was Roman learning, learning which had been received from Rome through Gaul with St. Patrick and the Christian religion. I know nothing, and I can say nothing, of the learning, the arts, the sciences, the laws, the polity, the civilization of the Irish prior to their conversion to Christianity in the fourth or fifth century of our era; I only say that what they gave to Italy and Gaul in the sixth and seventh centuries was what they had previously received from them, and which undeniably pertained to the Roman order. This forms then no exception to my position that modern Europe has been recivilized, not by Germany, but by old Rome and the church, and those nations which have the most firmly adhered to the church and retained the most of Roman civilization, or that have been the least germanized, have been, and are foremost in civilizing as in christianizing the world."

"There is undoubtedly truth in what Mr. de Bonneville says," remarked O'Connor, "and his view is certainly that which has been generally entertained. What we call civilization to-day is certainly the Græco-Roman civilization retained or resuscitated. Taking the Græco-Roman civilization as the standard, and calling all that differs from it barbarism, we must of course measure the progress of civilization in the modern world by the progress that has been made in the revival of Græco-Romanism, or classical antiquity and the Roman imperial polity and jurisprudence. Scholars, whether churchmen or laymen, educated at first in the imperial schools, which were never entirely broken up till supplanted by the modern universities, and imbued with Greek and Roman letters, have very naturally identified all civilization with the Roman order, and counted as barbarous whatever does not harmonize with it. You see this in Dante, in Petrarca, in Tiraboschi, in Muratori, as well as in Arnaldo da Brescia, Rienzi, Machiavelli, and Erasmus. Learning, letters, scholarship, has always in all Europe, since, as before the conquest, been Græco-Roman. If by civilization we mean specially literature, art, liberal culture, refined taste, and polished manners, we must concede that all modern civilization is Græco-Roman, and that the Germans, save so far as civilized by the Romans, were a barbarous people, barbarians as the Romans termed them, as all history terms them, and as they indeed termed themselves, accepting in their laws and language the distinction of Roman and barbarian."

"There is no pretence," replied Diefenbach, "that the Germans, when they first came in contact with the Roman empire, were a highly civilized people in the sense in which we use or in which the Romans themselves used the term. They were not a lettered people, and when compared to the Romans, refined and corrupted by their Greek slaves, become their masters and teachers, they were an unpolished people, and rude in their speech and in their manners. But they were less cruel, less inhuman, and less absurdly superstitious than pagan Rome had always been, and continued to be to the last moment of her existence. The whole history of pagan Rome gives countenance to the old fable that her founder was suckled by a she-wolf, for her wolfish were always her most prominent qualities. As for literature, for art, science, philosophy, liberal culture, the Romans themselves, till after their conquest of Greece, were as deficient as their own German conquerors. What Rome had of these she borrowed from the Greeks, themselves a Germanic people, a branch of the great Germanic or Aryan family, corrupted by Egypt, Phœnicia, and the East, and by mixture with the old Pelasgic stock. I call the Germans who conquered Rome a civilized people, because they had a civil polity, laws, religion, manners, and customs, a fixed and regular political and religious order, which their language, traditions, mythology, legends, and popular poetry prove they had brought with them from their original seat in upper Asia."

"We must distinguish among the Germans," remarked Father John, "three classes: 1. Those who entered the Roman armies and served under the imperial eagles; 2. Among those who remained at home, the nomadic and predatory bands, reappearing in our frontiersmen and filibusters; and 3. The sedentary population living in towns, villages, and hamlets, pursuing agriculture, trade, and the mechanic arts. The first class to a great extent adopted Roman ideas and manners, learned the Roman arts and sciences, cultivated Roman literature, and not unfrequently rose to senatorial, and even consular dignity, under the empire. The second class uniting with their nation in war, and forming not seldom the most effective part of its troops, were, no doubt, an irregular lawless set, as are our own filibusters, and went where, and did very much as, they pleased. But the third class, the great body of the German people, with a high spirit of freedom and an indomitable

love of independence, lived under a regular civil polity, and the empire of religion and law. Undoubtedly their civil order, as their literature and science, was less developed than that of the Romans, but it *was* a civil order, and contained the elements or germs of a civilization far superior to the Roman under the Cæsars, whatever it was under the republic, and far more in harmony with the rights of man and the freedom and independence of the church."

"The Romans themselves, as the Greeks, sprang from a Germanic stock," remarked Diefenbach, "and found their way to Italy from Media southwardly, through Asia Minor, as the Germans found their way to Europe from upper Persia to the north of the Black Sea, and spread themselves from the Palus Mæotis and Thracia, through Dacia and up the valley of the Danube, to the ocean. But by their relations with Africa and the East the Romans lost much of their original Germanic character before the end of the republic, and became corrupt, weak, effeminate, cunning, crafty, subtle, lying, and unchaste under the imperial despotism. They had long recruited their armies from the Germanic tribes, and even the legions with which Julius Cæsar conquered Rome and defeated Pompey at Pharsalia were Germans, recruited from Germanic Gaul. At the epoch of the conquest there is no doubt the Germans were superior to the Romans in nearly all the virtues that pertain to the natural order. They were for the most part, no doubt, pagans or Arians, but they were braver, more manly, more chaste, more truthful, and possessed a higher sense of honor and integrity than the contemporary Romans, or inhabitants of the empire. Hence the term *Barbarian*, applied to them, was a term of honor, while that of *Roman* was intended, and felt to be, a term of reproach, expressive of all that is low, cunning, lying, mean, base, and cowardly. The Franks, from whom the French derive their name, had, according to Salvian, the reputation of being liars, and would seem to have been the fiercest, the cruellest, and the least tractable of all the German invaders of the empire, but the more advanced and far-seeing of the ecclesiastical writers of the times predicted that the Germans would prove to be a people superior to the Romans, and regarded their conquest of the empire, though a terrible evil for the moment, as likely to be a great benefit to religion and society. You meet every now and then, in spite of their patriotism and

their Roman sympathies, the conviction flashing out that the conquest was a providential work, and designed in mercy to the human race. Impartial history confirms their predictions and their hopes."

"That the Germans were not a wholly uncivilized people, even in our modern or the Roman sense of the term," said O'Connor, "may I think be inferred from the success with which they maintained the struggle with the Roman empire for nearly five hundred years. For two hundred and fifty years imperial Rome exerted all her power to impose her civilization on the Germans without success. She penetrated their country with her armies indeed, though not without occasional disasters, and established her posts on the Rhine, the Danube, and the Elbe. Trajan carried away Dacia, drove the inhabitants beyond the Carpathian mountains, and planted the depopulated territory with a military colony, composed, it is said, principally of Gauls and Italians, the ancestors of the present Roumans, or inhabitants of the Danubian principalities. But the emperors were never able to subdue the German spirit, or to romanize Germania as they had romanized Celtic Gaul, and Iberian and Celtiberian Spain. Rome has left no trace of her language, of her laws, her manners, and her customs with the Germans, except of such as have been introduced since the conquest. This shows that the Roman civilization never conquered or subdued the German. After centuries of vain efforts to impose the pagan civilization of Rome on the Germans, Germanic patience was exhausted, the Germanic spirit was thoroughly aroused, and provoked to make reprisals on the empire. The Germans retort the attack, and commence offensive operations, and after a struggle continued with alternate successes and defeats for two hundred years or more, they obtain a complete victory, and put an end to the western empire, in the year of our era 476 or 479, when Odoacer the Goth compels its last emperor, Augustulus, the imbecile son of Orestes the Pannonian, to resign the purple and sue for mercy. This result might, and would have been effected more than a hundred years earlier, if the Germans themselves had not, while they invaded, also sustained the empire. The soldiers with whom Ætius defeated Attila were for the most part Germans, and Alaric would have defended instead of taking and sacking the city of Rome, if Roman pride and Roman perfidy, as well as Roman cowardice and meanness, had not disgusted him,

and justified his vengeance. Now a people who could resist the efforts of the Roman emperors, when Rome was as yet in the pride of her strength, to subdue them and to bring them under their yoke, who could not only successfully resist, but retain sufficient strength to make reprisals, and in turn invade, conquer, and subdue the most renowned civilized empire in the world, whose very ruins fill us with awe, could not have been an uncivilized people like the Indian tribes of North America. Barbarism can never successfully resist and subdue civilization; it may be violent, but its violence is that of weakness, not of strength. Barbarism is weakness, civilization is strength, and the conquering people, other things being equal, has always a higher, a more living civilization, even if less refined, than that of the conquered. When a civilized people meets a barbarous people, as when well disciplined and well-appointed regular troops meet an irregular and undisciplined horde, it is sure, finally, whatever checks it may momentarily undergo, to come off victorious."

"That is," said Father John, "supposing the civilized people to be a living people, and their civilization a living civilization. A civilization may have become old and decrepit, and succumb before a people less civilized, but possessing more rude vigor and more manly courage. Yet in reality a civilization that has grown old and decrepit has lapsed into barbarism, and ceased to be civilization, for barbarism always results from the loss of civilization. The Romans excelled the Germans in letters, in art, in science, in culture, in discipline, in classical refinement; but they were inferior to them in that civilization which gives and secures freedom, personal bravery and activity, high daring, noble resolve, and real energy of character, and these are the qualities which ensure, as they deserve, victory. I do not, however, go so far as some of my Teutonic friends in asserting the early civilization of the Germans. They were civilized before the conquest, in the sense that they had as yet unexhausted the elements of a rich and vigorous civil polity superior even to that of the Romans under the Cæsars, especially after Diocletian had reorganized the empire and made it a pure despotism. The Germans—I include under the term all the Teutonic tribes or nations who took part in the invasion and conquest of the empire, by whatever name they were called—were all virtually the same people, the white Scythians of Herodotus, as Cardinal Wiseman very

properly maintains, and known in history as the Asi, the Sagetes, Assagetes, Massagetes, the Getæ, Guttones, Gottones, Thracians, Teutones, and Goths, and were a branch of the great Aryan family that migrated to Europe after the Iberian and Celtic migrations, and probably before the Slavonic. There were differences among them, no doubt, but their language, their civil polity, their laws, religion, mythology, manners, and customs, their traditions and popular poetry, as well as the testimony of the early writers themselves, prove very satisfactorily that they were all of the same family, and entitled to the same generic name. Using the term in this generic sense, the Germans, though less cultivated and less lettered than the Romans, were at the epoch of the conquest superior to them in their moral and physical qualities, in simplicity and purity of manners, in manliness, frankness, courage, and strength and energy of character, and deserved to be held up, as Tacitus holds them up, in contrast with them. If success was due to the most deserving, they rightfully succeeded in their warfare against the corrupt and degenerate Romans under the empire. But what I contrast with the Roman civilization is not the Germanic civilization, as the Germanic family had retained it in their migrations from Asia, or possessed it when their relations with the Romans commenced, but as I find it developed after the conquest in connection with the Christian religion, under the fostering care of the church, whose missionaries had assimilated all that was worth retaining in the Jewish and Græco-Roman civilizations, and which received its most complete and vigorous organization under Charlemagne, elevated by Pope St. Leo III., in the year 800, to the imperial dignity, and constituted the protector and defender of the holy Roman church and the ecclesiastical states."

"That act of the pope, reviving the western empire and crowning Charlemagne its emperor, with the intention of making him the vassal of the Holy See," said De Bonneville, "was the source of incalculable evils to Europe, and led to the long struggle for supremacy between the pope and the emperors in the middle ages. The pope, charmed with the piety of the French king, and grateful for the services he had just rendered him in delivering him from his turbulent temporal subjects, who had risen against him, put out his eyes, and cut out his tongue, which a miracle restored, in a fit of enthusiasm created him emperor of Rome,

and laid the train for the terrible disasters which followed, when the empire passed from the French to the Germans."

"Mr. de Bonneville is out in his history," said Diefenbach. "Though Charlemagne reigned over what is now France, he was no *French* king, but a pure German, as were all the Franks. The kingdom of France begins only with what the French call their third race of kings, the Capetians, really their first race. Prior to the accession of Hugh Capet, duke of France, there was no French kingdom, no French people in the modern sense of the term. The Francia of an earlier date was German, and a reminiscence of it remains in the modern name of Franconia. The principal part of the glory the French claim for services rendered to the Holy See, is not theirs, and is made to appear theirs only by confounding the Franks with the French. They usurp for the French the glory that belongs of right to the Germans. The Franks were a German nation, and, it is said, were distinguished from the other German nations by being great liars, the only distinction which French historians seem to have inherited from them. Of all modern nations the French have done the most to pervert history, and the least for its truth. They are a hybrid of the Franks who invaded the empire, and the old Gallo-Roman population. They retain no little of their old Gallo-Roman character, and better than any other western people, the vices of the lower empire. What of glory the French are entitled to, they owe to their Germanic elements. The French nobility, the French chivalry, are Germanic, derived either through the Franks or the Normans. French meanness, littleness, astuteness, cruelty, ferocity, and licentiousness, exhibited on so gigantic a scale in their foreign and civil wars, are due to Gallo-Roman traditions and nurture, and have been inherited or resuscitated from the Romans of the lower empire."

"Mr. Diefenbach suffers his national prejudices to push him to injustice to the French," interposed Father John. "The French are a great and noble nation, and with all their faults deserve to be spoken of with love and respect. The old Gallic population, especially in those provinces where they had not, as in Brittany for instance, become thoroughly romanized, are as high-toned, as chivalric, and as virtuous as the population of any other country in the world. I dislike the present imperial *régime*, and the despotic tendencies of French politics, but the French people

are as enlightened, brave, virtuous, and freedom-loving as any other. I own, however, the French historians are wrong in calling the Carlovingians French sovereigns, and this has been well proved by Augustin Thierry, himself a Frenchman, in his *Lettres sur l'Histoire de France.* We might with even more truth call the Angles and Saxons English."

"Thierry was a Frenchman, no doubt," replied Diefenbach, "but he claimed to have been descended from Thierry, a Frankish king, and believing himself of Frankish origin, he was not unwilling to do justice to his German ancestors. But this remains true, that the Franks in the time of Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne, were not French. They were Germans, spoke the German language, and remained Germans as long as the Carlovingians reigned. It was only as the Carlovingians became exhausted, and the Gallo-Roman population revived, that the Franks sank to Frenchmen. Yet it is not against the Roman or Celtic, Aquitanian or Iberian, blood, I speak. It is not the race that is in fault, for all are of the same original stock; but the influence of imperial Rome. Wherever I find traces of the corrupt and effete Græco-Roman civilization under the later empire, I find matter to condemn. The French civilization differs from the German in the single respect that it mingles with its Germanic elements a much larger infusion of imperial Rome. To a certain extent Rome always survived in Gaul, and still survives in France, and therefore it is the French are to a great extent prone either to imperialism or Jacobinism, always wedded to absolutism, either in the monarchical or the democratic form."

"Celt as I am," said O'Connor, "I naturally sympathize with the French and Romans, whom I have considered of Celtic origin, and from whom I have received my faith and my learning, rather than with the Germans; but it cannot be denied that the Frankish sovereigns, who in the eighth and ninth centuries did so much to defend the Holy See, to protect the temporal sovereignty of the popes, to check the advance of the Saracens, and in the conquest of the pagan Saxons to save Christendom itself, were Germans, and not French as we now understand the term; and the glory, which is great and imperishable, belongs to Germany, and not to France. *Suum cuique.*"

"Mr. de Bonneville is wrong again," said Diefenbach, "in alleging that Pope St. Leo III. revived the Roman

empire in the West, and crowned Charlemagne, who was king of the Franks and Lombards, and patrician of Rome, its emperor. The holy pontiff did nothing of the sort, and the western Roman empire, which ended with Augustulus, was never revived by St. Leo or by any of his legitimate successors in the papacy. Charlemagne was never emperor of the Franks, of the Germans, of France, of Germany, or of any other country, or any other people. His estates were never during his life erected into an empire, either by the pope or by himself, and rarely, if ever, were they called an empire during the Carlovingian dynasty. When Napoleon I. dreamed of reconstituting what he held to be the Frankish empire, composed of France as the ruling nation, Spain, Italy, Germany, &c., as vassal kingdoms, or when he called himself the successor of Charlemagne, he only proved his ambition and his ignorance of history. He committed as gross a blunder as did Barbarossa when he called himself the ninety-sixth successor of Augustus, and alleged that the empire had been transferred from the Romans to the Germans. The Ghibellines have always been sad historians, though men of rare invention, and I can hardly explain how it is that the English, who are naturally Guelfs, generally confide in their statements. The popes, attacked by the Lombards and the iconoclastic Greeks, and conspired against by the disaffected among their own temporal subjects, called to their protection and assistance the Frankish kings, and in order to save their own temporal sovereignty, and yet give the Frankish monarch a legal right to exercise authority in the papal states, created the office of patrician, and conferred it on Pepin, and subsequently on Charlemagne. It was an office in the papal states and under the papal sovereignty, as much so as is at present the office of governor of Rome or of Bologna. St. Leo III., having been attacked by a portion of his own subjects, made his escape to Charlemagne, and called upon him to come and aid him to restore tranquillity in his states, and to punish the criminals. Charlemagne, as was his duty as patrician of Rome, complied, and marched an army into Italy, restored the pope to his temporal sovereignty, punished the criminals, and reëstablished peace. The pope, in gratitude for his services, surprised him by crowning him emperor, that is, simply raising him from the patrician to the imperial dignity, and associating him under the imperial title with himself in the exercise of temporal authority in the papal states.

He did not confer on him any new power, he did not declare him emperor of the Roman empire of the West, nor erect his estates into an empire, far less did he raise him to the sovereignty of Rome and the papal states, for he must, as the condition of receiving the crown, swear to protect and defend the pope in his temporal sovereignty."

"In the fact that the imperial dignity was conferred on the patrician who held his authority from the pope, and carried with it powers under the pope in the papal states, as well as duties to the Roman church and the special people of St. Peter, we see the reason," said O'Connor, "why the right to elect and crown the emperor belonged to the pope. The right did not belong, nor was it pretended that it belonged, to the pope, precisely as spiritual head of the church, but it was a prerogative of his temporal sovereignty in his own principality, and was in principle nothing more than the ordinary right of the sovereign to appoint the officers of his government."

"The struggle commenced," said Father John, "only when the emperors wished to assume the position and exercise the authority of the Roman Cæsars, when they forgot that by virtue of the imperial dignity, they were not created sovereigns of Rome, but protectors, defenders, and coadjutors of the pope in his own temporal sovereignty, and wished to make the pope the temporal subject of the German kaiser, as he had been of the Roman emperors, as Napoleon I. pretended to have made him, and as Napoleon III. is trying to make him, a subject of the emperor of the French. This, since the German emperors claimed not only the civil, but even the pontifical power of the old Roman Cæsars, would not only have destroyed the temporal sovereignty of the pope, but would have subjected the church to the state, the spiritual to the temporal, and annihilated all religious freedom and independence. The popes could not abandon their right to elect and crown the emperor without neglecting their manifest duty not only as temporal sovereigns, but as the spiritual head of the church and guardian of the rights and interests of religion. But let us return to the point we were discussing. The Germanic system I admire and contrast with the Roman, is not precisely the Germanic system as it prevailed among the Germans before their intercourse with Rome, but as it was developed after the conquest, primarily among the Franks, and as it prevailed in western Europe till the establishment of feudalism in the

eleventh and twelfth centuries. I do not pretend that this system, even as thus developed, was perfect, or that it secured all the advantages of both order and liberty. I see in it many defects; but in its general principles, and in its leading features, it belonged to the highest and most desirable order of civilization. What I most admire in it is its federal character, and the absence of centralism. It eschewed that logical unity and simplicity which characterizes alike Roman imperialism and modern democracy. All simple governments, flowing from a single principle, are absolute governments, and therefore despotic, hostile to all freedom. The Germans, though they had unity of origin, spirit, traditions, &c., were never a single political people organized under a single chief, or one and the same civil polity. The estates of Charlemagne were never constituted into a single state, kingdom, or empire, like modern Spain or France, or like what the present excellent emperor of Austria is attempting to make of his estates, induced, no doubt, by the *bureaucracie*, which interferes hardly less with the freedom of the sovereign than with the freedom of the subject, and by the belief, I presume, that it is necessary to his position in face of the great military monarchies of France and Russia. After the final defeat of the pagan Saxons, who made their last stand for barbaric paganism, under their duke, Witikind, backed by all the pagan nations of the North and the East to the western limits of China,—all the nations of Europe, from the lower Danube, south of the Carpathian Mountains and the Vistula, with the exception of the papal states, southern Italy, the British Isles, and a part of Spain, were united under Charlemagne, and formed the estates he left to his sons; but they formed a vast confederacy of nations, principalities, dukedoms, counties, free cities, under an elective chief, not a single consolidated state. The Germanic kingdom was not dissimilar to the American confederation or federal union of free, sovereign, independent states, and had some resemblance to what had several times been attempted among the free cities of Greece and Italy. Under the American system the states do not derive their rights and powers from the Union, but the Union derives its rights and powers from them. They are anterior to it, and remain independent and sovereign within their own limits under it. They elect the federal congress and the federal executive. It was the same, in principle, under the Caroline constitution, only under it the federal chief, if

I may so term him, was not a simple citizen of one of the states as under the American constitution, but the king, hereditary or elective, of one, and that usually the most powerful and preponderating state of the confederation. This was a defect in the system, and, though unavoidable, finally proved fatal to it.

"It is easy to see," continued Father John, "the difference between this system and that of the Roman Cæsars. Under the imperial system the provinces were governed as conquered or subjugated provinces, and the original local rights of the towns or municipalities were converted into the duty of paying or collecting taxes, and supplying the Roman fisc. What under the republic were local or municipal privileges, became under the empire an intolerable burden, which the decurions would frequently have willingly exchanged for slavery, if an imperial edict had not come to prohibit any freeman from making himself a slave, and compelling him to remain free for the benefit of the treasury, or to support the luxury of the court and its parasites. The land through the entire empire was held to belong to the emperor, and to be only leased to its occupiers,—the seminal principle, I take it, of feudalism, modified by the action of the Germanic system. All power was concentrated in the state, and was held to emanate from Cæsar, the fountain of justice, right, authority,—on earth what God is in heaven. The Caroline or Germanic system, left to each member of the federation its autonomy, its local sovereignty, its laws, its rights, its powers, its language, its usages, its manners and customs. It left the members their original freedom and independence, and recognized in them rights which must be respected by each and by all. The same principle was extended to the church as a spiritual kingdom, and hence her freedom and independence entered into the public law, and were recognized and guarantied as public right."

"This was true," said Diefenbach, "only under the Caroline constitution, or under the Austrasian Franks. It was never true, however consonant to the Germanic spirit, ideas, and sentiments, of the Neustrian Franks. The Neustrian kings were more than half romanized, and sought to revive or continue imperial Rome in Gaul, as Theodoric did in Italy. The Germanic nations who had invaded the empire, and alternately fought for and against the emperors, imbibed many Roman ideas and affections, and whenever they attempted to found in the limits of the empire kingdoms of

their own, they copied the imperial system. Gothic Spain was, perhaps, an exception. We see this especially in the Ostrogoths, and after them in the Neustrian Franks, who were seated in northern, western, and central Gaul, and who received the Christian religion with their king, Clovis, or rather Hlodowig, Ludwig, Louis. They not unnaturally inclined to the civilization they found associated with their new religion, and with Roman prelates in the church, and Gallo-Romans for ministers of state, or counsellors of the sovereign, they could hardly avoid tending to Roman imperialism; and we find, in fact, the Merovingian kings putting forth all the exorbitant claims of the Cæsars, and copying the Byzantine emperors in their relations with the church. Happily these first German organizations within the empire, which rivalled the Roman in corruption and despotism, proved short-lived, and were obliged to give way to the Austrasian Franks, whose relations with the empire were of more recent date, who had been but slightly romanized, and who were never severed from all connection with their original seats in Germany. The Austrasian Franks remained German, and are substantially German even to-day. The Neustrians, from whom on the German side the French are more immediately descended, became partially romanized, and it is to this romanization I attribute the contrast we find to-day between the French and the German minds. The French mind is the best representative the modern world has of the Roman mind under the later emperors."

"France is to-day," added Father John, "substantially the lower empire, with its refinement, its polish, its culture, its corruption, its vices, its despotism. Whether imperial or democratic, it must have a centralized government, and is always despotic. It can accept no alternative between cæsarism and Jacobinism, the empire and the republic one and indivisible. The old Germanic elements are eliminated from its soul, at least if we may believe the government and its supporters, as well as from its constitution. The fact is, France, of all the nations that have sprung up from the ruins of the empire, has remained the most Roman, and been the least thoroughly germanized, with perhaps the exception of southern Italy."

Conversation XIX.

"The Caroline constitution," said Winslow, "had one grand defect, at least, which hastened its ruin. Its central bond was too weak, and there was a constant tendency to dissolution. The centrifugal force was too strong for the centripetal, and it was only a strong and energetic chief that could prevent the union of so many heterogeneous elements from being dissolved. Charlemagne is hardly laid in his tomb, before the dissolution begins, and is completed under his grandsons, when we see begin to be formed distinct nations, and emerging the feudal system, which left no trace of European unity, except that of the papacy."

"The German emperors, so much abused by our friends, saw this," said De Bonneville, "saw all Europe parcelled out among petty feudal lords, each claiming and exercising high criminal justice in his own feudal territory, and between free cities, each claiming to be sovereign and independent in its own limits, all making war on one another as independent sovereigns, and inflicting untold sufferings on the poor people, and rendering impossible the restoration of civil order and social progress—they saw this, and attempted by concentrating the royal and imperial power, to apply a much needed remedy. They took the side of the people against their feudal oppressors; hence the support the people gave them in return, and that, too, in spite of the papal bulls excommunicating and deposing them. The Hohenstaufen still live in the popular heart of Germany, and hold a far higher place in the memory of the Germans than is held by those emperors who always proved themselves obsequious to the slightest papal behests, and for their subserviency were canonized."

"The Caroline constitution was defective," replied Father John, "or else it would not have failed. The German kaisers, as the Gallican kings, were right in seeking to redress the evils, and they were many, of feudalism; but they were wrong in attempting to do it by the revival of imperial Rome, and reëstablishing that imperialism which their ancestors had overthrown, and which was and is repugnant to the proper German spirit. The popes did not oppose them for the good they attempted, or for seeking to repress the anarchy and barbarism fostered by the feudal system, but for interfering with the rights of the church and of the

Holy See, with the freedom and independence of the spiritual authority on the one hand, and the independence of the pope as temporal sovereign in his own states on the other. There is a right and a wrong way of doing things; the princes, whether German, French, English, or Spanish, took the wrong way, as do our modern Jacobins, and the remedy they would have introduced in that way would have proved a greater evil on one side than it could have cured on the other. Bad as feudalism was, it was not so bad as Roman imperialism in the fourth and fifth centuries; great as were the evils it inflicted on society, the evils of the destruction of the freedom and independence of the church would have been greater."

"The people," said O'Connor, "seldom discriminate in their judgment, and the fact that they sympathized with the kaisers in their war against feudalism is no evidence that the popes were wrong in opposing their efforts to revive Roman imperialism. The history of Europe will show many weak popes,—weak according to our human modes of judging,—and some few whose personal morals were not much superior to the average morals of secular sovereigns; but the popes have always been the first to see and comprehend every new movement and tendency, and we may feel, even in matters not of faith, we are on the right side when we are on the side espoused or approved by the reigning pontiff. The pope almost alone saw the tendency of the movements commenced by the German sovereigns. He saw that it could end only in the resuscitation of Roman cæsarism, and the whole imperial system which for three centuries had proscribed Christianity, and persecuted the Christians, and had done religion afterwards a far greater disservice by pretending to protect it. Gioberti says the Romans were a hieratic, or sacerdotal people from the beginning, commissioned to spread civilization by conquest,—a hieratic people armed with the sword. Certain it is that the emperors succeeded to all the powers claimed by the Roman people, and concentrated in themselves the patricial, the tribunitial, and the sacerdotal powers, which under the republic had been distributed in different hands, and made to operate as checks one upon another. Under the imperial *régime* they were united in the person of the emperor, who was in reality consul, senate, tribune, and *pontifex maximus*. He was assumed in pagan times to be a divinity on earth, and divine honors were paid to his statues. Traces of this are

detected in the court language used even after the emperors became Christian, as late as the time of Theodosius the Great, who was addressed as 'your divinity,' 'your eternity,' &c. According to the imperial theory all power, all right, all justice, as has been explained, emanated from the emperor. This theory runs through the whole Theodosian and Justinian codes, and was tersely expressed by Ulpian, *Quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem.* As the emperor was *pontifex maximus* as well as imperator, supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, the church as well as the state fell within his jurisdiction, and could legally exist and exercise her functions in the empire only by his permission, and only so far and so long as it pleased him. The emperor was in every respect the superior of the pope, and the church, though tolerated, nay, though declared by an imperial edict to be the religion of the empire, had and could have no freedom, no independence, save at the expense of martyrdom. It was the recollection of the pontifical character of the emperor that led, after he became a Christian, to his perpetual interference with religious and ecclesiastical affairs, and to the greater part of that civil legislation respecting religion which is usually alleged as proof that the church opposes religious liberty, and demands for religion a civil establishment."

"In this claim of the emperors to be the chiefs of religion, as well as of the state, we see why under pagan Rome Christianity was proscribed and Christians were persecuted," added Diefenbach. "The Christian religion was opposed to the state religion, and therefore held to be the enemy of Cæsar, and its profession was punished as a crime against the emperor. Constantine the Great, *pontifex maximus* of the pagan religion, when he professed Christianity repealed the edicts of his predecessors against the Christians, and granted them liberty to profess Christianity, but he left paganism the legal religion of the empire. He promulgated an act of toleration, as was afterwards done by James II. of England, who, though a Catholic, was the legal head of the state religion, and held to be supreme in spirituals as in temporals in his realm. The successors of Constantine went further, made Christianity the state religion, and ordered the pagan sacrifices to cease and the temples to be closed, depriving them at the same time of their revenues. Whether pagan or Christian, Catholic or Arian, the emperors always claimed the right, if not to determine what

is or is not Christianity, at least to determine what must or must not be the religion of the empire. They never rose to the conception, certainly never adopted the conception, of religious liberty, or the full freedom and independence of the church before the state. They prohibited and persecuted the church, connived at her existence, tolerated her, or they enacted her as a civil law, and made the profession of her faith obligatory on their subjects. In no case was the church free. Her rights in the empire were held to be derived from the emperor, and whatever her privileges or possessions, they were held to be the gifts of the imperial liberality, and might be revoked at will. In this fact, that the church was held to have even spiritual authority in the empire only by virtue of the imperial edicts, not by virtue of her own divine constitution, is to be found the principal reason why the introduction of Christianity proved impotent to regenerate the empire, to save it from the vices and corruptions which destroyed its strength, and rendered it unable to resist the attacks of the German invaders. Her social action was circumscribed by the civil authority, and the private virtues of individuals, prevented by an iron despotism from infusing new life into the state, proved, as they must always prove, inadequate to the task of arresting the fall of an empire founded on despotic principles, and already on its declivity. This theory of imperial Rome was common to the empire in the East and the West, and continued in force in the Greek empire till it fell before the victorious arms of Mahomet II. It passed from Byzantium into Russia, where it was fully and firmly established by Ivan the Terrible. It was attempted to be revived by the Merovingians in Gaul, and in Germany and Italy by the German kaisers; it prevails now in most of the German courts, is sustained by rare ability, astuteness, and dissimulation by the present emperor of the French; it dominates in Turkey and China, and is imposed on the Elizabethan church in England and Ireland. This system had been suppressed by the Austrasian Franks and the old Germanic constitution, which remained in vigor from the seventh century to the eleventh, but the later German emperors, as well as the kings of England, France, and Aragon, attempted to revive it, and it was this system, so utterly repugnant to every Christian conception, that the popes, in so far as it affected their own temporal sovereignty and the rights of the church, opposed in their long and terrible struggles with

the Franconian, and more especially the Hohenstaufen, kaisers, and the temporal power in general during the later middle ages. For warring against this system they have been so loudly and bitterly denounced by kings and kaisers, courtiers, jurisconsults, heretics, schismatics, and disfrocked monks, that even good Catholics have almost feared to defend them, and felt that their conduct was to be excused, apologized for, rather than applauded, although in fact these noble popes devoted themselves, with all the spiritual and temporal forces at their command, to the defence of the highest and dearest interests of religion and society. If in opposing this doubly despotic system, which enslaves men's consciences as well as their bodies, the popes deranged royal and imperial plans for redressing the evils of feudalism, the blame belongs not to them, but to those by whose pride and ambition affairs became so complicated that it was impossible to defend the rights of the papacy and the independence of religion without disturbing, for the time at least, plans of civil organization in themselves not bad."

"But in no country," said Winslow, "is this system, which I as thoroughly detest as does any member of Our Club, carried to greater perfection, or the doctrine of royal supremacy more complete, than in England, where the chief of the state is *ex officio* the recognized chief of religion. And yet we are told that England, or Great Britain, is the representative in the modern world of the old Germanic constitution of Europe!"

"But the system," answered Father John, "is, and always has been decidedly anti-English, and repugnant to the genuine spirit of the British constitution. Only a minority of the British people adhere, or ever have adhered, to the state church. The system was favored by the Plantagenets, and imposed by the Welsh Tudors, but it was never accepted by the Catholics, who so late as the beginning of the last century constituted full one-third of the population of England and Wales; it was resisted in the seventeenth century by the much misunderstood and misrepresented Puritan movement in England and Scotland, and has been nobly, almost heroically protested against recently by the organization of the Scottish Free Kirk, which I regretted to find a writer in *The Dublin Review* condemning; it is opposed by the Tractarian movement in the bosom of the Elizabethan church itself. The Non-Conformist party daily

gathers courage and strength, and the admission of Protestant dissenters, Catholics, even Jews, to seats in parliament, proves that the system must ere long be abandoned, and that the recognition by the state of the equality of all professedly religious bodies before the civil law, and the suppression of the Anglican Church as a state religion, are only questions of time. The whole tendency of English legislation and of the English mind itself is towards true religious liberty, and the assertion of the incompetency of the state in spirituals. England nobly sustains religious liberty in her numerous colonies, even in India, and is rapidly approximating it at home."

"I have as an Irishman no reason to like England," said O'Connor, "and it is asking too much of my countrymen to ask them to forget the wrongs done to them and their religion by Saxon and Protestant England. Irishmen cannot be expected to join in the praise of the desolator and oppressor of their country, and they would be more than human, if they did not desire her humiliation, or at least the extinction of the English faction in Ireland. Yet I think myself, though mainly through Irish influence, the day is not far distant, when the English government will be permitted, nay, required by the British people to recognize full religious liberty, the full freedom and independence of every religious body recognizing the obligations of natural morality, to legislate for and govern in spirituals its own members, according to its own constitution, creed, discipline, and canons. Under such a recognition the church would be as free in the British empire as she ever was under the old Germanic constitution."

"She will be free and independent," resumed Father John, "in relation to her own members only, but that is all the freedom and independence she needs or has ever needed. She needs the protection of the laws against the external violence of her enemies, but she does not need laws to suppress sects and religions hostile to her. She asks what she has here, what our constitution and laws guaranty her, but I cannot discover that she asks or has ever asked any thing more. Here she is as free as she can be, and has to suffer only the annoyances and vexations that must always be expected from popular bigotry and prejudice, where the majority of the people are opposed to the Catholic religion. I do not pretend that England is not full of anti-Catholic prejudices; I do not pretend that she represents

the old Germanic system in all its best features; I do not deny that she has suffered and still suffers terribly from the old imperial system of pagan Rome; but I do maintain that she represents the old Germanic system far better than I find it represented by any other European nation."

"I fear," said Diefenbach, "that that is true. The Germans are not what they were in the time of Charlemagne, or even under the Othos. Roman imperialism reigns in the courts, and French Jacobinism has made terrible ravages among the people, yet I am far from despairing of the Germans in Germany. In nearly all the German states the old German spirit still lives, and reminiscences of German freedom are retained. There is in all Germany a strong constitutional party, free from either extreme, which needs only proper encouragement to become predominant. The difficulty is, that at present, order in Germany is defended on despotic, and liberty on anarchical principles. The German publicists, not connected with the administration, are book-men, theorizers, drawing on their logic and their imagination instead of practical knowledge and experience, and therefore almost necessarily favor either cæsarism or Jacobinism, that is, absolutism either under the imperial form or the democratic."

"There is another difficulty," said O'Connor; "Germany is about equally divided between Catholics and Protestants. The north, where Protestantism predominates, is precisely the part of Germany where we find the most of the original Germanic character, and where liberty is best understood, the most fearlessly asserted, in theory, if not in practice, and this turns the Catholic sympathies towards Austria, which, though for the most part Catholic, claims to be a continuation of the so-called Holy Roman Empire, and really inherits its traditions and its policy. Hence springs up the conviction, which superficial appearances justify, that Protestantism favors liberty and Catholicity favors despotism. Hence the Catholic shrinks from liberty, and the Protestant from Catholicity. Certainly the freest states in Christendom are precisely the states in which Catholics have the least influence in public affairs, and the most despotic are those in which Protestants are in a hopeless minority. The fact cannot be denied, and it is not strange that the world should infer that there is something more than a mere accidental relation between Protestantism and civil freedom, and between Catholicity and despotism. There are Cath-

olics, as well as Protestants, who infer this, and therefore who earnestly oppose all efforts to introduce free institutions, and with equal earnestness support the claims of absolute government."

"The inference, however," interposed Father John, "is false, and rests on a pure sophism. The truth is, Catholicity, though not given to introduce liberty, yet needs and demands it, in order to be able to labor freely and efficiently in her spiritual and divine mission; and Protestantism demands, not liberty but power, for, as a religion, it sustains and spreads itself only by the aid of the civil government or by colonization. Protestantism must always suffer, as Catholicity must always gain, by an extension of liberty combined with order. Francis Joseph deserves credit for the new concordat; but even that concordat, comparatively liberal as it is, is but a poor amends for that really liberal constitution for his states which he proclaimed shortly after his accession to the throne. If he had put that constitution in force substantially as he proclaimed it, sustained it, and governed his states in accordance with it, as I think he might have done, he would have proved that the connection between Protestantism and liberty, and Catholicity and despotism is, if it exists at all, purely accidental, and would have given us a Catholic state as the modern representative of the old Germanic system, or of modern representative and parliamentary government. Austria would have thus placed herself in harmony with modern ideas, annihilated French Jacobinism, conciliated even the Italian liberals, and taken her position at the head of the European world, and the lead in the progress of civilization. But her great statesman, Prince Schwartzenberg, unhappily wedded to the system of centralization, threw away that liberal constitution, returned, as soon as the battle with the rebels was fairly won, to the old bureaucratic system, and we have now to confide in Protestant England rather than in any Catholic state."

"Father John forgets France," interposed De Bonneville, "the eldest daughter of the church, and really at the head of the modern civilized world. Her present emperor sustains constitutionalism in Sardinia, he favors the establishment of free institutions in the papal states and the rest of Italy, and, if I understand his policy, he is evidently laboring to revive a Christian and Catholic East."

"I do not forget France and her terrible sacrifices for

liberty," answered Father John, "or that she contains many enlightened and patriotic sons who detest the present imperial *régime*. I do not even forget or overlook the arts and pretences by which Napoleon III. seeks to bamboozle both Catholics and liberals. But he has used universal suffrage to establish cæsarism, and he carries and must carry with him, as did his greater uncle, that imperial despotism which lost to the church the whole East, the Greek empire to civilization, drew Russia into schism, and plunged the half of Germany, all Scandinavia, Holland, England, and Scotland into the Protestant heresy. I want no such aid for the church as he seems likely to give, for he will concede her nothing save at the expense of her freedom and independence. I speak not lightly of *Catholic* France. In France there is much true faith and earnest piety, and the French do more than the Catholics of all other nations put together to fill and sustain Catholic missions. I speak of *imperial* France, of France as organized under and devoted to the will of Napoleon III., and I say, if the imperial *régime* does nothing to confirm the prejudices already existing against Catholicity, and to eviscerate the manhood of Catholics, it is all that can be expected, and far more than I dare hope."

"So Father John hopes more from heretical England, the persecutor of the church, and the oppressor of Ireland and India, than from Catholic France," said Winslow.

"More than from *imperial* France, most assuredly," answered Father John. "I hope I do not lose sight of the interests of my religion. In matters of faith and morals I can make no compromises, and I maintain all the rigid intolerance of truth itself in the theological order. No man is or can be less disposed to favor the indifferency of religions than myself. But the great question we have now to settle is not a theological question. It lies in the natural order, and is first of all a question as to the reorganization of European society, broken up by the conflicts between the cæsarists and the Jacobins. As a Catholic, looking solely to the interests of my religion, I wish this reorganization to be compatible with its freedom. What I want, as a Catholic, is the freedom and independence of the church; and I know of no way, I can discover no way, of gaining for her a tolerable security but through free civil and political institutions; and for such institutions, since they lie in the natural order and are a want of natural society, Protes-

tants can labor as earnestly and in as good faith as Catholics, although they can do it only for the sake of natural society, while Catholics may do it both for the sake of natural and of supernatural society. Though I can have no communion *in sacris* with heretics or schismatics, I know no reason why I should in matters relating to natural society refuse to coöperate with any man I find struggling for what I hold to be just and desirable. I regret the heresy and schism of Great Britain, but in spite of her heresy and schism she is the best friend and most energetic supporter I can find in the old world of that political and civil order, which as a citizen I want for myself, and as a Catholic for my church. Russia is schismatic and autocratic; Austria and France are to-day both wedded to cæsarism; Germany is debated between Prussia and Austria, between imperialism and red-republicanism, or losing itself in vague theories and pantheistic dreams; Spain is enfeebled and distracted by her internal struggles; Portugal, Belgium, and Sardinia can hardly stand alone, and are little better than mockeries of free states; and Italy must follow in the wake either of France or of Austria, or be divided between them. Where, then, can I look but to parliamentary England, who stands almost alone in Europe as the earnest defender of civil and religious liberty? I do not make facts; I must take them as I find them, and do the best I can with them. If Europe, if the Catholic cause even, hath need of England, is it my fault? or is it a fault in me to say so?"

"England has always played an important part in the European world," remarked Diefenbach. "The Germans who conquered the empire, and seated themselves among its ruins, were partially converted by the Roman prelates and missionaries, although in the sixth and seventh centuries a very large portion of the Gallo-Roman population lapsed into heathenism, from which the missions of the Irish monks did much to recover them. But these learned and excellent monks, zealous and devoted as they were, made little progress in converting the Germans, and hardly any progress was made in converting the Germans in Germany proper till the mission of St. Boniface, the Anglo-Saxon Winifred, or till after the conversion of Anglo-Saxon England by the missionaries sent by the pope, Gregory the Great. The Anglo-Saxon missionaries were able to address the Germans in their own language, in real German accents,

and with full sympathy with German life, manners, and customs. They could present them Christianity unembarrassed by any association with Roman imperialism, and convert them to Christianity without transforming them into Romans of the lower empire, and satisfy them that they could be Roman Catholics without being subjected to the civil order of pagan Rome. The conversion of Clovis, king of the Neustrian Franks, was a great event, and filled Rome with great joy, for it gave the church a Christian kingdom in the West to balance the degenerate Greek empire in the East; but the conversion of Ethelbert, king of Kent, some years later, when the Neustrian Franks had become nearly as base as the Greeks themselves, was a still greater event, and filled Rome with a greater joy, for it secured the conversion of the whole Germanic race. It was, in a human point of view, the greatest event that had occurred in the Christian world since the conversion of Constantine, and the lapse of England into heresy in the sixteenth century was the greatest loss the church suffered even in that era of disasters."

"Considering that the causes which alienated so many nations from the Holy See are political rather than religious," added Father John, "the reconciliation of England to the church would be the greatest gain in its probable results to the Catholic cause that could now be made. With her old Germanic constitution, modified to meet the ideas and wants of modern society, still in vigor, and the sympathies alike of Catholics and the friends of liberty enlisted on her side, Catholic England would carry with her a moral force that would check the progress of cæsarism, heal the schism in the European republic, give confidence and strength to the party that is struggling to restore, with the necessary modifications, the old Germanic order of political organization, enable the Germans to reconstruct German unity, recall Russia, who would otherwise be isolated from the European family, to submission to the Holy See, and enable her church to labor successfully for the conversion of the Asiatic nations remaining in heathenism, and to restore the old languishing East to Christian faith and unity. The great obstacle to the reorganization of Europe and the progress of true liberty, is the unnatural and false position of England in regard to the papacy, which enables the sovereigns who profess themselves Catholic to use the Catholic population in establishing despotism. Her position of hos-

tility to the papacy, and her persistence in carrying with her free and living civilization her puerile and lifeless Protestantism, which she never loved, and more than half despises, weaken her influence on the continent, and arm against her the Catholic populations that would willingly, joyously accept her civilization, if they could see it disengaged from Protestantism, with which it, in fact, has no necessary connection. She insists on her Protestantism, not for any theological reason or conscientious religious conviction, but because she has imbibed the false notion, in which Catholics have done their best to confirm the English people, that there is some necessary connection between it and the civil and political order which makes her glory. She falsely imagines that the pope is the defender, not the victim, of cæsarism, and that she cannot carry out her protest against pagan, without at the same time protesting, with equal earnestness, against papal Rome. But even all Protestant as she is, the Catholic states of Europe have need of her, and though she can serve them less than she would if Catholic, she can serve them more than any professedly Catholic power at the present moment to be found. France might serve them more and better, and would, if she would heartily and in good faith accept the constitutional and parliamentary *régime*, and so might Austria, but that is out of the question."

"And therefore," said Diefenbach, "I can conceive no greater blunder than that which is very generally committed by English-speaking Catholics, of directing all their artillery as well as small arms against Great Britain, and imagining that the Catholic cause would gain by effecting her humiliation and the preponderance of imperial France. We should never suffer personal or national wrongs, however great, to weigh in the balance against the real interests of religion. We can safely leave vengeance to the Almighty. We should look deeper and further. It is not, as is too often pretended, a matter of indifference to the interests of religion what political order obtains, or what order of civilization is sustained. France, to-day, represents the lower empire, and Great Britain its German invaders and conquerors, and her defeat and the triumph of France would be as great a calamity for religion and society as would have been theirs and the success of the Roman arms."

"Then the victory once won," added Father John, "constitutionalism once secure from the attacks of cæsarism, the

English would moderate their hostility to the papacy, which is and always has been political rather than theological, and suffer themselves to be converted, as were the Arian and pagan conquerors of the Roman empire. When Catholics prove false to their trust, God sends them the heathen and heretics to scourge them back to their duty, to their manliness, and courage. Non-Catholics have gained their victories over us because we have suffered them to surpass us in the stronger and more energetic natural virtues, which deserve and ensure success. It may be humiliating to us to need non-Catholics, who have known how to preserve free institutions, to help us regain the liberties we have suffered to be wrested from us; but it is so to us as men, not to our church, which has always struggled to maintain her own freedom and independence. All the dispensations of Providence are designed in justice and mercy. Victory for the British civilization will not result in making the world more heretical, but will help make it more Catholic, by removing the principal obstacle which now prevents the return of the nations to unity. Even the British system suffers by being associated with Protestantism. It hath need of Catholicity in the English people to save it from its own decay, to prevent it from becoming too material, to sustain the purity of morals and manners, without which liberty becomes license, and provokes a reaction which ends only in establishing despotism."

"The struggle of the day," added Diefenbach, "though in its results it will have important bearings on the interests of religion, is in the natural order, for the world now insists on judging religion, not by its fitness or unfitness to secure our supernatural beatitude, but by its direct effect in favoring or retarding the progress of one or another order of civilization. The war which rages is not a war between papal Rome and schism, or between Catholicity and heresy, but, consciously or unconsciously on the part of the belligerents, between two orders of civilization, between constitutionalism and cæsarism—in a word, between liberty and despotism. There is no use in multiplying words about it. Catholicity is not now, except with a very few old fogies, opposed on religious grounds, and men who reject it do so for the most part because they believe it wedded to despotism. Let it be once clearly shown, by facts as well as theory, that the popes in their long struggle with the German kaisers did not war against the Germanic constitution

of society for the reëstablishment of Roman imperialism, but in its defence, as securing their own rights as temporal sovereigns, and the freedom and independence of religion, and submitted to cæsarism only under protest, when they were no longer able to carry on the war against it; and let Catholics, wherever they have a free voice, and are free to act, prove themselves in word and deed the true, firm, and enlightened friends of liberty as well as of order, of the rights of the subject as well as of the rights of the sovereign, and the war, however long it may continue, will cease to be directed against the papacy, and the party of liberty at least will respect the church, and count her freedom and independence among the rights they are fighting to secure. Through the tendency of Catholics, inherited or revived from the empire, to associate the Græco-Roman civilization with their religion as it was associated with it under the Roman empire, the despots have taken advantage of us, and placed us and our church in a false and unnatural position, so that the Catholic often finds himself obliged either to submit to the despotism his soul hateth, or to make common cause with the enemies of his religion and his country. We must break the unnatural alliance, and avoid the snare the despots set for us. It is because I am a Catholic, and wish the freedom and independence of religion, that I am attached to your American political constitution, and that in the struggles going on in the Old World my sympathies are with Great Britain rather than with France, Austria, or Naples, for liberty is the only atmosphere in which my religion herself can breathe freely, and liberty for the church we can secure only by renewing the martyr ages, or else by establishing civil and political freedom."

"Mr. Diefenbach," said Father John, "need not fear that the church will censure the principle that governs him. Pius VII., of glorious memory, proved under the first Napoleon, in the most heroic manner, that even the sovereign pontiff can have the sympathy he expresses, and prefer British victory to the success of imperial France, though nominally Catholic. He even owed to British influence and British victory his release from a French prison, and his restoration to his temporal throne. You will find at Rome far less dread of British than of Russian preponderance, for Great Britain, with all her pride and arrogance, carries with her a comparatively free constitution, respect for law, and the faith of treaties, from which the church must always gain more than

she can lose, while Russia continues the Greek empire, carries cæsarism with her wherever she goes, makes all rights and powers emanate from the czar, and subjects the spiritual to the temporal authority.

"I know very well," continued Father John, "that the attempt to revive constitutionalism in Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, or countries where the church has been imposed by the civil law, has been attended with results for the moment not favorable to Catholicity; but this is not owing to any incompatibility between the church and a free commonwealth, but to the fact that the church had long been associated in the popular mind with the despotism of the state, sought to be displaced by the new constitutional *régime*. Wherever the church has been enacted and enforced as the religion of the state, imposed by the civil authority, rather than freely chosen by the people, the first effects of political emancipation will be attempts at emancipation from the spiritual authority of the church. The people know not at first, and cannot be expected to know, how to use their newly recovered freedom. But let not the friends of the church be frightened. After an infidel freak or two, very pleasing to Satan, no doubt, the people will return to their faith and their religious duties. We must allow nothing of this sort to frighten us back to despotism, and induce us like the children of Israel, when they began to experience the privations of the wilderness, to long again for the flesh-pots of Egypt. We must stand by liberty, even when we are obliged to deplore its excesses, and use our influence not to restrict it, but to protect it from abuse.

"The interests of the church require that the association in men's minds of Catholicity and despotism, and of Protestantism or infidelity and liberty, should be broken up, and broken up it can and will be only when Catholics learn that liberty, not despotism, is the element in which their religion thrives," remarked Father John, in conclusion. "The system which obtains in the principal Catholic states is suffered by the church, but she neither desires nor approves it. Catholics who are alive in those states to the interests of their religion, groan under it, and would gladly throw it off, if they could. The clergy do not like it; feel that it oppresses them, and crushes the life out of them; and to an extent little suspected they sympathize in their souls with the revolution, and half believe that even a red-republican revolution would be a relief, and less undesirable than

the systematic repression now resorted to by despotism. Even in France, decried and enthralled by the specious pretences of new-fangled cæsarism professing to hold from popular suffrage, there is a noble and heroic band of Catholics who have remained firm amid all defections, who have not bowed the knee to Baal, or offered sacrifices in his temple, and who may yet retrieve the honor and liberty of their glorious country. We English-speaking Catholics, who are free to speak out our full thought, must send to our brethren in these countries, languishing in secret and silence for the liberty we enjoy, words of sympathy, encouragement, and hope. Something we say may reach them, and if not, it may still serve to undeceive our non-Catholic countrymen, and prove to them that we can be devout Catholics, and at the same time the enlightened and unflinching friends of both civil and religious liberty, even in the American sense of the terms."

MISSION OF AMERICA.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1856.]

We called attention to Dr. Spalding's volume of Miscellanies when it first appeared, and we call attention to it again, for though it has been well spoken of and well received, we fear that it has not met with a success proportioned to its intrinsic merits. It should be in every public and every private library in the country, and studied by every American who makes the least pretensions to literary taste and judgment; for it is really one of the richest and most valuable works that have ever proceeded from an American author. It is the production of a distinguished American prelate, who feels that this is his own, his native land, and who identifies himself with the American people, and consults their interests as his own. He speaks to us from an American heart, and what he says is hardly less

*Miscellanea: Comprising Reviews, Lectures, and Essays on Historical, Theological, and Miscellaneous Subjects. By M. J. Spalding, D. D., Bishop of Louisville. Louisville (Ky.): 1855.

valuable under the point of view of patriotism than under that of religion. He is not only a bishop and a theologian, but also a learned man, an accomplished scholar, an eloquent, fresh, and vigorous writer, who counts nothing foreign to his purpose that affects the welfare of men, either in this world or in that which is to come. His reviews, lectures, and essays are well thought and reasoned out; they are written in a free, flowing, and popular style, and filled with precisely the sort of information most needed by our countrymen in the present crisis of our national life. They are not written solely or primarily for theologians, or even Catholics; they are addressed to the American people at large, whatever their religious or political preferences or tendencies.

The views of the right reverend author on the deposing power, and one or two other points, are indeed not precisely those we have from time to time set forth, and pertain to a school which we have not been accustomed to follow; but we pass them over, for we have already sufficiently discussed the subjects to which they relate. But his reviews of Bancroft, Prescott, and other popular historians of the day, are admirable specimens of enlightened and dignified criticism, and place him in the first rank of American authors. They prove, too, that the American critic, when he does take up a subject, treats it with a candor, a fairness, a depth and fullness, that we usually look for in vain in the criticisms which come to us from the writers of other nations. In them Dr. Spalding shows that these popular authors, especially Prescott, are not up to the level of the age, and that they are very far from appreciating the true province of history. He rectifies their principles, corrects their errors, and exposes their prejudices. His essays on civil liberty and the social condition respectively of Catholic and Protestant countries prove him an enlightened friend of freedom, and a generous sympathizer with the poorer and more numerous classes. We want more essays of the same sort, whose tendency is alike opposed to an impracticable and undesirable aristocracy on the one hand, and to a wild and destructive radicalism on the other. They teach us to distinguish in Catholic countries what is by the church, or in harmony with her principles, from what exists in spite of her authority, and against her teachings and influence. They furnish us principles applicable to the present state of society; and while they do

not blind us to the faults of Catholic states, or to the defects of our own republic, they deepen our gratitude to the church, and kindle in our hearts a pure, enlightened, and vigorous patriotism.

What we more especially admire in Dr. Spalding as a writer, is his free, manly, independent American spirit. He is a Catholic, a Catholic bishop, and, as a matter of course, free from all national bitterness, and above all, the narrow and narrowing prejudices of race or country. He knows that God has made of one blood all the nations of men, and that he has instituted one Catholic Church, one spiritual kingdom on earth, for the government and salvation of all. Wherever he sees a man, he sees a brother, for whom Christ has died,—a neighbor whom he is to love as himself. But he is an American, free born, a citizen, and feels that he is in bondage to no man. He was bred and born in an atmosphere of freedom—in a country where man is man in all the integrity of his manhood. His spirit is free, lofty, independent, firm and unbending, yet gentle, sweet, loving, through the charity of the Gospel, such as should be the spirit of every American. His faith purifies and elevates his manliness, and his religion intensifies and consecrates his patriotism. It does not extinguish it, or permit it to lose itself in a vague philanthropy, or an unmeaning cosmopolitanism. He makes the brotherhood of the race a living fact, not a watery sentiment, and seeks to promote the welfare of mankind by laboring specially for those committed to his care, or with whom his own lot in God's providence is bound up. In this respect at least, he is the model of an American citizen, an American prelate, an American scholar, and an American author, especially worthy of the study and imitation of our literary aspirants.

Any one who reads Dr. Spalding's book must find the objection, now growing somewhat stale, that Catholicity is hostile to our political and social order, for ever silenced, if not by his arguments, at least by his tone and spirit. No American can read it without feeling that the Catholic religion is at home in the American breast, if we may so speak, more American than the greater part of Americans themselves, and that it is just what is needed to complete and consecrate the American character. The author is not one of those Americans who have no sympathy with the institutions of their own country, and are really foreigners in their sentiments and affections. He sees, what some Cath-

olics even, though of American birth and lineage, do not see, that the natural relation between our religion and the government is that of concord, and not of antagonism. The dominant sentiment of the country is non-Catholic, but the political and civil order is in accordance with Catholicity, and the duty of all Catholics is to place a generous confidence in the government, to love and cherish it as their own. Dr. Spalding never thinks of asking whether he is American in thought and feeling, for he lives Americanism, which is his natural, as Catholicity is his supernatural life. He tells us by his spirit and example that Catholics are an integral portion of the American people, and that we are to let the warm current of American life flow through our veins, to assume as a matter of course our position as free American citizens, and to study, understand, and loyally perform our duties as free-born Americans.

The lesson conveyed by the illustrious Bishop of Louisville, is opportune and important. Owing to the fact that the active Catholic population of the country is in great part made up of recent emigrants from various foreign nations, with habits, manners, usages, sentiments, affections, and traditions, different from those of the great body of the American people, an impression has been produced that Catholicity is here a foreign religion, or, in the main, only the religion of certain classes of foreigners, and that to be Catholic is to be un-American. Hence a war is excited against us in the name of American patriotism. On the other hand, a considerable number of Catholics confound the sentiments of a portion of the American people with the American political order itself. Finding a majority of the people hostile, or at best indifferent to Catholicity, they look upon the American civil and political order as at war with their religion, separate themselves in their feelings from it, and forget that the government is as much our government as it is that of non-Catholics, and that we are as responsible for its doings as any other class of citizens. They obey the laws, but do not love the American institutions, and look upon the government as an enemy to be distrusted, and whose actions are always to be construed in a hostile sense. They have no confidence in the American state, and believe neither in its will, nor in its ability to serve our holy religion. They do not admit that as Catholics they are under any obligations to it, and they regard themselves as at liberty to express their distrust of it, or to

declaim against it as loudly and as fiercely as they please. Certainly these are not the majority, they are in fact only a feeble minority of the Catholic body; but they are numerous and clamorous enough to give the Know-Nothings a pretext for opposing us in the name of American patriotism. They do more harm than is commonly imagined. They check the free expression of the deep loyalty so natural to the Catholic heart, and obstruct by their coldness, their suspicions, and their lack of American sympathy, those efforts which Catholic charity and Catholic zeal, in obedience to the earnest exhortation of our Holy Father, Pius IX., would prompt for the conversion of those of our countrymen who are still in spiritual darkness, and sitting in the region and shadow of death. They exert an unhappy influence within and without, and are, if they did but know it, as uncatholic as unpatriotic in their spirit and tendency.

The very poorest way in the world to make authority your friend is to treat it as your enemy. By treating it as your enemy, you give it a good excuse for not treating you as its friend. In a country like Ireland, under a Protestant government, whose persistent policy has been for ages to crush out its nationality and with it the Catholic faith, we can well understand that Catholics should regard the government as their enemy, as hostile to their interests, as having no claim on their loyalty, and to be distrusted, evaded, resisted, as far as prudence will warrant. There the Catholic has the right to do it, because the government is in his regard a tyrant, makes him its victim, and his self-preservation demands it. But here every thing of this sort is misplaced and uncatholic. Here the government is no more Protestant than it is Catholic,—nay, in its principles it harmonizes far better with Catholicity than with Protestantism,—and Catholics and Protestants are placed by the constitution and laws on a footing of perfect equality. We, as Catholics, are not slaves or helots; and the feeling expressed by an American-born Catholic the other day, in a Catholic journal, that he has no country, that he is a helot in the land of his birth, is as unfounded as it is unpatriotic. The American-born Catholic has a country in the same sense and to the same extent that an American-born Protestant has a country. If he find public sentiment hostile to him, it is no more than many a Protestant finds. If he looks upon himself as a helot, the fault is his own, or that of those who had the forming of his childhood and youth.

He is, in fact, a free-born citizen, equal in his rights with every other citizen, and every avenue to success in life is open to him that would be were he a Protestant; and when we count up the merchants, lawyers, doctors, mechanics, contractors, &c., in this city, and find that Catholics, all things considered, have their full proportion among the most eminent, the most successful, and the most highly esteemed, we scout the idea that in this country a man forfeits his equality by being a Catholic.

In this country, every man, supposing him to be a man, is free to make his position pretty much what he chooses. If he chooses to forego his birthright as a citizen, and to regard himself as a helot, he will find few disposed to thwart his choice. He will most likely be treated as a helot. If Catholics choose to separate themselves from the great current of American nationality, and to assume the position in political and social life of an inferior, a distinct, or an alien people, or of a foreign colony planted in the midst of a people with whom they have no sympathies, they will be permitted to do so, and will be treated by the country at large according to their own estimate of themselves. But if they quietly take their position as free and equal American citizens, with American interests and sympathies, American sentiments and affections, and throw themselves fearlessly into the great current of American national life, ready to co-operate with any and every class of their fellow-citizens for the true interests and glory of a common country, their religion will not be in their way, and they will gain that weight and influence in the country to which their real merit entitles them. All depends on ourselves. If we have the spirit and virtues of freemen, there is nothing to hinder us from being freemen, and holding the rank of freemen. If we choose to cultivate our powers, and make ourselves worthy of high consideration in the commonwealth, there is nothing to hinder us from doing so, and exerting a commanding influence. If we choose to be servile and querulous, to attribute what is due to our own indolence or imbecility to the hostile influences of the country and its institutions, and to fold our hands and sit down and wait for the people or the government to take us from the dunghill and elevate us to the first rank in social and political life, we shall not find ourselves rising in our social position or in the estimation of the country, or even of ourselves.

It cannot be too often repeated that here man is man, if he chooses; but if he chooses to be less than man, he is at liberty to be so. The man must choose his own position and rely on himself, and depend on his own exertions. God will not work a miracle to give him the first rank in the state or in society because he is a Catholic, nor will the government raise him for that reason. Our political and social order gives and secures freedom to all to aspire; but it gives success to none. That the individual must earn for himself. If he lack the ability, the energy, the perseverance to do it, there is no help for him, and he must go without success. Self-reliance, energy, perseverance, are with us the chief elements of success alike for Catholic and non-Catholic, and they are pretty sure, in the long run, to secure it. But this is no country for those who lack these qualities. Men who know not how to help themselves, and are always looking to others to help them, who have never been out of leading-strings, and dare not venture abroad without a dry-nurse, who have never dared act from their own motion, *motu proprio*, or to rely on their own judgments, are sadly out of place here, and are sure to find the crowd jostling them aside, pushing past them, and leaving them far in the rear. Catholics, who are self-reliant and energetic, who enter into the spirit of the country, and conform to the inherent laws of American society, may go on with the rest, may, perhaps, even lead them; but such as are frightened at that spirit, throw up their hands in holy horror at it, or declaim against it, denounce it, and stoutly resist it, will count for little in the commonwealth, and be generally regarded with suspicion or contempt.

These are hard facts, but facts they are, and the sooner we admit it, and govern ourselves accordingly, the better for us and for our country. The Neapolitan lazaroni, no doubt, practise much of the true philosophy of life,—that is, of life in Naples, but it will not do to be lazaroni in America. To attempt it were suicidal. We may regret that such is the fact, but we cannot help it. There is, as far as we know, nothing in the American self-reliance, activity, energy, hurry, and bustle, however repugnant to our old world notions, that a Catholic may not reconcile with Catholic faith and morals. We know nothing in our religion that requires us to be lazaroni. They were the Gabeonites, not the chosen people of God, who were doomed to be

"hewers of wood and drawers of water." Labor, trade, law, medicine, every honest calling may be converted into prayer,—is prayer, if done in and for the love of God. Our religion does not make us slaves; it makes us freemen, for they are free indeed whom the Son makes free. God has given the earth to the children of men; he has given them the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that they should have dominion over them. He has not, indeed, given man dominion over man, or subjected any man to the arbitrary will of another, by whatever name he may be called, and hence all governments of mere human will are tyrannies, and as such unlawful and unjust. But he has given man dominion over the whole lower creation, and in the chase after this lawful dominion Catholics are as free as non-Catholics to engage, and they may engage, if they choose, without detriment to their faith or their piety. Voluntary poverty for Christ's sake is meritorious, but involuntary poverty, poverty due to our indolence, our improvidence, or our intemperance, is not meritorious, is not a virtue at all, and inherits no promise. Humility is a Christian virtue, the root of every virtue, and the mark of all true greatness; but not servility, tameness, mean-spiritedness, or cowardice. To be capable of humility, one must be brave, manly, magnanimous. We know no reason why a man may not be a thorough-going American, and at the same time an orthodox, devout, fervent Catholic. No man to be a Catholic is required to abjure his manhood.

No doubt to be a true Catholic in the rough and tumble of our American life demands a robust faith, and a robust piety; but that need not alarm us. God proportions his grace, if we seek it and are faithful to it, to our needs. He promises that his grace shall be sufficient for us. We may just as well have a faith or a piety equal to all exigencies and to all trials, as a weak and sickly faith, and a puny piety that must be fed on milk, and can never endure strong meat. The self-reliance in spiritual matters so common to our non-Catholic countrymen, of course, is to be guarded against; but other things being equal, the self-reliant, robust, energetic man in the natural order, will be all the more robust, energetic, and trustworthy in the supernatural. The saints the church proposes to us for our veneration were, for the most part, great men as well as great saints. Catholicity does not keep men in ignorance or in perpetual pupilage,

in order to keep them docile and submissive. It is adapted to the wants of the simple, the rude, the barbarian, and the savage, but it prefers to deal with the civilized and highly cultivated man, and it has always found its greatest obstacle in the ignorance and barbarism of the ages it has traversed. The church nurses a certain number in the cloister, and honors especially those who voluntarily, and for the love of God, give up all for a life of prayer and charity; but she prepares also her children to live in the world, and sustains them in the struggles of secular life. She demands, wherever practicable, the highest development of our natural faculties, and the highest order of civilization. She has no fear of strong men, resolute men, independent, self-reliant men, born to command, or to make their way in the world against every obstacle. The active, energetic, self-reliant American character she regards with no unfriendly eye, for she knows that, once purified, elevated, and directed by grace, it is a character from which she has every thing to hope. Grace does not destroy nature, nor change the national type of character. It purifies and elevates nature, and brings out whatever is good, noble, and strong in the national type. No national character stands more in need of Catholicity than the American, and never since her going forth from that "upper room" in Jerusalem, has the church found a national character so well fitted to give to true civilization its highest and noblest expression.

It is but simple truth to assert that ours, at present, is the country towards which Catholics throughout the world should especially turn their hopes, and that it is the last country in the world which they should set down as hostile to the church and her interests. The American people, in their national capacity, have never rejected the Catholic faith; as a government they have never made war on the pope, have never cast off the authority of the church. They have never, since their birth as a nation, performed one act of hostility to the Catholic religion, martyred or persecuted a single Catholic, and their first act on winning their independence, establishing their federal government, and remodelling their state constitutions, was to repair the injustice of the mother country towards the church, and to place Catholics, in their religion, on a footing of equality with Protestants. We as a nation are not guilty of the sin of persecution or apostasy. We have never dishonored or

blasphemed the spouse of the Lamb. We have done no injustice to Catholicity, and have repaired the injustice of the country from which we sprung. We have opened here an asylum for the oppressed Catholics of all lands, and given them the equal rights of American citizens. We are not under the curse pronounced against persecutors, apostates, and blasphemers. We are as a nation entitled to the gratitude and love of the Catholic heart throughout the world; and Catholics, especially American Catholics, should be prompt to acknowledge the generous and noble conduct thus far pursued by the American state. For noble and generous it was in a non-Catholic people in the last century, when all Europe was rising in rebellion against the church, when fashion and literature had discarded Catholicity, when the Holy Father was soon to be dragged a prisoner from his throne by his apostate sons, and to die in exile, and when even Catholics themselves were willing to accept restrictions on their liberty, to proclaim the equality of Catholics, then too few to have any weight in the councils of the nation, and to open to them here an asylum alike from religious and civil tyranny. No nation on earth has ever, the circumstances considered, done a nobler act, one of greater service to the church of God. And think you that that act is not registered in heaven? Think you that it will be suffered to go unrewarded? Think you ingratitude towards the American state, the denunciation of the American people, or alliance with their enemies on the part of Catholics, will be suffered to go unpunished? What is or can be baser on the part of Catholics than to curse the hand that has knocked off their fetters, and to place themselves in an attitude of hostility to their liberal benefactor? Are we not, indeed, to ascribe the late Know-Nothing movement as much to the forgetfulness, by some amongst us, of the generosity of the American people, or their refusal to recognize it, as to the hatred of Catholicity entertained by the more violent of the sects? And should we not regard that movement as an admonition from Heaven to be on our guard against disloyalty, and the encouragement of foreign or unpatriotic tendencies in any portion of our body? Every Catholic should love America, rejoice in her prosperity, labor for her true interests, and pray for her conversion.

America, we need not say, is the future of the world. Asia and Africa have long since lapsed into barbarism, and Europe, the heir of the ancient and the seat of the modern

civilization, has culminated, and the most that can be expected of it is that it shall preserve itself from growing worse. Spanish and Portuguese America has no promise of the future. We see nowhere outside of ours a nation really advancing in a civilization in accordance with Christian principles. Indeed, modern civilization itself is doomed, and must be supplanted some day by another, as it supplanted the Græco-Roman. The new order of civilization which is to supplant it can find its seat or its people only with us. The old Græco-Roman or ancient civilization contained so many inherent vices, was marked by so much cruelty and inhumanity, and was so saturated with pagan idolatry and superstition, that it could neither be reformed by Christianity nor stand before it. The interests of religion and of the human race demanded the destruction of the old world which sustained it. The Germanic tribes, whom imperial Rome had labored in vain for three centuries to subdue, and who had wrongs unnumbered to avenge in the city of the wolf-nursed Romulus, served the cause of civilization by their conquest of the empire of the West. They prepared the way for modern civilization, and the progress of society by the aid of the Christian church. But though they conquered the Roman empire and planted themselves on its ruins, they did not do it all at once, nor in all respects as avowed enemies. They often acted as the allies of the emperor, and their kings and chieftains held commissions in the imperial armies. In destroying the Roman power they continued the Roman jurisprudence, the Roman fiscal system, the Roman policy, and to no inconsiderable extent, Roman ideas, manners, and usages. They retained, we grant, all that was good in Roman civilization, but unhappily much also that was bad, and hence modern civilization, though a progress, a great progress on the ancient, is imperfect, and far below that order of civil society which accords with the Christian ideal. It is too imperfect, too pagan, and too little Christian, too incompatible with christianized humanity, to be the last term of human progress.

Hence modern civilization must give way to a higher and a more Christian order. This advanced civilization we look for cannot find its first realization in Europe; for in Europe there is no field for its development, and no nation that has attained to it, or that will permit it to be attained to. Russia, no doubt, advances in modern civilization, but

she does not advance and cannot advance civilization itself. The most that can be hoped of her is, that she will come up with those European nations that had the start of her in the race. In the rest of Europe, at least of continental Europe, you have two parties, the party of the government and the party of the revolution, each alike opposed to the progress of civilization. The governments of Europe hold on to the traditions of the Roman empire, and the revolutionists seek their model in the old Roman republic, and neither conceive nor allow true liberty. If the governments triumph, then liberty is extinct, individual energy is suppressed, man is dwarfed, and the mass of the people will become servile, imbecile, and unable to assert or even to conceive their natural rights and dignity; if the revolutionists triumph, disorder, anarchy, old pagan cruelty and inhumanity will follow, to end in general barbarism, for old pagan Rome still lies smouldering at the bottom of all European society. England is bound up with her aristocratic constitution, and must stand or fall with it, and that constitution favors the few and depresses the many, and is sustained only by means incompatible with an advanced civilization. A change that should throw the power into the hands of the democracy, would, in the present state of things, be a change for the worse. The church is indeed in old Europe, and it is well that she is; but the church addresses only conscience, the free-will of men, and she cannot save them, or even civilize them against their will. She imparts to man the power to work out his own salvation, but she does not work it out for him. He must voluntarily coöperate, or he will not be saved. It is the same with nations. They can neglect to do their proper work, and ruin themselves in spite of her, although they could not save themselves without her.

We can find the elements and conditions of this advanced civilization, or this new order of civilized life, only in our own country, and we see nowhere else a country that can legitimately claim to have the promise of the future. The mediæval civilization has lost, or is rapidly losing, its hold on mankind, and it will not do to despise the sentiments and aspirations of its enemies. We can easily declaim against the red-republicans, democrats, radicals, socialists, communists, and vague dreamers of an earthly paradise, now so numerous and in some countries so fierce; but it will be far wiser to recognize that they

have something at bottom in their dreams, sentiments, and aspirations which is true and just, and which ought to find its expression in our social and political order. These movements of large masses of the people throughout the whole civilized world for something which they have not, and which threaten at times the very existence of society, perverted as they are by the ambitious and the designing, are not wholly satanic. They have their origin in the irrepressible instincts of humanity, and indicate the need and the capacity of the nations for a higher and less imperfect order of civilization. In their actual character, they are no doubt bad, terribly destructive, but there underlies them a want that must be met, if we would have social peace. They are disorderly, because the party of order is indiscriminate in its hostility, and does not distinguish between authority and its abuses; they are anti-religious, anti-Catholic, if you will, because they fancy they find religion and the church on the side of their enemies, and because Catholics themselves are exceedingly slow to distinguish in modern civilization what is by or in accordance with the church, and what has existed from the old pagan world, whether barbaric or Roman, in spite of her. The necessary distinction in either case cannot be made in any European nation. Parties in them all are so evenly balanced, and passions are so excited and so fierce, that the slightest concession to either side is the signal for a conflagration. Liberty and order in them are divorced, and the one is maintained only at the expense of the other; and unhappily, as to the social and political order, a like divorce between religion and humanity has been effected. It is only in this country that we are free to make the proper distinctions, to reject what is bad in the mediæval civilization, and to accept and harmonize with the church the good these movements of the age indicate, but are incompetent to realize.

The elements of this new or advanced civilization exist here in a much purer state, in greater life and vigor, than they do in any nation of the Old World. The mediæval civilization eliminated much that was bad in the preceding civilization, and added, through the influence of Christianity, many new elements of the highest importance; but it could never found a temporal republic in strict accord with the spiritual. Too many discordant, barbarous, and despotic elements for that were retained from pagan Rome and her unchristianized conquerors. But these elements, by a singu-

lar good Providence, our fathers, for the most part, left behind them when they sought a home in this new world. They brought with them the majestic system of the Roman jurisprudence as modified and improved by the English common law and the influences of Christianity, but not either the Roman or the barbarian political system. Their political doctrines were those which had been developed and taught by the church through her popes, and councils, and doctors, during the middle ages, but which European society had never been able to realize. The church had constantly labored to bring society back to the principles of natural justice and equity, and the maxims of natural justice and equity, recognized indeed by the civil and canon law, but left without adequate political guaranties, were those which the English republicans of the seventeenth century so strenuously asserted against the Stuarts, and which our republican ancestors brought with them, and made the basis of the state they founded. Our fathers were, perhaps, precisely those of their age who had, in the natural order, the best collected and embodied in themselves the fruits of the past labors of mankind, especially of the Christian church, in regard to politics and jurisprudence. They were, in regard to civilization, the advanced guard of the human race in their times, and brought with them the best the Old World had to give. They lost nothing during their colonial days; they even advanced, by virtue both of their own experience and of the labors and experience of the Old World, and probably the world has never seen so august and so advanced a political assembly as that which met in 1787, in Philadelphia, to form our present federal constitution. The French Constituent, which met two years afterwards, was far behind it, and indeed hardly more advanced than the age of Charlemagne. Its best ideas were borrowed from us, and all it established that seems likely to live was copied from the American type in contradistinction from the English, a fact which is not unworthy of the consideration of our friends in France who seek their model in England.

The circumstances of the country and the times were favorable to the founding of an advanced civilization. The country was new and unsettled, and required, on the part of the colonists, great boldness, energy, self-reliance, and perseverance. It was encumbered with the primitive forest, indeed, but not with the superannuated institutions, con-

ventionalities, puerilities, and barbaric usages of the Old World. It was a virgin soil, in which the colonists could plant in freedom institutions in accordance with the ideal advance they had made, and remote enough from older communities to escape their blighting influence. The English colonies had a great advantage over those established by the French, the Spanish, and the Portuguese, in that, during their earlier period, they were neglected by the mother country, and left to provide for themselves. The French, Spanish, and Portuguese American colonies were either founded by the government of their respective mother countries, or were carefully watched over, directed, and in some sense subjected by it. They were never left to themselves, were never permitted a free development of their own, and therefore offer us nothing fresh, original, or in advance of the mother country. They never had any subsistence or independent life of their own, and hence those of them that have declared their independence have not as yet been able to sustain it, and they are continually crumbling to pieces. French Canada has acquired far more of a national character of its own since subjected to England than it ever had before, and the world may yet see a Canadian nation,—will do so, if by any accident Canada should escape annexation to the Union. But the Anglo-American colonies were left, in great measure, to themselves from the first, and were not spoiled by the over-nursing and over-anxious care of the mother country. England, in the beginning, was too much occupied with affairs at home, with the great contest between the crown and parliament, the monarch and the commons, to be at leisure to look very closely after feeble and scattered colonies in another hemisphere. The colonies were therefore permitted to take a free development, and to mould their institutions in accordance with reason and nature, the wisdom of experience, and the dictates of common sense. Hence they cast deep the foundations of an original and advanced civilization.

The geographical character and position of the country appear to us to fit it to be the seat of this new civilization, and the leading nation of the future. Its vast extent of territory, spreading as it does, or will, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien; its variety of climate, soil, and production make it, as it were, a world in itself, able to suffice for

itself, and to have its own policy free from all danger from foreign powers. Commercial intercourse with other nations is in our genius, our habits, and our convenience, but not in our necessities, and we could forego it, if necessary to our national development, without ruin, and even without grave injury. This fact gives us, and always will give us, a commanding position; for it renders us less dependent on other nations than they are on us. It places the power of peace and war in our own hands. No nation will voluntarily go to war with us, and we have only to pursue a calm, dignified, and just policy towards other nations, to remain virtually at peace with the whole world.

The population of the country is also admirably fitted for what we conceive to be its mission. It is a mixed population indeed, but it is a mixture of the strongest races of Europe,—the Teutonic, the Celtic, and the Iberian. The Teutonic or Germanic element predominates, and in the Germanic the Norse element, which gave to Europe the greater part of its nobility. We are comparatively free from all admixture with the inferior races of Asia and Africa, and also with that of the aborigines of the country. The majority of us have sprung from races which could subjugate, but which could never be subjugated,—races animated by a lofty spirit of independence, and an invincible love of liberty. Our population combines the best qualities of the English, the French, the Germans, and the Irish, rapidly amalgamating into one homogeneous people, with an original national character, superior, perhaps, to any which the world has hitherto seen. We have, as a nation, the proud consciousness of having never been conquered, or deprived of our independence. We do not know what it is to be a dependent, far less an enslaved people. We sprang into existence as a free people, were born free, and know not what it is to be in bondage. As Americans we are free men, not freedmen, and have none of the habits or dispositions of manumitted slaves. We may, and no doubt in many instances do, carry our self-reliance and our sense of independence to a very disagreeable length, so far that they become vices; but nevertheless, in doing so we only abuse generous and manly qualities, and prove that our national character has a noble foundation.

As a people we have very generally the conviction that divine Providence has given us an important mission, and has chosen us to work out for the world a higher order of

civilization than has hitherto obtained. We look upon ourselves as a providential people, as a people with a great destiny, and a destiny glorious to ourselves and beneficent to the world. This fact indicates generous instincts and a noble nature, and it will not be without its influence in kindling lofty aspirations in our bosoms, and urging us on in the path of a true and legitimate ambition. We believe ourselves the people of the future, and that belief itself will do much to make us so. There is more than meets the eye in the popular expression, "Manifest Destiny." We have a manifest destiny, and the world sees and confesses it, some with fear and some with hope; but it is not precisely that supposed by our journalists, or pretended by our filibusters,—although these filibusters may be unconsciously and unintentionally preparing the way for its fulfilment. It may be our manifest destiny to extend our government over the whole American continent, but that is in itself alone a small affair, and no worthy object of true American ambition. It is desirable only inasmuch as it benefits the new territories annexed to the Union, and secures our frontiers, and protects us in the peaceful elaboration and extension of the new social order of the world. The manifest destiny of this country is something far higher, nobler, and more spiritual,—the realization, we should say, of the Christian ideal of society for both the Old World and the New. Many things below this, and in themselves far enough from being in harmony with it, divine Providence may permit, and compel to serve it, but these should never be the term of our ambition; they should never be encouraged by us,—should be carefully eschewed, or at best tolerated only as unavoidable evils for the time being.

This manifest destiny of our country, showing that Providence has great designs in our regard, that he has given us the most glorious mission ever given to any people, should attach us to our country, kindle in our hearts the fire of a true and holy patriotism, and make us proud to be Americans. Especially should it endear the country to every Catholic heart, and make every Catholic, whatever his race or native land, a genuine American patriot; for it is the realization of the Christian ideal of society, and the diffusion through all quarters of the globe, for all men, whatever their varieties of race and language, of that free, pure, lofty, and virile civilization which the church loves, always favors, and has from the first labored to introduce, establish,

and extend, but which, owing to the ignorance, barbarism, and superstitions retained, in spite of her most strenuous exertions, from pagan Rome and the barbarian invaders of the empire, she has never been able fully to realize in the Old World.

Let no one, because we thus speak, hastily conclude that we overlook the discrepancy which exists between the actual character of a large portion of our countrymen and the principles of our American order. We do no such thing. We do not blind or deceive ourselves as to the actual manners and morals of a large portion of the population of the country, nor as to the errors, the vices, the corruptions, which abound in both public and private life. Our readers know that we have for years dwelt on these, even to satiety, and that we have spared our countrymen none of their faults. We concede that our faults are numerous and grave, and that, if they are not corrected, they will compromise our mission. But without seeking in the least to disguise or to extenuate them, we still retain our hope in our country's future, for they spring from no inherent vice in our constitution. We see in them a ground for encouragement, rather than of discouragement; for they are either foreign to our real character, or are such as indicate a rich and generous nature, not yet grown effete. They grow out of the abuse of sound principles and grand qualities. They result, for the most part, from the fact that the bulk of our old American population have lost their confidence in Protestantism, without having acquired faith in Catholicity, and are therefore thrown back on nature alone, without the restraints or the aids of Christianity. But this need not surprise or alarm us. It was to be expected, and might have been foreseen. There is an inherent antagonism between our American order and Protestantism claiming to be a divinely revealed and an authoritative religion, and as Protestantism has not been able to retain life and vigor enough to suppress our American civilization, it has been forced to give way before it.

This inherent antagonism between our American political and social order and Protestantism claiming to be a supernatural religion, has not been sufficiently noted either by Protestants or Catholics. Protestant authors overlook it altogether, claim our American system as the creature of Protestantism, and contend that its natural enemy is Catholicity. Catholic writers have usually contented themselves

with denying that the church is incompatible with republicanism or hostile to true liberty. That at the epoch of American colonization, absolute monarchy very generally obtained in Catholic Europe, and that it would have been very difficult to have found in a single Catholic state colonists that could or would have founded institutions like ours, we are willing to concede. That the early Anglo-American colonists were, with few exceptions, Protestants, and Protestants of the most rigid stamp, is a well-known fact, and cannot be denied. But in founding the American state they did not follow their Protestantism. They were bravely inconsequent, and "builded better than they knew." The liberty they loved, the political and social order they introduced and sustained, were only accidentally connected with their Protestant religion, as the absolutism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was only accidentally connected with Catholicity. In both cases the connection was unnatural, and could subsist only for a time. Monarchy in Catholic countries for a period became absolute, through the weakness, servility, or cupidity of Catholics. It suppressed the popular franchises and very nearly enslaved the church herself; but the hour of trial came, and monarchs found the altar, deprived of its freedom, could not sustain the throne. The people believing the church, because she was the victim, was the ally of despotism, turned against her, and God permitted the horrors of the French revolution to teach those who had tried to make religion subservient to arbitrary and oppressive government, that liberty is an instinct and a necessity of human nature, and that whoever tamely surrenders it to the monarch is faithless to his duty as a Catholic and as a man. The Catholics who identified their religion with the political *régime* so eloquently defended by the great Bossuet and impersonated in Louis XIV., were as much out in their reckoning as the Jacobins, who identified liberty with the rejection of the Gospel, the persecution of the church, and the worship of the goddess of reason. Protestant authors who identify our American order with Protestantism commit a like mistake, and wander equally far from the truth.

Our Protestant ancestors founded the American order, not on their Protestantism, but on the natural law, natural justice and equity as explained by the church, long prior to the Protestant movement of Luther and his associates, and they only followed out those great principles of

natural right, justice, and equality, which Catholic councils, doctors, and jurisconsults during fifteen hundred years had labored to render popular. The merit of our ancestors was, that in an age when cæsarism almost everywhere triumphed, and substituted the maxims of pagan Rome for those of natural justice, they remained faithful, and dared attempt to found a new world on an equitable basis. But in doing so they adopted a basis incompatible with the preservation of Protestantism as a religion. The basis they adopted was that of the natural law, natural reason, and justice; but this natural reason, this natural law, natural justice, Protestantism denies, and must deny; for it asserts the total depravity of human nature, declares all acts done in a state of nature to be sin, and denies nature to make way for grace, and reason to make way for faith. At least this is the character of all evangelical Protestantism, especially of the form of Protestantism embraced by our ancestors, and indeed of all Protestantism that is not pure rationalism. Here, then, is a fundamental antagonism between Protestantism and American civilization, and it is clear to the dullest understanding that the one can exist and develop itself only at the expense of the other. Either Protestantism must get the upper hand and eliminate the American system, or the American system must get the upper hand and eliminate Protestantism. The latter is what has happened.

Moreover, Protestantism, basing itself on a subjective fact, private judgment or private illumination,—very good, and never to be spoken lightly of in its sphere,—has no bond of union, and necessarily, where not restrained by outward civil force, splits into innumerable sects and parties. If the civil order has, as with us, for its fundamental principle, its incompetency in spirituals, and is bound to recognize all these sects and parties as standing on a footing of perfect equality before the law, the people in all their political action are obliged to treat them all as alike sacred, and seeing no objective ground of preference among them, very naturally come to regard one sect as good as another, and then to treat them all with indifference, perhaps, with a superb indifference, to fall back on the reason and nature on which their political and social order is founded, and practically to place their politics above their religion. This is what has been the result. There are very few, comparatively speaking, of our non-Catholic countrymen, who really

believe in any positive religion, and even the fiercest evangelicals have abandoned or are abandoning all dogmatic theology. The forms of religion, no doubt, are observed after a fashion, for the majority of our people, though without faith in any particular religion, have still a belief that there is a religion of some sort, and that it is essential to the health of the soul, and the preservation of the state,—a belief of great value as the foundation on which the Catholic is hereafter to build, but comparatively of little value in the practical conduct of life. The effect thus far of our institutions has been, as might have been foreseen, to bring the majority of our people back to simple nature, and to leave them without any positive religion. Their institutions have proved too strong for their Protestantism, and hence we see in the Know-Nothing movement, the politicians carrying it over the ministers.

Now it is not surprising that in this state, thrown back on nature alone, there should be the vice, crime, corruption, profligacy, which threaten so seriously our institutions; for nature alone is not sufficient, even under the best government and laws, to sustain the virtue and integrity of a people. But this need not discourage us, for this sad state of things is only temporary, and will last only during the period of transition from a religion incompatible with our order of civilization, to another which accepts, consecrates, and sustains it. Many of our non-Catholics feel this, and hence they demand with some earnestness the church of the future, and not without a good degree of confidence as well as hope, that it will come. They are right. Protestantism is outgrown, and has fallen into the past. One needs not to be a prophet, or the son of a prophet, to foretell that it is not to rule the future. But the church of the future exists, and already exists in our country. Between it and our institutions there is no incompatibilty, for Catholicity accepts, nay, asserts the natural law on which our American order is founded. The church does not recognize the Protestant doctrine of total depravity. She does not deny nature in favor of grace, nor reason in favor of faith. She presupposes nature, asserts natural justice and equity, and maintains the rights of reason. She comes not to destroy the natural, but to fulfil—to purify, elevate, direct, and invigorate it. That is, she comes to give us precisely the help we need, and as our country is the future hope of the world, so is Catholicity the future hope of our country; and it is

through Catholicity bringing the supernatural to the aid of the natural, that the present evils which afflict us are to be removed, and the country is to be enabled to perform its civilizing mission for the world.

In speaking of a new order of civilization we do not suppose a new development of Christian doctrine, or any modification of the church herself. Christian doctrine and the church were perfect in the beginning, and as they are divine, or represent the Divinity in human affairs, they are unalterable. We are not arguing either for something in advance of Christianity as it has been professed in every age from the apostles downward, or for a modification or adaptation of the church to a new order of things. We belive in progress *by* Christianity, not in it; by the Catholic church, not in it; and the new order of civilization we speak of is not a new Christianity, but a new progress in society, which places it as civilized society in more perfect harmony with Christianity, with Catholicity or the church. The foundations of this civilized society have been cast broad and deep in America by our Protestant ancestors, following not their Protestantism, but natural reason and justice as explained by Catholic doctors. The sentiments, the manners, the morals of the people, are very far from being in perfect harmony with Catholicity; but the *civility*, the political and social order, what we call the institutions of the country, being founded on natural right and equity, are in perfect accordance with it; for Catholicity republishes the law of nature,—natural right and equity,—and gives it new and higher sanctions. All that is needed to realize in practice the ideal of Christian society is to bring the sentiments, manners, and morals of the people into harmony with American institutions, or the American political and social order. This Protestantism could not do, and therefore has been obliged to give way; this reason and nature alone,—on which our non-Catholics are thrown back,—cannot do, for reason and nature alone, without the assistance of the supernatural providence of God, are, as the history of the world proves, practically as impotent to sustain true and genuine civilization, as they are to save the soul or secure the bliss of eternal life; but this Catholicity, which has the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come, can do, and will do, if permitted; and in doing it, will effect, without undergoing any change or modification in herself, a new and higher civilization, than the world has hitherto known.

We know there are persons who pretend that Christianity culminated in the thirteenth century, and imagine that the reign of Antichrist is commencing and the end of the world is not far off. But we are not of their number. Even in the days of the apostles some thought the end of the world was near at hand; when the barbarians overturned the Roman empire of the West, some thought the end of the world had come; again, in the year 1000, there was a prevalent persuasion in many countries of Europe that the world would end with that year; and, indeed, in every age since the founding of the Christian church, individuals have been persuaded that that day and hour of which no man knoweth, not even the Son, but the Father only, was about to strike; but we do not think that Christianity has yet more than fairly begun her mission. Only a small portion of mankind has become Christian, and in no nation has society as yet been thoroughly christianized. As yet Christ has nowhere made his religion as universal and all-pervading as was false religion in the old pagan world. His victory over Satan is not yet, save in principle, completely won. Why should not his religion become as general in society, pervade as thoroughly all departments of public and private life, as gentilism did in the old Roman world? Have we not the promise that the end should not come till the Gospel of the kingdom had been preached to all nations? And can it be said to have been preached to those nations in which it has been at best barely announced to a few individuals, and which it has never converted or annexed to the kingdom of Christ? What right have we to say, as some of us do, that a nation which has once thrown off the faith has never been reconverted? Instances are not wanting in which the same people has been converted several times over. If no nation can be recovered to the faith that has once thrown it off, why does the church sanction prayers for the conversion of England? Why does she authorize missions and prayers for the conversion of heretics? What right have we to limit the mercy of God? While there is life there is hope, and there is no nation or individual on earth that we have the right to assert cannot be converted to God. Let us beware of fatalism, and especially beware of seeking to find in God's providence an excuse for our indolence, our absence of missionary zeal, and our neglect of duty. The nation of the Goths was originally converted from

paganism to Christianity by Catholic missionaries; it fell into the Arian heresy to please the Emperor Valens, and to gain his assistance against its enemies; but the Goths were subsequently reconverted to Catholicity. The world lapsed into heresy or infidelity may be recovered, and will be so, when Catholics learn to live in accordance with the religion they profess.

We dismiss all the counsels to indolence or despair drawn from the supposed impossibility of regaining nations once lost, or from the supposed approaching end of the world. We know not when the world will end, but our business is to live as if it might end to-morrow, and as if it were not to end for a thousand ages to come. We are to look at the work God gives us to do to-day, and to do it with all our might. Catholicity is here to perfect our civilization, and to make ours the land of the future. But Catholicity does not work irrespective of human agents. She works as a help, as an assistance, a power, an influence, but not as an irresistible force. She works on free-will and conscience, gives the power to do, but does not do the work without the coöperation of free agents. She does not take a people, will they, nill they, and by main force raise them to virtue or civilization. The church deals with the world as she finds it. She takes things as they are, and seeks to remedy what is amiss, not by violence, not by revolutionary measures, but by Christian charity. She finds cæsarism established; she makes no direct war on it; but seeks to infuse into the heart of the monarch the sense of justice and humanity, to impress on his mind and conscience that he is himself under law, and must one day render an account of his conduct, that he holds his power as a trust, and that the king is not in "reigning, but in reigning justly." She finds the broad distinction of rich and poor, the few gorged with superfluous wealth, and the many suffering for the want of the necessaries of life. She does not excite the latter against the former, nor demand an agrarian law or an equal division of property; but consoles the poor with the assurance, that if they bear their poverty with resignation, for Christ's sake, theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and admonishes the rich that they are but stewards, and that what they have more than they need for themselves belongs to the poor, and that if they withhold it, they must answer for their lack of charity and their abuse of their stewardship. She finds masters and slaves;

she does not command the relation to cease; but she teaches the slave to render cheerful service to his master for Christ's sake, and the master that the slave is his brother, a man like himself, for whom Christ has died, a soul with all the rights and dignity of a human soul, and therefore that he must treat him with justice and humanity, respecting in him the image of God and the rights of conscience. Her mission is not to revolutionize states and empires, and by force to introduce and sustain even the political and social order that best harmonizes with her own principles. The political and social changes needed she leaves the people, inspired by her teaching, and following the dictates of justice and prudence, to introduce for themselves, as they see proper, or as circumstances permit.

Whether Catholicity shall do for us the work needed in this country, and therefore whether we fulfil our mission or not, depends on the fidelity or non-fidelity of Catholics themselves. It is not enough that the Catholic Church is here. She will not operate as a charm to remove existing evils or to give us the needed virtues. It is not enough that there is a large body of Catholics here; their mere presence has in itself no virtue to save the country, or to enable it to fulfil its mission. This is a fact that we should lay to heart. If Catholics do not surpass others in domestic and civil virtues, they will render the country no greater service than others. As yet we Catholics cannot applaud ourselves as having done much to advance public virtue. We do not see that the Catholics we have had in public life have shown themselves much more honest, more capable, much more devoted to principle, or much less accessible to party or selfish interests than non-Catholics, in the same rank or official station. We do not perceive that our Catholic electors, at least those who are most prompt to exercise the elective franchise, have generally surpassed their non-Catholic fellow-citizens in their intelligence, or that they have voted more independently, or with an eye more single to the public good. Not a few of them are apparently swayed very little by the common interests of the country, and are moved chiefly by other appeals than those made to them as simple American citizens. Too many who pass for Catholics have been as deeply implicated as any other class of citizens in the scandals which have of late years been so frequent in our elections; and we do not find that Catholics have been especially diligent to study the insti-

tutions, laws, and genius of the country, to understand its peculiar dangers, its more urgent wants, and the special duties of citizens. They sometimes act on the principle that all is to be done for the people, but nothing by them; and when rejecting this principle, they are apt to act on a worse principle, that the people are sovereign and may do whatever they please. In this they certainly are no worse than non-Catholics, and would deserve no special censure, if no more was demanded of them than of Protestants. But the responsibility of Catholics in this country is greater than that of any other class of citizens. It is only through Catholicity that the country can fulfil its mission, and it is through Catholics that Catholicity reaches and assists the country. The salvation of the country and its future glory depend on Catholics, and therefore they must prove themselves superior in intelligence, independence, public spirit, all the civic virtues, to non-Catholics, or else they will do nothing to save and develop American civilization.

It is this consideration, that more depends on us than on non-Catholics, that we wish to impress on the minds and hearts of our Catholic brethren. Looking to the future, we Catholics are the American people, and we hold the destinies of the country in our hands. If we suffer the country to fail in its mission, we have no excuse. We have all that our non-Catholic fellow citizens lack. We have faith, we have religion, we have principles, we have the truth, we have instruction, we have grace to assist us, and need not be at a loss to know how we should act on any of the great questions that come up. We are the only class of American citizens that can fully understand and appreciate the lofty mission of the United States, and therefore the heaviest responsibility rests on us. We ought to be able to exhibit on all occasions, superior wisdom, intelligence, and virtue, and we will add, superior capacity. We ought to be able to enlighten every public question that comes up, and to give a right direction to the public mind. If we cannot do so, by what right do we boast the superiority of Catholicity, under the point of view of civilization? We boast in vain, and shall deserve as we shall secure only scorn and derision, if we remain below or do not rise above the average of non-Catholics. We must win the minds and hearts of our countrymen, not by empty boastings, or idle assertions of what Catholics have done in other times and places, but by proving our own superiority in wisdom, intelligence, and virtue,

here and now. We must be the best Americans, the best and ablest men in the country, and prove that we are so by the services we render, the disinterestedness we show, and the sacrifices we are ready to make. Here authority stands aloof, and we cannot invoke its power to eke out the deficiency of our own. We must enter the lists, and fight out our battle with non-Catholics, man to man, hand to hand, and win the victory, or confess our inferiority.

Why is it that we do not already exert a commanding influence in the country, in the sense of American civilization? Our numbers are sufficient to enable us to do it, and there is no good reason, no reason creditable to us as Catholics, why our wisdom, intelligence, and virtue are not also sufficient. We must do it. But in order to do it we must not seek the elements of our strength in a foreign nationality, but must identify ourselves with the country, accept loyally its institutions, confide in the grandeur of its mission, and be warmed and inspired by it. We must dismiss such of our old-world notions as have and can have no application here but to create divisions and enfeeble our powers; we must get our minds out of the grooves in which ages of despotism have compelled them to run, and say to Routine, "Get behind me Satan;" we must become a reading and a thinking people, developing in the highest degree our moral and intellectual faculties, taking broad and comprehensive views of men and things, and applying them with freedom and conscientiousness to all the great questions of the age or the country as they rise. The policy, however good in other times and places, of folding our hands, of refusing to do any thing for ourselves, and sitting down in indolence or despair, and calling upon authority or waiting for it to come to our relief, is no policy for Catholics in the United States. The world helps only those who show that they are able to help themselves, and respects only those who are able to command its respect. We must exert our own powers, understand what the country needs, and do it, and do it before and better than any others can possibly do it.

We have rich, original geniuses, powerful intellects, and noble hearts in our Catholic population; we have a whole army of young men, increasing every day in numbers and discipline, whose hearts are burning to find some outlet for their fiery activity, some work equal to their lofty and laudable ambition. These young men are the future hope of

the church, and through the church of the country. We must not lose these young men; we must not damp their ardor, or extinguish their generous enthusiasm, whatever their calling or sphere in life, unless we would commit an act of suicide. We must give them a broad field for their activity, and confide in their honest intentions and generous instincts. What if we do find them inexperienced, hot-headed, and a little rash now and then? Nothing venture, nothing have. Perhaps their inexperience and rashness will not be more fatal than the timidity and over-prudence of those who are counted wise and experienced. We who are grey-headed, and pass for wise and prudent, must remember that we ourselves were once young and inexperienced, and that if our elders had not placed a generous confidence in us, and given us scope for our activity, we should never have had an opportunity for acquiring our wisdom and experience. When there is work to be done, a cause to be advanced, the unsafest men in the world to confide it to are those who are usually termed safe men. The British army learned this to their cost in the Crimean war. What we want in this nineteenth century and in these United States are men of fresh hearts, bold and energetic characters,—men of enterprise, of daring enthusiasm, of positive virtues, who can act, can do good, with God's blessing, advance the cause of truth and virtue, religion and civilization; not simply good easy men, whose chief merit is their inability to do harm, and whose chief study is to keep things quiet and as they are. Life is better than death, and it is better sometimes to blunder, if we blunder through disinterested zeal and generous devotion, than it is never to act. We do not want to keep things quiet; we do not want to keep things as they are; we want progress. We want to excite activity, and stir up our whole community to energetic and continued efforts to advance the cause of truth and civilization. As Catholics we must go forward, or cease to hold our own in the country. We can maintain our position only by advancing.

When the end we have to consult is not simply to hold our own, but to advance, to make new conquests, or to take possession of new fields of enterprise, we must draw largely upon young men whose is the future. These Catholic young men, who now feel that they have no place and find no outlet for their activity, are the future, the men who are to take our places and carry on the work committed to us.

We must inspire them with faith in the future, and encourage them to live for it. Instead of snubbing them for their inexperience, mocking them for their greenness, quizzing them for their zeal, damping their hopes, pouring cold water on their enthusiasm, brushing the flower from their young hearts, or freezing up the well-springs of their life, we must renew our own youth and freshness in theirs, encourage them with our confidence and sympathy, raise them up if they fall, soothe them when they fail, and cheer them on always to new and nobler efforts. O, for the love of God and of man, do not discourage them, force them to be mute and inactive, or suffer them, in the name of Catholicity, to separate themselves in their affections from the country and her glorious mission. Let them feel and act as American citizens; let them feel that this country is their country, its institutions their institutions, its mission their mission, its glory their glory. Bear with them, tread lightly on their involuntary errors, forgive the ebullitions of a zeal not always according to knowledge, and they will not refuse to listen to the counsels of age and experience; they will take advice, and will amply repay us by making themselves felt in the country, by elevating the standard of intelligence, raising the tone of moral feeling and directing public and private activity to just and noble ends.

We do not want Catholics to be radicals, political agitators, or place-hunters; but we do want them to be Americans in the fullest and best sense of the terms; we do want them to study and understand the institutions and the mission of the country, and to devote themselves with their best thoughts and energies to the interests of American civilization, in every sphere or way which Providence opens to them; we do want them to qualify themselves to take the lead in every department of human activity; in a word, to understand the enviable position in which God has placed them, and to rise to its height. What we urge, and what we always have urged, is that Catholics should fit themselves to be the foremost men in the nation, to exert that influence on its life and activity which belongs to superior wisdom, virtue, and intelligence, and which they who have faith, religion, clear and well-defined principles, and determinate doctrines, who know what they want, and wherefore they want it, always must exert on a high-minded and generous people who have fallen into doubt, and no longer know what to believe or what to do. Nobody can

say how much the presence of the church here has done for the country, or how many judgments that might have fallen on it have been averted by her prayers and those of her devout children; but we must say, that as yet Catholics have not acquired that moral weight in the American community, or exerted that high and salutary influence on national thought and action, to which our numbers and our religion would seem to entitle us. We owe the country a higher and nobler service than we have as yet rendered it, or shall render it, till we prepare ourselves for the position God has given us, and feel the high and terrible responsibility that rests upon us.

We know the battle is not always to the strong, nor the race always to the swift. We know that God has chosen the foolish things of this world that he may confound the wise, weak things that he may confound the strong, and mean things and contemptible things that no flesh may glory in his presence. But not, therefore, are we to be foolish, weak, mean, and contemptible. That were to fall, under pretence of piety, into fatalism, and to forget the part God assigns to human activity. Undoubtedly we are to be on our guard against the gentile spirit, which is that of pride. Certainly all Christian virtues have their root in humility; but humility prompts to action, not to indolence. Man must remember that he can do nothing without the divine assistance, and should do whatever he does for God's sake; but he is also to do with God's assistance and for God's sake the best in his power, and leave it to God to give or to withhold success. God gives the harvest, but man must till the ground, sow the seed, and nurse the plant. We ask only the performance of the part given to man, and if we perform that with fidelity and alacrity, with pure motives, and for a right end, we may rely with confidence on God to crown our labors with success. Let us live as our religion commands, and do what our character as American citizens requires of us, and we need not doubt that the great body of non-Catholics will soon listen to us, study and embrace our faith, and join with us, not only in the work of saving souls, which is of course the great thing, but in effectually realizing for our country and the world the true Christian ideal of society.

We know the church in this world is always the church militant, and we are far from being so visionary as to suppose that even the realization of the Christian ideal of so-

ciety will leave her no enemies to combat. All obstacles to her spiritual work will not be removed, and there will be room for the combat as long as life lasts or the world stands. Society, however admirably organized, and however perfectly christianized, will always remain human society, and will never become or supersede the church of God. We would fain hope that it is possible so to perfect it that the church will find comparatively no obstacles to her work in its government, its institutions, its manners or usages; so that she will have few obstacles except those which spring from the flesh and the temptations of Satan in the individual, and which not being embodied institutions, and favored by the prevailing civilization, will be less formidable, and more easily surmounted. The flesh or concupiscence remains after baptism; and though not itself sin, concupiscence inclines to sin, and so long as it remains there will be disorders; but much is gained, if we can keep these disorders confined to the bosom of the individual, and prevent them from breaking out into society, or embodying themselves in institutions, public manners, or social usages. This much we hope from the realization of the Christian ideal of society, or the realization of that order of civilization which the American people have it in charge to realize.

We do not pretend, as is obvious from all we have said, that the American people have as yet realized the Christian ideal of society. They have through God's providence laid its foundations, recognized its principles, and adopted the necessary institutions, but they have not yet practically conformed themselves to the new order of civilization. This they could not do without the supernatural aid to be obtained only through the Catholic Church. In urging Catholics to study our institutions, to understand and love them, to accept and conform to them, we are only following out the teaching of the church, and coöperating, as a simple layman in his own sphere, with the venerable hierarchy, who teaches us to love and serve our country, and to use the freedom she secures for the glory of religion and the progress of civilization. We have no sympathy with that false liberalism represented by a Kossuth or Mazzini, nor with that superb gentilism we sometimes meet with in the writings of Gioberti, either of which is as un-American as it is un-Catholic. We do not erect our American form of republicanism into a Catholic dogma, though we hold our

order of civilization is based on natural justice and equity, which the church recognizes, interprets, and enforces. We do not hold that we have a right to introduce by revolutionary violence even this order where it does not exist; we have only urged Catholics to accept it, to develop it, and do their best to perfect it where it already exists, and is the law for the Catholic conscience.

It is no doubt true, we say in conclusion, that the prospects of our country may appear to some of our friends as gloomy, and good men, and even firm patriots, may almost despond. To the superficial observer, the American Union may seem threatened by the violence of party, and on the eve of dissolution. Foreign war hovers over us, and almost civil war rages within; public spirit disappears; public and private virtue are at a discount; selfish ends govern our public men, and private vice and profligacy are loosening the bonds of society. But we must listen to no alarmists, and suffer none of these things to move us. There is, after all, no real cause for discouragement or gloomy forebodings. There is a vitality in the American people that the present night's debauch cannot destroy, can indeed hardly impair. It will take two or three generations, corrupter even than the present, to break down our constitution and effect our dissolution. Happily the remedy is in our hands, and we can apply it when we choose. We must give way to no discouragements. We must feel our position and prove ourselves equal to it, understand the mission of our country, confide in it, and suffer ourselves to be inspired by it, and thus work with cheerfulness and hope. God is with us, the Holy Father encourages us, and, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, the only living sentiment of the country is for us, and we need fear nothing that can oppose us. They who are for us are more and mightier than they who are against us, for we are working with God and humanity.

From the work God and our country give us no Catholic is excluded. They who can contribute nothing else can contribute their prayers, and the poor servant girl who can only say her *Ave Maria* may be contributing more than we who write elaborate essays to call public attention to it. Nor are those not of American birth and lineage excluded. The American mission is not restricted in its intent or in its results to a narrow and exclusive nationality. The legitimacy of American nationality is in the fact that it is not exclu-

sive, that it is founded on the principles of natural justice and equity, and is as broad as the human race. It embraces and absorbs all distinctive nationalities, and moulds all into one family in the natural order, as Catholicity does in the supernatural. We must recognize no cliques at home or abroad, and neither divide nor suffer ourselves to be divided by the accidents of birth or race. Are we not all men and Catholics? Is not the American mission in the interest of all Catholics and of all men? Then why should not foreign-born as well as native-born Catholics labor for its realization? We appeal alike to all Catholics, wherever born, whencesoever they come, or whatever their national peculiarities. All who have American hearts, love the American mission, and are willing to devote themselves to the cause of religion and the advancement of civilization, are in our sense of the word Americans. They are our countrymen, our fellow-citizens, and we will have no other rivalry with them than that of seeing who will best adorn our religion and serve American civilization.

If there is division between native-born and foreign-born Catholic citizens, we wash our hands of it. It is not we who have made it, and it shall never be we who make it. If we have complained of some foreign-born Catholics, it has not been because they were foreign born, but because they held themselves aloof from the natural-born citizens, regarded themselves as pertaining to a separate nationality, and felt that they must conduct themselves as foreigners rather than as men who are to "the manner born." It has been because they have attempted to force their narrow and insular nationality upon our continental hearts, and seemed unable to feel themselves our equals unless they were recognized as our masters, and permitted to lord it over us. But these of whom we have complained, though making much noise, are only a small part, and that neither the more intelligent nor the more virtuous part, of our foreign-born population. The more numerous, intelligent, and respectable portion of foreign-born Catholics, those who have some stamina, and are not afraid of being lost in the crowd unless distinguished by a foreign badge, or labelled with some un-American nationality, are as American in their convictions, intentions, and affections, as those born on the soil, and not seldom even more so. No native-born American would for one moment dream of excluding these from the American army, or of realizing the American mission without their coöperation.

We insist, indeed, on the duty of all Catholic citizens, whether natural-born or naturalized, to be, or to make themselves, thorough-going Americans; but to be Americans is to understand and love American institutions, to understand and love the American mission, to understand and love American liberty, to understand and love American principles and interests, and to use with a free and manly spirit the advantages of American citizenship to advance the cause of religion and civilization. Those who will not be Americans in this sense, we disown, we hold to be "outside barbarians," and not within the pale of the American order. They have no business here, and the sooner they leave us the better. They have no lot or part in our work, no part or lot in the American mission. But whoever does his best to be in this sense an American, whoever is devoted to true American interests, and is fired with a noble ambition to promote the glory of America, we embrace as a countryman, wherever he was born or reared; we hold him to be our fellow-laborer, and to him we make our appeal. To all such we say, here is a glorious work to be done, in which you may perform a glorious part,—a work which you will be doing, whenever preparing yourselves for your part as Catholics, as citizens, or as men,—to which every noble sentiment you cherish, every generous sacrifice you make, every disinterested act you perform, every prayer you breathe even in secret, every living word you drop from your lips, will contribute. The field is as broad as your activity, the work as high as your ambition, as great as your thought. You may, if you will, add a nation, a nation destined to rule the future, to your church, and to the world a new civilization. You may bring faith to the doubting, hope to the desponding, and peace to the troubled,—send freedom to the down-trodden millions of the Old World, redeem long-oppressed continents, and fill with joy the broken-hearted friends of the human race. Let each one work in his own sphere, according to his ability and opportunity, but always with a view to the greater glory of God, and with a firm reliance on him for support and ultimate success.

END OF VOLUME XI.